Toward An Integrated National Food Policy Strategy

Proceedings of the Second National Consultative Workshop
Troutbeck Inn, Nyanga - June 1991

Co-Sponsored by

Econimics & Markets Branch, Ministry of Lands,
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Executive Summary:

National Consultative Workshop On Food, Nutrition And Agricultural Policy

J.B. Wyckoff[1]

A second National Consultative Workshop on Food, Nutrition and Agricultural Policy was held June 10-12, 1991 at Troutbeck Inn, Nyanga, Zimbabwe. This workshop, again, was jointly sponsored by the University of Zimbabwe (UZ)/Michigan State University's (MSU) Food Security Research in Southern Africa Project, The Economics and Markets Branch of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and the Nutrition Unit, Ministry of Health. In addition to participants from these entities, invited participants were present from the Ministries of Energy, Water Resources and Development; Environment and Tourism; Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare; Local Government, Rural and Urban Development; Public Construction and Housing; and Transport and National Supplies; as well as from Agritex, the Central Statistical Office, the Department of Economics of UZ, the Grain Marketing Board, Research and Specialist Services and USAID/Harare (see Annex 1 for the list of participants).

Two documents were commissioned and delivered to the workshop participants prior to the conference. The first, drafted by Dr. T.S. Jayne and Dr. M. Rukuni, reviewed the status, incidence and causes of malnutrition in Zimbabwe highlighted at last year's workshop. They then examined the expected impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme on the most vulnerable groups within Zimbabwe's society. Their analysis indicates that, if no changes are made in the structure of the existing marketing system, the phased elimination of GMB subsidies laid out in the Government Of Zimbabwe's *Framework for Economic Reform* ultimately will increase the price of commercial maize meal by 6-8 percent in real terms. The

[1]Co-Director, Food Security Research in Southern Africa Project and Visiting Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension. University of Zimbabwe.

greatest impact will be felt by households in regions of the country where income levels tend to be low and where commercial maize meal absorbs a large share of the households' total income. The rural areas of Matabeleland South, lower Midlands and the southern part of Masvingo province would experience the greatest decline in real income and food security. The marginally employed or unemployed in the urban areas would also be negatively affected.

The study recognises the need for compensation mechanisms to cushion the impact of GMB subsidy removal on the poor. Interestingly, the most cost effective "cushioning" method would be through selected changes in the regulatory and pricing structure of the grain marketing system. The scenarios examined included:

1. Authorising the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) to sell grain in any quantity over 1 bag to all buyers including informal traders. This would give consumers the option of buying maize for milling at small local mills at a 12-15 percent cost savings over the currently indirectly subsidised commercial roller meal.

2. Deregulate the marketing of white maize in Natural Regions III, IV and V. This option would reduce the GMB operating losses and introduce additional options for rural producers and consumers. Farmers could sell to private traders distributing grain from non-contiguous surplus to deficit areas. Since the option of selling (buying) to (from) the GMB would still be available, producer prices should exceed the GMB buying price while consumer prices should be below GMB selling prices.

3. Expand the function of GMB collection points and licensed agents to include the selling of grain to rural consumers and traders. This should result in retaining more grain in the rural areas and reducing the need to backhaul maize meal later in the season. Authorising (and encouraging) urban millers to manufacture straight run maize meal in convenient bag sizes together with fortifying the more refined meal with appropriate vitamins were also suggested.

Dr. Lenneiye had been asked to meet with key people in all of the Ministries with food and nutrition related responsibilities to determine their current policies, their current programmes to carry out these policies and the problems they perceive. Needed changes in policies and programmes as well as in the organisational structure for implementation were identified. Eleven Ministries were contacted together with the farmers' organisations and the Food Manufacturers Association. The proliferation of food and nutrition policy and programmes identified are detailed in his paper together with an associated range of problems. The multifaceted nature of the problem of food insecurity and malnutrition generates a role for each sector interviewed. However, the absence of a coordinating mechanism leads to a less than optimal contribution towards alleviating food insecurity and malnutrition.

Although the National Steering Committee (NSC) and the Drought Relief Committee (DRC) have made some progress in coordinating their particular interventions aimed at alleviating hunger and malnutrition, there is not a national framework for addressing the issues of food production, marketing, distribution and consumption to ensure both national and household food security. With the current Structural Adjustment Programme making new demands on all of the sectors involved in food and nutrition activities, better defined indicators to assess the impact of the SAP on vulnerable groups, improved analysis of existing information, more effective and timely communication of findings to decision makers and well-informed evaluations of activities being undertaken will be needed.

A national mechanism is proposed to mobilise resources for food and nutrition activities, prepare project documents and minimise duplication of efforts between sectors. Development of the urgently needed National Food and Nutrition Policy will facilitate these functions.

Dr Lenneiye recommended that the NSC and the DRC membership be combined into a Food and Nutrition Coordinating Committee (FNCC) together with representatives from farmer organisations and the Food Manufacturers Association. An additional member might be considered from VOICE or from the Nutrition Board of the NGOs. The FNCC would be chaired by the Deputy Secretary for Economics and Markets Branch in the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MLARR) with the vice-chairperson being the Deputy Secretary for Social Welfare. The FNCC would be supported by a small Secretariat will skills in agricultural economics, macroeconomic planning, nutrition and statistics. Standing and/or *ad hoc* work groups to deal with specific issues or activities would be formed to support the FNCC. The FNCC would report to the Ministerial Economic Coordinating Committee (MECC) chaired by the Senior Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development.

The FNCC would have the responsibility for:

- coordinating the preparation of a food and nutrition policy for Zimbabwe;
- monitoring the implementation of the policy:
- preparing strategies for the management and implementation of various activities designed to carry out the policy; and,
- commission and oversee needed research, prepare and produce information on food and nutrition issues and report the progress being achieved.

The workshop participants were divided into four work groups to:

1. determine the problems faced by the various Ministries in areas of food and nutrition policy and programmes;

2. identify strategies to overcome the problems identified; and,

3. develop mechanisms to implement the strategies identified.

The general failure to recognise the importance of food and nutrition issues in virtually all Ministries resulted in problems of inadequate planning, lack of coordination, weak management, inadequate quantity and quality of staff and insufficient financial resources allocated to implement their programmes.

Strategies identified to solve these problems included the development of more definitive policies, improved coordination within and among Ministries, better planning for programme implementation, more effective project supervision, and determination of the impacts of food and nutrition activities. More and better qualified manpower, a shifting and/or increase of financial support into this area, an improvement in salaries and working conditions and a general restructuring of programmes to improve the cost effectiveness of programme delivery were also advocated. Improved land distribution, increased access to extension services, more research oriented toward communal farmers, improved pricing and marketing systems, improved infrastructure in the rural areas (especially the road network and facilities to provide water for the irrigation of gardens), and expanded private sector participation in areas in which it has a comparative advantage, were suggested as additional strategies worthy of implementation. Finally, procedures for increasing and stabilising access to foreign currency where needed, improving collaboration within and out of government in food and nutrition research and service programmes, expanding nutrition training and implementing much needed data collection and analysis systems were strategies proposed.

In addition to the organisational structure outlined in Dr. Lenneiye's paper, the work groups proposed the following;

1. That a single organisation/Ministry coordinate all food and nutrition activities with the MLARR providing the focal point with the Ministries of Finance, Economic Planning and Development; Industry and Commerce; Environment and Tourism; Health and others relevant to food and nutrition issues participating.

2. The creation of a body (mechanism) that would have the responsibility for directing and coordinating nutrition activities while simultaneously being in a position to influence food and nutrition policy. The MLARR was judged to be in the best position to channel food and nutrition policy to the cabinet for their consideration.

3. Create by an Act of Parliament, a Food and Nutrition Council to be administered by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. Alternatively, the FNC could be housed in the MEPD or the MIC.

4. That the name of the existing Cabinet Committee on Drought Relief be changed and its mandate be expanded to reflect National Food and Nutrition Policy responsibilities. All of the Ministries presently participating in the Cabinet Committee on Drought Relief would continue to serve.

The workshop participants ultimately agreed that **the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Economics and Markets Branch was best placed to spearhead the preparation of a paper to bring the Food and Nutrition situation to the attention of the Cabinet and highlight the need to develop a National Policy to address the problem holistically. The National Steering Committee for Food and Nutrition, chaired by Agriculture, would provide assistance in the preparation of this paper. It was further agreed that the paper should be introduced through the existing Cabinet Sub-committee on Drought Relief before the end of 1991.**

2

Introduction

Towards A National Food And Nutrition Policy

J. Tagwireyi[1]

The First National Consultative Workshop towards Integrating Food, Nutrition and Agricultural Policy was organised jointly by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, the University of Zimbabwe (UZ)/Michigan State University's (MSU) Food Security Research in Southern Africa Project, University of Zimbabwe and the National Steering Committee for Food and Nutrition in 1990. The objectives of this workshop were to review the body of ongoing research findings on household food security as well as the current nutrition situation, highlighting the dilemma of malnutrition amidst food abundance.

The conclusion was reached at the Workshop that there was a need to disseminate information on the Food and Nutrition situation widely and regularly to ensure that all relevant sectors are informed and involved in the development of interventions. It was also concluded that an appropriate Institutional Framework needed to be established to address the problems of food insecurity and malnutrition in Zimbabwe. It was further agreed that a National Food and Nutrition Policy was critical to the development of appropriate strategies to address malnutrition. The need for additional consultative meetings and continued dialogue among the key sectors was highlighted to ensure that the momentum and interest generated was sustained.

A recommendation was forthcoming from the workshop that a paper be prepared and submitted to Cabinet on the Food and Nutrition situation and the need to develop a National Food and Nutrition Policy. The planning task force was to continue to seek ways to implement these recommendations.

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[1]Director, Nutrition Unit, Ministry of Health.

The Task Force agreed that the development of any Food and Nutrition Policy needed the support and endorsement of many sectors. It was, therefore, necessary to ensure a broad based, active participation in this process from the beginning. This was to ensure that all relevant issues were adequately addressed within the policy to minimise conflict in discussions by key policy makers.

A consultant was recruited to undertake a review of current food and nutrition activities being undertaken by the various government, quasi-government and private sectors to highlight problems being encountered. This review document was to provide the basis of discussion at the second consultative meeting.

The following key ministries were invited to participate in the second Consultative Workshop:

Ministry of Education
Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development
Ministry of Energy and Water Resources Development
Ministry of Environment and Tourism
Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Industry and Commerce
Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement
Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing
Ministry of Transport and National Supplies

The main objectives of the second consultative meeting were:

1. To obtain consensus on the main issues which need to be addressed by sectors with regards to Food and Nutrition,
2. To define broad strategies for addressing Food and Nutrition problems within the framework of a National Food and Nutrition Policy,
3. To propose a mechanism for implementing these strategies, and,
4. To propose a plan of action for follow-up activities.

The outcome, presented in this document, substantiates that these objectives were accomplished. Implementation and follow-up activities are now the challenge. However, the Food and Nutrition Policy dialogue chronicled here is but part of the broader policy formulation network operating in Zimbabwe, and should be interpreted in that context. Even a cursory examination of Dr Lenneiye's paper, included in these proceedings, reveals the multiplicity of Ministries, committees and agencies involved and the complexity of Food and Nutrition Policy issues. All of this documents the importance policy makers place on Food and Nutrition Policy. This consultative workshop is but one effort to facilitate the ongoing process to develop a National Food and Nutrition Policy.

3

Structural Adjustment, Maize Marketing Policy And Food Security In Zimbabwe[1]

T.S. Jayne, M. Rukuni, M. Hajek, G. Sithole and G. Mudimu[2]

INTRODUCTION

The Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) is embarking on a five-year structural adjustment programme to increase the country's rate of economic growth, improve the living standards of the people and reduce budgetary losses associated with government participation in the economy. The GOZ's *Framework for Economic Reform* Document (1991) outlines anticipated changes for the agricultural sector. Among these are the government's commitment to gradually reduce the deficits of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) from current levels of between Z$40 to Z$75 million to zero by 1994-95. The government may also restructure some aspects of the grain marketing system by removing restrictions that impede private traders' access to GMB grain and by deregulating private maize movement in the drier areas of the country.

While these changes will ultimate provide greater congruence between the GOZ's broad food policy objectives and the marketing system designed to achieve them, there is uncertainty about the short-run effects of market restructuring on the price and accessibility of maize to poor and vulnerable groups in urban and rural areas. In recognition of this, the GOZ has agreed to set aside part of the savings from GMB subsidy reduction to cover costs associated with maintaining vulnerable

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[1]This paper is a revised and condensed version of a UZ/MSU Food Security Project study initiated by and submitted to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement by T.S. Jayne, M. Rukuni, M. Hajek, G. Sithole and G. Mudimu. This revised paper has benefitted from the constructive comments of S. Jones, J.B. Wyckoff, M. Weber, T. Attwood, and T. Ikpe.

[2]T.S. Jayne is Visiting Lecturer, University of Zimbabwe and Visiting Assistant Professor, Michigan State University; M. Rukuni is Dean, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Zimbabwe; M. Hajek is Professor, University of Zimbabwe, G. Sithole is Chief Agricultural Economist, Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement; and G. Mudimu is Senior Lecturer, University of Zimbabwe.

groups' access to basic foodstuffs, particularly maize. However, there is little precedent to guide policy on the form that such cushioning mechanisms should take. Thus, it is important to identify the effect of these changes on poor and vulnerable households in Zimbabwe, and to design a "safety net" to ensure their food security during the structural adjustment process.

This chapter identifies the relationship between specific market reform strategies, specified in the Government's *Framework for Economic Reform* (1991), and urban and rural food security in Zimbabwe. The paper addresses the following questions:

a. What is the impact of the existing set of grain marketing policies on various socio-economic and regional groups in the country relative to that of an uncontrolled market?

b. How will the price of and access to maize change as a result of GMB subsidy reductions and other potential changes in the maize marketing system?

c. How can GMB subsidy reduction be carried out in ways consistent with protecting poor people? What policy options will maintain or promote food security among poor and vulnerable groups? What are their costs and side-effects?

Current discussion of structural adjustment in Zimbabwe has been based on the premise of higher food prices. However, selected restructuring of the maize marketing system could restrain or even reverse the upward trend in real consumer maize meal prices under GMB subsidy reduction. Mechanisms to provide a "safety net" to cushion low-income and vulnerable groups from the effects of structural adjustment have been conceptualized primarily in terms of short-run direct assistance programmes. However, regulatory aspects of the existing grain marketing system pose such serious impediments to maize access and affordability that their modification must be viewed as part and parcel of a well-defined cushioning strategy as well as an overall growth and development strategy.

The specific set of reforms to be embodied in the unfolding Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Zimbabwe is unknown at this time. The effect of the Programme on household food security will therefore depend on the composition of policy changes under the SAP that accompany GMB subsidy reduction. Three scenarios are presented: (1) GMB subsidy reduction without any accompanying changes in the grain marketing system; (2) GMB subsidy reduction plus policy changes that allow private informal traders to procure grain at GMB depots in

unlimited amounts; and (3) the above plus deregulation of maize movement in the semi-arid areas of the country.[3]

A econometrically-based simulation model indicates that Scenario 1 will raise the real price of commercial meal by 6 percent to 8 percent. Given that structural adjustment will increase costs for a wide range of currently subsidized goods and services (*e.g.*, higher school and health care fees under proposed cost recovery plans), higher staple food prices will occur concomitantly with a decline in real disposable incomes for large segments of the population. *Per capita* consumption of maize meal is estimated to decline by 5 percent to 6 percent in urban areas and 2 percent to 3 percent in rural areas. These effects will be concentrated disproportionately in the grain-deficit rural areas and among the urban unemployed or underemployed.

Under Scenario 2, urban consumption would rise by 12 percent to 14 percent. This would result from less refined and less expensive maize meal being milled and distributed by the informal small-scale milling sector, a practice that is currently blocked by policy in urban areas. The major beneficiaries would be low-income urban consumers who prefer straight-run meal or would be induced to purchase it because of its lower price. The simulation results indicate that removal of GMB resale restrictions would increase rural consumption by only one percent to two percent. These gains would be concentrated in deficit areas near depots.

Scenario 3 would increase maize consumption in both rural areas (6 percent to 7 percent) and urban areas (12 percent to 14 percent). The rural areas would benefit from increased intra-rural trade between surplus and deficit areas. Such trade is currently impeded by policy restrictions on grain movement. Increased consumption occurs concurrently with GMB subsidy reduction, underscoring the point that policy changes in this scenario may be viewed as substantive and cost-effective "safety-net" mechanisms to cushion vulnerable groups during structural adjustment.

A BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF MALNUTRITION IN ZIMBABWE

The, types, magnitude and causes of malnutrition in Zimbabwe are:

Chronic malnutrition: Stunting, or height-for-age malnutrition, indicates chronically inadequate food intake. Stunting afflicts about 30 percent of Zimbabwe's children between 2-5 years of age. It is as high as 37 percent in the drier provinces (Ministry of Health, 1990). Little information is available concerning malnutrition among adults. However, low birth weight, an indicator of maternal nutritional status, has increased in the Matabeleland provinces during the recent drought years. The high

[3]These scenarios are within the parameters of the *Framework for Economic Reform* Document. More substantial departures from the current system, such as abolition of pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices, are the subject of current analysis under the UZ/MSU Food Security Project.

incidence of stunting, especially in the drier communal lands, indicates chronically inadequate food intake in addition to transitory food insecurity caused by drought.

Transitory malnutrition: Weight-for-height malnutrition, or "wasting", measures current nutritional status. Wasting affects less than two percent of children under five, indicating that malnutrition in Zimbabwe is primarily a chronic rather than a transitory problem. A shortcoming of this measure is that it does not identify those who are already stunted and, as a consequence, have weights proportional to their stunted height.

Vulnerable groups: The social groups most prone to chronic malnutrition are: families working on commercial farms (41 percent of children under five), families in resettlement areas (34 percent), households in communal areas (34 percent), and urban dwellers (20 percent) (NSC, 1990). By far, the largest number of malnourished are in the low-rainfall communal lands subject to recurrent drought.

Geographic Concentration: Stunting and weight-for-age malnutrition are highest in the areas of lowest agricultural productivity. No necessary causal link need exist between malnutrition and low staple food production, especially where purchasing power and an efficient food distribution system are in place. However, there appears to be a relationship between malnutrition and *per capita* smallholder grain production at the district level (of which there are over 60). Simple OLS regressions of the form:

$$Y_i = a + b^*(X_i)$$

where Y_i is the percentage of children exibiting weight-for-age malnutrition in District i and X_i is per capital smallholder grain production in District i, produced the following results (t-statistics in parentheses):[4]

1989/90: $Y_i = 22.28 - 0.032^*(X_i)$ $\quad R_2 = .21 \quad DW = 1.97 \quad F = 4.87$
(17.55) (-2.30)

The coefficient on *per capita* production was statistically significant at the .035 level.

One limitation of this model is that it does not account for the effects of other variables that are likely to vary between districts (*e.g.*, income, water supply). However, the apparent link between malnutrition and localised grain availability, in a country where national supplies are more than adequate, could exist only if the flow of grain into deficit areas is restricted or if real incomes in the low-productivity areas are inadequate, relative to staple food prices, to purchase needed food.

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[4] Similar results were obtained on the Provincial level for the 1986-87, 1987-88, and 1988-89 marketing years.

Causes of malnutrition: Very little information exists that disentangles the relative importance of various sources of malnutrition (*e.g.*, sanitation, parental education, inadequate food availability, *etc.*). A recent study of determinants of child malnutrition by Thomas (1990) shows that mothers' education, habitation in resettlement areas, and child age significantly affected chronic malnutrition in rural areas. However, the importance of income or food available to the household was not measured directly. Perhaps the most comprehensive assessment of causes of chronic child malnutrition is by Chisvo (1991). This analysis shows that while quality of water supply and mothers' weaning practices have the most statistically significant effects on child stunting, grain availability per household member, ceteris paribus, is associated with a four percent rise in the height-for-age Z-score of rural children under five in Zimbabwe. This relationship was significant at the .15 level.

ZIMBABWE'S MAIZE MARKETING SYSTEM: POLICY OBJECTIVES AND CURRENT PERFORMANCE

Government Objectives and Grain Marketing Policies

Since independence in 1980, the objectives of the GOZ's agricultural policy have been, *inter alia*: (1) income growth among rural smallholders; (2) food security, with particular attention to the urban and rural poor; and (3) the minimisation of budgetary losses arising from government marketing and pricing operations (GOZ, 1983; 1986).

Maize marketing and pricing policies have been primary instruments to achieve these broad objectives.[5] The expansion of GMB infrastructure into the communal lands was a pillar of post-independence policy to promote income growth among smallholders. GMB expansion into the more distant and arid areas is often referred to as a "social function" because it was not justified on strictly commercial terms. The GOZ also pursued its policy objectives by maintaining GMB producer prices above export parity and by expanding smallholders' access to government credit, recouped from crop sales to the GMB. These policies contributed to the dramatic rise in GMB grain intake from the smallholder sector.

To ensure a consistent flow of maize meal to urban consumers, the GOZ has influenced prices and distribution through a highly controlled and centralised maize marketing system. The official grain marketing system features a predominantly one-way flow of grain from rural to urban areas and is characterised by centralised urban milling and storage facilities, Figure 1. Maize may be sold through the official

[5] The importance of maize in the agricultural economy of Zimbabwe is apparent from the following: maize accounts for 88% of coarse grain production in the country, 80 percent of coarse grain production among smallholders and 61% of coarse grain production among smallholders in Natural Regions IV and V since 1981 (AGRITEX, various years). Furthermore, the proportion of smallholder area and production devoted to maize appears to be gradually increasing (AGRITEX, various years). Maize meal accounts for 45% of the total caloric intake in the Zimbabwean diet (USDA, 1988).



Note: Formal channels are represented by solid double lines, informal channels by solid single lines. Informal maize trading channels that are restricted either by law or in practice are depicted by broken single lines.

Figure 1: **Formal and informal maize distribution channels linking sellers and buyers in Zimbabwe's communal areas.**

system to one of three procurement arms of the GMB: (1) GMB depots, normally located in urban centres or growth points, (2) GMB collection points located in rural smallholder areas; and (3) Approved Buyers, *i.e.*, licensed private traders that buy on behalf of the GMB. Private maize trading within smallholder areas was never banned, but is nevertheless circumscribed by numerous government policy regulations:

1. Smallholder maize, unless destined for a GMB depot, is prohibited from moving across the boundaries of urban or commercial farming enclaves.[6] Since these areas contain virtually all of the country's main roads, this regulation effectively blocks private grain trade between non-contiguous smallholder areas or from smallholder areas to urban consumption centers.

2. Maize may not be moved privately from commercial farming areas to smallholder areas.

3. Once grain is sold to GMB collection points or approved buyers in smallholder areas, direct resale to consumers is prohibited. Instead, the grain must be forwarded to GMB depots, often a considerable distance from deficit rural areas. This effectively siphons supplies out of rural areas, tightens local supply-demand conditions and exerts upward pressure on rural market prices.

4. The margin between the GMB purchase price and selling price to urban millers since 1986-87 has been only half of GMB's actual operating costs (AMA, 1990). The combination of consumer price subsidies and restrictions on direct trade between surplus and deficit rural areas has encouraged the consumption of urban-milled meal in deficit rural areas. Pan-territorial prices for commercial-milled meal further extend the dominance of the official distribution system even in the most distant regions. These direct and indirect subsidies in the official marketing channel substantially narrow the scope for intra-rural private trade.

5. The rules governing resale of GMB grain to rural traders are subject to a variety of interpretations. In theory, any individual may purchase grain from GMB depots within smallholder areas (Grain Marketing Act, Section 21). Yet 13 of 15 GMB depot managers interviewed stated that they do not permit sales to informal traders suspected of reselling the grain, due to perceptions that they would exploit poor households needing grain (Chisvo *et al.*, 1990).

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[6] Grain marketing policy divides the country into "Zone A" areas, which include all urban and European commercial farming areas, and "Zone B" African smallholder areas. The Zone B areas are geographically scattered and are essentially enclaves within Zone A. Even between contiguous smallholder areas, the scope for trade is limited by poor or non-existent road infrastructure.

Thus, It is not surprising that less than two percent of GMB's total maize intake since 1980 has been sold to consumers or private traders. Large urban millers, stockfeeders and brewers have accounted for 77, 8 and 6 percent of GMB sales since 1980. The remaining 7 percent have been used for drought relief purposes. Thus, stocks at GMB depots in town centres throughout the country do not ensure access to grain in distant rural areas.

The GMB's uniform pricing policy is essentially a policy of income transfers. The GMB's pan-territorial and pan-seasonal buying and selling prices offer subsidised storage and transport services to selective purchasers. By holding selling prices constant throughout the year, regardless of location, the GMB cross-subsidizes buyers later in the marketing year by taxing buyers early in the year, and cross-subsidises buyers in deficit areas distant from production centers by taxing buyers relatively close to production centers.[7]

The ability of GMB to practice pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing requires corresponding policies that control the private movement of maize. Without such controls, maize producers in areas involving low marketing costs to urban centers would almost surely contract directly with the large urban millers and stockfeeders, thus bypassing the GMB. The GMB would lose market share on the routes which it currently uses to cross-subsidise its unprofitable routes in the more distant, semi-arid communal areas. This kind of decontrol would therefore exacerbate GMB operating losses rather than reduce them.[8]

Moreover, the deregulation of maize movement without modification of GMB pan-seasonal pricing would create incentives for producers and millers to contract directly for early season deliveries, before storage costs bid the wholesale market price above the GMB selling price. Later in the season, industrial buyers would switch and attempt to buy from GMB at its uniform selling price. With the loss of sales early in the year, when storage costs are low, the GMB would no longer be able to cross-subsidise buyers later in the year. In this environment, it is doubtful that GMB could, without allowing spatial and temporal differentiation in its pricing, continue to perform the politically crucial functions of national security stockpiling

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[7] Since GMB incurs progressively higher storage costs as the year progresses -- yet its selling price is constant throughout the year -- those who buy late in the season do not pay a price that reflects these storage costs, while those who buy early in the season help defray the storage costs of the late-season buyers. Similarly, since it is more expensive for GMB to transport grain to Bulawayo than to Harare, given the geographical concentration of maize surpluses in the Mashonaland provinces, the pan-territorial selling price of the GMB essentially makes the Harare maize consumers help defray the transport costs of transporting grain to the Bulawayo consumers.

[8] The cause of profitable and unprofitable trading routes from GMB's standpoint is in part related to historical infrastructural development: depots in commercial farming areas are usually along rail lines with low per-unit transport and handling costs. In contrast, most GMB depots in smallholder areas are relatively far from urban milling centers and require expensive road transport.

and price stabilisation. Nor is it clear that these tasks could be effectively assumed by the private sector.

This discussion highlights the potential difficulties associated with swift and wholesale liberalisation of the marketing system. While the GOZ is aware of the need for substantial changes in the organisation of the grain marketing system, it may be viewed as somewhat reckless to proceed without adequate analysis to guide the process of reform and to anticipate how such changes will affect price levels, supplies, food consumption and income levels of various socio-economic and regional groups in the country.

Gainers and Losers from the Existing Policies of the Grain Marketing System

Zimbabwe's grain marketing system facilitates a number of important and often unrecognised transfers of income between groups. These income transfers occur through explicit subsidies, but often more importantly, through regulations and policies inherent in the organisation of the marketing system. This section examines how these policies and regulations influence income growth and/or food security -- two of the GOZ's most important development goals -- among specific socio-economic and regional groups in Zimbabwe.

Smallholders in High-productivity Areas in the Mashonaland Provinces:

Smallholders in the high-productivity areas of the Mashonaland Provinces have been the major beneficiaries of the post-independence extension of GMB buying networks. This policy has effectively provided a perfectly elastic demand for smallholders' maize in areas previously limited by underdeveloped informal markets and grain movement restrictions. Mashonaland smallholders have accounted for 80 percent of *per capita* smallholder maize deliveries to GMB since 1980, even though they constitute only 22 percent of the smallholder population and 25 percent of the maize area planted in the smallholder sector. Maize sales in these areas, almost all of which go to GMB, comprise 20 percent to 35 percent of average household incomes in these areas (Stanning, 1989). It can be concluded that, with few exceptions, the primary beneficiaries of GMB budget outlays toward improved market infrastructure and producer price incentives have been smallholders in the Mashonaland provinces. Survey results also suggest that average *per capita* income levels in these areas are substantially higher than those in NRs IV and V (Stack and Chopak, 1990; Hedden Dunkhorst, 1990).

The GMB incurs small to moderate operating losses from providing marketing services for these smallholders, given the margin levels between GMB selling and purchase prices in recent years. In effect, the GMB's uniform prices cross-subsidise this group by charging margins exceeding actual marketing costs in other trading areas with low transport and handling costs. Thus the current marketing system

effectively raises farm incomes to smallholders in this group at a cost to taxpayers and commercial farmers close to the major demand centers.

Available evidence indicates that consumption of commercial maize meal among this smallholder group is relatively small (Stanning, 1989; National Foods, 1991). Thus household incomes among this group are not very sensitive to commercial maize meal prices, except in the extreme eastern and western parts of Mashonaland East and West, which are situated in Natural Regions IV and V.

Smallholders in Surplus Areas of Midlands and Manicaland:

Most of the surpluses from smallholders in these areas are from Gokwe, Chiduku, Sabi North and Buhera Communal Lands. These smallholders account for about 12 percent of the total CA population. Available evidence shows that 40 to 80 percent of these smallholders are maize sellers (Stack and Chopak, 1990; Jayne and Chisvo, 1991), but *per capita* sales are less than in Mashonaland, supplies are more variable and production more prone to drought.

Although 20-50 percent of these households are grain purchasers (depending on rainfall), they normally buy from surplus neighbours (Chigume, 1990; Jayne and Chisvo, 1991). Commercial maize meal forms only a minor share of grain purchases in these areas. The normal abundance of grain makes neighbour-to-neighbour purchases relatively easy and less expensive than urban-manufactured meal (Jayne and Chisvo, 1991). Thus, changes in the government-controlled price of urban-manufactured maize meal does not greatly affect household incomes in these areas, except during periods of serious drought.

The existing set of maize policies -- in particular the expansion of GMB buying points into communal lands and the pan-territorial producer price -- has stimulated income growth among the majority of smallholders in these areas. However, the GMB operates at a substantial loss in these areas -- its depots are off the line-of-rail and maize movement involves high transport costs to the urban centres. GMB procurement costs per tonne are over twice as high in these areas compared with commercial maize farmers in Mashonaland. Yet these added costs are not reflected in the pan-territorial pricing policy of the GMB. Hence, the existing system cross-subsidises these smallholder farmers at the expense of maize farmers closer to the major consumption centres and better linked to these centers by rail infrastructure (*i.e.*, commercial maize producers).

It is not clear that the current set of policies are entirely consistent with the interests of these smallholders or stated government objectives. For example, restrictions on the private movement of grain between non-contiguous communal lands, or between communal lands and urban centers, effectively bars these farmers from receiving potentially higher maize prices through informal trade. For example, informal movement of maize grain from Gokwe to Gweru, or from Chiduku to Mutare City is currently prohibited, although evidence indicates that such movement would improve real incomes of both grain sellers and urban consumers (Jayne and Chisvo,

1990). This is because direct informal trade between these nearby areas could be performed at a lower cost than the existing margins in the formal marketing channel.

Smallholders in Natural Regions IV and V:

This group comprises 60 percent of Zimbabwe's communal sector population and 30 percent of the country's total population. Geographically, this group occupies virtually all of Matabeleland North and South, most of Masvingo, part of Mashonaland West, and the southern portions of Midlands and Manicaland Provinces. Between 60 percent and 95 percent of these farm households are grain buyers (depending on location and weather). Informal grain prices are normally higher than the GMB producer price, but are lower than urban maize meal prices (Jayne and Chisvo, 1991).

Movement restrictions on maize are one of the most important income transfers implicit in the organisation of the grain marketing system. This regulation restricts maize supplies from flowing into these areas, keeps informal grain prices artificially high (an advantage to the 5-40 percent of grain sellers who can sell locally), and is a major cause of food insecurity and loss of real income among grain purchasers. The combination of restrictions on private maize movement into these areas and resale by approved buyers produces grain shortages later in the season when a substantial portion of the rural population depletes its grain stocks. These controls on informal maize trade make households in these areas dependent upon purchases of commercial maize meal -- a less preferred, less nutritious and more expensive product than grain procured and milled through informal channels, Table 1.[9] Household surveys indicate that commercial meal may comprise up to 90 percent of grain purchased in the drier smallholder areas, Table 2. Seventy-four percent of the grain-deficit households in Mberengwa and Zvishavane districts stated that they bought urban-milled meal simply because no grain was available locally. The loss of real cash income due to dependence on commercial meal rather than locally-traded grain may be as high as 30 percent (Jayne *et al.*, 1990). Thus, the current marketing system exacerbates problems of maize access and affordability for most smallholders in these areas. This regulation, a colonial legacy, is inconsistent with the present government's food security, income, and budgetary objectives for smallholders in the dry areas.

Because informal markets are largely absent, the GMB has become a major grain buyer from the minority of households in these areas that do sell grain. GMB

[9] Price monitoring surveys were conducted bi-weekly in 27 wards within seven semi-arid communal areas during 1990/91 (UZ/MSU/ICRISAT Grain Marketing Study). In a survey of 648 households covering these same areas, 88% of the respondents stated a preference for straight-run meal in the preparation of sadza (the staple dish) over the more refined commercially-milled meals, price being equal. Only 71% stated that they would actually buy this meal, price being equal. The slight difference between taste preferences and overall preferences is mostly because the coarser straight-run meal takes longer to cook (Jayne and Chisvo, 1990).

operates at a loss in these areas due to a low volume-to-fixed cost ratio, relatively long distances to industrial buyers in urban areas and the necessity of using expensive road transport in the absence of cheaper rail transport. This "social function" which the GOZ has imposed upon the GMB has produced limited benefit to the vast majority of smallholders in the low-rainfall areas who enter the market as buyers only and not as sellers. This policy has been detrimental to the extent that expanded GMB activity in the marginal areas (a) extracts limited surpluses out of these areas through the official marketing channel into urban centers, thus raising local prices, and (b) increases GMB operating deficits causing upward pressure on GMB selling prices and, ultimately, commercial maize meal prices.

Table 1:
Nutrient comparison of parlenta, roller meal and straight-run maize meal, per 100 grams

	Parlenta	Roller Meal	Straight-Run Meal
Energy (kilocalories)	334	341	343
Protein (gms)	8.0	9.3	10.0
Calcium (milligms)	6.0	7.0	12.0
Iron (mgs)	1.1	2.0	2.5
Vitamin A (microgms)	-	-	-
Thiamin (mgs)	.14	.30	.35
Riboflavin (mgs)	.05	.08	.13
Niacin (mgs)	1.0	1.8	2.0
Vitamin C (mgs)	0	3.0	3.0

Source: "Food Composition Table" Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation, Waginengen Agricultural University, The Netherlands, 1987.

Commercial Millers, Informal Millers and Urban Consumers

Commercial maize milling is dominated by five large private firms: National Foods, Blue Ribbon Foods, Premier Milling, Midlands Milling Company and Triangle Milling Company. National Foods alone handles about 65 percent of the market, while National Foods and Blue Ribbon combined handle 85 percent. These millers produce two types of maize meal: super refined meal (60 percent extraction rate) and roller meal (85 percent extraction rate). Millers currently buy maize from the GMB and sell to retailers at controlled prices.

Table 2:
Aspects of household grain marketing behaviour in selected smallholder farming areas.

COMMUNAL AREA	PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS THAT ARE NET GRAIN PURCHASERS	% OF TOTAL GRAIN SALES BY THE 10% OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS SELLING THE MOST GRAIN	AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD NET GRAIN SALES (KGS)		% OF TOTAL GRAIN SOLD TO			% OF TOTAL GRAIN AND MEAL PURCHASED FROM			
			SURPLUS HOUSEHOLDS	DEFICIT HOUSEHOLDS	GMB OR LICENSED AGENTS	NEIGHBORING HOUSEHOLDS	PRIVATE TRADERS	GMB	NEIGHBORING HOUSEHOLDS	PRIVATE TRADERS	SHOPKEEPERS
								--- grain ---			urban-milled - meal -
High Rainfall:											
Gokwe (south)[a]	12	51	3 707	-183	86	8	6	7	80	13	0
Buhera (north)[a]	26	50	1 023	-252	69	16	15	16	70	1	13
Low Rainfall:											
Gokwe (north)[a]	59	59	1 118	-438	5	95	0	10	44	36	10
Buhera (south)[a]	57	72	973	-392	68	31	1	0	40	16	44
Runde[a]	61	74	1 465	-344	30	70	0	0	23	37	40
Mberengwa[a]	85	60	834	-483	43	57	0	26	15	17	42
Nata[b]	94	57	21	-301	0	100	0	0	7[c]		92
Ramakwebana[b]	96	68	340	-383	0	100	0	0	13[c]		87
Semukwe[b]	98	62	46	-352	0	100	0	0	21[c]		79

Note: The results of these surveys pertain to the period [a]April 1989 to March 1990 and [b]November 1988 to October 1989. Rainfall was average to moderately below average during the relevant production years in all survey areas. [c]The distinction between purchases from households and private traders was not made in this study.
Source: [a]UZ/MSU/ICRISAT Grain Marketing Surveys, 1990; [b]Hedden-Dunkhorst, Bettina, 'The role of small grains in semi-arid smallholder farming systems in Zimbabwe: preliminary findings', draft mimeo, SADCC/ICRISAT, Matopos.

Since maize grain cannot legally be transported into urban or peri-urban areas privately, there is very little consumption of maize meal milled through informal channels.[10] Households are allowed to transport up to one 91kg bag of maize meal into urban areas from rural areas, but this practice appears to be negligible. Among the households surveyed, the average quantity of grain or meal brought into urban areas from rural areas was 5 kgs *per capita*. In contrast, grain consumption requirements *per capita* are in the neighbourhood of 230 kgs per year (SADCC, 1990).

Thus, urban consumers generally do not have the choice of purchasing grain and must purchase commercially-milled maize meal. It has been noted by the current Managing Director of the largest urban milling firm in Zimbabwe that

> "Straight-Run Meal, a product which enjoyed some measure of popularity before the introduction of the consumer subsidy on Roller Meal in 1979 (Straight-Run Meal was not included in this subsidy), has virtually disappeared from the market place. This is in spite of the complete removal of consumer subsidies in 1986 (Robinson, 1988, p. 28).

However, it is not clear that consumer subsidies have been fully lifted. Although subsidies to the millers were phased out in 1986, those to the GMB have gradually increased through the 1980s. At present, only 60 percent of the Board's actual operating costs are reflected in the margin between GMB producer and selling prices. To the extent that these subsidies result in lower GMB selling prices to millers, and ultimately lower consumer maize meal prices than would prevail without GMB subsidies, the system stimulates consumption of commercial meal and narrows the margin within which informal grain traders may operate profitably.

Furthermore, the virtual disappearance of straight-run meal has not occurred due to lack of consumer preference for this meal. While it has become somewhat of a truism that urban consumers hold strong preferences for the refined maize meals, this conclusion is not supported by results of a recent household survey in four peri-urban areas of Harare. Responses indicate that preferences for various types of maize meal vary significantly across income groups, Table 3. Relatively few of the high- and middle-income groups would purchase straight-run meal, even if it were 18 percent cheaper than roller meal (*i.e.*, 33 percent cheaper than super-refined meal). On the other hand, 62 percent of the low-income group stated that they would purchase straight-run meal if it were 12 percent cheaper than roller meal. These findings indicate that straight-run meal appears to have "inferior good"

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[10] It has been estimated that approximately 5,000 tonnes of maize are produced illegally in and around Harare (Mudimu, 1991). In addition, an unknown amount of maize is reputedly bought illegally from commercial farms outside the city. These flows of maize into urban consumption are insignificant when compared to the 400,000 to 450,000 tonnes of commercial maize meal consumed in urban areas each year.

attributes (*i.e.*, it would be consumed mainly by the poor, if available). The policy implications of these results regarding targeting mechanisms to protect low-income groups during structural adjustment are examined further below.

Table 3:
Percentage of peri-urban households that would purchase straight-run meal, by income group.

price of straight-run meal relative to roller meal	cumulative % of income group that would buy straight-run meal			
	High Income (n=186)	Middle Income (n=202)	Low Income (n=199)	Total (n=587)
92% (8% discount)	12.4	32.2	56.2	34.8
88% (12% discount)	19.8	35.8	62.0	40.2
82% (18% discount)	28.5	43.6	65.8	46.4

Note: Over the sample period of February to April 1991, the control price of roller meal was $9.79 per 20 kg bag. Respondents who preferred either roller meal or parlenta were asked whether they would switch and buy straight run meal if it were readily available and the price of the latter were $9.00, $8.50, and $8.00 (*i.e.*, 92%, 88% and 82% of the price of roller meal). The four peri-urban areas surveyed were Chitungwiza, Tafara, Highfield and Dzivaresekwa.

Source: Jayne and Chisvo (1991).

The disappearance of less expensive straight-run meal from the market, despite an apparent demand for it, appears to be due to government pricing policy which has created disincentives for millers to market a substantially less profitable product. Millers receive 183 percent and 42 percent more gross revenue for every tonne of

super-refined meal and roller meal sold than straight-run meal.[11] Retailers also receive 5 percent and 13 percent more profit for stocking and selling super-refined and roller meal than straight-run meal. Moreover, many retailers are under the impression that straight-run meal is not even available to order from the mills.[12] Government pricing policy creates incentives that perpetuate the distribution of more expensive meal, catering to higher-income tastes, with potentially adverse consequences for food security among the urban poor.

The government further entrenches a high-cost system to consumers by granting a *de facto* monopoly to commercial millers. The controls on informal maize movement into urban areas and the inability of informal traders to purchase grain from most GMB depots effectively blocks informal millers' access to grain.[13] These

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[11] The gross revenue (minus raw material cost) for manufacturing the three types of commercial meal are:

Super-Refined	Roller Meal	Straight-Run Meal	
$751	$535	$470	government controlled 1991/92 selling price of meal per tonne *ex mill*;
-360/0.62	-360/0.85	-360/0.96	procurement cost of maize grain necessary to produce one tonne of meal (i.e., GMB maize selling price per tonne adjusted for the grain-to-meal outturn rate for each type of meal);
$170	$111	$ 95	gross revenue from one tonne of meal;
$200	$200	$200	approximate market value of maize offals for livestock feed (1991 current prices);
1/0.62-1	1/0.85-1	1/0.96-1	quantity of maize offal by-product produced in the manufacture of one tonne of maize meal (tonnes);
$122	$ 35	$ 8	value of offal revenue from the manufacture of one tonne of maize meal;
$292	$146	$103	total gross revenue from one tonne of meal plus by-product.

[12] None of the 35 urban shops surveyed stocked straight run meal -- 80 percent of these shopowners stated that they did not think is was possible to order straight-run meal from the commercial mills. The other 20% stated that the major problem with ordering straight-run meal was that it was available only in 50kg and 90kg bags, sizes that are not convenient for households to buy but instead are geared toward institutional buyers.

[13] This monopoly is further entrenched in some urban municipalities such as Harare where informal maize mills are banned by law. In Bulawayo, by contrast, investment in small-scale milling is known to have taken place and appears to have been made possible by the ability of informal traders to acquire grain from the Bulawayo GMB depot. In most cases, however, GMB grain is not accessible to informal traders, hence restricting volumes milled through informal channels in urban areas.

regulations allow commercial millers to phase out the less profitable and less expensive straight-run meal without losing market share to informal millers. Ironically, government-determined milling margins given to commercial millers are over twice as high as those charged by informal small-scale mills, *ex mill*.[14] The commercially milled products have higher value added because they are more refined. But the aforementioned surveys have shown that the more refined products are not necessarily more preferred.

The current implicit subsidy on maize distributed through the GMB/commercial milling system is tantamount to an income transfer to high and medium-income consumers who prefer refined commercially-milled meal. At the same time, market regulations that restrict the availability of coarser, cheaper meal amounts to an implicit tax on low-income groups by forcing them to consume a more costly and less preferred product. Although the low-income groups still consume an implicitly subsidised commercially-milled meal, its price is still higher than what would prevail if straight-run meal were available.

Commercial farmers in the Mashonaland Provinces:

Commercial farmers in the Mashonaland provinces account for virtually all marketed maize output by the commercial sector.[15] These maize suppliers are characterized by large bulk sales and low per-unit marketing costs. Most of these farms are situated near rail lines, enabling the GMB to operate within its prescribed margin. Thus, the GMB cross-subsidizes communal maize sellers, especially those in marginal or outlying areas, at the expense of commercial farmers in Mashonaland. It is well understood by the GMB that its activities, especially in the drier areas, have increased Board operating costs and put pressure on GOZ to respond by increasing the margin between GMB producer and selling prices. The current GMB trading margin is sufficiently high to provide incentives for commercial farmers and urban buyers to conduct direct transactions that bypass the GMB. These incentives will increase as GMB is forced to raise its margins further to reduce losses under the Structural Adjustment Programme.

The Commercial Farmers' Union has expressed interest in changing grain marketing legislation to allow direct sales to urban buyers. However, since intake from commercial farmers is profitable for the GMB, any reduction in intake from this sector will increase its per unit operating costs. Deregulation, unless accompanied by regional pricing, will escalate GMB deficits rather than reduce them. Yet subsidy reduction without deregulation will raise GMB margins and create irresistible

[14] Informal small-scale milling margins were established from household surveys during 1990/91 together with before-and-after weight measurements of maize processed through a sample of hammer mills in Buhera and Mberengwa Communal Lands (Jayne et al., 1991).

[15] The indirect effects of changes in maize prices on commercial livestock producers, meat prices and food security among low-income groups, while important, are beyond the scope of this report.

opportunities for illegal trade that bypasses the GMB. Additional costs for monitoring and enforcing the existing controls could result.

GMB is currently the sole legal buyer of white maize produced by commercial farmers. Commercial farmers are relatively high-input producers. The econometric evidence presented below indicates that the maize producer price/nitrogen fertilizer price ratio markedly affects commercial farmers' incentives to produce maize. This price ratio has declined in recent years with the result that commercial farmers are diversifying out of maize production. Maize hectarage in this sector has fallen from 286,000 hectares in 1981 to 125,000 hectares in 1990. This has eroded the stability of GMB intake making maize supply more variable than in the past. GMB has stressed the need to keep at least 150,000 hectares of maize production in this sector to reduce the needed size of its buffer stocks.

Informal Grain Traders

While government controls on the movement and resale of maize constrain the development of private grain trade, to what extent would private traders respond if the controls were lifted? The nature and severity of other constraints to private investment not directly related to grain marketing policy must be identified and addressed if market reform is to result in market development.

Survey responses of 125 rural grain and meal traders indicate that the major barriers to investment and new entry can be grouped into three broad categories: government policy restrictions on grain movement and resale, ambiguity of state regulations governing informal grain trade, and limited capital, transport and storage. As an example of the latter, only 60 percent of the rural traders surveyed owned a vehicle. Less than 50 percent owned a vehicle with the capacity to carry more than 20 bags of grain. Shortage of capital credit also limits investment in vehicles and economies of scale in distribution.

A major implication of the foregoing is that the existing market dominance of maize meal -- while resulting in artificially high prices for consumers -- overcomes constraints faced by traders. Many shopowners have found commercial maize meal trading to be a convenient substitute for grain trading because (1) most commercial millers deliver their meal directly to retailers' shops, even in rural areas, permitting retailers to earn a 9 percent mark-up (set by government) for simply stocking a product that is delivered to their doorstep; (2) many shopowners buy commercial meal on credit; (3) commercial meal is delivered monthly relieving the trader of the risks and costs of storage; (4) the trader avoids the information and transaction costs of having to locate buyers within surplus areas and performing bulking functions that would be necessary with grain trading; and (5) the demand for commercial meal is guaranteed by controls on grain movement and by the extraction of grain out of rural areas by the GMB. The commercial maize meal distribution system thus eliminates critical transport, credit, storage and informational constraints that grain trading would present, entrenching incentives for traders to deal in commercial meal rather than grain. However, the system results in higher consumer grain access costs

than would prevail in an environment of well-functioning rural grain markets. This suggests that policy reform, while necessary, is insufficient to induce the desired response by the private sector. Increased investment and new entry to develop rural grain markets requires active government support to relieve the transport, storage, credit and informational constraints associated with grain trading.

The majority of informal traders appear to be uncertain of the legality of grain trading. Most traders surveyed were unaware of the policy changes in 1990 which deregulated trade in red sorghum and the millets. Others reported that approved buyers threatened to report them to the police for trading grain informally within their own communal area -- which is legal. While the ambiguity of trading regulations has not precluded the development of informal trade, the trade has been of lower volume and higher cost than would be the case if the rules were clear and government took steps to actively support intra-rural trading activity.

Many analysts have questioned why there are no public "open" grain markets in Zimbabwe's rural areas. If rural grain prices and milling costs are lower than the price of urban-milled meal, as price monitoring surveys overwhelmingly indicate (Jayne *et al.*, 1989; Chisvo *et al.*, 1990), then why don't private traders buy from surplus households, offering a higher price than the GMB, and then sell locally-milled meal to deficit households within the same smallholder area? While the scope for this is limited in arid smallholder areas which produce little marketable surplus, other areas feature substantial outflows of grain through the GMB system and substantial inflows in the form of urban-milled meal (*e.g.*, Buhera South, Runde and Mberengwa, Table 2). The majority of traders interviewed stated that they did not actively buy grain due to perceptions that local demand was limited and geographically dispersed. The GMB's pan-seasonal price encourages grain outflows through official channels early in the season when households' cash needs are great. By contrast, demand in informal channels occurs later in the season when deficit households begin to run out of grain stocks. Moreover, the absence of local marketplaces where buyers and sellers can interact suppresses the articulation of supply and demand conditions, makes trading risky and raises the transactions costs of identifying potential buyers and/or sellers. Historic prohibitions on long-distance trade, which effectively bar trade based on regional specialisation by confining it to enclaves with similar agro-ecological conditions, have constrained the development of open public markets. In this way, controls on maize movement appear to impede short-distance trade within communal zones as well as the more obvious constraints which they put on long-distance trade.

Summary : Major Problems with Existing Organisation of the Grain Marketing System

1. The current system is unable to cost-effectively distribute maize to semi-arid rural areas. Regulations block grain from moving directly from surplus to deficit rural areas. As a result, most surplus grain production is channeled into the GMB/urban commercial milling system. This results in a wasteful

use of transport and artificially high consumer prices exacerbating food insecurity.

2. The system places increased emphasis on the commercial milling system to meet rural demand during drought years. This transfers income from grain purchasers and rural small-scale millers (along with any multiplier and employment effects) to urban commercial millers. The phenomenon of increased demand for urban-milled meal during drought years is largely due to the failure of the marketing system to allow more direct redistribution of grain from surplus to deficit smallholder areas.

3. Low-income urban consumers pay artificially high prices for maize meal due to restrictions on the resale of GMB grain to informal traders. Considering that urban unemployment levels currently stand at 30 percent (ILO, 1989), artificially high prices of the most important staple food in the Zimbabwean diet erodes household food security among the poor.

4. The share of the maize meal price accruing to producers has declined over the past decade. The producer received 44 percent of the full cost of roller meal (including subsidies) in 1991-92 compared with an average of more than 50 percent during the early and mid 1980s. Therefore, social functions that inflate GMB margins at a time when subsidies are to be cut must come at the expense of lower real producer prices or higher real consumer prices, or both. Over the past decade, the GOZ has chosen to extract the cost of these social function out of the producer price (Jayne *et al.*, 1991), contributing to an erosion of the national maize production base. Commercial maize area is declining at an annual rate of 18,000 hectares a year (*i.e.*, 90,000 tonnes a year, given average yields). Meanwhile, smallholder maize sales to GMB peaked in 1985-86.

5. The system encourages a pattern of regional self-sufficiency in grain production inconsistent with comparative advantage and income growth in the semi-arid areas. Inflated consumer grain prices encourage grain production for home consumption in low-rainfall areas and discourage diversification into higher-valued oilseed crops that generate foreign exchange (Chigume and Jayne, 1990). Cheaper and more reliable access to grain in the drier areas are necessary to reduce households' overriding concern with grain self-sufficiency and to promote dynamic changes in crop mix more consistent with comparative advantage and income growth in the low-rainfall areas.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty with the present organization of the marketing system is that it is increasingly unsustainable in an environment of GMB subsidy reduction. Attractive opportunities already exist for private maize trading that bypasses the GMB in areas where transport costs between producer regions and urban centers are low. A further widening of the GMB margin by 35 percent to 40 percent to eliminate subsidies will create additional incentives for private trade that contravene

existing market regulations. The inability of most developing countries to suppress illegal informal trade when state regulations are no longer compatible with producer or consumer interests suggests that the existing system is becoming increasingly unsustainable. This suggests that, apart from the desirability of market reforms, changes will become imperative in an environment of GMB subsidy reduction.

Summary of Gainers and Losers from Current System Relative to a Decontrolled Market

Pan-territorial Pricing and Controls on Informal Maize Movement:

The major gainers and losers resulting from these policies may be identified by comparing the GMB uniform price with the average annual price that would prevail in a given area in a decontrolled market. This is a function of both supply and demand conditions in each area as well as the marketing costs and infrastructural development between areas. Masters and Nuppenau (1990) have estimated the direction and magnitude of maize price changes that would prevail in a decontrolled market.

Major Gainers:

1. Maize producers in the surplus, northern regions of the country and in areas involving high transport costs to urban demand centers. These are mainly smallholder farmers in areas such as Gokwe, Buhera and Hurungwe. Surplus producers in these areas are currently subsidised because of pan-territorial pricing. Simultaneously, they may be penalised because the option of higher prices through intra-rural trade is foreclosed due to movement controls and poor road infrastructure between surplus and deficit rural areas. For example, farmers in Hurungwe are constrained from selling maize in nearby and chronically drought-stricken Omay for lack of road infrastructure between these areas. Thus Hurungwe farmers are deprived of alternative and potentially more profitable markets while Omay remains dependent on commercial meal and drought relief. To the extent that the removal of these constraints would provide farmers with alternative market outlets for their surplus grain, the current restrictions on the development of intra-rural grain trade implicitly tax these producers. The fear that producers would receive depressed prices from private traders is largely baseless as long as farmers could continue to sell to GMB.

Major Losers:

1. Urban consumers in the north who pay a higher price for maize meal because pan-territorial pricing prevents them from benefiting from the low transport costs of moving maize from nearby surplus production areas. Regulations preventing the free movement of maize directly to consumers in these demand centres from surplus communal areas also results in higher access costs.

2. Grain purchasers in deficit rural areas close to non-contiguous surplus areas. These include the majority of communal households in Masvingo, southern

Midlands, and areas of Matabeleland South close to Bulawayo. The controls on maize movement restrict supplies from flowing into these areas from commercial and surplus communal areas, thus obliging consumers to buy less preferred, less nutritious and considerably more expensive maize meal. The absence of viable intra-rural marketing channels inflates consumer grain prices and effectively reduces cash incomes among poor rural consumers by as much as 30 percent (Jayne and Chisvo, 1990).

Pan-seasonal Pricing:

Major Gainers:
1. Those able to sell grain to the GMB early in the season before storage costs mount -- primarily commercial farmers.

2. Smallholders in the drier rural areas who buy maize meal late in the season.

Major Losers:
1. Taxpayers, to the extent that prevailing GMB margins between producer and selling prices are not sufficient to cover the storage costs incurred by GMB as a result of its pan-seasonal pricing policy.

De facto Restrictions on Grain Sales to Informal Traders:

Major Gainers:
1. Commercial millers who are provided with a *de facto* monopoly on maize meal distribution in urban areas.

Major Losers:
1. Urban consumers, especially those with a preference for straight-run meal, who are obliged to purchase the more expensive and less nutritious commercial meal.

2. Rural consumers, especially those within 50 to 80 kms of a GMB depot. Preventing maize sales to informal traders restricts grain redistribution to rural deficit areas through informal trade, thereby increasing rural dependence on more expensive commercial meal.

Subsidised GMB Operating Margin:

Major Gainers:
1. Urban consumers with a preference for the more refined commercial maize meals. The GMB subsidy offers maize to commercial millers at a price below full GMB cost. To the extent that these discounts are reflected in the retail price of commercial meal, urban consumers benefit.

Major Losers:
1. Taxpayers, who ultimately pay for GMB operating losses.

Expansion of GMB Buying Points in Low-rainfall Smallholder Areas:

Major Gainers:
1. Surplus farm households in the low-rainfall areas. However, only a small proportion of smallholders in these areas sell maize to GMB. For example, only 6 percent of the 264 households surveyed in 3 communal areas in NRs IV and V possessing GMB depots earned more than $100 from grain sales during the 1989/90 marketing year (Jayne and Chisvo, 1991).

Major Losers:
1. Taxpayers

2. Grain-deficit households in the low-rainfall areas. The GMB's unidirectional distribution system, while offering producers a stable price, effectively siphons grain supplies out of semi-arid rural areas. This creates localised shortages later in the season, requiring substantial amounts of commercial meal to flow back into these areas to meet local demand.

3. All maize meal consumers. The expansion of GMB infrastructure to the low-rainfall areas has increased Board operating costs, pressuring GOZ to increase the margin between GMB producer and selling prices. Consumers lose to the extent that the widening GMB margin has translated into higher consumer prices for maize meal.

4. Maize sellers to GMB in areas near urban centers. These producers lose to the extent that the widening GMB margin has translated into lower producer prices for maize.

Resale Restrictions on Approved Buyers and at Collection Points:

Major Gainers:
1. Grain surplus households in the low-rainfall areas that do not sell to GMB

Major Losers:
1. Grain-deficit households in the low-rainfall areas. The resale restrictions, which force surpluses to be forwarded directly to GMB depots, effectively extract grain out of deficit rural areas. This tightens local supply-demand conditions and exerts upward pressure on local grain prices.

2. The Department of Social Welfare and, indirectly, taxpayers. The resale restrictions, by extracting grain out of rural areas, increase the volume of grain

required for drought relief and food for work purposes placing additional burdens upon these programmes.

EFFECTS OF SELECTED POLICY REFORMS ON MAIZE ACCESS AND AFFORDABILITY

The grain marketing policy reforms to which the GOZ has committed itself in the *Framework for Economic Reform* Document (1991) will have major effects on maize prices and accessibility by low-income groups. However, neither the pace nor form of the actual restructuring are clear. Thus, the study reported here considers several alternative reform scenarios and examines, through an econometric simulation model, their effects on selected objectives and outcomes. The scenarios, each of which are within the parameters as laid out in the *FER* Document,[16] are:

Scenario 1: The GMB maize selling price is increased to cover all costs of its domestic trading operations (*i.e.*, the margin between producer and selling price is increased from Z$90 to Z$125 per tonne).
Existing controls on maize movement and resale are retained.

Scenario 2: GMB subsidies on domestic maize trading operations are eliminated.
GMB allows maize sales to informal traders in unlimited amounts.
Existing controls on maize movement across Zone A areas are retained.

Scenario 3: GOZ subsidies on domestic maize trading operations are eliminated. GMB allows grain sales to private traders in unlimited amounts.
Maize movement is deregulated except in Natural Regions IIa and IIb.

3.1 Simulation Model Description

The results of this analysis are based on a regional simulation model of maize production, GMB intake, GMB sales, trade and consumption as functions of GMB price levels, stock policy, marketing margins between regions and weather. The model includes seven maize production and/or consumption regions: (a) commercial farmers in Mashonaland; (b) communal farmers in Mashonaland; (c) commercial producers in the remaining provinces; (d) communal households in surplus areas of Midlands and Manicaland Provinces; (e) communal households in the semi-arid regions of Masvingo, Midlands; (f) communal households in Matabeleland North and South Provinces; and (g) urban consumers.

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[16] See pg 14 and pg 12 of Annex III of the *FER* Document (1991).

The model simulates expected effects on maize production, sales to GMB, volume of throughput by commercial *vs.* informal millers, and consumption over a 3-year period (1991-92 marketing year to 1993-94 marketing year) -- given specific GMB producer price and endstock levels, and (in the case of Scenario 3) estimated regional price elasticities of supply and demand.[17] For each scenario, three different rainfall cases are examined: (a) a normal rainfall case; (b) a drought case (*i.e.*, yields are 70 percent of normal in each production region); and (c) a good rainfall case (*i.e.*, yields are 125 percent of normal in each production region).

Coefficients for the simulation model are based on econometric estimation of structural equations for annual maize area, GMB intake and GMB sales over the 1978 to 1990 period.

Only the key features of the model are highlighted in this report. Those interested in a more detailed presentation of the model as well as its estimated coefficients are referred to Jayne and Hajek (forthcoming, 1991). A "user friendly" version of the simulation model will be provided to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement for use in evaluating alternative price and stockholding policies.

3.1.1 Maize Area Equations

Maize area equations are estimated for each region of the form:

$$(1)\quad AREA_{it} = a_0 + a_1(PP^*_t/PF_{t-1}) + a_2(PPSUB_{t-1}/PF_{t-1}) + a_3(AREA_{it-1}) + a_4(TREND_t) + e_{it}$$

where $AREA_{it}$ represents hectares planted to maize by regional group i in harvest year t; PP^*_t/PF_{t-1} is the expected GMB producer price to be announced in marketing year t/t+1 deflated by the price of nitrogen fertilizer at time of planting; $PPSUB_{t-1}/PF_{t-1})$ is the producer price of a major substitute cash crop in region i also deflated by the price of fertilizer at planting. The substitute crops chosen were tobacco in the Mashonaland commercial equation, cotton in the Mashonaland and Midlands/Manicaland equation, and sunflower in the remaining communal equations. $TREND_t$ is a time trend to capture the effects of excluded time-correlated factors.

Since GMB producer prices for maize have been announced after planting time for the past decade, the maize area equations must be formulated on the basis of price expectations, using information available to the farmer at planting to predict the likely price announced after harvest. It is well known that the government-

[17] Regional supply elasticities are based on econometric estimates using GMB maize intake data from 1979 to 1990. Since regional maize consumption data is not available, this study assumes a price elasticity of demand of -1.0 in each region.

determined maize producer price is influenced by the level of GMB maize stocks from the previous harvest and by recent price trends (Wright and Takavarasha, 1988). This suggests a simple maize price expectations model of the form:

$$(2)\quad PP_t^* = b_0 + b_1(ENDSTOCKS_{t-1}) + b_2(PP_{t-1})$$

where PP_t^* is expected price to be announced by GMB at harvest year t, $ENDSTOCKS_{t-1}$ are GMB maize stock levels at the end of the previous marketing year, and PP_{t-1} is the GMB price announced in the previous year.

The model allows for maize yields to be determined randomly through monte carlo simulation based on the mean and standard deviation of rainfall in region i over the past 10 years. Yields can also be held constant in the model at particular levels to examine outcomes of specific weather conditions. The product of yield and area estimates from Equation (1) generates maize production levels for each region.

3.1.2 GMB Maize Intake Equations:

GMB maize intake from region i is modelled as a function of production (Q) in region i:

$$(3)\quad INTAKE_{it} = c_0 + c_1(Q_{it}) + v_{it}$$

Modelling GMB intake as a quadratic function of production produced statistically insignificant results.

3.1.3 GMB Maize Sales Equations:

GMB maize sales equations are disaggregated by type of purchaser. The bulk of GMB sales are to millers for the manufacture of commercial meal. Interviews with managers of several urban milling firms indicate that (a) demand for maize by mills is based on perceived demand for meal rather than by-products; (b) there is a 2 to 3 week time lag between the purchase of maize from the GMB and the time at which it is milled and distributed to retail outlets, and (c) aside from working stocks, these millers do not store maize grain because the GMB's pan-seasonal price offers no incentive for them to do so. These points suggest that the demand for maize grain by millers is essentially a derived demand for meal by consumers. In addition, past research has noted an inverse relationship between demand for commercial meal and the quality of the harvest (Blackie, 1984). During drought years, annual demand for commercial meal rises substantially. This suggests that the demand for maize grain by millers, a derived demand for maize meal, may be estimated in the form:

$$(4)\ \text{MILL DEMAND}_t = d_{10} + d_{11}(\text{PMEAL}_t) + d_{12}(\text{PBEAD}_t) + d_{13}(\text{GNP}_t) + d_{14}(Q_{jt} - \text{INTAKE}_{jt}) + e_{1t}$$

where MILL DEMAND$_t$ is maize grain demanded by millers in year t, PMEAL$_t$ is the retail price of commercial roller meal, PBREAD$_t$ is the retail price of wheat bread, and GNP$_t$ is the gross national product. All prices were deflated by the national consumer price index. Q_{jt} - INTAKE$_{jt}$ is the level of maize retentions in the smallholder areas (where j = the aggregate of the three smallholder regions in the model).

Results for equation (4) show that demand for grain by millers is negatively associated with maize retentions in the communal lands at the .01 level of significance. Retentions are highly correlated with rainfall. A 50 percent drop in retentions (as in the drought-affected 1987-88 marketing year) is associated with a 150,000 tonne increase in the demand for maize meal.

Maize sales to stockfeeders and poultry producers in year t are assumed to be negatively related to the quality of the harvest in year t (this would increase farm retentions for stockfeed use and thus reduce the demand for GMB maize) and negatively related to the GMB maize/sorghum selling price ratio.

$$(5)\ \text{STOCKFEED DEMAND}_t = d_{20} + d_{21}(\text{PSMZ}_t/\text{PSSO}_t) + d_{22}(Q_{ct}) + e_{2t}$$

where PSMZ and PSSO are the GMB selling price of maize and red sorghum, respectively, and Q_{ct} is total commercial sector maize production in year t.

It is commonly held that the composition of maize and sorghum for use as stockfeeds is influenced by the relative GMB selling prices. However, econometric estimation of equation (5) over the 1978-79 to 1989-90 period suggests that this relationship is weak. Although GMB has recently been able to sell much of its rotting small grain stock to pig producers at discounted prices (relative to maize), there is little scope for GMB to continue this practice in a sustainable way. Clearly the most important factor influencing demand for maize by stockfeeders is the quality of harvest in commercial areas for which Q_{ct} is a proxy.

GMB maize sales to beer brewers, accounting for about 5 percent of GMB sales since 1980, are modelled as a constant. The sum of GMB sales to millers, stockfeed and poultry producers, and beer firms constitute total GMB maize sales.

3.1.4 National Flow and Stock Identities:

The estimated values for GMB intake and sales are tied into national accounting identities:

(6) $\text{NET EXPORTS}_t = \text{GMB INTAKE}_t + \text{ENDSTOCKS}_{t-1} - \text{GMB SALES}_t - \text{ENDSTOCKS}_t$

(7) $\text{CONSUMPTION}_t = Q_t + \text{ENDSTOCKS}_{t-1} - \text{NET EXPORTS}_t - \text{ENDSTOCKS}_t$

Substituting (6) into (7) yields:

(8) $\text{CONSUMPTION}_t = Q_t - \text{GMB INTAKE}_t + \text{GMB SALES}_t$

Maize consumption is disaggregated into human and feed components:

(9) $\text{CONFEED}_t = Q_{ct} - \text{GMB INTAKE}_{ct} + \text{STOCKFEED DEMAND}_t$

where Q_{ct} and GMB INTAKE_{ct} are commercial sector maize production and sales to GMB. The portion of commercial production not sold to GMB is largely retained for stockfeed. Finally, maize used for human consumption is derived by subtracting equation (9) from equation (8):

(10) $\text{CONHUMAN}_t = Q_{st} - \text{GMB INTAKE}_{st} + \text{MILL DEMAND}_t$

where CONHUMAN_t is quantity of maize milled into meal for human consumption, Q_{st} is smallholder maize production and GMB INTAKE_{st} is smallholder maize sales to the GMB. It is possible to further disaggregate smallholder maize consumption from urban and commercial sector consumption. The former is comprised of smallholder maize retentions, $Q_{st} - \text{GMB INTAKE}_{st}$, plus a portion of MILL DEMAND_t that is consumed in smallholder areas. The technique used to estimate smallholder consumption of commercial meal in the absence of miller distribution data is contained in Jayne *et al.*, 1990.

Estimates of maize meal consumption are derived from Equation (10) by adjusting smallholder maize retentions ($Q_{st} - \text{GMB INTAKE}_{st}$) by a storage loss factor (10 percent), which is subsequently multiplied by the informal mill extraction rate of 97 percent. MILL DEMAND_t is multiplied by the average commercial milling extraction rate of .80.

The model holds the following variables constant: Tobacco, cotton, groundnut and sorghum prices at their 1990-91 levels, and GNP. Beginning stocks are set at 500,000 metric tonnes, the amount believed by the GMB to be the appropriate minimum level for buffer stock purposes. Sensitivity analysis on rainfall, GMB maize producer prices, selling prices, and commercial roller meal prices allows examination of the effect of varying the values of these variables on urban and rural consumption, net exports, the GMB maize trading account, and other factors.

3.2 Model Results

Table 4 presents the simulation results showing how alternative policy scenarios affect the major participants in the maize marketing system *relative to the existing policy framework.*

Scenario 1: Deregulation of maize movement: no
GMB removes restrictions on sales to informal traders: no
Subsidy on GMB domestic trading margin: no

The phased elimination of GMB subsidies as laid out in the GOZ's *Framework for Economic Reform* Document will -- if the *status quo* is maintained -- ultimately raise the price of commercial maize meal by six percent to eight percent in real terms.[18] Simulation model results indicate that -- without any other changes to the system -- per capita consumption of maize meal would fall by five percent to six percent in urban areas, and by one percent to two percent in rural areas. However, these aggregate figures mask the extent to which the decline in consumption would be disproportionately borne by low-income groups in the drier rural areas and by the marginally employed in urban areas. Available information indicates that, under the existing system, those that will experience the greatest decline in real incomes and food security will be in the rural areas of Matabeleland South, lower Midlands, and the southern parts of Masvingo Provinces. According to recent surveys, at least a quarter of the households in these areas have annual cash incomes below $200 (Stack and Chopak, 1990; Hedden-Dunkhorst, 1990). If these households buy four 50kg bags of roller meal a year, a six percent price increase would leave 10 percent less cash available to the household.

[18] This is based on the assumption that (a) 90% of the operating losses on the GMB maize trading account are passed on through higher GMB selling prices, (b) only minimal subsidy reduction will by achieved through efforts to streamline GMB operations, and (c) producer price levels will be kept within the range of $270 to $290 per tonne in real 1991 dollars over the reform period to minimize the need for imports. Producer prices below this level, which may necessitate imports, could require even further increases in commercial maize meal prices if the GMB is to operate at no loss.

Table 4:

Effects of alternative policy reforms on market participants relative to existing set of grain marketing and pricing policies.

Scenario description:				Effect on maize sellers				Effect on maize purchasers					Position of GMB		Market share of	
	Movement deregulation in dry areas	GMB sells to private traders:	Subsidy on GMB margin:	--commercial-- I	----communal---- I	II	III	--commercial-- I	---communal--- I	II	III	--urban--	trading account	export position	large urban mills	small-scale mills
(1)	no	no	no	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	-	-	++	0	0	0
(2)	no	yes	no	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	+	++	++	-	-	++
(3)	yes	yes	no	0	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	++	++	-	-	++

Notes: Commercial I: commercial farmers in Mashonaland provinces (commercial grain purchasers are hired farm labourers).
Communal I: communal farmers in surplus areas of Mashonaland provinces
Communal II: communal farmers in surplus areas of Midlands and Manicaland
Communal III: communal farmers in deficit areas of Midlands, Masvingo, and Matabeland provinces

\+ denotes positive effect
0 denotes minor or no effect
\- denotes negative effect

Source: based on results of simulation model given a range of GMB producer price levels between Z$260 and Z$280 (constant 1991=1) per tonne.

Income erosion would also occur for the marginally employed or unemployed in urban areas. The increase in staple meal prices will, under the Structural Adjustment Programme, be accompanied by cost increases for a wide range of currently subsidized goods and services (*e.g.*, higher school and health care fees under proposed cost recovery plans). Thus, it is likely that price increases for staple foods will occur concomitantly with a decline in real disposable incomes among large segments of the population.

It cannot be assumed that rural households with access to remittance income will be cushioned from the effect of higher staple food prices. It is likely that in the short-run, urban wages will rise more slowly than commercial maize meal prices due to the commitment to GMB subsidy reduction and pressures to increase real maize producer prices to avoid imports. These factors will tend to increase commercial maize meal prices over and above the rate of inflation. Increasing strains on urban wage-earners to meet their own expenses may reduce remittance income to the rural areas below current levels.

Farm labourers on commercial farms will also be adversely affected by the elimination of GMB subsidies without policy actions to reduce marketing costs. Commercial meal is the primary form of grain purchases for many, if not most of 1.5 million farm labourers in Zimbabwe.

It must be stressed that this rather pessimistic scenario is not inevitable if GMB subsidy reduction is accompanied by selected reforms in the grain marketing system (see GOZ *Framework for Economic Reform* (1991).

Scenario 2: Deregulation of maize movement: no
GMB removes restrictions on sales to informal traders: yes
Subsidy on GMB domestic trading margin: no

The major effect of this policy scenario is that urban consumption would rise by 12 percent to 14 percent, Figure 2. This increase would be the result of less expensive straight-run meal being milled and distributed by the informal small-scale milling sector. The major beneficiaries of this scenario would be low-income consumers in urban areas who either prefer this kind of meal or would be induced to purchase it because of its lower price.[19] The increase in consumption would occur primarily

[19] Milling charges recorded at 52 small-scale mills surveyed during 1990/91 ranged from Z$40 to Z$55 per tonne. Adding to this a transport charge of Z$.60/tonne/kilometre for a hypothetical distance of 50 kms (Z$30) and a marketing mark-up of 20% per tonne of maize purchased from the GMB (.2*Z$360 = Z$72 per tonne) and an extraction rate loss of 3%, it appears that straight-run maize grain could be marketed within 50 kms of each depot in the country for about Z$520 to Z$535 per tonne. This is 13%-15% lower than the retail price of roller meal and 33% lower than the price of super-refined meal.

in urban areas because transport costs are lower from GMB depots to urban demand areas than from rural depots to areas of significant rural demand. This would result in relatively larger cost differentials between informally-milled meal and commercial maize meal in urban areas than in rural areas.

The simulation results indicate that removal of GMB resale restrictions would increase rural consumption by only two percent to three percent, Figure 3. These gains would be concentrated in selected deficit areas where depots are located. Given available information on transport and milling costs, informal traders would find it profitable to buy in bulk at the GMB selling price and resell to rural consumers at a price below that of commercial maize meal. However, due to mounting transport costs as distance from the depot increases, it is unlikely that private traders could profitably compete against the pan-territorial maize meal price in rural areas over 120 kilometers from a depot. There are only 4 GMB depots south of Bulawayo, indicating that this scenario would have little effect on food security in the extreme southern and western portions of the country where malnutrition is most severe. Enhanced food security in these areas will require concomitant decontrol of maize inflows into these areas and better road networks linking them with surplus areas.

Increased reliance on informal grain marketing will require a larger supply of vehicles for grain transport. To increase the benefits of this policy change, foreign exchange for increased investment in small and medium-sized trucks will be necessary.

The increased consumption of maize meal will, *ceteris paribus*, leave less surplus to be exported and will increase the potential for maize imports during drought years. A major implication of the simulation results is that the eroded productive base for maize over the past five years can no longer guarantee a national surplus during a moderate drought year, unless real producer prices are increased. The relatively productive and stable maize cultivation among commercial farmers in Mashonaland has fallen from 280,000 hectares in 1981 to 125,000 hectares in 1990, entailing a shrinking of the national maize production base of 450,000 tonnes from this sector since 1985. Maize production within the communal sector also shows no upward trend since 1985-86, signalling a possible end of the "maize revolution" in the mid-1980s.

These results suggest that policy changes that expand access and affordability of maize to urban and rural consumers will lead to a greater potential for imports unless accompanied by increases in real producer prices. Simulation results indicate that while a producer price of Z$240 (in constant 1991 dollars) would be sufficient to avoid imports under normal rainfall conditions, a price of Z$294 would be necessary to avoid imports during a drought year (*i.e.*, 80 percent of normal yields).



Key: □ Existing policy framework
△ Scenario 1
* Scenario 2
▽ Scenario 3

Source: Simulation model results.

Figure 2: Estimated effects of selected policy scenarios on urban maize meal consumption, under alternative producer price levels.



Key: □ Existing policy framework
△ Scenario 1
* Scenario 2
▽ Scenario 3

Source: Simulation model results.

Figure 3: Estimated effects of selected policy scenarios on rural maize meal consumption, under alternative producer price levels.

The GMB's ability to reduce its operating costs under structural adjustment is not just a function of the margin between its producer and selling price, but also a function of the *level* of producer prices set by Cabinet. Simulation model results displayed in Figure 4 indicate that producer prices, in constant 1991 dollars, must exceed Z$260 during normal weather and Z$294 during drought to satisfy the higher level of domestic consumption under this scenario and reduce the potential for imports during a drought year. While it costs the GMB approximately Z$400 to procure a tonne of maize from domestic production, it currently costs over US$200 (about Z$600 c.i.f. Harare) to import maize from the international market. Thus, it costs the GMB about Z$200 more for every tonne of maize it must procure from the world market.[20] Assuming real prices remain at their 1991 level of Z$270 per tonne, a drought year will necessitate 90,000 tonnes either from imports or security stocks. If stock levels were not sufficient to cover this amount, the trading margin required to permit the GMB to execute domestic operations at no loss would result in a trading account deficit, Figure 5.

Major gainers: urban consumers, rural consumers near GMB depots, labourers working on commercial farms, and small-scale millers.

Major losers: commercial millers

Scenario 3: Deregulation of maize: yes (in Natural Regions III, IV and V)
GMB removes restrictions on sales to informal traders: yes
Subsidy on GMB domestic trading margin: no

The major effect of this policy scenario would be that maize consumption would increase in both rural and urban areas. The simulation results indicate that urban consumption would rise by 12 to 14 percent, again primarily among low-income groups, due to the availability of less expensive straight-run meal in peri-urban areas. This increase in consumption occurs concurrently with GMB subsidy elimination, underscoring the point that policy changes in this scenario may be viewed as substantive and cost-effective forms of "safety net" mechanisms to cushion vulnerable groups from the effects of GMB subsidy reduction.

[20] This loss is calculated at the official exchange rate; at the shadow exchange rate, losses would be substantially higher.



Key: □ Existing policy framework
△ Scenario 1
* Scenario 2
▽ Scenario 3

Source: Simulation model results.

Figure 4: Estimated effects of selected policy scenarios on GMB net maize exports, under alternative producer price levels.



Key: □ Existing policy framework
△ Scenario 1
* Scenario 2
▽ Scenario 3

Source: Simulation model results.

Figure 5: Estimated effects of selected policy scenarios on GMB maize trading account, under alternative producer price levels.

Rural consumption is expected to rise by about 7 percent, primarily in the grain-deficit portions of the country. These results are based on a critical assumption of the model, *i.e.*, that informal trading margins would equal milling charges and transport charges[21] plus a 20 percent mark-up. Given this assumption, movement decontrol would result in higher informal producer prices (stimulating production in areas such as Gokwe, Sabi North, northern Buhera and Chiduku), and simultaneously, lower consumer prices and greater consumption in grain-deficit rural areas of Midlands and Masvingo.

The model also indicates that the GMB's operating losses would decline because of a reduced volume of maize intake from relatively remote smallholder areas off the line of rail. A portion of grain surpluses in areas such as Buhera, Gokwe and Chiduku would be traded through informal channels.

The benefits of this policy -- increased food consumption among the poor -- provide the seeds of its biggest disadvantage: the heightened risk of imports unless producer prices are increased in real terms. With producer prices at Z$270 in real terms, a moderate drought (80 percent of normal yields) is predicted to require 120,000 tonnes from imports or stocks. A serious drought similar to 1987 (65 percent of normal yields) would require 450,000 tonnes of imports or stocks. While stocks would probably be the more cost-effective choice, there are no assurances that the chronic surpluses of the 1980s will exist in the 1990s.

This scenario was repeated with a 10 percent increase in GMB producer prices to examine the impact on self-sufficiency during drought. This scenario still results in 10 percent to 13 percent lower maize meal prices for low-income urban consumers. The GMB's selling price would rise to approximately Z$430 per tonne, raising the price of straight-run maize meal to about Z$550 - 565, as compared with the current roller meal price of Z$620 per tonne. The cost savings would accrue only to those willing to purchase straight-run meal. Those consumers who would continue to purchase the more refined commercial meal would pay approximate Z$70 per tonne more. This $70 is comprised of a 10 percent increase in producer prices passed on to selling price, plus the additional $40 required to remove the existing GMB subsidy on its domestic operations.

The model indicates that a 10 percent rise in real producer prices during a moderate drought (80 percent of normal yields) still requires 34,000 tonnes from imports or stocks, while a serious drought (65 percent of normal yields) would still require 290,000 tonnes from imports or stocks.

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[21] Based on actual survey findings of informal millers and traders during 1990 and 1991 (see Chisvo et al., 1990 and Jayne and Chisvo, 1990).

Major gainers: urban consumers, rural consumers in the drier areas, farm labourers on commercial farms, grain surplus smallholders in the drier areas, and small-scale millers.
Major losers: commercial millers

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The organisation of the existing grain marketing system results in a number of important and often unrecognised income transfers among groups. These income transfers occur explicitly through subsidies and implicitly through regulations such as controls on maize movement and resale. These regulations tend to (a) inflate consumer food prices in both urban and rural areas; (b) constrain the development of private grain trade; and (c) reroute grain supplies through urban areas and high-cost milling facilities before being distributed back to rural areas. The major beneficiaries of the existing system are urban millers and, to some extent, surplus grain producers in the high productivity areas of the country. The major losers in terms of loss of real income and food security are rural consumers in the drier portions of the country, low-income urban consumers with a preference for less expensive straight-run meal, the small-scale informal milling industry, and surplus grain producers in areas where controls on grain movement have suppressed the development of potentially attractive marketing alternatives.

One of the most critical issues facing the GOZ regarding structural adjustment is how to cushion the urban and rural poor from increased staple food prices. Mechanisms to provide a "safety net" to cushion low-income and vulnerable groups from the effects of structural adjustment have been conceptualized primarily in terms of short-run, direct assistance programmes. However, selected regulatory aspects of the grain marketing system pose such serious impediments to maize access and affordability that their modification must be viewed as part and parcel of an well-defined cushioning strategy as well as an overall development strategy.

Upward pressure on food prices as a result of GMB subsidy reduction can be restrained by policy decisions to remove the constraints on access to GMB grain by private traders and by taking steps to promote the distribution of straight-run meal through informal millers. These steps would likely be sufficient for the commercial milling sector to resume distribution of straight-run meal to prevent the loss of market share. Informal milling margins are about one-half of the government-controlled formal milling sector. Simulation results suggest that, holding producer prices constant, the removal of GMB resale restrictions would increase urban consumption of maize meal by 10 percent to 14 percent.

A beneficial side-effect of this policy may be a lower import bill for wheat. Currently, Zimbabwe imports 10 percent to 50 percent of the wheat consumed in the country. Cheaper maize meal prices in urban areas may shift consumption from wheat to maize, commensurate with the cross-elasticity of demand, thereby restraining upward pressure on wheat import costs.

Straight-run meal in Zimbabwe appears to have attributes of an inferior good. Urban surveys indicate that the majority of the low-income households would prefer straight-run meal if it were available at even an eight percent discount below the price of roller meal. Thus, a subsidy confined to this type of meal -- and not on roller meal or super-refined meal -- may target assistance to the urban poor more cost-effectively than the existing blanket subsidies on all forms of commercial maize meal. Furthermore, since over 60 percent of the high- and middle income groups stated that they would continue to purchase the more refined meals, no matter what the price of straight-run meal, the magnitude of subsidies misdirected to non-target groups would be substantially reduced in comparison with the current system which subsidises all forms of commercial meal.

The major impediments to the manufacture of straight-run meal by the formal milling sector appears to be problems of articulating consumer preferences through a highly controlled pricing system in which profits and margins are determined by government rather than by market forces. Government pricing policy creates incentives that perpetuate the distribution of a more expensive and less nutritious product.

The promotion of rural food security under structural adjustment requires that grain be permitted to move directly from surplus to deficit rural areas at low cost. Simulation results indicate that the deregulation of maize movement in the drier areas could reduce the marketing costs linking selected surplus and deficit regions and raise rural consumption of maize meal by five percent to seven percent. The complete deregulation of private maize movement, without a shift to regional pricing, would mean that the GMB could no longer cover the costs of its non-commercial activities by widening the GMB margins, as has been the case in recent years. Wider margins would come at the expense of lower market share in the most profitable trading routes, larger GMB deficits and greater difficulty in procuring sufficient supplies of white maize to operate a strategic stock. These problems could be alleviated if deregulation were accompanied by measures that allowed the GMB to vary its producer and selling prices according to supply and demand conditions in the various regions of the country.

A major implication of the simulation results is that the eroded production base for maize over the past five years no longer guarantees a national surplus during a moderate drought year, unless real producer prices are increased dramatically. The real producer price decline of 35 percent since 1981 has been associated with a decline of 450,000 tonnes from annual commercial sector maize production. The dramatic maize revolution in the communal sector during the early and mid-1980s also appears to have waned during the past five years. A major implication of these trends for structural adjustment is that policy changes that successfully expand access and affordability of maize to urban and rural consumers will lead to increased consumption, a greater potential for imports and, relatedly, larger GMB operating deficits -- unless accompanied by increases in real producer prices.

Major Issues for Further Analysis

The scope of this paper has been confined to potential policy changes under active consideration by the GOZ. These do not appear to include issues of regional maize pricing or full deregulation of the maize sub-sector. In the longer run, more substantial pricing and marketing changes may bring large benefits in terms of food security and GMB cost reduction. However, they involve more fundamental changes, the full consequences of which have not been thoroughly analysed. These include:

1. Regional price differentiation at GMB depots perhaps associated with regional pricing of maize meal. Would higher GMB grain prices in the drier areas suck more grain out of informal channels and into the GMB / urban milling system? How would higher (lower) grain prices in the south affect rural food security? Should the producer pricing rule be based on the supply and demand conditions in the area in which the depot is located or on the supply and demand conditions at the urban mill to which the grain is destined?

2. Full deregulation of maize in all areas. Initial work on this subject was done by Masters and Nuppenau (1990) and provides the basis for more detailed analysis in a dual marketing system.

3. Examine the effects of higher maize meal prices on workers on commercial farms. Qualitatively, the same policy changes that would reduce maize meal prices in urban areas would likely apply in commercial farming areas as well. Yet potentially different sources of malnutrition in these areas, reported to be quite high (Demographic Health Survey, 1989), merit further investigation.

4. Actual implementation guidelines to improve the efficiency of the existing direct food transfer programmes. The report has concluded that selected policy changes identified above will promote food access and affordability, and will reduce the number of vulnerable households nationally, but will not obviate the need for continued targeted assistance programmes. A detailed assessment of the limitations and operational problems of the existing Drought Relief and Food For Work Programmes are beyond the scope of this report. However, detailed analysis is needed on how the efficiency of such targeted food programmes can be improved and incorporated into broader development objectives (*e.g.*, public works programmes that improve the rural infrastructure in the course of distributing food). But it is important to note that public works programmes may not be appropriate for helping single-parent families and people beyond working age who require a different form of assistance.

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Towards A Food And Nutrition Policy For Zimbabwe:

Inter-Ministerial Paper

N.M. Lenneiye

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Historical Background to Food and Nutrition Issues

Food and Nutrition issues in pre-independence Zimbabwe were handled by a nutritionist in the Ministry of Health, two agricultural extension departments (one for commercial farmers and one for communal areas) and actions of the Finance and Trade Ministries. After independence, the two agricultural extension departments were merged to form Agritex, the national agency for providing agricultural extension services. Also a Department of National Nutrition was set up in the Ministry of Health. Planning and pricing mechanisms were used more explicitly to protect consumers from excessively high prices while agricultural viability was retained through the provision of "realistic" prices to farmers.

National and Household Food Security Contrast, 1980-81

In this period, the country experienced a bumper harvest, certainly in maize production, and credit was given to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and Agritex for the work they had done with farmers -- especially the large scale commercial sectors. At the same time, many communal areas were experiencing food shortages due to returning refugees from Mozambique as well as the disruption of production caused by a decade of war.

The Ministry of Health (supported by key NGOs like OXFAM-UK) conducted several nutrition surveys which showed high levels of malnutrition among the under-five age group. A child supplementary feeding programme was implemented by NGOs with the support of the Ministry of Health during this period. The Ministry

of Health, through the Primary Health Strategy, embarked on a programme of improving health in communities by expanding and re-defining the Village Health Worker programme run by mission hospitals prior to 1980. This VHW programme was seen as an important strategy for empowering communities to take local action in the area of community health and nutrition. Thus, while the country was enjoying a bumper harvest, there were serious food shortages in the communal areas as early as 1980 -- exposing the contradiction between the attainment of national food security while household food insecurity persists. Much has been written on this since.

The Drought Year, 1982-83

When drought hit the country in this period, the responsibility for distributing food to the hungry was given to the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare (MLMPSW). This Ministry was also implementing other rehabilitation programmes (demobilisation of ex-combatants in the national liberation armies, the indigent and others targeted for state assistance). Given its experience in feeding the under-fives, the Ministry of Health was given the task of running a national Child Supplementary Feeding Programme under the leadership of MLMPSW-led Drought Relief Committee.

At the same time, the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement intensified its efforts to increase irrigated lands as a way to counter the effects of drought on food production. Investments in health, food subsidies, and other social programmes rose dramatically as government tried to fulfil its promise to improve the lives of those who had been neglected by the colonial administration.

Persistent Drought and Early Restructuring, 1984-85

The drought persisted throughout this period and government was forced to introduce a drought levy as a way of instituting long-term budgetary planning to combat the effects of drought on the population. The Ministry of Health continued to run a Child Supplementary Feeding Programme (CSFP) and was feeding over 0.25 million children in the under-fives group by 1985. This programme was stabilising the situation but not solving the problems of malnutrition. As a result, the Ministry of Health was getting frustrated at being unable to tackle the root causes of malnutrition. While continuing its rehabilitation efforts for the malnourished, the Ministry of Health (MOH) embarked on a Supplementary Food Production Programme (SFPP) aimed at providing inputs to community groups with malnourished children so that they could produce food for group feeding. Inter-sectoral support was provided to this programme but it was limited by the relatively undeveloped nutrition awareness in most of those Ministries called upon to participate.

The ambitious 1980 development programmes by government in the Communal Areas were running into problems of inadequate extension support compounded by duplication of activities between different extension staff. The 1985 Prime Minister's

directive on decentralisation contained a strategy to address these issues by creating Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) to strengthen community action; and District Development Committees (DDCs) and Provincial Development Committees (PDCs) to improve planning based on community needs and an element of popular participation.

Inter-Sectoral Reorganisation 1986-87

The country continued to suffer throughout the 1980s from intermittent drought and the management of drought relief was brought under a strengthened Cabinet Committee on Drought Relief(CCDR) following the mismanagement related fraud -- the Paweni scandal. The CSFP was wound down in favour of SFPP but this new programme experienced serious constraints in inter-sectoral collaboration. New management procedures for the SFPP were formulated and implemented under a National Steering Committee and Provincial and District Food and Nutrition Management Teams. The Management of this 'new' SFPP was jointly led by Agritex (handling planning and extension activities) and MOH (handling the provision of technical nutrition expertise and administrative support).

Main Issues Emerging From the 1981-87 Period

In tackling the contradiction between national food security and household food insecurity, the government had attacked the problems of food production and consumption with the formation of the NSC and FNMTs with management procedures for community nutrition and food production -- a major intervention in the promotion of food security at the household level. Food production and consumption issues were thus firmly linked with the nutrition status of various population groups in the country. However, there remained serious gaps in the linkage between national and household food security issues in terms of addressing various aspects of food distribution (transportation, storage, processing, pricing, *etc.*). This limitation was compounded by the lack of awareness among government agencies on the link between the status of the national economy and food security.

National Food and Nutrition Policy Vacuum, 1988-90

During this period, the SFPP mobilised sectors and communities, leading to a situation where issues of food production and consumption could no longer be separated in the way sectors addressed the problem of hunger in Zimbabwe. Awareness of household food security got a boost from research conducted on regional food security (by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MLARR), University of Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies researchers). This led to various sectors becoming aware of limitations imposed on the country's development strategies by the absence of a National Food and Nutrition Policy. Several international development agencies (UNICEF, SIDA, FAO, *etc*), who had taken an interest in such a policy after 1980, continued to remind the government of the need for a broad framework within which food and

nutrition issues could be related to economic development and the welfare of Zimbabweans.

Several meetings have been held with a variety of agencies to explore strategies for producing a national food and nutrition policy for Zimbabwe. These meetings and other activities have been integrated into the wider national debate on how economic structural adjustment is going to be achieved and what role a national food and nutrition policy can play.

1.2 Background to Nutrition Policy Document

In July 1990, an inter-ministerial National Consultative Workshop on strategies for the integration of food, nutrition and agricultural policy in Zimbabwe was held in Juliasdale, Nyanga. One of the recommendations from the workshop was that a "Cabinet Discussion Paper" be prepared with the objective of seeking "a mandate for preparing a proposal for integrating food and nutrition policy" to address "food insecurity and malnutrition in their short- and long-run dimensions" (UZ/MSU Food Security Project, 1990 :128-9).

After the workshop, a food security national consultative group, bringing together members of the National Steering Committee of Food and Nutrition and researchers from the University of Zimbabwe/Michigan State University Food Security Research in Southern Africa Project' was left to implement the recommendation. The group decided to commission this consultancy to prepare a draft inter-ministerial paper on food and nutrition policy.[1]

In the course of the consultancy, discussions have been held with officers concerned with food and nutrition issues in the various sectors. Emphasis has been on what Ministries are doing, problems encountered and solutions suggested. Ministries dealing with the management of activities aimed at alleviating the effects of drought as well as those involved with supplementary food production have been consulted. Contact has also been made with NGOs, food manufacturers and commercial farming organisations to determine their contribution to the policy.

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[1]Specific terms of reference were to interview key persons in the relevant Ministries and "obtain information on their (1) current policies affecting food and nutrition in Zimbabwe, (2) current programmes to carry out these policies, and (3) problems they perceive relative to these policies and programmes. Suggestions on needed changes in policies, programmes and organisational structure for implementing food and nutrition policy will be subtly solicited. The same general information will be gathered from several major NGOs involved in food and nutrition programmes" (Terms of Reference, 17 April 1991).

Two Ministries wrote a paper as part of their preparation for this consultancy and these have been used.[2] Most information came from interviews and the reading of background documents and reports. There are many reports on the agricultural sector and on the extent of hunger in the country. Less has been written on linkages among sectors and among various food producers.

Consultations have been held with officials who sit on the two committees concerned with food and nutrition issues *i.e.* the National Steering Committee (NSC), and the Drought Relief Committee (DRC). Members of NSC tend to be middle-level management personnel in the sector Ministries, while the DRC has more senior members. This difference has had a significant effect on the kind of information made available and the kind of policy options suggested. The pricing of agricultural products and its effect on food production, distribution and consumption has been explored.

There is awareness across all sectors on the need to maintain national food security while tackling the issue of household food security. Thus, the potential for producing a national food and nutrition policy is there, subject to the availability of a well-placed institution to play the advocacy role given the multiplicity of institutions interested in the subject.

An important issue to arise from discussions is how to package the new policy in terms of (a) financial procedures, (b) administrative procedures, and (c) coordination. The consultancy has benefitted from experience gained by the inter-ministerial committee on Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (IRWSS) Programme in terms of what is feasible in the Zimbabwe context.

The proposal to integrate drought management and the promotion of supplementary food production by a merger of the NSC and DRC has been supported by all the sectors consulted. However, whether to house the new Food and Nutrition Policy body in a line Ministry or in a coordinating Ministry is an issue for further discussion. This issue is especially important because several Ministries are active in operating food and nutrition activities (distribution of drought relief food, supplementary food production programme, food for work programme and public works programme).

This document summarises food and nutrition activities in the country together with solutions and strategies proposed to overcome existing constraints and presents a proposal for a new body to deal with food and nutrition programmes and activities.

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[2]The Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, and The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement prepared papers on policy issues of concern -- "The drought relief programme in Zimbabwe" (n.d.) and "Major agricultural policy issues" (n.d.) respectively. The nutrition Unit has several background documents on health-related issues and the 1988 NSC "Food and nutrition issues paper" has a description of what these ministries are doing (although with limited analyses).

2. CURRENT FOOD AND NUTRITION PROGRAMMES

There are two major actors in the area of food and nutrition besides government. The private sector has producer, processing and marketing organisations that have an interest in a food and nutrition policy for Zimbabwe. There are also NGOs with an interest in food and nutrition policy. This consultancy has not tackled the private and non-government agencies involved in food and nutrition activities. The rationale followed has been to first set up the right mechanism for handling the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the policy before drawing in all those with an interest in the issue. The most comprehensive statement on strategies and plans developed by government to tackle nutrition problems in Zimbabwe was written by the NSC in 1990, *i.e.* "The nutrition situation : current strategies and plans" in UZ/MSU Food Security Project, 1990.

2.1 Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development

The Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development (MCCD) is one of the original participants of the Supplementary Food Production Programme (SFPP) managed under the inter-ministerial NSC. When the old Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development and Women's Affairs was split into a Women's affairs Department (now under the Ministry of Political Affairs) and MCCD, the responsibility for food and nutrition was shared between the two. Issues of women in development, with respect to food and nutrition, went to Women's Affairs while community organisational issues remained with MCCD. Due to manpower shortages in the new MCCD, attendance of NSC meetings was suspended, although the Ministry continued to send representatives to Drought Relief Committee meetings.

Only two officers are currently involved in community development work in the MCCD head office. The rest are concerned with cooperatives. Even the two Community Development cadres are involved in promoting pre-cooperatives. In spite of this, Provincial, District, Ward and Village level personnel from the MCCD are very active in food and nutrition activities. The Ward Community Coordinators (WCCs) pass information on nutrition gardens to Agritex staff, while the Village Community Workers (VCWs) remain key promoters of improved nutrition in rural communities (at the household level) as well as on commercial farms (by Farm Health Workers).

Under programmes promoted by the MCCD, women are involved in the keeping of chickens, pigs, rabbits, and goats as a way of generating income in the communal areas. Uniform making, soap making and bakeries are other popular income-generating activities. The inadequate supply of flour, fabric and other inputs is hindering the progress of these groups. Bakeries are also being discouraged because the amount of wood they use is causing deforestation. It also is being suggested that women's groups expand their activities into growing bananas and maintaining orchards.

Individual families are using water from boreholes in the Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation projects for growing vegetables. However, the National Action Committee is discouraging this until the results of a pilot survey are analysed to determine the impact of nutrition gardens on the availability of water for human and livestock consumption.

Under the SFPP, the staff of MCCD have specific support tasks with groups as follows:

Ward Community Coordinator (old Community Development Worker):

- visit each group to encourage and assist in organising pre-schools;
- train some parents in these groups to run pre-schools, make shelters and toys, *etc.*;
- make follow-up visits to pre-schools at least once every two months; and,
- assist in growth monitoring activities within these groups.

Village Community Worker (old Village Health Worker):

- weighs children under five years of age in village and identifies the malnourished ones;
- visits groups regularly and keeps record of such visits;
- prepares a group master card from the weights of children and explains to the group any differences since the last master card;
- follows-up with mothers referred to the group by clinic nurses because of malnourished children; and,
- attends various meetings and teaches health education to groups.

District and Provincial Community Development Officers are members of Food and Nutrition Management Teams and are active in developing planning, implementation, and monitoring strategies for the programme.

2.2 Ministry of Education

Through the Curriculum Development Unit (CDU), the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education is active in the activities of the NSC. The Ministry is responsible for integrating nutrition education into the teaching programmes of schools and designing ways of making sure that agricultural and nutrition techniques learnt at school are disseminated to parents.

During the 1980-85 Child Supplementary Feeding Programme, many teachers and schools became involved in assisting community feeding committees that had organisational and logistical problems. With the transfer of pre-schools from the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs, the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education has become even more involved in the group feeding of children at these centres. Several NGOs have donated foods for the feeding of school children (supplements) and Parent Teachers Associations, working with communities, have organised the cooking. Recently, some NGOs have donated fencing materials as well as funds for stocking schools for the production of chickens, vegetables, rabbits, *etc*. This method of developing small scale projects for communities implemented through their schools is highly favoured by the Ministry.

The Ministry would like to see supplementary feeding extended to all primary schools, even in times of plenty, because many children are under-nourished. During drought, the Ministry would like to see some of the drought relief food channelled through the school system so that children are guaranteed at least one meal a day. This is not always the case at the moment. The provision of technical guidelines from MOH and Agritex on the organisation of feeding and production for the school supplementary feeding programme has been invaluable. In Secondary schools, the issue has been one of promoting healthy life-styles (anti-drug, alcohol and smoking, sex education *etc.*).

The Ministry has also implemented an Education with Production programme under the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production (ZIMFEP) this programme is currently under review. It has been recognised that it is difficult for pupils to undertake education with production and still have time to pursue other O-level subjects.

Schools pursuing Education with Production programmes like Dhaniko School, are good but expensive -- having to rely heavily on donor support. In such schools, a few graduates are retained each year to undertake production for the market as a way of generating revenue. Students graduating from these schools expect formal employment, but opportunities are limited. The Ministry is now interested in a strategy the produces graduates who become self-employed through the establishment of home industries.

As a result of ZIMFEP's experience, draft O-level syllabi have been prepared on vocational training so that students can be prepared for both self-employment and formal employment. The new vocational programmes will have a major nutrition component. Catering will be an important part of training (to prepare pupils to work in such enterprises as take-aways, hotels, and schools). Food processing, preservation, and technology will be other important areas in the new food and nutrition syllabus. Teachers are being trained for this programme through in-service training.

The Ministry is interested in securing attachment places (hotels, hostels, *etc.*) where teachers and graduates for the new vocational programme can go during training to

acquire practical experience. There is also an interest in seeing the private sector develop the capacity to produce catering equipment suited for use in schools (the proper size, convenience, maintenance, capacity, *etc.*). Consultations will be needed with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to ensure that companies that produce this type of equipment get necessary support.

The Ministry is also interested in developing the Education for Living programme for training primary school and early learning centre teachers.

The Ministry is implementing a pilot project on "Child health and school participation" in collaboration with UNESCO (since 1989). This project is being implemented in Masvingo, Matabeleland South and Mashonaland East provinces; and is managed by the Inter-Ministerial National Steering Committee for the Zimbabwe Project on Child Health, Nutrition and School Participation.[3] This project seeks to identify way of combating nutritional deficiencies and poor health in primary schools, to improve school enrolment, reduce absenteeism and early drop-out, and improve classroom performance (Pollitt, 1990).

Coordination mechanisms between the work of this committee and that of the DRP and NSC (for food and nutrition) have not been worked out. Without these mechanisms, it is not clear how problems of coordination with the government extension system and elected community officials at the village and ward levels will be handled.

2.3 Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Development

The MEWRD deals with the provision of water under both NSC and DRC programmes. The DRC in recent years has been hampered by the lack of funds to cover borehole drilling in drought-stricken areas. The last allocation of $4.5 million was made available to MEWRD in 1987-88 for borehole drilling (then costing $10 000 each). Two hundred boreholes were drilled using these funds -- the balance being used for the rehabilitation of village piped water schemes in the same drought-stricken areas. (These are the D-Vote stations maintained with funds from Treasury as opposed to the others that operate on a cost-recovery basis).

Currently there are no funds specifically made available for drought areas. However, the MEWRD makes a request each year under the PSIP (the budget requested for 1990-91 to 1995-96 was for $16 million but no allocation was made). The $6 million allocated to the MEWRD for drilling boreholes during 1990-91, although not specifically for drought relief, will be used to sink boreholes in areas hit by drought. Money for drilling boreholes (even when allocated for drought relief) is divided equally among the eight provinces even though drought is more

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[3]Members of the committee are (1) From Ministry of Health: Health Education Officer, Senior Nutritionist, Chief Nutritionist; (2) Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education: Deputy Chief Education Officer - CDU (Chairperson), and two lecturers from CDU.

severe in the Southern Provinces. Drilling rig capacity is declining and eight new rigs will be needed for the provinces to successfully implement current drilling programmes.

The MEWRD has guide-lines on the construction of dams for irrigation schemes, in drought-prone areas. While all dam design work is done by MEWRD, the DDF is responsible for constructing those with a wall height of less than eight meters. Medium and large scale dams are constructed by the MEWRD, mainly for irrigation, with Agritex undertaking the feasibility studies to establish irrigation potential.

Although there are good ground water resources in some districts (*e.g.*, Chipinge and Chisumbanje), there has been no systematic attempt to promote the use of boreholes for agricultural production. Existing policy insists that the water is for human and livestock consumption. There are currently 16 IRWSS Project Districts in the country (funded by NORAD, DANIDA, EEC, *etc.*) that provide an excellent opportunity to address the issue of vegetable gardening and better nutrition at the village level. It has been suggested that the MEWRD should incorporate vegetable growing in the calculation of borehole yields and indicate what load (human and livestock consumption as well as vegetable gardening) can be supported. The NAC for IRWSS Programme has commissioned a study of the links between vegetable gardening and the water programme. It is expected that the new headworks for boreholes will have facilities for run-off water to be led to a communal vegetable garden. A clear distribution of responsibilities in the Food and Nutrition programmes (NSC and DRC) could greatly improve the planning and implementation for borehole development.

2.4 Ministry of Environment and Tourism

The relationship between land degradation and rising population combined with increasing poverty, is of concern to the Board and it is in this context that they would like to be involved in the formulation and implementation of a food and nutrition policy. There is concern that, although government is encouraging people in regions III, IV and V to grow sorghum and millet, only maize can be found in the shops -- this makes it is unrealistic to expect people not to continue growing maize.

The choice between sorghum and millet on the one hand and maize on the other needs more research.[4]

Existing regulations on environmental concerns in planning development programmes are relatively ineffective. Environmental impact studies have been conducted prior to the execution of a few projects based on a "gentleman's agreement" rather than a mandatory basis. There are plans to make environmental impact assessment studies mandatory for all major development projects. The need for training programmes was also expressed to enable government and NGO personnel to learn of development strategies responsive to environmental concerns which do not reduce benefits. Such planning guide-lines can address specific issues such as food and nutrition. Personnel involved in food and nutrition activities can contribute to the planning guide-lines being formulated for identifying agricultural practices in marginal lands that are responsive to environmental concerns. All farming activities in regions III, IV and V should be preceded by a Land Capability Study (LCS). Such LCSs should make it possible to determine the best mix of crop, livestock and irrigation farming systems suitable for a given area. Such a mix should then be promoted.

Drought is part and parcel of this country's natural environment. Every sectoral plan should have a component that reflects drought. It then would no longer be necessary to take funds from programmes as if drought was unexpected. "If you own a dog, its food should be in the family budget. Drought is part of us in Zimbabwe

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[4]Although common wisdom seems to be that millet, sorghum and other small grains should be grown in Natural Regions IV and V, some statistics (MLARR, 1990) seem to indicate that there is need for more research before this recommendation can be adopted as policy (see below).

Crop yields and returns to labour, eight communal areas.

Crop	Simple Average mt/ha	Own labour yields $/hr
Maize	0.62	0.23
Pearl millet	0.45	-0.02
Sorghum	0.47	-0.04
Finger millet	0.23	0.12

Source: UZ/MSU Food Security Research Project, 1990. :39-49; Jayne, T. UZ personal communication. Negative income indicates that the farmers lost money from the cultivation of these crops.

There are only two crops which have a better yield than maize (cotton at $0.57 and Burley tobacco at $0.79). While recognising that "maize will out-yield most of the millets given a suitable variety and good management" Agritex is concerned that for most families in regions IV and V, the issue is not one of quantity, but of getting any maize yield at all when there is severe drought -- while millet and sorghum will have some yield (personal communication with Agritex staff, 1991). The introduction of appropriate technologies to process the small grains is also an issue.

and it should be planned for instead of pulling funds from other programmes year in and year out."

Some concern was expressed that the Ministry of Tourism and Environment, through its Tourist Division, 'seems to be more concerned with the welfare of animals than that of man'. The issue of animals destroying crops in Omay was cited as an example of this problem. Wildlife management programmes which give communities some returns from culling animals are useful. However, some of these districts are so remote that there are no shops where people can buy food or sell their produce. The roads are also usually poor and a hindrance to effective marketing. Strategies to guarantee household food security are needed for such communities.

2.5 Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development

Traditionally, the Ministry has associated food and nutrition issues with the Ministries of Health and Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. At the beginning of the NSC, communications and activities were handled through interested individuals rather than by identification of functional departments within the Ministry. Over the years, functional departments have been drawn into the programme by way of:

- getting representation from the macro-economic division, and
- the deployment of economists to the provinces where they can participate in the work of Provincial Food and Nutrition Management Teams (FNMT).

The Ministry is involved in supporting planning activities in all Ministries and may not have sufficient staff to deal with food and nutrition issues. The NPA is particularly interested in the planning methodologies currently being utilised by the NAC for IRWSS and the NSC for food and nutrition activities. Staff from the Ministry participate in both Committees and useful procedures have been negotiated and implemented.

The Treasury side of the Ministry has been very active in over-seeing the disbursement of funds for IRWSS to line Ministries using a plan developed under the NAC. While a similar process of planning and financial disbursement has not been developed for the food and nutrition programme (SFPP), there is recognition that a foundation has been laid by the coherent planning currently being undertaken by Provincial and District FNMTs.

The Ministry is planning to develop spatial planning, in collaboration with the Department of Physical Planning, to complement current programme planning. Food and nutrition issues could fit into this. Existing provincial planning guide-lines have been assessed as lacking coordination of these two planning processes, and discussions between MFEPD and MLGRUD are needed to correct this situation.

The National Planning Agency under the MFEPD is interested in the development of short-, medium-, and long-term food and nutrition policies. In the current climate of The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, there is also interest in the NPA for a planning process with capacity to document and predict policies that negatively impact vulnerable groups. The three Branches coming under the Research and Planning Division in the NPA have an interest in food and nutrition activities -- Macro-economic, Sectoral and Regional Planning.

2.6 Ministry of Health

Refugees returning after the War of National Liberation in 1980 needed nutritional support and rehabilitation. The small nutrition unit in the Ministry of Health was expanded into a Department of National Nutrition, given more staff and the expanded mandate to:

- determine the magnitude and extent of malnutrition in Zimbabwe;
- implement a nutrition surveillance system to monitor nutrition status;
- develop nutrition programmes in line with the Primary Health Care Strategy;
- utilise inter-sectoral cooperation to develop a National Food and Nutrition Policy;
- establish norms and guide-lines for government institutional feeding;
- train institutional food service managers for government; and,
- provide technical expertise to other government workers.

In spite of this broadened mandate, the Department of National Nutrition was re-organised and 'demoted in status' in 1987 during the implementation of Family Health Project Phase I. It was made into a Nutrition Unit within the Maternal and Child Health Department, with reduced opportunities and mechanisms to address the inter-sectoral and broader nutrition issues.

Within the Ministry of Health, the Nutrition Unit has two areas of work:
(a) community nutrition and (b) institutional feeding; both under the Director and Deputy Director of the Unit based at the head office. In addition, the Unit has inter-sectoral responsibilities in the area of food and nutrition.

Community Nutrition

Nutrition activities in the Ministry are implemented within the Primary Health Care (PHC) framework where nutrition is one of eight components. In the PHC context, nutrition has been successful in attaining the community participation and inter-sectoral cooperation goals stated in the Alma Alta Declaration of 1978.[5]

Growth Monitoring

This programme is based at hospital and health centres. There are plans to extend it to the community level (some pilot projects are currently under way). The linking of information from this programme to the development of health education materials has also been planned.

Community Food and Nutrition Programme

The Child Supplementary Feeding Programme of 1981-85 gave way to a Supplementary Food Production Programme with SIDA support. This programme has been re-named the Community Food and Nutrition Programme (CFNP) to reflect the broadening of objectives to include the production of nutritious foods not just for the children but for the whole family. This transition has been made possible by the inter-sectoral collaboration secured through the National Steering Committee (mobilising communities and government personnel, as well as political leadership).[6] Under the programme, communities have received material support *via* seeds and fencing as well as technical support from Agritex and community educational inputs from other Ministries.

Under the CFNP, several initiatives were started, mainly in the form of reviews and consultancy reports. The main ones covered (a) health education strategies, (b) appropriate technologies for food processing, preservation and storage, and (c) curricula review of nutrition education in training programmes (Patsanza and Harvey, 1986; Lenneiye and Muza, 1987; Muza and Sweirstra 1987). These and other reports prepared in the course of planning the Family Health Project Phase II contain many recommendations on how to strengthen the integration of nutrition into activities undertaken by the Ministry of Health as well as other Ministries.

The Unit has had serious difficulties executing its role as Secretariat to the National Steering Committee due to staff shortages and insufficient access to government decision-making staff in other Ministries and agencies due to the organisational

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[5]See the PHC evaluations of 1984 and 1987 by the MOH supported by a variety of donors (WHO, UNICEF *etc.*).

[6]Management manuals, evaluation reports and several other reports have been produced by this programme. These provide ample evidence of the progress made by this programme in mobilising various agencies for food and nutrition activities.

location of this unit (Greiner 1990; UZ/MSU Food Security Research Project 1990.). The work of the Unit has also been subject to the priorities of the health sector which are often different from other sectors involved in food and nutrition activities. There are various strategies proposed to strengthen the capacity of this Unit but it is not clear how many of these will be feasible in view of the Structural Adjustment Programme.[7] Without some significant changes (see section 4), it will not be possible to mobilise nutrition technical support for the Structural Adjustment Programme (economic planning as well as social rehabilitation for individuals and families affected by the Programme).

Micro-Nutrient Programmes

A national programme to combat Iodine Deficiency Diseases has been planned and will be implemented. There are plans to make iodized salt more widely available and an inter-ministerial group is looking into the logistics. There is also a programme to deal with anaemia, especially during pregnancy. Vitamin A deficiency has also been identified as an area where action is needed. These last two programmes are being tackled through the health facilities by way of distributing iron tablets and Vitamin A capsules for children at risk.

Institutional Feeding

The programme of feeding patients in all government hospitals is managed by the Nutrition Unit through the deployment of Dietitians and food service supervisors (Institutional Domestic Supervisors - IDS). The Unit also runs the training programme for the IDS at Parirenyatwa hospital. It is under this programme that the Nutrition Unit contributes to the work of other institutions, like the Prisons, by providing guide-lines on diet and food composition for the maintenance of good nutrition in these institutions. Several programmes, like the CSFP, benefitted from this service when the quantities of food (maize meal, beans and oil) needed by each child were calculated and used as the basis of determining the rations.

Inter-Sectoral Action

The Nutrition Unit remains the only place in government where technical nutrition support can be obtained for all programmes with a food and nutrition component. The Unit has in recent years experienced a serious loss of staff (mainly as a result of the low salaries offered compared with other health workers). The Child Supplementary Feeding Programme, which the Unit spearheaded in 1982-85, cannot be implemented with the existing staff complement. The Unit still has to provide technical guide-lines to all government institutions with an institutional feeding programme. Technical nutrition support for drought relief activities as well as for

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[7]Details of planned strategies are in MOH (1991) *Family Health Project, Phase II Project Document; MCH: Nutrition Component.*

producing nutrition indicators for use in national planning are still the Unit's responsibilities.

As the leading nutrition advocate in the country, the Unit needs several skills that are not in the mandate of the Ministry of Health. The macro-economic issues of food pricing and subsidy, the statistical capacity to produce indicators sensitive to various development activities and the agricultural economics linking food production and nutrition are not in the sphere of Health. Thus, although the Unit has the mandate, its location in the health sector precludes it from acquiring staff with the skills necessary for food and nutrition planning and management. These gaps have been filled, although not fully, by the cooperation existing within the National Steering Committees - within the constraints implied by the status of this committee.

2.7 Ministry of Industry and Commerce

The Ministry is a key actor in the determination of farm and food prices. The procedure for the determination of agricultural prices is summarised below, but it is currently under review to strengthen the government's ability to respond to consumer and producer concerns (Sithole and Attwood, 1990):

1. Producer organisations hold discussions with The Economic Policy Committee of AMA.

2. Forecasts of trading account for each commodity is made by the advisory committees for various marketing boards (DMB, CMB, GMB and CSC) which also have representatives of producer organisations. Information is also obtained from the Crop Forecasting Committee to determine expected intakes.

3. AMA presents its producer price recommendations to MLARR.

4. MLARR negotiates prices with producer organisations while simultaneously holding discussions within the Ministry.

5. Recommendations are forwarded to the working party of senior officials of the Ministerial Economic Coordination Committee (MECC) who may modify the recommended prices.

6. Recommendations then are submitted to the MECC which comments, changes and submits them to Cabinet.

7. Cabinet deliberates on the recommendations and decides on producer and consumer prices of all controlled goods.

The Ministry of Industry and Commerce depends on information from MLARR and food manufacturers to determine recommended retail prices. These

recommendations are coupled with those from MLARR on producer prices to form a joint submission to decision makers in steps 5, 6 and 7 (above).

In the determination of prices as outlined above, several issues have been identified as important for food and nutrition:

1. What information is generated within MLARR and what is supplied by the producer organisations when assessing what is a reasonable price?

2. What mechanism does the Ministry of Industry and Commerce have for checking the accuracy of figures supplied by millers and food processing firms?

3. Can pricing be used as a mechanism to encourage or discourage the production and consumption of particular products?

These three issues are particularly important in view of the statement often repeated that "the price of maize is the single most important item influencing the nutrition of Zimbabweans".

The Ministry of Industry and Commerce has also participated in the committee handling the iodisation of salt for the control of diseases associated with iodine deficiency.

The Ministry was included in the list of NSC membership in the 1987 handbook on the SFPP but there is no evidence that it has sent representatives to any of the NSC meetings. Its inclusion in the committee was based on the recognition that the formulation of a national food and nutrition policy would have commercial and technological dimensions.[8]

2.8 Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare

The Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare administers two programmes: the Drought Relief Committee activities and the Public Assistance Programme (PAP) for the indigent under the Department of Social Welfare (DSW). The Director for Social Welfare is assisted by three Deputies in charge of (a) Drought Relief, (b) Public Assistance, and (c) Refugees.

Public Assistance Programme

This programme is targeted at individual families with the screening being done by staff of the DSW. The Social Welfare Act aims at protecting the vulnerable groups (widows, disabled, those continuously ill, *etc.*) who need both physical and social

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[8]The Ministry of Industry and Technology would contribute to the definition of "a framework within which a National Food and Nutrition Policy can be formulated"; MOH (1987).

rehabilitation. In a pilot study this year, the programme found that, with good screening, the numbers receiving assistance could be reduced, but presently staffing to carry it out is inadequate.

With the SAP, over 32 000 able-bodied people will be retrenched. They will receive a generous 'hand-shake' followed up by public assistance in the form of capital so that they can become self-employed. Initially, the children of retrenched workers will also receive assistance in the form of school fees. With the current minimum wages well below the poverty *datum* line (crudely estimated at around Z$400 per month), it will be necessary to develop a methodology for assessing the impact of the SAP on the poor and lowly-paid. The newly-constituted Social Fund will be responsible for channelling the necessary public assistance to individuals through the relevant Ministries (*e.g.*, fees through the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education). In the context of this fund, the DRP will have good screening guidelines covering the livestock, grains in store, remittances from the urban areas, *etc.*, held by each family).

Drought Relief Programme

The programme is targeted at whole communities rather than individuals or families and has four components. The management of these components is as follows:

Food distribution	-	by the DSW
Food for Work Programme	-	by DSW
Public Works Programme	-	by DDF in the MLGRUD
Child Supp. Feeding Programme	-	by Nutrition Unit in MOH

The whole Drought Relief Programme (DRP) is managed by the DSW under the direction of a Cabinet Committee on Drought Relief made up of Government Ministries and operating as:

(a) Members of a Drought Relief Task Force:

1. Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare (Chairing)
2. Finance, Economic Planning and Development
3. Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
4. Transport and National Supplies; and,

(b) Other Ministries to make up the full DRC:

5. Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.
6. Energy, Water Resources and Development.
7. Health
8. Construction and National Housing
9. Community and Cooperative Development.

Ministers of the above Ministries constitute a Cabinet Committee on Drought Relief (CCDR) which is responsible for policy formulation. Provincial and district drought relief activities are managed by an appropriate DRC chaired by the Provincial and District Administrators respectively.

Families in need of drought relief register with the VIDCO Chairman who then forwards the list to the Ward Councillor who compiles a list for the six villages in a ward. These ward requirements are submitted to the District Drought Relief Committee, which compiles a district report for the Provincial DRC - for onward transmission to the National Drought Relief Coordinator. Food is requisitioned from the GMB by the National Drought Relief Coordinator and it is taken to district distribution points by the drought relief staff. Councilors then assist with food distribution (10kgs. of maize per person per month). No other foods are given. Food is distributed in 10 kg packs (rather than breaking up the packs into smaller units) to distribute equally among deserving cases. The reported harassment of social workers during the distribution period is because many people are turned away since the number of 10 kg packs available is always less than the deserving/requesting population.

Information on the DRP is available in the Ministry but not analysed due to staff shortages. The staff are so busy that they do not even have time to summarise monthly returns into an annual report on drought relief activities. But, even from a casual inspection of this programme, it is clear that a substantial number of people benefit from the programme every year, Table 1.

Table 1:
An example of numbers fed under the Drought Relief Programme 1989-90

TIME	REQUESTS	FED	COST $	$/CAPITA
1989 April	694 255	219 862	1 433 462	6.52
1989 October	935 331	514 915	1 618 768	3.14
1990 April	1 558 977	12 016	114 546	9.53
1990 October	1 712 771	1 035 230	3 778 536	3.65

Food availability is reasonable during the harvest period (April-May) of each year and the number fed under the DRP is small. In the period October - December each year, food availability is a problem and the numbers requesting feeding and those fed under the programme are higher. Whatever the period, the difference between people identified as needing food and those fed is always quite substantial -- the percentage fed can be as low as 8 percent and as high as 60 percent. Explanations are being sought as to why the *per capita* feeding costs are lower in

October than April in both years. Transport costs might explain the higher *per capita* cost when small numbers are fed. In 1990, the lowest cost of 1kg of maize under the DRP was Z$0.36, and the highest Z$0.95 Table 1. The price of roller meal was Z$0.47 per kg.[9] It has been suggested that the DRC investigate the use of coupons which can be used to buy mealie meal at the local shops instead of distributing maize under the DRP.[10]

In the current management system of drought relief, two key mechanisms are not utilised: the various government extension workers in villages and wards (VCWs, WCCs, EHTs, Agritex Workers, Teachers, *etc.*) who have the technical knowledge on food and nutrition activities and the element of community participation where elected villagers take responsibility for organising activities as outlined in the 1984 Decentralisation Guide-lines from the Prime Minister's Office. Thus the VIDCO, WADCO and District Council are not consulted as a matter of routine, on work being left to the officials of these bodies.

Since the District Officer of the Department of Social Welfare has only a Social Welfare Assistant, a clerk, two drivers and four general hands, it is not surprising that the DRC has logistical problems (summarised below from discussions with various Ministries).

The Drought Relief Committee was advised by local leadership and DSW staff that, due to the difficulty of screening deserving families, instituting a programme where people work for food would not only screen needy families but also bring development to the communal areas. The Food for Work programme was instituted in 1989. Local drought relief recipients identify development projects and submit these to the DA's office for approval and advice. Projects must require no inputs except labour because there is no budget for other inputs. Supervision of the projects is undertaken by councilors and drought relief staff with DDC members being encouraged to visit projects if they happen to be in the area. Road construction, gulley reclamation, clearing of bush for irrigation schemes, brick moulding, fencing of grazing schemes, *etc.*, are some of the projects executed under this programme.

In a few instances, Food for Work labour has been used to work on projects being implemented by other Ministries (building of clinics, classroom blocks, digging of pits for latrines, *etc.*), but there is no systematic structure to facilitate this. This programme has serious problems because tools and materials are not provided. The Ministry staff do not like the programme because there is never enough food for the people who come forward. Thus the community becomes hostile towards the Ministry staff.

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[9]Personal communication with Jayne T.S., University of Zimbabwe. 1991.

[10]However, Zambia's experience with coupons has been disastrous.

Projects from the Five Year National Development Plan are selected for implementation in the Public Works Programme. Materials and tools are provided and each person who works for a month receives Z$88. Some of those registered in the Food for Work Programme prefer to work on the Public Works Programme because cash is paid which can be used for fees, clothing, drinking, *etc.* The programme pays half the money to the wife in some areas, so that household food can be bought.

There are plans to improve the management of this programme by:

- Implementing the criteria that families with a working husband and those with food in the granaries should not receive drought relief food. The problem is deciding on the cut-off point for sufficient food in the granaries.

- Investigating the possibility of implementing Public Works Programmes only and abolishing the Food for Work and other food distribution programmes. The money earned from Public Works Programmes would then be used to purchase food simultaneously creating the need for development and improved food distribution and marketing networks. Improved supervision of labour under this programme will improve if the Ministry is able to appoint one of the workers as supervisor.

- Encouraging Ministries with projects in the rural areas to use labour available under the Public Works Programme because it is able bodied and does good work with adequate supervision.

Problems Facing the DRP

Identified by the Department of Social Welfare:

- No evaluation of logistical problems facing the programme has been undertaken, except the fraud-related inquiry of 1985-86 (the Paweni saga) hence the lack of a comprehensive statement of problems facing the programme.

- There is no definition of sectoral distribution of responsibilities and staff of the Department of Social Welfare undertake all the work. The DA and PA exercise their authority in over-seeing this programme but they take no responsibility for programme problems. This existence of poor accountability is seen as a major problem in the management of DRP.

- There are problems of transport. The CMED has a serious vehicle shortage and the RMS undertakes transportation at commercial rates, therefore they are not willing to keep trucks standing. DDF vehicles have recently been deployed but they have many other competing duties.

- Inadequate staff to screen recipients has been identified as a major problem leading to many un-deserving people in the programme. This combined with the 'politicisation' of the programme has hampered adequate programme management.

- The DRP needs to have wider participation by various Ministries so that the MLMPSW can produce and implement a more comprehensive response to drought.

Identified by other Ministries:

- Although the government is promoting the growing of millet and sorghum in regions III, IV and V, the drought relief programme continues deliver maize. This is self-defeating in terms of the policy to promote drought-resistant crops.

- The child supplementary feeding programme had promoted good nutrition among communities by encouraging the consumption of oil, beans, vegetables and maize. On the other hand, the drought relief programme is accused of promoting poor nutrition.

- Communities have difficulties in using un-milled maize because it is not traditionally eaten that way and it is difficult and expensive to get milling facilities.[11] It is suggested that the milling of maize at Growth Points should be promoted so that less transport is needed to reach the rural population (the concern here is with the high transport cost when maize meal is delivered from city millers).

- The drought relief programme has lost the support of several government agencies because "political interference by local political leadership" instead of technical criteria is determining participants. The CSFP and SFPP were effective because the Ministry of Health developed technical criteria for screening and then trained government and community personnel to implement the programme.[12] It has been suggested that, except for transport and purchasing, the control and management of the Drought Relief, CSFP, nutrition gardens and similar initiatives should be decentralised to the community level. Such decentralisation would be accompanied by a clear outline of the role various support agencies (at province, district and ward) will play and what technical criteria they will

[11]This is not supported by the findings of the UZ/MSU Food Security Project, which found that rural families pay Z$5.00 per 90 kg bag for milling at hammer mills (personal communication, T. Jayne).

[12]There are detailed procedures on how to organise community feeding schemes during times of drought in Zimbabwe; MOH (n.d.) "Training manual on Child Supplementary Feeding Programme" Department of National Nutrition. Harare.

use to identify needy families. As in past projects, the staff of MCCD in villages and wards could be trained to conduct screening for malnutrition using the given criteria.

- It has been argued that due to poor planning, labour available through the Food for Work and Public Works Programmes has been used to build dams without input from MEWRD. Half of these dams have been washed away in subsequent rainy reasons. Small dams can be designed so that those who implement Food for Work and Public Works Programmes can use the designs to construct dams that can survive subsequent rainy seasons.

- Labour available under the Food for Work and Public Works Programmes also could be used in the construction of livestock troughs, washing slabs and other parts of the headworks during borehole construction. The construction of small dams and the rehabilitation of existing ones could be undertaken using the same labour but it would need to be better organised and supervised.

- Under current development strategies, the District Administrator and even NRB officials are more inclined to promote the building of bridges, roads, clinics and schools before they embark on environmental work using labour that is available under the Food for Work and Public Works Programmes. This is because of the lack of guiding principles formulated for the latter. A careful mobilisation of labour under the Food for Work and Public Works Programmes should be undertaken for land reclamation and re-afforestation programmes. Midlands and Masvingo have taken the lead in using this labour for land reclamation. Other provinces can learn from their experience.

- There is little linkage between community development and the labour mobilised under the Food for Work and Public Works Programmes. Although the supervision of labour under the Food for Work and Public Works Programme is a critical issue, the VCWs and WCCs cannot be used as supervisors because they are not senior enough to exercise the authority. It was suggested that Project Coordinators under the SFPP might have more success supervising this labour.

- Although Agritex and the Central Statistics Office (CSO) provide the DSW with statistics, these data are not used for planning for drought relief. Reliance is instead placed on information from councilors, MPs and other political personalities.

- There is a lack of forecasting of transport requirements from the DSW, which combined with poor planning, ensures that available transport capacity is not used optimally. During 1989-90, there were over 200 empty rail wagons going from Harare to Hwange every day but only once were they used for ferrying drought relief food. Even this instance experienced

many bureaucratic problems from both the Ministry of Transport and National Supply and the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare. Since there are areas known to be drought-prone, the DSW should estimate minimum food requirements on an annual basis and inform the Ministry of Transport and National Supply in a timely manner once the first crop forecasts are available from Agritex.

- The choice of depots by the GMB for the distribution of drought relief supplies has not been the best in view of the existing transport network. Maize is often drawn from depots in Harare for delivery to places where other, closer depots could have been used, thus reducing costs. The drawing of drought relief maize from GMB depots should take full advantage of the rail network. There are many depots between Harare and Bulawayo and maize from these should be used to supply Matabeleland.

- DSW HQ procures and purchases food supplies with little coordination with the provincial machinery. Although the GMB has heavy commitments because it must buy all grain on offer, it has agreed to work on weekends to load Drought Relief Supplies. However, the poor coordination of transportation with the DSW makes this difficult to implement at reasonable cost. There is always an inadequate number of off-loaders when the food supplies reach their destination. The standing times for trucks working on the drought relief programme are unacceptably high. Due to poor management, women and children often off-load the food although there is an abundance of labour available under the Food for Work and Public Works Programmes.

- CMED vehicles are hired out to Ministries and are administered under the authority of the Permanent Secretaries. It is therefore impossible for the DSW to direct that vehicles in districts be re-deployed to move food on weekends (when the drivers have their time off) without the authority of the line Ministry PS. Most vehicles hired to Ministries are 7-tonne trucks and are suitable for the movement of food within the district. The DSW only intends to move 8 000 tonnes of maize, a small consignment in terms of transport capacity available at the RMS and the NRZ. The RMS should deliver in 30-tonne trucks to the DAs office and DDF trucks used to distribute the food within the districts.

These management problems of the DRP indicate the lack of(or a failure to use) a National Food Early Warning System which would allow the relevant Ministries to operate at different states of alert depending on the crop forecast and anticipated seriousness of drought. Such a system is part of Food and Nutrition Policy and cannot be expected to operate under an *ad hoc* arrangement.

2.9 Ministry for Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement

The Ministry has the important task of supporting agricultural production as well as spearheading the determination of producer and consumer prices (see section 2.7). The Ministry is implementing several programmes in support of improved food and nutrition. Some of the key ones are aimed at:

- Increasing farm output from small-scale farming sectors to meet household needs with surplus for the market. Agritex, AFC and the Department of Research and Specialist Services are expected to play a major role. Improved marketing, irrigation and access to farm machinery will complement the work of these key institutions.

- Releasing more funds for activities identified above by removing food subsidies and offering higher producer prices. Government subsidy to the GMB will be reduced gradually from its current level of Z$59 million to Zero by 1994-95. This may impact the nutritional status of communal and urban dwellers whose staple is maize meal. The heavy subsidy given to wheat through the GMB trading account will also be removed. This is likely to have less adverse effects on nutrition. Analyses of these issues will be an important responsibility of the Ministry.

- Increasing the amount of Natural Regions I II and III land available for the resettlement of communal farmers through the amended Land Acquisition Act.

- Increasing the role of entrepreneurs in the marketing and distribution of agricultural produce in the country (especially food grains).

The reasons for malnutrition existing in commercial farm workers' families with incomes higher that those prevailing in the communal areas, need to be determined. Most MLARR research has been conducted in the commercial farming areas. Other farming areas need to be included.

Specific problems identified within the sector are:

- While lack of money, insufficient food and inappropriate diets are some of the reasons given to explain malnutrition, it is not clear what role each of these play in the communal, commercial farms, and urban areas.

- There is much fragmentation of responsibilities between sectors in the planning and implementation of food and nutrition activities.

- The NSC is not recognised in the government system and primarily works as a coordination mechanism between a few sectors. the MCCD, for instance, has pulled out the NDC because of its skeletal work staff. But NSC-related work cannot be used to justify the hiring of new staff.

Agritex

The Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (Agritex) implements programmes that have great potential in helping attain food security at the household and national levels. Its Extension, training, information and technical programmes are critical in the successful production of food and other crops in the country's farming areas. The department serves over 900 000 communal, 9 000 small scale, and 52 000 resettlement families, all belonging to the small scale farming category; and 4 000 large scale commercial farmers in the country. The Department has 1 733 Agricultural Extension Workers out of a total of 2 595 professional and technical staff.

Agritex is responsible for Land Use Planning; identifying settlement, farming and livestock areas in the communal areas; and advising communities. The successful implementation of many rural development programmes (*e.g.*, water supply and sanitation) is becoming dependent on the speed at which Agritex produces Land Use Plans for villages and wards.[13] The department undertakes many other activities which influence food security issues including conservation and irrigation plans, wet land drainage surveys, *etc.*. It also provides statistical data on many agricultural activities in the country.

The Department produces annual figures on expected crop harvests in the country by district so that the various agencies involved in food and nutrition activities can use the figures for planning. A systematic way of relating these figures to other population characteristics to produce planning indicators for various sectors has not been developed.

The Department is involved in several inter-sectoral food and nutrition programmes. Some of the main ones are:

- Land Use Planning in the NAC for the IRWSS Programme led by the MLGRUD;
- SFPP, Iodine Deficiency project and other health-related activities;
- Construction of houses on commercial farms and growth points with the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing;
- Support of the Refugee Agricultural Production programme under MLMPSW;

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[13]This programme is going slowly due to a variety of factors (inadequate transport, materials, and staff). By the beginning of 1991, just over 200 villages had complete maps and reports; with another 500 in progress (the figures were 20 and 100 respectively). There are 5860 villages and 1 020 wards in the Communal Areas needing these reports and maps (Agritex 1991.) *Field division annual report, 1989-90.* MLARR. Harare.

- Working with NGOs on agricultural projects related to women farmers, commercial farm labour, developing new extension methods, *etc.*; and,

- Working with private companies in organising competitions and field days around the country.

It is through management of SFPP that Senior Agritex Officers at the national, provincial and district level have made great strides in linking food production and consumption (nutrition) issues with household food security considerations. These staff have brought project planning, implementation and monitoring skills to the work of NSC, as well as Provincial and District FNMTs. The distribution of inputs, the design of gardens, the provision agricultural advice as well as many other activities, have been improved as a result of the leadership role played by Agritex Officers. Agricultural Extension Workers in villages and wards have provided direct support to groups and individuals. Thus the SFPP provides a forum for individuals to reach more information on the improvement of agricultural production on private plots. This has been particularly important in reaching women farmers who have traditionally been disadvantaged when extension support is provided through the old methods.

The widespread dissemination of new and improved technologies for food processing preservation, and storage still has to be implemented. This is another area where the role of Agritex will be critical. In the context of a national food and nutrition policy, Agritex has made important contributions and will need to continue participating in the process.

2.10 Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development

The Ministry has been active on the NDC since its inception. The Provincial and District Administrators have shown much interest in the work of Food and Nutrition Management Teams and have participated in the various planning workshops held for the SFPP. The same administrators chair the Drought Relief Committees. Reports and plans on district and provincial food and nutrition activities are discussed and passed by the DDCs and PDCs, chaired by the same administrators. Thus there is ample opportunity for Provincial and District Administrators to make an input into the planning and management of food and nutrition activities.

The Ministry is responsible for the operation of Local Authorities that can influence the direction of food and nutrition activities in the districts. The Councillor, working through WADCOs and VIDCOs, is responsible for allocating land in the communal areas and many groups on the SFPP have received land this way. The District Councils then pass a resolution confirming such land allocation.

The District Development Fund is responsible for road maintenance and construction in the communal areas which can improve the transportation of produce. The DDF is also responsible for sinking boreholes and deep wells to provide water to rural communities. The maintenance of these water points is also

undertaken by the DDF. In the IRWSS programme, the DDF is expected to work with organised communities in executing its task within the programme. The Water Point Committee, for instance, provides a critical link with communities in the implementation of water and sanitation activities by the DDF.

The work of the DDF is greatly hampered in the absence of organised community structures to handle food distribution under the drought relief programme.

2.11 Ministry of Transport and National Supplies

The Ministry of Transport and National Supplies was not included in the original composition of the NSC. The exclusion of this Ministry is perceived by some sectors to have hindered the progress of food and nutrition activities in the country. The planning of transport requirements, especially in the communal areas, is important because an increase in the rural truck fleet could have a major impact on the movement of food to solve local food shortages.

The Commercial Vehicle Procurement Committee has recommended the injection of 2 000 units of 8 to 10 tonne trucks into the rural transport sector. Although the kits for these vehicles have been approved, it is likely that most of these vehicles will remain in Harare and not go to the provinces where they are needed. Implementing ministries (like MLARR) need to liaise with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and request that 200 vehicles be allocated to distributors in each of the eight provinces so that rural transporters have a chance to buy these vehicles and use them to improve rural transportation. Although a few might make their way back to Harare, the majority would most likely be bought by transporters working in the rural areas and improve the transportation of food within and out of districts. A further injection of these under 10 tonne trucks into the rural transport sector should ease the problem of intra-district/regional food movement. The distribution of food within districts (from surplus to deficit food areas) should be easier now that the government no longer requires vehicles of 10 tonnes and under to be licensed - save for a valid road license and a certificate of road-worthiness.

The Ministry is represented on the National Drought Relief Committee and its input into the programme has been identified as critical to the success of the programme. There is therefore an extensive discussion of transport problems in the section dealing with the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare.

There is much interest in developing the role of this Ministry in food and nutrition activities. Useful support systems were identified and recommended as follows:

- Although the Government has implemented many programmes aimed at alleviating poverty, there is little evaluation to determine the impact of these interventions on nutrition. The impact of such programmes as adult literacy, food production under SFPP, drought relief, CSFP, *etc.*, should be assessed and the results made available to demonstrate to the MFEPD that

the investments made in the past have had an impact on the nutritional status of the nation. Such information should also be made available to the Ministry of Transport and National Supplies for use in its planning work.

- The unit handling food and nutrition in the country should produce indicators that can be used by various sectors to monitor progress in their programmes.

- The number of Zimbabweans who need food because they cannot produce enough for their needs should be estimated and made available to the DRC. It is possible for the Ministry of Transport and National Supplies to declare an emergency by way of a Statutory Instrument and call upon private transporters to move drought relief supplies.

2.12 Non-Governmental Organisations

The Zimbabwe Church Related Hospitals (ZACH) have shown an interest in the development of a nutrition programme under NGO auspices. [14] The Bulawayo Churches Coordinating Committee for Drought Relief has also been involved in nutrition programmes, especially relative to food production. This Committee has been running a Nutrition Improvement Programme in several Matabeleland districts since 1985. From the 1989 evaluation of this programme, there is evidence that (a) coordination between food production and drought relief takes place in some areas at the village and ward levels, and (b) the NGOs have successfully integrated their food and nutrition work into the Food and Nutrition Management Teams set up under the SFPP, (Khumalo *et al.*, 1989). Reports from the Provincial FNMTs reflect the participation of NGOs in the planning of food production projects in most provinces in the country. NGOs are represented on the FNMTs if they have staff at district or provincial levels.

Although VOICE in the past, has shown interest in nutrition work under the PHC strategy, such work is now being left to individual NGOs. The Association of Women's Clubs and other NGOs active in promoting the welfare of women are particularly active in village-level nutrition related work. Some NGOs (Catholic Development Commission, CADEC, Christian Care, Manicaland Development Authority - MDA, *etc.*) have also participated in the Drought Relief Programme by donating maize, beans, cooking oil, *etc.* Most of this food goes to the Child Supplementary Feeding Programme, although some NGOs have taken responsibility for the feeding of whole districts for months.

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[14] This interest culminated in the holding of a workshop to work out strategies for the NGOs in the area of food and nutrition; Kees van der Poort (1989) *Move my Hands.* Report of a nutrition workshop held at Kentucky Hotel. Harare. Zimbabwe.

2.13 Private Sector

Discussions have been held with some representatives of farming organisations. Their concerns in the formulation of a national food and nutrition are summarised here. The Commercial Farmers' Union has built up impressive data banks on various crops handled by their representatives. The main issues identified from discussions with various Associations under the CFU are:

1. In the case of all crops, the amount produced is dependent on the price offered to producers. The old system of announcing a Guaranteed Minimum Return before planting was felt to be a good mechanism for influencing the quantities grown and delivered to marketing boards for the various crops.[15] The current system of post-planting prices is said to have negatively affected the crops delivered (farmers with maize have the option of feeding it to cows if the announced price is too low). Pre-planting prices announced in August (which can be adjusted in April the following year when crop forecasts are available) are favoured by the farming organisations.

2. There is concern that current pricing policies pay attention to national and household food security concerns. Some examples were given:

   - The structural adjustment programme is encouraging cotton exports but the volume of cotton produced is dropping (affecting the textile industry and the oil industry).

   - The vegetable oil-expressing capacity for the five existing plants is 160 000 tonnes but the national production figures are well below this inspite of good export prices for both products (oil and the meal). National livestock requirements are estimated at 80 000 tonnes per year, sold locally at $540 per tonne (compared with $600 paid by South Africa if exported). The national ginning capacity is 350 000 tonnes of cotton seed which would yield 117 000 tonnes of lint and 233 000 tonnes of oil seed (proportion of 1:2 respectively). Only 18 percent of the cotton seed is oil (total potential of 42 000 tonnes of oil) with 53 percent remaining as seed meal for livestock. The national production is 187 000 tonnes and declining, although more cotton could be grown -- it is a crop that does well on marginal soils such as those found in many communal areas.[16]

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[15]However, this system resulted in the accumulation of large surplus stocks of several crops -- the ultimate reason for its discard.

[16]Most of the figures and arguments cited here can be found in the CFU publication Commercial Agriculture in Zimbabwe, 1990-1 edited by Syme, A. (1991).

- Over 90 percent of the vegetable oil produced in this country comes from cotton seed (accounting for 50 percent of total) and soya beans. The current method of estimating demand is based on the needs of urban consumers. If the system was broadened to fully cater for rural dwellers, a big shortage of vegetable oils would be realised. Soya beans were initially grown to replace fish meal for animal feeds but have become a successful crop for the production of vegetable oil.

- The 1981 and 1983 producer prices for maize were high and much maize was produced. Maize is said to be one of the few crops for which farmers can easily adjust production levels in response to prices. In the case of soya beans and wheat, there are constraints to rapid expansion. Soya beans can only be harvested over a 4-week period and the harvesting machinery capacity is limited. In the case of wheat, large investments are required in irrigation and harvesting equipment and can only be made gradually. Wheat and soyabeans are grown in rotation (wheat in winter and soya in summer). The farming organisations would like prices that ensure that the country produces the minimum quantities required. Maize is harvested over a long period, requires little capital investment and the harvesting technologies are quite simple. Price levels should be sufficiently high to maintain national requirements plus a strategic reserve.

- Horticulture and tobacco are becoming very lucrative for farmers (with returns between 30 and 50 percent; compared with 10 to 20 percent for maize). There is concern that the country will find itself with less food crops and more tobacco and horticulture[17]. Self-sufficiency in wheat, maize, cotton seed and soya beans is favoured with prices seen as the key mechanism.

- Neither the MLARR nor the CFU has developed a method to prepare a crop package balancing national requirements for various crops. If the price elasticities of supply and demand were known, a mix of prices could be developed and used to achieve the balance sought between various crops. A small price increase in the price of oil for instance can lead to a big increase in producer income due to the large volumes of oil sold. This is favoured as a way of maintaining price competitiveness between various crops.

- The good price paid for sunflower combined with its low-labour requirements has led to a decrease in the production of groundnuts. Communal area residents now prefer to grow sunflower and use the income from the GMB to purchase cooking oil instead of making their own peanut butter. Concern is expressed that cash income is not always used to benefit

[17]However, competition from production areas in other countries will keep prices in Zimbabwe at levels that will discourage greatly expanded production.

nutrition and the growing of groundnuts in communal areas should be encouraged. There is no price difference paid by GMB for high and low oil-yielding varieties of sunflower, leading to waste during the expressing stage. Price differentials should be used to encourage the delivery of higher oil-yielding varieties. Decontrolling groundnuts might also be a good thing (GMB pays $800 per tonne, but the informal sector pays over $2 000 per tonne).

3. The current relationship between government and farming organisations could be improved to facilitate negotiations between producers and marketing boards. There is a feeling that when the producers make a recommendation (with the boards agreeing) and the MLARR modifies the prices which are then approved by Cabinet with amendments, the full analysis is not being made available to the decision makers. Clear and concise arguments on prices and crop balance should be prepared by producers and government officials and submitted to MECC working party officials. Changes might also be discussed with producers and consumer representatives.

4. The GMB deficit is of concern. The Government, like any other buyer should pay the GMB for maize stocks held on its behalf. Changing these boards into viable enterprises can be achieved by the adoption of appropriate policies - *e.g.*, selling cotton seed on competitive tender instead of through the current monopolies perpetuated by price controls and fixed prices for the seed. The CMB could realise better prices and the oil expressers would become more cost-conscious. The Boards should be autonomous as recommended by the Parastatals Commission with the government defining the broad national food and nutrition policy within which the boards would function.

The Food Manufacturers Association was invited to make a submission to this consultancy on important issues for food and nutrition policy effecting food processing and distribution. No information was forthcoming.

The Nutrition Unit in the Ministry of Health has participated in the revision of food standards under the leadership of the Government Analyst. More areas for cooperation will be identified from discussions with the industries.

3. NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL FOOD AND NUTRITION POLICY

3.1 Extent and Causes of Hunger

The magnitude and causes of hunger in Zimbabwe have been the subject of many reports and documents.[18] Both chronic and transitory malnutrition have been documented and contrasted with the "phenomenal agricultural expansion among Zimbabwean smallholders and millions of tonnes of national grain surpluses" (Jayne, T. and J. Tagwireyi in UZ/MSU Food Security Project, 1990 :127). Particular focus has been put on the nutrition status of children under the age of five (as a sensitive indicator of community nutrition status since children show the effects of food shortage and ill-health sooner than adults). There are many documents on this subject as well.[19]

From the various studies, the status of hunger in Zimbabwe can be summarised as follows:

- Much hunger is caused by drought which mainly affects populations in the Southern and Western provinces. In these areas of low rainfall, the production technologies promoted are unsuitable.

- Children under five, especially in commercial farming areas, are hardest hit by hunger (one in three rural children in the under fives group is stunted).

- Poverty is the major cause of protein-energy malnutrition in the country. The laid down minimum wage has consistently been lower than the poverty datum line (Z$100 and Z$200 respectively in 1983).

- Inadequate land, combined with drought, lead to a situation where nearly one in four communal families runs out of food before the next harvest. Over 50 percent of the population live in the communal areas and nearly half of the land available to them is in the marginal Natural regions IV and V.

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[18]Moyo S. *et al.* (1985); Jayne T. *et al.* (1990) have comprehensive bibliographies on the subject of 'causes of hunger'. The NSC paper 'The nutrition situation : current strategies and plans' In: UZ/MSU Food Security Project (1990) *Integrating Food Nutrition and Agricultural Policy in Zimbabwe.* Proceedings of the first national consultative workshop. Juliasdale. July 1990. University of Zimbabwe :8-32, is a particularly good summary.

[19]The latest reviews are Greiner, T. (1990) "Nutrition Review, Zimbabwe - an update", Nutrition Unit, Ministry of Health, Zimbabwe; and Mason E. (1990) "The nutrition situation: current strategies and plans - consequences of malnutrition" In: UZ/MSU Food Security Project (1990) *Integrating Food Nutrition and Agricultural Policy in Zimbabwe.* Proceedings of the first national consultative workshop. Juliasdale. July 1990. University of Zimbabwe. :33-38.

- The agricultural policies pursued in the country favour the growing of maize which may be unsuited to regions IV and V.[20] The tendency to produce maize for the market may lead to a shortage of food for the family. Furthermore, the existing grain marketing system has discouraged the development of viable informal grain markets leading to the prevalence of artificially high consumer staple food prices in the rural areas.

- One in three children admitted to hospitals on account of malnutrition comes from a family with an alcohol problem. Home made beer, which uses up sorghum and millet, combined with excessive consumption reduces the amount of food available to families. This combines with poor food targeting mechanisms to produce malnourished families.

- There are poor infant feeding practices -- two in five mothers introduce solids before the infant reaches the recommended age of four months. Low bulk and high-energy foods are not always available to children in the 1-4 year age group.

- Excessive workload for women combined with large families means that food is often prepared late and in inadequate quantities.

3.2 Consequences of Malnutrition

The main consequences of nutrition problems facing Zimbabwe are:

- Increased mortality, especially in the 1-4 year old group where malnutrition is the major cause of death.

- Increased morbidity due to the susceptibility for malnourished people to infections.

- Retarded physical growth due to persistent malnutrition in early childhood.

- Reduced mental development due to small brains caused by protein-energy malnutrition during the first two years of life.

- Reduced socio-economic development due to lowered economic output from malnourished persons.

3.3 Coordination of Interventions

Although the NSC and DRC have made some progress in coordinating their particular interventions aimed at alleviating hunger and malnutrition, there is no

[20]Figures on crop yields and return on labour for various crops seem to cast some doubt on this assessment (MLARR, 1990).

national framework to address the issues of production, marketing, distribution and consumption to ensure both national and household food security.

The Nutrition Unit in MOH has performed its Secretariat functions well for the NSC in spite of staff shortages, inappropriate organisational positioning within the health sector and the conflicting demands on their time between sectoral and inter-sectoral health activities. Management, administration, coordination and other procedures developed and consolidated under the Unit as Secretariat to the NSC have now reached their optimum within the existing organisational set-up.

The current Economic Structural Adjustment Programme being implemented in the country is making new demands on all sectors involved in food and nutrition activities (Sithole and Attwood, in UZ/MSU Food Security Project, 1990). The planning of food and nutrition programmes will need better-defined indicators to assess impact of the SAP on vulnerable groups, better analysis of existing information, improved timely communication of findings to decision makers and well-informed evaluations of activities being undertaken. There will also be need for a concerted effort to mobilise resources for food and nutrition activities, prepare project documents and minimize duplication of efforts between sectors.

All these activities will require a national mechanism to keep sectors in touch with on-going activities without creating a large bureaucracy and at a reasonable cost. Proposals on coordinating mechanisms have been formulated with these concerns in mind relying on the strengthening of existing structures with minimum, but strategic changes. This is particularly important as the country is implementing an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which implies tight control of the expansion of public sector expenditure, especially in the social sectors.

It is anticipated that SAP will lead to short-term hardships for some of the population (especially commercial farm workers, marginal households in the communal areas, and the urban poor employed/unemployed). In this context, it is important for the country to articulate the role food and nutrition-related interventions can contribute to the 'social safety net' to protect the vulnerable groups from adverse effects of the SAP (GOZ 1991).

4. PROPOSED POLICY FOR FOOD AND NUTRITION

4.1 Mechanisms for Coordinating Food and Nutrition

National Coordination

The July 1990 Nyanga Workshop recommended that a National Action Committee on Food and Nutrition (NAC) be formed from the current membership of NSC and DRC. In order to avoid confusion with NAC for water and sanitation (NAC-IRWSS), it is recommended that this committee be given another name (Food and Nutrition Coordinating Committee - FNCC). The success of such a strategy needs

to be informed by the experience of NAC-IRWSS so that the FNCC can build on the strengths and avoid the weaknesses of this strategy.

Short History and Relevant Experiences of the NAC-IRWSS

The NAC-IRWSS started in 1981 as a brain-storming grouping of government officials responsible for implementing the United Nations International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. The Committee was chaired jointly by the Secretaries for Health and for Energy and Water Resources Development. From its deliberations in the period 1981-83, the committee set up several sub-committees and commissioned a large consultancy to prepare a draft National Water Master Plan (NWMP) - produced in 1985. During the period 1986-87, a National Coordinating Unit (NCU) was set up in MLGRUD which had been given the task of coordinating the development of rural water supply and sanitation programmes. Each of the Ministries on NAC - IRWSS was given a specific task to coordinate in these integrated projects.

From 1987 to the present, the NAC and NCU for IRWSS programmes have developed planning, administrative and financial procedures for use in IRWSS projects. Other achievements include:

- Retaining the implementation of programmes within sectors while planning and management procedures were developed by the NAC. The NCU undertakes day-to-day coordination and follow-up, as well as the Secretariat function demanded by IRWSS inter-sectoral management.

- Keeping sectors working together on these programmes.

- Allowing inter-sectoral planning to take place with funds being channelled through the relevant line ministry.

- Increasing rural water supply and sanitation coverage in the communal areas, thereby contributing to the improvement of people's lives.

In constituting the FNCC along the lines of NAC-IRWSS, there are certain constraints that need to be addressed. The main ones are that the NAC-IRWSS and NCU have:

- No inter-sectoral channel to the highest decision-making body in the country (Cabinet); relying on the coordinating Ministry alone. Thus, any measures that need to be addressed as a package are difficult to steer through because no one single Ministry can handle the various issues. The NWMP is still awaiting Cabinet approval due to some difficult inter-sectoral issues that have not been resolved since 1985.

- To check the tendency to build up administrative functions within the NCU instead of handing these over to the sectors as coordinating work builds up. The former would antagonise some sectors.

- A mandate to deal with rural water supply only. But most resources (money) for water goes to dam construction and the NAC-IRWSS has no mechanism to influence the use of these funds by MEWRD as a way of developing an integrated national water supply and utilisation programme.

In addition to the above aspects, NAC-IRWSS had the advantage of starting with a mixture of senior and middle-level government officers. The FNCC will only be bringing these together with the merger of DRP and NSC. All of these are important when approaching the issue of how to create a national mechanism to oversee the development, implementation and monitoring of a Food and Nutrition Policy.

Composition of FNCC

The FNCC should be comprised of Ministries already represented on the National Steering Committee for Food and Nutrition (NSC) and the Drought Relief Committee (DRC). These ministries are:

- Community and Cooperative Development
- Public Construction and National Housing
- Education
- Energy, Water Resources and Development
- Finance, Economic Planning and Development
- Health
- Industry and Technology
- Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare
- Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement
- Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
- Transport and National Supplies

There should be representation from the private sector on this committee (the key actors being farming organisations and food manufacturers). The three farming organisations, together with the Food Manufacturers Association, should be given a representative on the FNCC. The NGOs should also be considered for representation by either inviting a representative from VOICE or from the Nutrition Board of NGOs.[21]

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[21]The rationale, functions, and links with the NSC of this Nutrition Board of NGOs is outlined in Kees van der Poort (1989) "Move my hands", Report of a nutrition workshop held at Kentucky Hotel. Harare. Zimbabwe 23-27 October. :17.

Housing of the FNCC

The July 1990 Nyanga Workshop recommended that the new body to deal with food and nutrition issues could be housed in one of the three places; (a) Office of the Vice-President, (b) in the MFEPD or (c) in the MLARR. Having discussed this issue at length with various officials, it can be concluded that only the MLARR has the capacity to oversee the development and implementation of such a Food and Nutrition Policy, but needs critical support from MFEPD. The other proposed locations for FNCC were judged to lack follow-up capacity due to the limited size of their staff complement and the operational procedures prevalent in government.

The FNCC should be chaired by the Deputy Secretary handling agricultural economic issues in the MLARR. The Vice-chairperson should be the Deputy Secretary for Social Welfare.

The Day-to-day functions and administrative support should be provided by a Secretariat based in MLARR, with four key skills: (a) agricultural economics, (b) macro-economic planning, (c) nutrition, and (d) statistics. It would be necessary to have more than one officer handling some of these issues in the Secretariat. In view of the SAP, it would be important for the Secretariat to have full-time staff undertaking activities implied by (a) - (d) above. Without this kind of capacity, it is difficult to see how food and nutrition indicators for monitoring the SAP can be produced.

The FNCC would need to consider setting up standing working groups to handle the following issues:

- Planning and budgeting (chaired by Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning Development).
- Drought Relief (chaired by the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development).[22]
- Technical and Health Education (chaired by Ministry of Health).
- Manpower and Training (chaired by Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education).

Other working groups could be set up according to need (the removal of food subsidies, transportation and logistics, *etc.* could be handled by the standing working groups or by *ad hoc* groups constituted to handle a specific issue).

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[22]The PAs and DAs chair the Provincial and District Drought Relief Committees, and communication might be improved if the national working group is chaired by the same Ministry).

Reporting Structure of FNCC

The FNCC would report to the Ministerial Economic Coordinating Committee through the working party of officials. MECC is a Cabinet Committee chaired by the Senior Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development. The full membership of MECC is:

- Senior Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development -- Chair
- Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement
- Minister of Transport and National Supplies
- Minister of Industry and Commerce
- Minister of Energy, Water Resources and Development.

While overall policy and strategic decisions would be referred to MECC, there would be need to continue, at least for the time being, the channelling of drought relief policy issues to the Cabinet Committee on Drought Relief chaired by the Minister of MLMPSW. Using the overall national economic framework on food and nutrition from MECC, the Drought Relief working group of FNCC would prepare plans, strategies and activities for combating drought. The FNCC would then review and adopt these before the FNCC vice-chairperson tables them in the Cabinet Committee on Drought Relief.

Other mechanisms for handling reports and plans from the other four working groups of the FNCC would be identified so that MECC is free to address overall strategies and plans. The detailed plans and strategies covering health education, manpower planning, training, project planning, financial disbursements, *etc.*, would be channelled through other relevant government bodies.

Functions of FNCC

The FNCC would have the following responsibilities:

- Coordinate the preparation of food and nutrition policy for Zimbabwe based on the need for the country to address;
  (a) the short-term feeding programmes as well as the long-term issues of improving nutrition through agricultural pricing, marketing and production programmes; and
  (b) how to promote income growth in low-rainfall areas and among food-deficit farm families.

- Monitor the implementation of the policy by continuously assessing the nature and extent of the problems of hunger, especially by focussing on agricultural production and supplies.

- Prepare inter-sectoral strategies on the implementation of various activities demanded by the national food and nutrition policy.

- Assist various sectors in the management of their component in the food and nutrition policy.

- Coordinate the implementation of all programmes aimed at addressing hunger and malnutrition (such as Food for Work, Drought Relief, Supplementary Feeding and Production).

- Prepare and produce information on food and nutrition issues (hunger, agricultural production, supplies, national and household food security, *etc.*).

- Commission and oversee execution of research identified as relevant to food and nutrition activities.

- Produce annual reports on progress made by various sectors in the implementation of food and nutrition activities (covering programme targets, budget disbursements, *etc.*).[23]

FNCC Secretariat

The FNCC should have a full-time Secretariat based at MLARR. The MOH and MFEPD should second staff to work full-time in the Secretariat with these officers attending a weekly meeting in their parent Ministry (either Monday Morning or the Planning Pool meetings in the case of MOH) to give feedback and raise important issues. The Macro-economic Branch in MFEPD should second one of its economists to the Secretariat. Sectoral Economists should be part of the working groups identified as important for the working of the FNCC.

The Secretariat would require strengthening with technical personnel and equipment. Two to three agencies/donors interested in providing substantial support to both agricultural development and decentralised planning might provide support. Through such programmes, it should be possible to fund the equipment and personnel needed to build up expertise which can be passed on to line Ministries.

Secretariat functions would be to:

- Coordinate the production of planning, monitoring and evaluation reports for the FNCC.

[23]A start might be an evaluation of what has been achieved since 1983 in accordance with the report prepared by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development supported by a joint FAO/WHO/OAU Regional Food and Nutrition Commission for Africa. The document *Development policies and programmes for food and nutrition in Zimbabwe.* was produced in October 1983 and summarised the various food and nutrition strategies to be pursued by different agencies.

- Coordinate the preparation of project/programme budgets and facilitate negotiations with MFEPD and donors on the procurement and disbursement of funds and other resources to the line Ministries.

- Identify management constraints and develop procedures to strengthen the weak areas. Once the management procedures have been developed and instituted as administrative tasks, they should be delegated to the relevant line Ministry so that the tendency to expand the Secretariat is kept in check.

Provincial and District

Provincial and District FNMTs have in the past functioned as working parties of the PDC and DDC sub-committee on Production. The FNMTs should continue to be chaired by Agritex Officers (Provincial and District). The Social Welfare officer should now be the vice-chair. Secretariat functions should be undertaken by staff with training in (a) nutrition, (b) economics, and (c) statistics. The Regional Economist from MFEPD should be seconded to the Secretariat to fulfil the economist's functions. The structure and location of the Secretariat at the provincial level needs some thorough discussion once the future structure on the FNCC is agreed.

4.2 Planning Framework for Food and Nutrition

Several issues have been identified and suggested as being important in the development of a planning framework for food and nutrition policy in Zimbabwe (Tagwireyi J, n.d.). It is suggested that a national food and nutrition policy, within the overall agricultural policy framework, should:

1. Clearly state that household food security is a major objective and then develop strategies to deal with seasonal food insecurity.

2. The availability of safe and nutritious food throughout the year should be a stated goal (based on production, distribution, marketing and consumption requirements of the whole population). Important issues here are:

    - Making nutrition issues part of agricultural planning.

    - Reviewing the pricing of basic food-stuffs and its impact on households ability to secure the right mix of foods.

    - Inclusion of other food (not just cereals) in the definition of food security taking into account regional variations in types of food available.

    - Defining the size of vulnerable groups and then targeting strategies and programmes.

- Responding to the needs of women in agriculture and the bringing up of well-nourished children.

3. Commissioning and undertaking operational research to produce planning information and strategies to tackle the above issues.

4. Defining a suitable institution to develop and monitor the implementation of national food and nutrition work covering items 1-3 above.

4.3 Administrative Support for a Food and Nutrition Policy

Initially, there would be need to build sufficient capacity in a Secretariat to oversee the development of management (planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation) procedures for food and nutrition activities. The Secretariat would need to have the capacity to coordinate the formulation of a Food and Nutrition Policy as the first priority. It is therefore suggested that a temporary post of Coordinator for the Secretariat be established as a Technical Assistance Post along the lines of the National Coordinator for the IRWSS, established at the Deputy Secretary level. Once the NFNP and management procedures are developed and instituted into the various line Ministries, the post will need to be reviewed and either abolished, merged with others or retained as a temporary post.

In view of the Structural Adjustment Programme and its implications for the civil service, most technical work for the FNCC should be executed by a small team of permanent staff with a large pool of technical assistance personnel.

PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Attwood, Dr.	Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement
Chigudu, E. Mr.	National Planning Agency, MFEPD
Habede, Mr.	Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education
Hove, Mr.	National Planning Agency, MFEPD
Hutchinson Mr.	Commercial Oilseeds Producers' Association, CFU
Kahwa, S. Mr.	Agritex
Kasere, Mr.	Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare.
Macneil, Mr.	Commercial Cotton Growers' Association, CFU
Madzima R. Mrs.	Ministry of Health
Marume, S.B. Dr.	Ministry of Transport and National Supplies
Mashingaidze, Mr.	Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education
Mate, Mrs.	Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare.
Mpofu Mr.	Natural Resources Board
Nunhama, Mr.	Ministry of Energy, Water and Resources Development
Remba, J. Mr.	Ministry of Energy, Water and Resources Development
Tagwireyi, J. Mrs	Ministry of Health
Takavarasha, T. Mr.	Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.
Tsomondo, Mr.	Ministry of Transport and National Supplies
Wells, Mr.	Zimbabwe Cereals Producers' Association, CFU.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CADEC	Catholic Development Commission
CCDR	Cabinet Committee on Drought Relief
CDU	Curriculum Development Unit
CFNP	Community Food and Nutrition Programme
CFU	Commercial Farmers' Union
CMB	Cotton Marketing Board
CMED	Central Mechanical Engineering Depot
CSC	Cold Storage Commission
CSFP	Child Supplementary Feeding Programme
CSO	Central Statistical Office
DA	District Administrator
DANIDA	Danish Development Agency
DDC	District Development Committee
DMB	Dairy Marketing Board
DRC	Drought Relief Committee
DRP	Drought Relief Programme
DSW	Department of Social Welfare
EHT	Environmental Health Technician
FNCC	Food and Nutrition Coordinating Committee
FNMT	Food and Nutrition Management Team
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
IDS	Institutional Domestic Supervisors
IRWSS	Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation
LCS	Land Capability Study
LSCF	Large Scale Commercial Farms
MCCD	Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MDA	Manicaland Development Association
MECC	Ministry Economic Coordinating Committee
MEWRD	Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Development
MFEPD	Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development
MLARR	Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement
MLGRUD	Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
MLMPSW	Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare
MOH	Ministry of Health
MP	Member of Parliament
NAC	National Action Committee
NFNP	National Food and Nutrition Policy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NPA	National Planning Agency
NRB	National Resources Board
NRZ	National Railways of Zimbabwe
NSC	National Steering Committee
PDC	Provincial Development Committee
PHC	Primary Health Care
PSIP	Public Sector Investment Programme
RMS	Road Motor Transport
SFPP	Supplementary Food Production Programme
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WCC	Ward Community Coordinator
ZACH	Zimbabwe Association of Church-related Hospitals
ZIMFEP	Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production.

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5

Results Of Workshop Sessions:

National Consultative Workshop On Food, Nutrition And Agricultural Policy

June 10 - 12, 1991.
Troutbeck Inn, Nyanga, Zimbabwe

Compiled by J.B. Wyckoff[1]

INTRODUCTION

The First National Consultative Workshop on Integrating Food, Nutrition and Agricultural Policy in Zimbabwe sponsored by the Economics and Market Branch of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement; the Nutrition Unit, Ministry of Health; and the UZ/MSU Food Security Research in Southern Africa Project, was held in Juliasdale, July 15-18, 1990. A "Plan of Action" was developed at that workshop to "(l) seek a mandate from the Cabinet regarding a proposal to improve the organisational framework for addressing food insecurity and malnutrition in their short and long term dimensions; (2) to actually prepare this proposal in collaboration with other interested groups (contingent upon point l); and (3) to sensitise policy makers and the Zimbabwean society in general about the magnitude of the malnutrition problem in the country."

This follow-up National Consultative Workshop was called to:

1. Obtain consensus on the main issues to be addressed with regard to Food and Nutrition;

2. Define strategies for addressing Food and Nutrition problems within the framework of a National Food and Nutrition Policy;

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3. Propose a mechanism for implementing these strategies; and,

4. Propose a plan of action for follow-up activities.

All of the Ministries involved in carrying out food and nutrition programmes were invited to participate. The Jayne and Rukuni paper in this document reviews the dimensions of the problem and examines how vulnerable groups will likely be affected as the "Structural Adjustment Programme" is implemented throughout the economy. Recommendations for changes in the existing marketing system to minimise these impacts are identified.

Dr. Lenneiye then effectively identifies ongoing food and nutrition programmes, the Ministries responsible for implementing them and implementation problems. In addition, he proposes that the National Action Committee on Food and Nutrition, proposed at the First Consultative Workshop, be renamed the Food and Nutrition Coordinating Committee (FNCC) to avoid confusing this committee with other existing National Action Committees. He recommends that this committee be chaired by the Deputy Secretary handling agricultural economic issues in the MLARR. The FNCC would report to the Ministerial Economic Coordinating Committee, a Cabinet Committee chaired by the Senior Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development.

A response from the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement points out that we now have the *Framework for Economic Reform to 1995* which includes a policy matrix outlining the main long term objectives, short term measures and the sequencing of the government's structural adjustment programme. It is emphasised that the structural adjustment programme must achieve its economic growth targets in order to provide the resources required for social improvements. Further, the current rapidly diminishing food reserve stocks make it imperative that we examine both the production and consumption aspects of national food security.
Dr.Rukuni's reference at last year's conference to our success in addressing the issue of food availability but the need for "a lot more vision to balance the other side of the equation -- access to food through family production and purchasing in the market and through food transfer programmes" remains very valid.

Thus, the MLARR's response emphasises that, although the issues may be clearer, the recent disappearance of chronic maize surpluses makes them more complex. Any proposed organizational structure for administering a national food and nutrition policy must take into consideration the structural adjustment goal of reducing the civil service by 25 percent and the government budget deficit from 10 percent to 5 percent by 1995. These changes are not likely to reduce the workload of middle and senior grade management--the level of people required to successfully administer a national food and nutrition policy programme--nor increase the resources at their command. There will be serious problems determining priorities and resource allocations in spite of the overwhelming importance of the issues at hand. Proposals to request assistance from donors to build up required technical expertise must recognize the competition from other government programmes.

Much of the planning function required for implementing food and nutrition policy already exists, at various levels of effectiveness, within the Ministries and related parastatals. Coordination within the very real constraints of existing economic, social and political realities to obtain the proposed objectives will not be easy. Certainly, a pragmatic approach is appropriate for considering options within the framework of this workshop.

The initial response from the Ministry of Health noted that "malnutrition" is not understood by the public--"hunger" is. Further, the Ministry of Health concentrates primarily on "preventative, promotive, curative and rehabilitative" aspects of health and has few resources to allocate for studying malnutrition and/or programming solutions. The Ministry is not well equipped to take the lead role in National Food and Nutrition Policy formulation. However, it can provide limited technical support.

The importance of construction, transport and water development was emphasised. The necessity of government intervention in many of these activities was questioned. Why do we need government intervention in private boreholes? (Actually, this reflects a concern for ground water levels). Why do private boreholes work when government boreholes do not? Why does government play such a dominant role in construction and transport? Why is private sector entry restricted rather than encouraged in activities where it may well have a comparative advantage? These questions were felt to be rhetorical by many of the workshop participants.

However, the general failure of government and its entities to recognise the importance of "capital maintenance" rather than its implicit "destroy and replace" philosophy decreases the effectiveness of the construction and transport sectors in meeting the needs of the agricultural and food sectors. Lack of adequate infrastructure also decreases the efficiency of these sectors. Much of this inefficiency is concealed by false accounting to hide unneeded multiple handling and empty backhauls. It was suggested that grain be left (taken) where it is known it will be needed at some later time rather than being hauled to central depots. Further, that better planning would improve the utilisation of the transport fleet. It was pointed out that the GMB has developed a minimum cost transportation model but it is of little use without information on anticipated needs together with the time and location of the needed food by the various agencies by areas of the country. Finally, the need for investment in transport equipment was emphasized, but it was felt that much of this equipment could be manufactured locally if the proper investment incentives were present.

A question was raised concerning the policy of channeling large amounts of money for development into Natural Regions IV and V where it is difficult for people to produce enough crops and livestock to sustain human life. Wouldn't it be better to deliberately began to move the human population from those areas to more productive areas of the country? It was pointed out that even if the new varieties of sorghums and millets being developed by the experiment station at Matopos can provide high yields, problems with birds, drying, dehulling, grinding, *etc.*, increase the

cost of producing and using these grains. There is also the problem of palatability and cultural preference for maize to be overcome.

Much has been said about the existing drought relief programme currently administered by the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Services. It was pointed out that multi-ministerial decision making is the norm in drought relief and many other government food distribution programmes. This, together with the lack of proper planning, leads to many of the programme failures reported in the local press. Without proper planning, coordination of services among the various Ministries, *e.g.*, the Ministry of transport for the provision of trucks for delivering relief food, is difficult. The fact that staff contracts are annual, also leads to discontinuity.

All Ministries can participate in programmes such as "food for work" if they have appropriate projects. Politicisation and lack of adequate supervision are often problems in the execution of such projects. There have also been situations where the work is done but the food does not arrive. It should be noted that these programmes are separate from public works programmes.

The Ministry of Local Government is responsible for governmental administration at both the Provincial and District levels. As such, Ministry representatives pointed out that "nothing happens in the country without us". Effectiveness of their programmes, administered *via* committees chaired by Provincial and District Administrators, suffers from lack of participation by representatives from other Ministries and high levels of politicisation.

The final question raised during this discussion session was,"Can we double food production in the next 28 years to match the increase in the country's population?"

REPORTS OF WORK GROUPS

Workshop participants were divided into four "work groups" to:

1. Determine the problems faced by the various Ministries in areas of food and nutrition policies and programmes;

2. Identify strategies to overcome the problems identified; and,

3. Develop mechanisms to implement the strategies identified.

GROUP I

The group analysing the Ministries of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement; Environment and Tourism; Finance, Economic Planning and Development; Industry and Commerce; as well as the private sector food industry and farmers' organisations reported the following:

Ministry of Environment and Tourism

Problems

Land degradation due to the rapidly increasing population exerting more pressure on the land and, consequently, increasing poverty.

Lack of environmental impact assessment regulations due to a shortage of adequately trained people and a shortage of resources, *i.e.*, land, capital, *etc.*

Lack of planning for drought -- even when adequate planning is done, available financial resources are insufficient to implement the planned activities.

The presence of poor infrastructure, *e.g.*, roads, hospitals, schools, transport, *etc.*, due to financial constraints.

Strategies for Solving

Properly planning land use to indicate the optimum choice of crops in relation to agro-ecological zones. Education of residents relative to the importance of shifting to crops for which they may not have a traditional preference, as well as help in solving labour and other problems involved in the growing and processing of millets, will be instituted.

Implementation of a policy to decentralise processing into rural areas and to modify the current pricing system to target poor and vulnerable families.

Improvement of current environmental control regulations as well as methods for enforcing these improved regulations.

Development of adequate planning for drought together with priorities for the delivery of relief programmes. Funds to cope with the financial needs of drought relief could be raised by:

a) Collecting and setting aside a drought relief levy, or,
b) The government budgeting for drought relief even during good crop years.

However, there is always the danger that the government would be tempted to use the set-aside funds for other purposes during good crop seasons.

Encourage the government to shift some of their limited financial resources into the provision of roads, hospitals, schools and transport in the rural areas together with intensified efforts to raise funds locally.

Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development

Problems

Lack of adequate planning capacity, both because of a shortage of manpower and the necessity of using inexperienced staff. The inability to attract and retain well qualified, experienced staff is due to the lack of funds to provide competitive salaries and attractive working conditions.

Lack of continuity in coordinating the planning and implementation of food and nutrition activities because of the reasons stated above.

Strategies for Solving

Improve salaries and working conditions for civil servants.

Examine and rationalise both short and long term food and nutrition policies to identify the efforts needed to solve food and nutrition related issues. Identifying and sourcing funds and other resources within (and outside) government to implement solutions is essential.

Ministry of Industry and Commerce

Problem

Inadequate pricing policies for farm and food products.

Strategy for Solving

This problem has been identified as a major problem and efforts are underway to develop improved methods of pricing within the mandates of the SAP. Pricing on a regional basis could result in lower food costs in the drier areas.

Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement

Problems

Low agricultural productivity due, in some cases, to inadequate rainfall and infertile land, (especially in the communal sector), inadequate extension services, and research activities oriented towards solving the production problems of the commercial farming sector with a lack of resources to cover the research needs of the communal sector.

The existing levels of subsidy within the food production and marketing system are unacceptable under the SAP. The impact of removal of these subsidies on the poor, the vulnerable and small producers, especially relative to the basic foods such as maize, must be determined.

A skewed land ownership pattern due in part to Zimbabwe's political history and the present land tenure system. The existing large private holdings and the inability of communal farmers to gain title deeds to their land, harbors large inequities within the farming community.

An ineffective marketing system in rural areas due to the lack of an all-season road system, the absence of adequate marketing infrastructure, the centralization of storage, processing and selling points and the failure of the present system to support the development of private sector marketing.

Inadequate capacity to implement needed extension and research programmes due to a shortage of trained manpower and financial resources.

Strategies for Solving

Improve the allocation of the present resource base (land, capital and other) and provide more research and extension services to the communal areas.

Complete the ongoing analyses of the impacts of structural adjustment with full consideration of alternative producer and consumer pricing systems. Special attention should be focussed on the small grains for both local consumption and industrial use.

Introduce resettlement exercises only after all basic infrastructure in available.

Accelerate ongoing land use planning activities, the design of a viable land resettlement scheme with appropriate production and marketing technology, together with the mandated land redistribution.

Encourage the shifting of additional resources into improving the road network in the communal areas to support the decentralisation of storage, processing and selling (and buying) points together with the development of the private grain trade. Accelerate construction of irrigation projects.

Encourage the priority disbursement of additional financial resources to those departments of the Ministry that have responsibility for food and nutrition activities.

The Food Industry

Problem

There are inadequate food processing facilities in the country, many are operating with obsolete machinery and equipment, are too centralised to efficiently service the present sources of production and currently enjoy implicit transport and storage subsidies that will need to be removed if the SAP goals are to be met.

Strategy for Solving

The decentralisation problem is to be addressed in the same manner as with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. The overall role of the Food Industry needs to be clearly defined because of its potential contribution to household food security and nutrition.

Farmer Organisations

Problems

Too many farmer organisations -- the Commercial Farmers Union, Zimbabwe National Farmers Union and the National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe -- representing the interests of different farmers but none effectively representing the communal farming sector. The farm organisations tend to press for higher farm prices ignoring the impact of these higher prices on poor consumers as they are passed on through the marketing system by the government *via* higher consumer prices.

Strategy for Solving

The existing farm organisations should be consulted in the formulation of policies that affect their clientele even though they function largely as "pressure groups". Such consultation is especially critical on land and pricing issues.

Mechanisms for Implementing the Strategies

It was suggested that the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement should be the coordinating Ministry for implementing these food and nutrition strategies since most of the issues identified focussed on current agricultural policies and activities. This coordination should be done with the Ministries of Finance, Economic Planning and Development; Industry and Commerce; Environment and Tourism; Health; and others relevant to food and nutrition issues, together with farmer organisations and the food industry.

As indicated above, the lack of coordination in existing food and nutrition programmes is a major shortcoming of the present system and leads to ineffective

implementation and gross inefficiency. Thus, the need for a single organisation/Ministry to coordinate these activities is clear. But food and nutrition issues should not be considered in isolation. Thus, existing subcommittees associated with the various programmes could remain but would report through the proposed structure to the MLARR.

GROUP II

The group analysing the Ministries of Health, Education and Energy, Water Resources and Development identified the following:

Ministry of Health

Problems

Not all nutrition data is collected in a routine manner; when collected, it does not include sufficient indicators to specifically pinpoint the actual causes of malnutrition; the available data is not analysed in a timely fashion; and, very often, does not reach the authorities who appropriately need it for either policy formulation or to initiate action.

Some programmes operate with difficulty because of the lack of adequate manpower. For example, the capacity to handle the logistics involved in the purchase and delivery of food to where it is needed within the Child Supplementary Feeding Programme is not present within the Nutrition Unit.

Insufficient financial resources assigned to the Nutrition Unit has prevented some programmes from being undertaken while others have actually had to be discontinued, *e.g.*, the Child Supplementary Feeding Programme.

Neither the Nutrition Unit nor the Ministry of Health has the political clout to influence the integration of nutrition concerns into policy when it is being formulated.

Inter-sectoral cooperation has enjoyed some limited success even though some Ministries do not have definitive mandates to perform nutrition related activities.

Strategies for Solving

Strengthen community based food and nutrition programmes' data collection function and use the data to define strategies to increase awareness and programme effectiveness.

Match the allocation of personnel to the Nutrition Unit with the workload assigned to the Unit.

Encourage the Nutrition Unit to collaborate with other units such as the University of Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office or relevant commissioned researchers to increase the food and nutrition data base for planning. Even delegation of duties within the Ministry should be encouraged when appropriate to ensure that assigned tasks are accomplished.

Ministry of Education

Problems

Shortage of personnel to conduct nutrition related assignments. The Ministry of Health normally assists in curriculum development for nutrition and other activities as available resources permit.

Coordination within the Ministry is not adequately defined to facilitate the efficient execution of duties pertaining to nutrition.

Strategies for Solving

The Ministry of Education needs to acquire (or train) its own personnel capable of taking charge and effectively executing its nutrition activities.

A feasibility study is needed to determine the most efficient way to implement a school feeding programme in a cost effective manner.

Nutrition education needs to be encouraged at all educational levels to promote awareness of nutrition issues and their impact on the nation's well being.

The Ministry needs to organise their personnel to optimise the coordination of their nutrition activities.

Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Development

Problem

The capacity of existing boreholes is not adequate to support the household needs of people and water for their livestock. Thus, these boreholes cannot sustain the additional burden of providing water for irrigating gardens.

Strategy for Solving

Access financial and other resources needed to improve water availability in the communal areas.

Mechanisms to Implement Strategies

A body (or mechanism) needs to be created that will have the responsibility for directing and coordinating nutrition activities while simultaneously being in a position to influence policy.

The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (at the present time) is in the best position to channel nutrition policy concerns to the cabinet for consideration.

GROUP III

This group examined the situation existing within the Ministries of Community and Cooperative Development; Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare; and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs). Their analysis follows:

Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development

Problems

An apparent lack of policy guidance at the national level together with no definitive programme and/or policy for community development activities nor their linkage into a defined plan for rural development.

Absence of viable, alternative, non-agricultural income earning opportunities. Even within agriculture, many projects are not viable, *e.g.*, small stock projects introduced to provide sufficient incomes to rural households. Identified sources of non-viability include: 1) small markets, 2) lack of inputs due to non-functioning input markets, 3) lack of appropriate technologies, and, 4) lack of skills, both managerial and technical.

A lack of well integrated support systems by the government and the NGO's.

A general shortage of water with no provision of water for irrigation purposes. This results in water shortages in boreholes meant for human and livestock water.

Strategies for Solving

The drafting of national guidelines for community development together with designing a mechanism for liaising with other Ministries to advocate community development in an integrated way. Existing National Guidelines need to be implemented rigourously.

The creation of employment opportunities in the rural areas.

The development of integrated support systems for rural community development projects.

Encouraging institutional support in the form of contracting with rural projects for supplies, *e.g.*, vegetables for hospitals, bricks for building projects, *etc.*

Construction of water facilities to provide for the irrigation of vegetable gardens via, *e.g.*, small earthen dams, high yielding boreholes and low cost pumps.

Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare

Problems

Public Assistance Programmes (Social Welfare) are intended for indigent persons throughout the country but the Ministry is not able to provide adequate coverage for all the needy. Coverage has tended to favour those who were familiar with the system rather than those who most need help.

Drought relief programmes have many problems with the "Food for Work Programme" suffering from:

1 poor coordination and planning with other Ministries and agencies charged with providing transport and services;

2 the technical criteria developed for screening recipients is not always utilised;

3 interference by local politicians or other local leadership;

4 the absence of, or poor, monitoring and/or evaluation;

5 nothing to show for the investment or money that has been put into the programme; and,

6 being treated as an *ad hoc* matter.

Public Works Programmes (incorporated into the District Development Work Programme) suffer from:

1 poor workmanship and discipline in the work done -- as a result, government departments do not contract work to the Public Works Programmes; and,

2 the fact that they are viewed as a temporary and not as a permanent part of the programme.

Strategies for Solving

Re-examine and review the provisions of the Structural Adjustment Programme to make sure that adequate provision has been made in the "Social Fund".

Develop new criteria for identifying recipients of food relief (see "Proposed Food Relief Programme").

Conduct an evaluation to highlight the weaknesses of existing food relief programmes to assist in designing more effective management systems that eliminate interference from local leadership and politicians motivated by personal gain.

Abolish existing programmes and adopt the following "Proposed Food Relief Programme". This proposed programme would have three components:

1 A school feeding programme to provide meals for school children identified as malnourished in the primary schools. The criteria for identifying the needy would be built into the food relief programme.

2 A clinic based feeding programme for "under fives" with problems of malnutrition. The identified malnourished "under five's" would be traced to their households to assess the nutrition status of all household members. If malnutrition is discerned to be present, a feeding programme would be instituted for the family.

3 A permanent programme for affected households in the low rainfall areas, the marginal communal areas and for households not able to produce a sufficient quantity of food to meet their own food requirements.

If this proposed programme cannot be adopted, put labour employed under the Food for Work Programme on projects that will enhance productive capacity. Any permanent food relief programme that evolves should have drought relief built into it together with criteria for identifying needy persons and/or groups.

Public Works Programme projects should be supervised by professional supervisors. Further, minimum work standards to be achieved by the work parties should be set up with penalties for non-achievement. Finally, this programme should concentrate on projects that will enhance the capacity of rural areas to sustain themselves.

Drought relief programmes should be made permanent as drought is a permanent feature in the low rainfall areas (Natural Regions IV and V) of Zimbabwe and is one of the reasons that food relief is needed to supplement low production and to make food available to households not able to produce enough to meet their own food requirements.

Non-Government Organisations

Problems

Neither the organisations nor their programmes are well coordinated at the national level. Further, they are not represented on relevant committees, *e.g.*, drought relief at the national level, but are on the District and Provincial drought relief committees.

The impact of their programmes and projects has never been assessed by government.

Strategies for Solving

Measure the impact of their activities with the view of adopting those elements and mechanisms deemed to be successful in achieving relevant food and nutrition objectives in the context of national policy.

Involve NGO representatives on national committees, especially for food relief programmes.

Mechanism to Implement Strategies

Create by Act of Parliament a Food and Nutrition Council to be administered by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.

Alternatively, this Food and Nutrition Council could be housed by a) the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, or, b) the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

GROUP IV

The group considering the Ministries of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development; Ministry of Transport and National Supplies; and the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing filed the following report:

Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development

Problems

Lack of coordination with other Ministries and the National Steering Committee in programme implementation from the top management levels to the grassroots. There is a general lack of understanding of the functions that Local Government performs, thus a failure of relevant Ministries to participate at both the policy and

the operational levels. This is reflected in such activities as coordination in the utilisation of transport belonging to different Ministries to deliver food relief.

The general failure of the various Ministries to send representatives to attend meetings called by Local Government at the Provincial and District levels. When representatives are sent, they are often junior staff who have to "check with the boss" and then never return.

The lack of both quantity and quality manpower to supervise the food distribution work programmes to assure that standards are being maintained.

The public works programmes give money for work -- currently Z$4/day -- but rumoured to soon be reduced back to its previous level of Z$2/day. How much work can you expect to get for Z$2-4/day? Even at this level, available financial resources to support the programmes are scarce.

A problem in distributing relief food which is delivered to the District Administrator's office. The availability of Ministry of Transport vehicles and District vehicles is often inadequate.

The existing system for the collection of data to identify deserving beneficiaries for drought relief and other nutrition programmes is not utilised. As a consequence, data are synthesised and no one is left out. This synthesised data is also used for project identification at other levels of government that depend upon local government for this input.

Ministries of Public Construction and National Housing and Transport and National Supplies

Construction Problems

There a shortage of skilled, professional, technical manpower, *e.g.*, architects, engineers, planners, *etc.* These professionals are important in the creation of support infrastructure such as roads, housing, factories, grain storage and other civil works. Further, those available are assigned to the head office and are not available to supervise projects in the field. All Ministries involved in public works projects should contribute to project supervision to ensure that acceptable standards are met.

There is a transport problem--both in moving personnel and materials. The Ministry of Public Construction is dependent upon the CMED and RMS for transport. This is critical as some building materials have limited "life", *e.g.*, cement.

There is a problem of timely availability and shortage of some building materials such as cement, steel, tiles and bricks as well as a shortage of skilled personnel, *i.e*, a general shortage of construction capacity.

There is a general lack of foreign exchange for procuring building raw materials, finished building components, construction plant equipment and machinery as well as spare parts.

Transport Problems

There is a general shortage of equipment for the national fleet, *e.g.*, NRZ, CMED, Swift (private), *etc.*, as well as a shortage of spares for the maintenance of the existing fleet. This generally reflects lack of access to foreign currency.

The wrong choice of transport mode for the job at hand results in inefficient and costly transport. For example, shipments that should move by rail are sent by truck, appropriate road shipments may go by air, *etc.*. Analysis of the actual cost of wrong decisions is now underway.

The transport user community tends to operate with "crises management". This lack of management in planning and coordination results in critical inefficiencies in the use of scarce transport resources.

Inefficient management of both the transport and user sectors leads to under-utilisation of transport equipment. Zimbabwe has the highest incidence of empty backhauls.

Inadequate infrastructure (roads, *etc.*) in the rural areas limits the efficiency of grain deliveries. Further, CMED and DDF vehicles are not suitable for grain haulage and may do great damage to existing roads.

Strategies for Solving

Implement the strategy contained in the SAP by reducing government participation in those activities that can be best performed by the private sector--for example, construction and the transport of maize. This will release scarce government resources for other vital functions.

Implement a policy to increase the amount and reliability of access to foreign exchange for transport and construction to meet the nation's objectives for these sectors (both public and private) and to guarantee regular access to spares for maintenance of existing capital stock.

Develop the means for training an increased supply of skilled manpower needed by these sectors such as engineers, architects, surveyors, *etc.*, together with a review of salary scales and working conditions for retaining professional staff within government.

Encourage privatisation of parastatal functions that can be performed efficiently by the private sector, reduce general subsidies and target direct subsidies only to the most needy areas, improve management efficiency both within government and the

private sector and coordinate public and private sector construction and transport to maximise national performance in these sectors.

Specifically improve planning and coordination from the head offices to the grassroots for food distribution programmes such as drought relief among the relevant Ministries and parastatals such as Social Welfare, the GMB, Transport, District Administrators, *etc.* Development of appropriate data collection and analysis systems for determining optimum transport modes, supply sources and destinations; projecting relief food needs by location and timing; and for establishing priorities for use of the limited government construction resources.

Develop an appropriate dynamic, objective data base for identification of deserving beneficiaries for food relief programmes to maximize professional input and remove the politicisation existent in the present system.

Mechanism for Implementation

It is proposed that the name of the existing Cabinet Committee on Drought Relief be changed and the responsibilities of the committee be expanded to reflect National Food and Nutrition Policy responsibilities. It is felt that institutionalising a Food and Nutrition Policy, which includes drought relief, would emphasise the importance of these concerns to the nation. All of the Ministries presently participating in the Cabinet Committee on Drought Relief would continue to serve under the proposed structure.

Plan of Action

The programmes, problems, strategies and implementing mechanisms presented in Dr. Lenneiye's paper and identified by the work groups were thoroughly discussed. Ultimately, it was agreed that the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement would be the appropriate coordinating Ministry for a National Food and Nutrition Policy. It was further agreed that the Deputy Secretary for Economics and Markets, Mr. Takavarasha would be the appropriate person to guide the drafting of the proposed "Cabinet Paper on Food and Nutrition". An early draft of the proposed paper would be discussed by the organisers and participants of this workshop.

The time-table proposed was as follows:

1. The University of Zimbabwe would compile the proceedings from the workshop material by the end of June.

2. Participants and their Ministries would review the draft proceedings and forward their comments to the University of Zimbabwe within ten days.

3. After consultations with and the acquiescence of the Permanent Secretary of the MLARR, Mr.Takavarasha would supervise the production of the first draft of the "Cabinet Paper" to be completed by the end of August.[2]

4. Workshop participants would be called for a one day meeting to review the draft paper.

5. The MLARR would move the draft "Food and Nutrition Policy" paper, if accepted, to the Cabinet Committee for Drought Relief.

6. The workshop organising committee and the National Steering Committee are to keep activities related to this issue going until the proposed FNCC (or some similar group) is formed.

EPILOGUE

It is obvious from the material presented in these proceedings that the food and nutrition issue is a complex one. It involves many Ministries, departments within Ministries, parastatals, industry groups and private sector entities. Food and nutrition affects everyone in the population. It affects some only as consumers--some as both producers and consumers. The current level of awareness of household food security and malnutrition problems is not high, even at the highest levels of government where policy is made. The absence of a definitive National Food and Nutrition Policy has resulted in less than optimally managed, fragmented, uncoordinated policies and programmes located in many different Ministries.

Failure to recognise the importance of food and nutrition at the national level has led to underfunding, understaffing, inadequate staff quality, failure to initiate and/or cancellation of worthy feeding programmes, lack of adequate nutrition training, politicisation of food relief programmes, and unnecessary hunger and malnutrition. The lack of appropriate statistical information, lack of analysis of the data available and failure to appropriately use the available analyses has led to poor planning, as well as a failure to anticipate and coordinate human needs, available food supplies, transport for delivery and effective identification of those deserving food relief.

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[2]Because of previous commitments, the August schedule for completion of the draft paper has proven to be unrealistic.

National and household food security depends, first, upon the effectiveness of the organisation of productive resources and the level of technology employed to make the proper balance of nutritious food available to the country's families. Being sure that all households have means to access available supplies is the second element of the food equation. Being sure that each member of each family actually consumes their share of the food accessed is the final element.

Government gazetted farm and consumer prices for basic commodities, together with a government grain marketing monopoly and subsidised consumer prices for some commodities, has distorted the allocation of resources and provided little guidance for the "Structural Adjustment" programme now being implemented. The failure of Zimbabwe's economy to keep pace with the country's population growth has led to high levels of unemployment, thus, a lack of access to food *via* consumer markets. Finally, poorly designed and executed food relief programmes have failed to consistently provide access to needed food by those temporarily or chronically not relevant in the market place.

A National Food and Nutrition Policy must deal with these issues in a coordinated manner. The mechanism for formulating and implementing this policy must be capable of "beefing up" the technical capacity needed, provide effective administrative support and have sufficient "political clout" to access the necessary financial resources. All this within the context of the SAP.

The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement has been identified by the workshop as the most appropriate entity to provide the leadership for developing a National Food and Nutrition Policy. The National Steering Committee for Food and Nutrition's activities over the last six years provide a useful input into this effort as does the output of these National Consultative Workshops. The goals of the Government's Structural Adjustment Programme demands the rationalisation and streamlining of many food security and nutrition activities and the cushioning of adverse effects on society's vulnerable groups. A National Food and Nutrition Policy will ensure that these goals are met.

ANNEX 1

National Consultative Workshop On Food, Nutrition And Agricultural Policy

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