Journal of Social Development in Africa (1988), 3,1, 31-38 
Enhancing Equity in the Midst of 
Drought: The Botswana Approach 
JOHN HOLM AND MARK COHEN + 
ABSTRACT 
In Africa the typical social consequence of drought is an accordion effect in 
which wealth and income shrink drastically. The poor suffer most severely as 
their mortality rate rises. Their plight then prompts dramatic increases in 
international aid. Moving this relief to those in need, however, is usually 
extremely slow, as indigenous elites and the head of the aid organisations 
struggle over their relative roles in decision-making. 
This article examines how a veritable welfare state has emerged from one of 
Botswana's most severe droughts and why this deviation from the typical 
African syndrome has taken place. 
Introduction 
Botswana, situated on the Kalahari desert and its fringes, is no stranger to the 
realities of drought, but it has managed to avoid the syndrome of inequitable 
levels of suffering in its current five-year drought, which began in 1981. Relief 
and recovery programmes have both protected the rural poor from 
malnutrition and ensured that they are able to maintain a large proportion of 
their economic assets. International agencies are so impressed by the 
country's own relief organisation that they channel all their support through 
it. The system's popularity with the general population is so great that political 
observers suspect the government will retain much of the programme as a 
permanent welfare system. 
In most of Botswana rainfall averages between 400 and 500 mm, with some 
small areas receiving as much as 700 mm and others as little as 250 mm. With 
such low precipitation, even sorghum and millet, which require relatively little 
moisture, become high-risk crops, especially since the irregular character of 
rainfall often produces severe moisture stress during the growing season. 
'Reprinted from Ceres, the FAO Review on Agriculture and Development, Vol 19 No 6, 
Nov - Dec 1986, 20 - 24. 
•••Cleveland State University, 1983 East 24th Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44115, USA, and 
Agricultural Economics Department, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853, USA.
32 John Holm and Mark Cohen 
Furthermore, winter is a dry season; field preparations are often delayed until 
after the first rains because oxen are not in condition for ploughing. 
Botswana alternates between decades with rainfall and decades without 
rainfall. Drought devastated the country in the 1960s, but in the 1970s grain 
output met nearly half of the country's needs and the national cattle herd 
almost doubled. In the 1980s drought returned. While the area planted 
remained high because of government programmes, the harvested area fell to 
15 per cent of 1981, the last normal year. Crop production in tonnage 
plummeted to one third or less of the 1981 figure: the country has become 
almost totaly dependent on cereal imports. 
Nearly half the rural households own some cattle. Their survival strategy 
during a drought is to sell off part of their herd. As the drought continues, this 
source of security is greatly reduced since the animals lose weight, calving 
rates decline, and death rates rise. The owners of smaller herds suffer 
disproportionately since they do not have the resources to protect their 
investments, and they need to sell relatively more to survive. 
Those without cattle are, however, hardest hit by drought. Foragers, who 
constitute a significant portion of the lower income quartile, must extend the 
area over which they search for food. Unfortunately, the rapid expansion of 
cattle ranches in Botswana during the 1970s has greatly reduced the veld area 
able to support wildlife and edible plants. Many of the low income groups also 
depend on occasional labour with their more well-to-do neighbours to provide 
additional food or the cash with which to buy it. During the last five years of 
drought, opportunities for such employment have shrunk to almost half those 
of normal times, thus placing further strain on families that do not own cattle. 
Protection and recovery 
The objectives of Botswana's drought relief and recovery programme are two: 
first, to protect the nutritional status and health of vulnerable groups and to 
protect the economic assets of the rural population to insure rapid recovery 
from the drought. The programme is composed of four basic elements. First, 
the government has established a system of food distribution to supplement 
the die.ts of pregnant and lactating women, young children, and tubercular 
out-patients and to provide complete rations to remote area dwellers and the 
destitute. Currently, a third of the population receives rations, and since most 
of the rations are shared with household members, it is estimated that over 70 
per cent of the rural population benefits from food aid. 
The second element is a rapidly expanding labour-Based Relief 
Programme (LBRP) which provides opportunities for earning cash incomes on 
village improvement projects. The objective is not only to replace income lost 
because of the drought but also to enable poorer households to invest in
Enhancing Equity 33 
productive assets. As far as possible, projects are labour-intensive and make 
use of traditional skills. One of the more noteworthy projects employs women 
to hand stamp sorghum grain into flour for a school feeding programme. 
Others involve the construction or improvement of local infrastructure, 
especially roads, dams, firebreaks, drift fences, airfields, and community 
vegetable gardens. 
Agricultural relief and recovery measures are the third focus of the 
programme. These include the distribution of free seed, grants for 
destumping, clearance, and ploughing of arable land, the subsidised sale to 
farm implements and livestock for use in ploughing, the purchase of older 
cattle and small-stock at guaranteed prices, the provision of animal feed at 
subsidised prices, and assistance to farmer group^s to improve their water 
supplies. 
Finally the government has expanded its efforts to provide clean and 
dependable sources of water. In the short run, villages that lack adequate 
water sources are provided with temporary supplies, while in the long run the 
government aims to rehabilitate old boreholes or construct new ones where 
needed. 
Distributional effect 
The success of these schemes in protecting the nutritional status and health of 
vulnerable groups is best reflected in the condition of the children. In the early 
1980s the percentage of undernourished children (defined as less than 80 per 
cent of the expected weight for their age) increased slightly over normal 
trends. Currently, the percentage of undernourished has fallen below predrought 
levels, even though the drought has worsened over the last year. 
While there are no figures on earlier years, those who have experienced 
previous droughts say that the decline in suffering among the disadvantaged is 
dramatic. At the most graphic level, unlike the 1979/80 drought, which lasted 
only a year, there is no evidence of death by starvation and there has been 
little or no increase in the number of public beggars. 
The programme has actually altered the distribution of food in the country 
as a whole. The amount of food per capita in the rural areas is greater than in 
non-drought years. Moreover, the available food is probably more equitably 
distributed because it is channelled through government programmes. 
Given the intensity and length of the current drought, the government has, 
for the most part, also been successful in maintaining rural assets. The 
percentage of traditional household farms with arable land has fallen by less 
than 17 per cent, while the total number of households engaged in farming has 
declined by less than five per cent1. Households with adequate supplies of 
labour have been able to earn income through the government destumping 
programme while increasing their hectarage of ploughable land.
34 John Holm and Mark Cohfn 
Since the programme is focused not only on protecting the health of the 
poor but also on productive assets within the rural sector, distribution of some 
aid has been far from equal. For example, during the most recent agricultural 
season, the government subsidised the ploughing of up to 13 hectares of land 
per household. However, since most households have less than five hectares of 
land, only the wealthier were able to take full advantage of the programme. 
Similarly, it is mostly the larger producers who participate in agricultural 
development programmes which provide free seed and production tools at a 
fraction of cost. Owners of large cattle herds have been much better able to 
purchase government-subsidised food and to borrow money for drilling new 
boreholes than have their less-well-off compatriots. 
Such forms of maldistribution may in fact be necessary to protect the 
income sources of the poor in the rural economy. In particular, many femaleheaded 
households are dependent on employment opportunities provided by 
the larger farmers. In protecting the capability of the larger households to 
farm, the government is also securing the employment they provide. 
The government can more correctly be faulted for not targeting more 
drought relief to the poorest households. The amount of aid that femaleheaded 
households receive is inadequate if the mother is unable to engage in 
LBRP due to child care constraints or if no LBRP project is available in the 
immediate area. Since food aid is intended only to supplement the household 
food supply of vulnerable members, the total quantity which a household 
receives is inadequate if there is no additional means of support. Reports from 
several districts indicate that some families are coping with this problem by 
keeping school-age children home in order to obtain-larger take-home rations. 
Absence of patronage 
Despite this targeting problem, Botswana's drought relief programmes have 
generally succeeded in preventing the typical accordion effect of drought in 
Africa. The reasons are several. In part, Botswana can afford to take care of 
the poor during drought because it has a substantial income from diamonds, 
accounting for almost half of government revenues. But national wealth does 
not translate automatically into policies that promote justice and are 
effectively implemented. To understand Botswana's situation, we need to look 
at the political context in which drought relief takes place. 
First, the political elite are mostly owners of large cattle herds from which 
they obtain a very reasonable income. Top government officials need not look 
upon positions of political authority as sinecures required for personal 
economic advancement. Thus it has been possible for a civil bureaucracy to 
develop which serves various sectors of the economy rather than functioning 
as a source of employment and patronage for the leaders of the ruling party 
and its followers. Though the government may not be highly efficient, it is at
Enhancing Equity 35 
least not burdened with corruption and other forms of patronage politics. 
Drought relief benefits from this environment. The programme can be built 
around existing ministry staff capable of performing specific programme 
activities. The Ministry of Local Government and Lands, through its Food 
Resources Department, manages food aid imports, local purchases and 
distribution. The Ministry of Agriculture administers farm relief and recovery 
through its extension staff and veterinary cadres. The Ministry of Mineral 
Resources and Water Affairs takes care of water supply problems. The 
Ministry of Health monitors the nutrition levels and organises on-site feeding 
at its health centres. The Ministry of Education directs the feeding of primary 
school children. Several officials in the Ministry of Finance provide overall 
coordination of these operations, with the help of early-warning technical 
personnel drawn from several ministries. 
This organisation did not spring immediately into existence at the inception 
of the present drought. Rather it has evolved since the middle 1970s. Almost 
every year the government hires a number of consultants, usually expatriates, 
to evaluate parts of the programme. Particularly substantial reviews took place 
after the 1979-80 drought and then after three years of the present one. Policymakers 
have debated each of the resulting reports including proposals for 
reformulating policies and changes in organisations. A number of these 
proposals have eventually been adopted. The consequence is that the 
effectiveness of drought relief has steadily been improving. The consultants 
have been particularly effective in raising issues related to-the condition of the 
poor and the need to target this population. 
The government's willingness to commit itself to improving its drought 
relief programme, and especially one that serves the poor, is critical to 
Botswana's success. This commitment is very much tied to the democratic 
character of the political system. Since 1965 the country has had regular 
elections every four to five years. Although the ruling Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP) has always won, it has recently been seriously threatened by the 
Botswana National Front (BNF), particularly in the cities. 
BDP politicians have come to see the drought relief programme as their best 
means of countering the BNF threat. The programme reduces the motivation 
of peasants to migrate to the cities, where they are likely to be jobless and 
easily subject to mobilisation by the opposition. Even more important, it 
provides economic security to the core of the Party's rural constituency, the 
peasants. The impact of the programme in this regard cannot be 
overestimated. Besides the food distribution itself, LBRP creates a number of 
jobs comparable to those lost from the drought. This last year the daily wage of 
P2,25 was slightly more than maids and security guards earned in the cities 
and considerably more than cattle herders could obtain at cattle posts. 2
36 John Holm and Mark Cohen 
Citizens rights 
The 1984 elections were critical in bringing BDP to see the political value of 
drought relief. The Cabinet decided that an expansion of the drought relief 
budget from P12 million in 1983-84 to P40 million in 1984-85 would be a 
dramatic means to secure votes in the rural areas. P40 million was well above 
the figure the Ministry of Finance recommended and one-third more, it 
turned out, than the various ministries could even mobilise themselves to 
spend. While BDP lost a number of seats in the cities, its rural support 
remained relatively solid. The party's leadership reacted by further expanding 
the drought relief budget. For 1985-86 it is P47 million. 
This concern to carry popular support has also meant that the politicians 
have wanted drought programmes to have a community input. LBRP projects 
are initially selected by local village development committees and then 
approved by district drought committees composed of civil servants. The 
administrators of drought programmes in the districts are required, 
furthermore, to report on a regular basis to elected local councils, where they 
may be severely criticised. 
The great popularity of the programme in the rural areas raises real 
questions as to whether the government will close it down when the drought is 
over. Many appear to believe that the government should continue to help 
them with their ploughing, provide jobs in the off-season, and serve free food 
to the children at the schools and health centres. From the peasants' point of 
view, if the government can afford such services in hard times, it should be 
even more able to do so when rains are good. In a very real sense, these 
programmes are beginning to be perceived as a defacto right of Botswana 
citizens. While many in top political and civil service circles might like to 
redirect drought programme funds to more development-oriented activities, 
mass demands to preserve the new rights may make the change impossible. 
Like social welfare programmes in the West, drought relief in Botswana is 
politically popular because it reaches almost all the population, not simply the 
poor, and provides tangible help in a time of need. Foreign advisors in 
particular would like to target a higher portion of the drought programme on 
the poor. 
Any attempt to do so, however, would be politically risky. Among the rest 
of the voters, who are also suffering from the drought, politicians fear there 
would be deep resentment that the poor are receiving more than their fair 
share. In this sense, drought relief cannot reverse the existing economic 
distribution. Rather Botswana's programmes prevent drought from falling 
more heavily on the poor than on the rest of the population. Elections thus also 
place a limit on the extent to which drought relief can be used to achieve social 
justice.
Enhancing Equity 37 
Foreign influence minimised 
A final element in Botswana's success is that conflict between international 
donors and the Government has been minimal. Since the government has 
organised itself to respond to the drought in a relatively effective manner, aid 
agencies are very willing to work through the existing structure. The 
government's continuous monitoring and modification of the drought relief 
system over the last decade has meant that it is well prepared to control the 
role of international orgnisations within the country. Even expatriates 
required to provide specialised skills have been incorporated into regular 
government agencies as technical assistance personnel. Their presence is not 
dependent on the drought. The influx of foreign personnel during the drought 
itself is further minimised by the fact that the government hires individuals 
and organisations in the private sector to undertake such activities as 
transporting and milling grain, storing food, and ploughing fields. The result 
is that additional foreign aid required for the drought consists almost entirely 
of food imports channelled into a fully functioning system. 
Conclusion 
None of this should lead to the conclusion that Botswana's drought relief 
programme is without problems. Many feel that more resources should be 
targeted on the poor. Informed observers also have other concerns. The 
ploughing subsidies appear in many cases to be lining the pockets of the 
tractor owners, with little resulting crop output. The government is promoting 
destumping, ploughing, and planting with what seems to be marginal 
attention to adverse effects on the country's fragile ecology. Little is being 
done to improve the productivity of smallholders. Paying the villagers through 
LBRP over a considerable period of time appears to be eroding communities' 
willngness to help themselves. 
While all these criticisms have some validity, the fact remains that they 
involve questions about the effectiveness of particular aspects of the drought 
relief programme. Everyone recognises that the government has succeeded in 
protecting almost the entire society, including the poor, from the adverse 
effects of drought. Now all social groups arc at least holding their own while 
waiting for the rains to come. 
The relevance of Botswana's experience to other African countries at first 
glance appears questionable. After all, none have the combination of a steady 
and substantial export income, an electoral democracy, and a relatively 
uncorrupt bureaucracy. Nevertheless, if the popularity of Botswana's 
programme is any indication, trying to replicate the approach as far as is 
possible may be politically rewarding.
38 Helm Jackson 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics (Gaborone, 1981 and 1984). The percentage 
of households actually farming has declined by 25 %. It is expected, however, that many of 
the households that have maintained their land but are not engaged in crop production 
because of the drought will resume planting once the drought ends. 
2. The value of the Botswana pula has fluctuated recently between US$0.61 and $0.46, largely 
because of its, connection to the South African rand.