Journal qfSocial Development in Africa (1989) 4,2, 71-73 
Comment on the Reply 
LEONARD BLOOM* 
Pearce's misconceived 'reply' is intellectually dishonest, totally without understanding of the 
position of social scientists in Africa (and elsewhere), and inadequate, impressionistic and 
unsubstantiated. It's intellectually dishonest because I am accused of faults that reside in 
Pearce's mind and not in my article. Itis inadequate because it slides into mystifying, populist 
fallacies that are irrelevant to my paper, and do nothing to suggest positively how the social 
sciences might better serve Africa. Its impressionistic, nihilistic tone and unsubstantiated, 
wild accusations will be read with skepticism by her social scientist colleagues. 
Pearce's critique of my paper begins by misrepresenting the theme of my paper. It wastes 
time with a turgid section that rubbishes the social sciences, and it ends with a misty ethicalpolitical 
section. This last is particularly odd, because Pearce seems to base much of her 
critique upon my using ethical-political arguments. The paper is disappointing because it is 
so busy with scholastic choplogic that the opportunity to add to the discussion of an urgent 
problem is ignored. The paper is barren because it has not one item of observation or research, 
and yet she accuses me of not writing a 'descriptive sociology'. 
Pearce'spaper is largely constructed around her opinions of the methodology of the social 
sciences. Not everyone will agree with her conservative and somewhat old-fashioned views. 
There is, repeatedly, the explicit criticism that I make normative claims, yet Pearce replies 
with her covert normative judgments, which appear to be little more than a sentimental antiintellectualist 
position that social scientists must avoid 'pretensions' and should remember 
that they are human beings too. Whoever has denied this platitude? 
Pearce claims that I give reasons to those hostile to the social sciences 'for intensifying 
their hostility'. Her fiery hostility to social sciences is hardly likely to moderate the hostility 
of government Would she prefer mat we fell over backwards to placate governments, and 
abandon the attempt to combine social commitment and methodological detachment? Has 
she never heard about the fate of the unhostile and conforming social scientists in Nazi 
Germany? With more political and philosophical sensitivity Pearce could have usefully 
supplemented my paper with the fruits of her experience - if she has had any experience in 
tackling the problems that I identify. She might, too, have tried to fill the descriptive gaps 
about which she complains. If, however, she seeks sociological description she might glance 
at Bloom and Otong (1987). 
+ I>^ofS<xiriSdences,SoothB»iikPolytcdmic, Lender Ro«d, London SEl OAA
72 Leonard Bloom 
Essentially Pearce comments on a paper that exists in her head. I did not 'prepare us for 
a descriptive sociology of the social sciences in Africa' because I didn't intend to. If Pearce 
wants such a sociology, she is free to write one. I was concerned about a worrying problem 
in Africa - a problem with which many social scientists are troubled. Pearce, a fellow in a 
university with a social science faculty, shows a lack of sensitivity to those of her colleagues 
who strive to employ their skills, experience and commitment to the social, administrative and 
political problems of Zimbabwe. They would rightfully resent her impetuous attempt 'to lay 
bare the pretensions of social scientists'. 
Pearce's opaque style does not help the reader with 'theproblem of intelligibility'. What 
precisely is meant by the ugly sentence that there is a "tendency within social science writing 
to inflate complexity of ideas with obscurity of expression and to perceive in the latter 
evidence of the former"? Does Pearce mean that there are some social scientists who 
«?/»ieft'mesusejargon,andthatjargonmaybecorifusing? But what is judged by Pearce to be 
jargon may be judged by a social scientist using it as a concise, time-saving technical term. 
In itself this, and similar remarks by Pearce, betray her prejudices about social sciences and 
add nothing to the debate. More serious are some tendentious and sweeping generalisations, 
quite unfounded, that a moment's thought should have edited out, that reveal her hostility to 
the social sciences. 
Three examples: Pearce claims that I think that' social scientists are entitled to play social 
critic because of a superior understanding of social problems'. The emotive use of 'entitled' 
and 'play', to suggest that social scientists are frivolously indulging in some mysterious game, 
is a breach of one of the 'laws of thought' which so trouble Pearce. She has forgotten about 
the inadmissibility of arguments ad hominem! 
There is also one total misrepresentation, Pearce writes of 'Bloom's faith in the success 
of statistical analysis'. This is not a matter for faith or lack of faith. We are not debating the 
existence of fairies. With one breath, however, I am assailed for ignoring evidence, ie 
statistical data among other sources. With another breath I'm assailed for my 'faith' in them! 
It is difficult to take seriously a writer who cannot understand that the stresses and 
problems of a post-colonial society can cause individuals and groups to experience alienation; 
who cannot understand that writing of the Third World as a hospice is a dramatic image. If 
the ThirdWorldis no more than a hospice, then it is perceived as a world that is dying. Adying 
world is a world that we need not strive too vigorously to restore to health. Has Pearce never 
heard of, or even used, metaphors? It is neither 'trivial' nor 'completely illegitimate' to 
mention a view, not rare in the west, mat Africa can be written off - a terminal patient in a 
hospice. 
Pearce does 'not wish to deny the failures of Africa', but she seems not to understand that 
'BkxHn'sexplanationof the causeofAfrica'swoes' does notexclude me study of the political, 
economic, historical and social environment: a socio-cultural study does not, however, 
exclude the study of psychologicalprocesses, even psychopathology. Whatever Pearce might 
think, Africans are people too- including those in positions of power. It is entirely legitimate
- Comment 73 
to explore the irrational aspects of African, as of any, people in power. This view is not racist 
It is a legitimate part of the complex study of psychology and social structure. 
Where could we go from here? Pearce's paper is negative. It is admitted that the 
'challenge...seeks less to present new empirical evidence...than to demonstrate the weaknesses' 
of a social science approach. Pearce attacks positivism, thus strengthening the impression that 
she is less concerned with studying social problems than in pontificating about them. Had 
Pearce shown a stronger interest in the difficulties of Africa she might, perhaps, have 
suggested some possible areas of research or better methods of enquiry. We are left with 
nothing. 
May I tentatively suggest that there are some broad directions in which research might 
proceed? It wouldbe useful to have more case studies of political socialisation, of 'traditional' 
vs 'non-traditional' attitudes towards authority, and the social psychology of moderating 
authority, and of the personality and other characteristics of those who seek and those who 
secure power. I hope that Pearce's unsatisfying paper does not discourage her social scientist 
colleagues from pursuing further some of the issues that I raise. 
Reference 
Bloom L and Ottong J G (1987) Changing Africa: An Introduction to Sociology, 
Macmillan, London.