Akokpari/THE DEBT CRISIS, THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT 
The debt crisis, the global economy and the 
challenges of development: sub Saharan Africa at 
the crossroads 
JOHN K. AKOKPARI1 
ABSTRACT 
Current initiatives by the G7 and other Western creditors to write off 
the debts of the world's heavily indebted countries, the majority of 
which are in sub Saharan Africa, has interested both African states 
themselves and among non-governmental organizations working 
towards poverty alleviation. If this is implemented, governments will 
no longer have to divert large proportions of national revenue away 
from development to debt-servicing obligations. This article argues, 
however, that sub Saharan Africa debt is attributable to both internal 
and external factors, aggravated by the hostile global economy and 
by the lending conditionalities of international financial institutions. 
The paper is optimistic that unconditional debt cancellation will allow 
sub Saharan Africa to emerge from decay and stagnation. However, it 
warns that, while it is a necessary condition for improvement, debt 
cancellation alone is not sufficient to reverse the despondency into 
which sub Saharan Africa has fallen. Debt cancellation must be 
augmented by interrelated domestic policies such as deepening 
democratization, striving towards gender parity, stemming conditions 
that precipitate incessant conflicts, reversing the region's crumbling 
environmental conditions, and fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
1 Department of Political & Administrative Studies, National 
University of Lesotho 
VOL 16 NO 2 JULY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 147
Introduction 
IN 1996 THE INDUSTRIALIZED countries instituted a scheme aimed at writing 
off the debt of heavily indebted Third World countries. Aptly called the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative, the scheme has excited 
exhilaration not only among African states who are increasingly unable 
to repay their debts, but also among non-governmental organizations 
working towards poverty alleviation in the Third World. The exhilaration 
has been heightened by the known linkage between debt and the 
development crisis of sub Saharan Africa. It is generally believed that 
sub Saharan Africa's debt has been partly responsible for the stalling 
of development and the deterioration in the quality of life in the region. 
This thinking is reinforced by the frequent diversion of large 
proportions of national revenues away from development into debt 
servicing and other debt repayment obligations. Consequently, as some 
states in the developing world, especially those in Asia, develop 
resilience and find niches in the increasingly competitive global market, 
the capacity in sub Saharan Africa to meet the exigencies of development 
is truncated. The debt in our region is the result of the interplay of 
internal and external factors, although the dominant international 
financial institutions mostly emphasize the former. 
This article analyses the causes of sub Saharan Africa's debt and 
related hurdles to development. It argues that there is a correlation 
between debt and the development crisis in sub Saharan Africa. Contrary 
to neoclassical assumptions, the origins of sub Saharan Africa's debt 
are both internal and external, aggravated not only by the international 
economy on whose margins Africa is located, but also by the 
inauspicious lending conditionalities of the international financial 
institutions. The initiative towards debt cancellation is necessary not 
sufficient to reverse the developmental malaise of the region. 
The paper suggests that the unconditional cancellation of debt 
augmented by such domestic policies as deepening democratization, 
striving towards gender parity, stemming conditions that precipitate 
and facilitate incessant conflicts, reversing the crumbling environmental 
situation in the region and fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic, will hasten 
sub Saharan Africa's emergence from decay. 
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The first part of the article seeks conceptual clarity on the notion of 
development. The second examines the causes of sub Saharan Africa's 
debt, the third makes a case for debt cancellation and exposes the 
contradictions in the HIPC initiative, while the fourth, whichexamines 
the way forward, is followed by a short conclusion. 
Conceptual framework 
HISTORICALLY, DIFFERENT, often contradictory, conceptual frameworks 
have informed the concept and meaning of "development". The limitation 
imposed by space in this paper does not permit a comprehensive review 
of these frameworks. Nevertheless, I make some cursory observations 
on three—Marxism/structuralism, modernization and basic needs—in 
an attempt to place the concept of development in perspective for the 
current discussion. These conceptual frameworks are briefly reviewed 
in turn. 
Marxism is one of the earliest conceptual approaches to the analysis 
and definitions of development. Marxism perceives development in terms 
of the reordering of socioeconomic relations in society. Marx viewed a 
developed society as one that has successfully purged itself of 
exploitations and abolished class distinctions in favour of an egalitarian 
social system. Marx's ideas were developed by radical development 
economists who blamed the underdevelopment in their societies on the 
exploitative role of foreign capital. The policy prescription emerging 
from this perspective is state intervention and the establishment of 
social democracy to mitigate exploitation. 
The problem with Marx and the general structuralist perspective is 
their reductionism. Both Marx and his later disciples believed that once 
the means of production were socialized the fruits of development would 
inevitably be reaped. The experiences of contemporary communist China 
and the now defunct Soviet Union, which were good laboratories for 
testing Marxist assumptions, have scarcely vindicated these radical 
assertions. 
Similarly, with the coming into vogue of the modernization theory in 
the 1960s, development was defined in terms of a society's movement 
away from traditional practices towards western modes of life. 
VOL 16 NO 2 JULY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 149
Specifically, development was measured in terms of the degree to which 
a society extricated itself from the shackles of primitive practices in 
favour of "modern" values. Economistic in outlook, the modernization 
process was perceived as a linear process ending at a specific point. 
Rostow's (1960) stage theory, which depicted societies as passing 
through various stages to full scale development, is one classic 
exposition of the modernization theory. Rostow believed that the 
institution of liberal market principles hastened a society's transition 
from one stage to the next. Thus the key policy thrust of modernization 
is the establishment of a capitalist economic system that runs on the 
principles of the free market. Modernization theory implicitly equated 
development to a western-styled democratic and a capital-oriented 
society with scientific methods of production. 
Although popular, the modernization framework has come under 
telling criticism for its implicit attempt to standardize western values for 
all societies, thereby disregarding the wide cultural differences that 
exist among States. To assume, for example, that a society is not 
developed until democratic institutions modelled after the West are 
established is to depict democracy—erroneously—as the end of history. 
Some have warned that democracy neither offers an automatic panacea 
to underdevelopment, nor guarantees improvements in the quality of 
life (Schmitter and Karl 1991; Shepherd 1998:2). Even more difficult, 
modernization theory did not foresee the future centrality of the 
conservation of the environment in sustainable development; defined 
as "development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." 
(World Commission on the Environment and Development 1990:43). 
Accordingly, modernization can hardly provide a holistic paradigm of 
development. 
Another framework which influences the development discourse in 
Africa, and upon which this paper is based, is the basic needs approach. 
Various authors have expatiated upon it. The social psychologist, 
Abraham Maslow perceived development in terms of the satisfaction 
of certain basic human needs, including food, shelter, sleep and sex. To 
him, the route to high-stage human development is initiated from low- 
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stage economic development and proceeds through intermediate social 
development. Social development in turn entails social security, stability, 
order, social integration and group belongingness. A human being thus 
proceeds to higher social development when those basic needs are 
fulfilled (Maslow 1954). Maslow's thoughts have been criticized for 
focusing on the development of the individual rather than on the 
collectivity of the nation. This criticism, however, fails to recognize that 
a nation is composed of individuals; that national development is 
meaningless if it does not translate into improving upon the conditions 
of the individual. Indeed, as Vehnamaki (1999) has noted, Maslow's 
ideas emphasize links between economic development and socio-human 
development, in particular the fact that economic development 
constitutes the foundation for human development. 
In contrast to the methodology of Maslow, yet consistent with the 
basic needs approach, Seers (1972:124), conceives of development 
mainly in economic terms and within the broader needs of society. 
Although his conceptualization is by no means flawless, it nonetheless 
captures some of the key indices of what is generally accepted in Africa 
as encompassing development. He notes: 
The questions to ask about a country's development are...:what 
has been happening to poverty?...to unemployment? [and] to 
inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, 
then beyond doubt, this has been a period of development for the 
country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have 
been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange 
to call the result "development", even if per capita income doubled. 
Like Maslow, Seers projects a concept of development that is peoplecentred. 
Its basic tenet, in contrast to the ideas of modernization, is the 
establishment of a welfare system that protects vulnerable sections of 
society from the dangers of the market, to ensure a balanced and 
sustainable human development. Although Seers' conceptualization is 
economistic and thus excludes political and environmental issues, it is 
nevertheless appropriate for the present discussion. This is because 
poverty, unemployment and deepening inequalities, along with their 
VOL 16 NO 2 JULY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 151
attendant ancillaries such as crime, violence and AIDS, are among the 
most visible features of the political economy of sub Saharan Africa. 
In this paper, therefore, we conceive of development within the 
basic needs framework. Development here means holistic and 
progressive improvements in the economic, social, political and 
environmental conditions of a nation (WCED 1987:43), which translate 
into improvements in the quality of life through meeting basic human 
needs. We surmise that sub Saharan Africa's inability to improve upon 
the quality of life of its population has been partly due to the pressures 
exerted by its external debt. 
Sub Saharan Africa's debt—causes and escalation 
THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE precipitating the adoption of structural 
adjustment programmes in Africa was the continent's socioeconomic 
crises, which was growing out of control by the 1970s. Central to this 
crisis was the region's debt, which has been growing astronomically 
since the last two decades. In 1974, for example, sub Saharan Africa's 
total debt stood at $ 14.8 billion. By 1984 it had risen to $91 billion and 
rose further to $217 billion by 1993, representing 12 per cent of the total 
debt of $1,812 billion owed by developing countries. South Asia's share 
was then 8 per cent while the corresponding percentage for East Asia 
and the Pacific was 20. The debt is currently at a staggering $233 billion, 
although some sources put it even higher (Parfitt and Riley 1989:88; 
77zeAta/o«14Mayl998). 
The rapid escalation of sub Saharan Africa's debt is now well known. 
However, the causes of the debt have generated a debate, which has 
featured two main perspectives—the neoconservative view represented 
by Africa's creditors and the radical view espoused by African leaders. 
The neoconservative view traces the origins of Africa's debt to the 
pursuit of discredited and self-destructive internal policies. Reflecting 
old beliefs in modernization and neoclassicalism, it identifies state 
intervention and the consequent stalling of market forces as core causes. 
These ideas were set out in a World Bank Report (1981), which identified, 
inter alia, import substitution industrialization, overvaluation of local 
currencies, state expansion and the inefficiency of the State. Other 
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economic factors identified in this perspective were corruption and the 
reckless use of loans, which were wasted on prestigious and unprofitable 
projects (Lever and Huhne 1985). Additionally, the neoconservative 
perspective locates Africa's debt in such ruinous political factors as 
personal rule and clientelism, which, along with their intrinsic predatory 
and rent-seeking tendencies, have undermined effective governance 
and facilitated economic decline (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Sandbrook 
1985). 
In contrast to the conservative view, the radical perspective sees 
Africa's debt as externally generated. It explains Africa's debt and its 
general economic crisis within a broader historical context rooted in 
dependency theory. At the core of this explanation is the incorporation 
of Africa into the global economy which, while playing an essentially 
peripheral role, also became overly dependent on the capitalist economy. 
Africa, the argument goes, was made to develop monocrop agriculture 
and primary economies driven primarily by agriculture, which remained 
vulnerable to the vagaries of the world market. This in turn created 
unfavourable terms of trade, generated chronic balance of payment 
problems, and consequently spawned new pressures towards 
borrowing from external sources (Korner et al., 1986). 
But if balance of payments led to sub Saharan Africa's initial 
indebtedness, the debt itself became a self-generating phenomenon 
that created an even heavier debt burden on the borrowers. Rescheduling 
(the arranged postponement of debt repayment) became a conventional 
method of debt management by sub Saharan Africa countries. Of the 42 
countries rescheduling their debts between 1975 and 1985,19 were from 
sub Saharan Africa and of the 144 debt rescheduled worldwide during 
the same period, 67 were for sub Saharan Africa (Callaghy 1987:154). 
Yet rescheduling has compounded the debt as debtors have had to 
pay more in interest than they had originally borrowed. In the four-year 
period 1986-1990, for example, the IMF extracted through debt 
rescheduling over $3 billion more than it gave to low-income countries 
in sub Saharan Africa {New African:32). As a result of rescheduling, 
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo—DRC), paid $ 191 million 
more to its creditors than it received in 1984 alone. On aggregate, as a 
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result of rescheduling, sub Saharan Africa's interest payments rose 
from $221 million in 1980 to $7.2 billion in 1989 (Kraus 1994:251; New 
African, 32). Thus, although foreign loans were supposed to alleviate 
the recipient's budgetary crisis, the result in practice is that debtors are 
constantly digging a new pit to fill the old one. A bigger and deeper pit 
always remains to be filled. 
Compounding the debt of sub Saharan Africa was the process of 
debt-servicing. As sub Saharan Africa governments strengthened their 
determination to demonstrate a capacity to repay debt in order to 
establish credit-worthiness, a greater percentage of new loans and export 
earnings were committed to servicing existing debt. Cameroon, for 
example, spent 36 per cent of its national budget on debt service during 
the 1996/97 fiscal year compared to only 4 per cent on basic social 
services. Similarly, Tanzania's debt payments were four times what it 
spent on primary education and nine times what it spent on basic health 
during the 1996/97 year. Although some countries such as Swaziland 
and Lesotho committed only 5 per cent of their export earnings to debt 
servicing, others like Somalia committed as high as 112 per cent (West 
Africa 1993:16-22). Such high debt service ratios led inevitably to further 
externa1 borrowing as virtually nothing was left for development. 
Further causes of sub Saharan Africa's debt were the two oil shocks 
of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980. To be sure, the responsibility of the oil 
crises in escalating sub Saharan Africa's debt has remained debatable 
since, in the face of increased oil revenues, the debt of some major oilexporting 
countries like Nigeria and Mexico increased. Generally, 
however, consequent on these oil shocks, the combined deficit of oilimporting 
developing countries rose from $11.3 billion in 1973 to $37 
billion in 1974 and expanded further from $42 billion in 1978 to $88 
billion in 1980 (Hallberg 1986). Even in normal times oil-importing 
countries in sub Saharan Africa committed nearly half of their total 
export earnings to meeting energy requirements. During the oil crises, 
therefore, much of sub Saharan Africa's revenue went into the payment 
of oil bills, creating the need for more external loans. In addition, the oil 
crises created global recessions, which drove down the prices of primary 
commodities upon which the economic fortunes of most sub Saharan 
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Africa countries depended (Nyerere 1986). The two oil crises were thus 
responsible at the least for the escalation of sub Saharan Africa's debt. 
1 The abatement of the Cold War placed Africa in an ambivalent 
position on the world stage; a position that diminished its prospects for 
attracting foreign capital. On the one hand, it has become heavily 
dependent on the international financial institutions and the global 
economy through aid and structural adjustment programmes. On the 
1 other hand, and more poignantly, Africa is being marginalized in the 
global economy. This is reflected in two interrelated developments—its 
receipt of shrinking development aid, which dropped from more than $8 
billion to $ 1 billion between 1983 and 1990; and declining direct foreign 
investment. Since the late 1980s foreign capital has been gravitating 
j. away from the continent. For example, British companies (numbering 
' some 139) investing in Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe declined to 96 
j duringthe 1980-1990 period (Africa Recovery 41 1990:18-19). 
) In addition to the trend of disinvestment, which possibly were the 
consequences of conflicts and insecurity and the discovery of new 
investment opportunities in Eastern Europe, Africa also witnessed a 
rapid dwindling of net nonconcessional aid, a trend that has since been 
\ persisting (Callaghy 1991:14). In 1994 aid to Africa totalled $23.4 billion. 
This declined to $ 17 billion in 1998, while that for sub Saharan Africa fell 
from $ 18 billion to $ 13.5 billion within the same period (Africa Recovery 
200014 1:7). Similarly, although new loan commitments by international 
banks to developing countries increased from $20.6 billion in 1990 to 
' $28 billion in 1991, the proportion destined for Africa declined from $0.6 
billion to $0.4 billion over the same period (IMF, 1992:77). Official funding 
! has also been drying up. Between 1991 and 1997, grants and net lending 
from official funding declined in real terms by more than one-third from 
| $66 billion to $44 billion, which experts say is barely sufficient to cover 
interest payments (UNDP 1997). 
Africa's marginalization is further complicated by globalization, which 
f conventional wisdom claims will hasten the eradication of poverty. So 
far, as economies across the world become globalized and unified, many 
developing countries continue to face difficulties in integrating into the 
fast-expanding global economy. This problem has been particularly acute 
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for sub Saharan Africa where the convergence of debt, inflation and a 
narrow export base concentrated in primary commodities, has attenuated 
the competitiveness of the region's economies, and reducing its ability 
to be a conspicuous member of the "global village" (Akokpari 2001). 
The establishment of the World Trade Organization, and the Uruguay 
Round Agreements to supervise trade among states, along with the 
conclusion of the Multilateral Agreement on Investments have 
complemented the conditionalities of the IMF—the unloved policeman 
of capitalism—in facilitating the exploitation and appropriation of the 
resources of developing countries by big multinational corporations 
(Tandon 1998). 
In this process the industrialized economies are the ultimate 
beneficiaries. As Giddens (1999) observed in his Reith Lectures on 
globalization, the share of the poorest fifth of the world's population in 
global income dropped from 2.3 per cent to 1.4 per cent over the past 10 
years, while the proportion taken by the richest fifth has risen from 70 
per cent to 85 per cent. He noted further that 20 sub Saharan Africa 
countries now have lower incomes per head than they did two decades 
ago. For sub Saharan Africa, the asymmetry in the distribution of 
resources under the current orthodoxy and in particular the tendency 
for MNCs to control its resources, depicts globalization as promoting 
"global pillage" rather than establishing what is commonly assumed to 
be a "global village". 
In short, the debt crisis is the result of forces that are both internal 
and external to Africa. But the critical point is that the debt burden has 
become unbearable for the fragile and stagnating, if not declining, 
economies of sub Saharan Africa. Commenting on the size of Africa's 
debt Ake (1996:106) laments that "the debt burden of Africa is so great 
and the capacity to repay so limited that it is increasingly necessary to 
think not in terms of servicing but in terms of debt stock reduction and 
write-offs." It is in this context that the relevance of the HIPC scheme 
can be readily appreciated. Yet, as will be shown subsequently, the 
HIPC initiative falls far short of popular expectation. 
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Debt cancellation and the contradiction in the HIPC scheme 
As SUB SAHARAN AFRICA'S debt mounted, the international financial 
institutions instituted structural adjustment programmes both as a 
method of managing it and as an alternative path to recovery. 
Emphasizing policy measures as decontrolling, desubsidization, 
downsizing, devaluation and privatization among others, structural 
adjustment programmes were to check state intervention and patronage, 
considered to be the central causes of the region's economic downturn. 
However, after over a decade of strict implementation, the results of 
structural adjustment programmes have been mixed at best. Indeed, as 
inflation, unemployment and balance of payment persisted, the Economic 
Commission for Africa (1989) described the 1980s as "a decade of lost 
hope". Five years later the World Bank (1994a:2) was candid in conceding 
that "adjustment alone will not put countries on a sustained, povertyreducing 
growth path. That is the challenge of long term development". 
This admission rocked the foundations of the initial euphoria that greeted 
the introduction of structural adjustment programmes. 
But even more disappointing the neoclassical paradigm sank 
adjusting countries deeper into debt. In an effort to establish structural 
adjustment as a credible alternative developmental paradigm, the 
international financial institutions granted huge amounts of loans to 
countries considered "strong adjusters" (Herbst 1993). For example, 
Ghana, considered "a star in the adjustment business", received a total 
of $9.3 billion from the IMF and the World Bank between 1983 and 1993 
as nonconcessional aid (World Bank 1994b). During that same period, 
however, Ghana paid back to, or repurchased from, the IMF more than 
that amount, resulting not only in negative transfers, but also in the 
aggravation of its debt (Ofori-Atta 1993:1813). The introduction of the 
HIPC initiative was a tacit admission by creditors that structural 
adjustment programmes, in which much confidence was reposed, lack 
the capacity to arrest the spiral rise of developing countries' debt. 
As a scheme of debt management, the HIPC initiative identified 41 
poor countries for debt forgiveness. Among these, 20 were eligible for 
special assistance. Of the 41 countries marked as HIPCs, 33 were in 
Africa. In reality, however, the HIPC initiative fails to meet the expectations 
VOL 16 NO 2 JULY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 157
of poor and indebted countries. The strict eligibility criteria set by the 
architects of the scheme has excluded many poor countries. First, the 
initiative excluded countries with low debt-to-income ratio. Creditors 
deemed debt to be sustainable at 200-250 per cent of exports and 280 
per cent of revenues. Second, prospective beneficiaries of the HIPC 
plan need to meet a six-year track record of successful structural 
adjustment, a condition that applied especially to countries which begun 
the implementation of structural adjustment programmes in 1996. More 
generally, this condition is particularly stringent not only because of 
the pauperizing effects of these programmes, but also because of the 
long period of time required to determine the fate of a country. Even 
this, notwithstanding the six-year record of structural adjustment 
implementation, the confirmation of a country as a successful structural 
adjuster is still at the discretion of creditors. 
In the light of such distressing, indeed seemingly unattainable 
conditionalities, many non-governmental organizations, including Oxfam, 
Jubilee 2000 and Christian Aid have been critical of the HIPC project 
and sceptical about its capacity to relieve the debt of poor countries. 
They maintain that the debt-export ratio is far too high for most indebted 
countries, who, to benefit from the scheme, must borrow more and 
contract bigger debts. The concerns of the non-governmental 
organizations were well-founded, for by April 1998 only Uganda, among 
the many heavily indebted sub Saharan Africa countries, had benefited 
from the scheme. Even so, this benefit was partial: only 20 per cent of its 
debt was cancelled. It was not until June 1999 that Mozambique, 
classified as one of the poorest countries in Africa, qualified. Burkina 
Faso and Cote d'lvoire qualified in 2000, while Mali and Tanzania are 
due to follow suit in 2001 (UNDP 1997). The other non-African countries 
qualifying by July 1999 were Bolivia and Guyana. To increase the 
chances of many more countries of being eligible, the non-governmental 
organizations asked for a reduction in the debt-to-revenue target to 
150-170 per cent. In addition, they argued for the reduction of the six 
year waiting period and the linkage of debt cancellation with genuine 
needs for poverty alleviation (Katsouris 1999). 
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The agitation of the non-governmental organizations has not been in 
vain. In a meeting in Cologne, Germany, in June 1999, the G7 relaxed the 
eligibility criteria into what is called HIPC-2. The debt-to-export and 
debt-to-revenue ratios have been reduced to 150 per cent and 250 per 
cent respectively, while the six years' waiting period has been slashed 
to three years for those countries beginning adjustment before 1996. In 
practice, however, the efficacy of HIPC-2 has remained an issue of 
contention between proponents of the scheme and critics. While 
creditors claim HIPC-2 would bring debt relief to between six and ten 
more countries, non-governmental organizations argue that most 
countries included in HIPC-2 are unlikely to meet the three-year 
adjustment record qualification, since they were or are presently at war. 
These countries include Liberia, the DRC, Angola and Sierra Leone. 
Moreover, contrary to the G7 claim that HIPC-2 brings $100 billion 
additional debt relief, non-governmental organizations say only an 
additional $16 billion of relief comes with it. Thus much controversy 
still surrounds the debt relief initiative. The continuous campaign by 
non-governmental organizations for the unconditional cancellation of 
the debt of poor countries (Africa Recovery September 1999) indicates 
that, despite its apparent generosity, HIPC-2, is still far from totally 
addressing the debt problems of the developing countries. 
Yet, an even greater challenge confronting the HIPC initiative, which 
reveals its perfidy is the funding of the debt relief project. The IMF 
estimates that the total cost to creditors of the HIPC scheme, even with 
just a handful of qualifiers so far, is around $27.5 billion, excluding 
bilateral cancellation of development aid debt. The strategy of the IMF 
in financing the cancellation is through gold sales. The UK, one of the 
major international creditors, has recently sold some 803,768 ounces to 
help finance the HIPC scheme. Concern is, however, emerging from 
gold-producing African countries which have no illusions about the 
deleterious consequences of gold sales. In practice, gold sales mean 
infusing more gold into the global market. This has the effect of driving 
down gold prices and, as a natural response, forcing the industry to lay 
offworkers. Already, Ghana and South Africa, the leading gold producers 
in Africa, have been forced by recessionary pressures in the gold market 
VOL 16 NO 2 JULY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 159
to retrench over 2,000 mine workers {Africa Recovery 199913:2-3). In 
reality, therefore, the HIPC initiative relieves less than it promises. Apart 
from its failure to satisfy the initial expectation it excited, it also addresses 
one set of problems and creates another in the process. But in general, 
requirements for sub Saharan Africa's development go beyond debt 
cancellation. The President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, has 
noted that debt relief is just "one very important component in a 
comprehensive approach to poverty reduction [and development]" 
{Africa Recovery 13:10). Additional interrelated policy issues need to 
be addressed to ensure sustainable development in sub Saharan Africa. 
This is an issue to which we now turn. 
Towards sustainable development in the twenty-first century 
IF THE CRITERIA FOR eligibility to HIPC are revised and debt cancellation 
becomes a reality for many more countries, sub Saharan Africa will still 
have to address other set of challenges, including the crisis of democratic 
governance; gender inequality; stemming conditions that promote 
conflicts; environmental degradation and launching an aggressive 
campaign against the HIV/AIDS epidemic. These are briefly elucidated in 
turn. 
Strengthening democratic governance 
WHILE THE INSTITUTION of democratic rule does not automatically 
guarantee development, it nevertheless provides channels for checking 
anti-developmental practices such as corruption and inefficiency. There 
is no gainsaying the fact that part of the causes of sub Saharan Africa's 
socioeconomic woes were the direct consequence of undemocratic 
governance. As Barber Conable, the former president of the World 
Bank, noted, 
The development of many sub Saharan Africa countries has been 
quite unnecessarily constrained by their political systems.... People 
need freedom to realise individual and collective potential... Open 
political participation has been restricted... .Many African leaders 
have been more concerned about retaining power than about the 
long-term development interest of their people...(Callaghy 
1991:59). 
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The power of members of civil society to stage protests unfettered is 
enough to dissuade the political elite from pursuing unpopular policies. 
Moreover, with democratic rule, elected representatives find themselves 
constantly accountable to the electorate and the risk of loosing the next 
election becomes a motivating factor to prioritize the interest of the 
governed over everything else. The institution of democratization and 
good governance by the international donor community as a condition 
for aid and investment in Africa is partly informed by the thinking that 
a positive correlation exists between democracy and development. In 
these respects, the deepening of a democratic culture and the 
strengthening of civil society provide a countercheck to state 
authoritarianism, which had been the foundation of such antidevelopmental 
practices as corruption and inefficient governance. 
Recognizing the contribution of women 
ANOTHER CENTRAL PROBLEM which sub Saharan Africa governments must 
surmount in the march towards sustainable development is recognizing 
of the contribution of women. The World Bank (1989:7) notes that, 
In Africa women are generally lead managers in the household; 
they are responsible for feeding the family; for providing water, 
education and health; and for family planning. They are also active 
in the production of food crops and in trade. Their role should be 
more explicitly recognized in the design and implementation of 
human resource development programmes. 
Yet women have suffered discrimination and marginalization both in 
politics and in the economy. In recent years, however, women in sub 
Saharan Africa have been taking advantage of political openings in 
national political systems to assert their leadership roles and press for 
increased access to social, economic and political opportunities. But 
this gone no further. The recognition has not translated into increased 
access to sociopolitical resources. Statistics across Africa show that 
despite women's numerical, sometimes academic superiority, very few 
of them occupy high political offices. This has been due to the 
reluctance and refusal of some African leaders to appreciate and 
recognize the capabilities of women. 
VOL 16 NO 2 JULY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 161
Aided by tradition, leaders confine women to subordinate positions. 
For example, in response to demands by Kenyan women for equitable 
gender representation in the national parliament, President Daniel Arap 
Moi, in a typical male-chauvinistic old-generation leadership style, 
reiterated: "God made man to be the head of the family [and] challenging 
that was tantamount to criticising God." (Gordon and Gordon 1995:261). 
Such conceptions of leadership, if not changed, are certain to keep 
women perpetually in the lower echelons of the political hierarchy. The 
situation is similar in the economic sphere where women are frequently 
confined to domestic jobs and the informal economy. Development 
requires the changing of these trends and thinking in order to harness 
the potentials of all sections of the society in the national effort. 
Stemming conditions that facilitate conflicts 
THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT that part of the reason for Africa's inability to 
surmount its developmental problems are the incessant conflicts which 
are now dominating the attention of its leaders (Akokpari 1999). In 
Angola, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Sierra Leone and Sudan 
to mention but a few, wars have not only devastated national economies, 
but have also unleashed untold hardships on the population. Moreover, 
the effects of conflicts have been felt by neighbouring and regional 
States, which assume the onerous task of stretching their meagre 
resources to accommodate the massive influx of refugees. Often, as a 
result of the wider implications, regional States are forced to intervene 
diplomatically, sometimes militarily, to either contain or terminate the 
conflicts. Africa's conflicts are over the control of resources and the 
intensification of these conflicts is linked to the partisan posture of the 
African State (Doornbos 1990). 
The postcolonial African State has failed to accord its competing 
constituencies equal access to meagre political and economic resources. 
At the same time, it also failed to promote conditions that facilitate fair 
competition for these resources (Akokpari 1998). The State has become 
in most cases an instrument for furthering the sectional interest of 
particular constituencies. 
Lacking alternative channels to access resources, marginalized 
constituencies have had to resort to war to dislodge their governments. 
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The interests that have thus been overthrown must in turn regroup and 
dislodge the incumbent government, creating an endless cycle of 
conflicts and wars. At a deeper level this cycle of conflicts is linked to 
poverty and scarcity, which intensify competition for access to the 
State. The State under these conditions is seen as a channel for 
accumulating wealth and the competition for access to it becomes a 
matter of life and death. To promote development, the African State will 
have to assume a more neutral posture and address rapidly spreading 
poverty. 
Reversing environmental decay 
THE CAUSES OF SUB SAHARAN Africa's crises are also partly located in the 
region's crumbling ecological system. As noted already, environmental 
conservation has become a key component of development. Yet 
environmental degradation has escalated in sub Saharan Africa in recent 
decades. The poorest region of the world, sub Saharan Africa is 
threatened by such related phenomena as deforestation, desertification, 
soil erosion, pollution, drought and famine'. While these are vehicles for 
catastrophe, the region is also facing a population crisis, currently 
growing at a rate of 3.1 per cent, the highest in the world. Sub Saharan 
Africa's environmental decay is most readily visible in deforestation. 
Although the destruction of vegetation is a global phenomenon, it is 
acute in many parts of sub Saharan Africa where over 70 per cent of the 
population depend on the forest for survival and other economic 
activities. 
As a result of population pressure the rate of deforestation in 
Madagascar, for example, has destroyed more than 80 per cent of its 
rainforest. In other countries like Ghana and Cote d'lvoire, deforestation 
has been accelerated by increased timber exports. In Cote d'lvoire, 
closed forest has declined by nearly 67 percent in 20 years, (Timberlake 
1991:90-91) while in Ghana tropical forest shrank to a quarter of its 
original size between 1983 and 1993 (Nyang'oro 1995:90). Generally, as 
a result of deforestation and inappropriate land use, Africa loses 36,000 
square kilometres on the average to the desert annually (Nnoli 1990). 
Other features of Africa's environmental malaise include soil erosion 
and pollution. Erosion is a particularly serious problem for hilly countries 
VOL 16 NO 2 JULY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 163
like Ethiopia and Lesotho. Everywhere, unmitigated erosion triggers a 
chain of related ecological disasters. For example, it robs the soil of its 
ability to support vegetation. This in turn has implications for humans. 
In years of inadequate rains the prospects for crop failure and famine 
are high. Similarly, nomadic communities are unable to pasture their 
herds. In the final analysis development suffers, as governments commit 
large amounts of scarce hard currency, which could have gone into 
poverty alleviation programmes, into the importation of food. The 
challenge, for sustainable development, therefore, is for sub Saharan 
Africa governments to institute appropriate policies to reverse 
ecological decline, for as Rahab Mwatha, of the Greenbelt Movement, 
suggests, 
The African crisis is essentially an environmental problem that 
has precipitated such adverse symptoms as drought, famine, 
desertification, overpopulation, environmental refugees, political 
instability, widespread poverty, etc Africa is dying because 
her environment has been overexploited and neglected.... (WCED 
1990:154). 
Fighting HIV/AIDS 
IT IS NOW WIDELY ACKNOWLEDGED that HIV/AIDS are among sub Saharan 
Africa's greatest developmental challenges. The extent of the infection 
and the rapidity of the spread of HIV/AIDS are such that not only will it 
reverse gains in development, but it will also lead sub Saharan Africa 
into a future without a people. The recent issue of the World Bank 
publication, Africa Recovery (1999,13:2-3), reveals frightening figures 
about the effects of HIV and AIDS on development, some of which are 
worth restating. 
The World Bank estimates that countries with high incidents of AIDS 
will loose 1 per cent of per capita GNP growth each year. Over the next 
decade, for example, Kenya could lose 15 per cent of per capita GNP 
while human welfare indicators are expected to worsen dramatically in 
southern Africa, where infection rate has assumed epidemic proportions. 
These predictions are not sanguine; they tell the grim reality about a 
region set to be devastated by a disease to which an effective antidote 
still remains elusive. Already, over 9 million Africans have died of AIDS. 
164 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA VOL 16 NO 2 JULY 2001
Akokpari/THE DEBT CRISIS, THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT 
In 1998 alone, 1.5 million adults died of AIDS along with 500,000 children. 
At the same time, the rate of infection is on the increase. In 1998, for 
example, 3.5 million adults—equal to the population of Eritrea— 
contracted the virus and Hiv-positive mothers infected another 500,000 
children at birth. In South Africa, conservative estimates indicate that 
about 1,500 people contract AIDS daily and in Cote d'lvoire it is reported 
that a teacher dies of AIDS every day. 
These statistics have serious implications for development. It is 
estimated that the death from AIDS of one family member causes the 
family income to fall by half and agricultural output has already fallen 
by half in one-third of rural households affected by HIV. A study shows 
that in Zimbabwe maize output fell by 61 per cent, vegetables by 49 per 
cent and cotton by 41 per cent as a result of HIV/AIDS. Industry has not 
been spared either. It has been estimated that company profits have 
fallen by between 7 and 20 per cent in some sub Saharan Africa countries 
as a result of HIV/AIDS. 
Similarly, AIDS has significantly reduced life expectancy in Africa. 
The World Bank has estimated that life expectancy has dropped from 50 
to 40 years in Zambia as a result of HIV/AIDS and, in Botswana, where it 
was projected to exceed 69 years by 2000-2005 has now been predicted 
to decline to 41 years. It is a sad paradox that in the midst of the alarming 
devastation caused by HIV/AIDS, African governments seem to be doing 
little to contain its spread. A study, for example, found that in 1997 
African countries spent just $150 million on AIDS prevention, out of 
which only 10 per cent came from governments. However, the United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimates that at least $ 1 
billion is needed to contain the epidemic. As governments show a slow 
commitment to the fight against AIDS, the virus is certain to pose a major 
hurdle to Africa's developmental efforts. 
Thus in order to promote meaningful and sustainable development, 
sub Saharan Africa governments need to double their efforts to combat 
the spread of AIDS. In furtherance of this, budgetary allocation to health 
sectors will need to be increased dramatically and governments will 
have to assume tougher stances on crimes such as rape and other 
abuses that can potentially lead to AIDS infection. Above all, an 
VOL 16 NO 2 JULY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 165
aggressive government and non-governmental organization-driven 
campaign of education needs to be pursued among sub Saharan Africa's 
population about the dangers associated with AIDS. Only a programme 
backed by political will can stem the current devastation caused by AIDS 
and only then can sub Saharan Africa tread on the path to sustainable 
development. 
Conclusion 
THE SUB SAHARAN AFRICA debt burden which has been mounting since 
the 1970s is the product of internal and external factors. As the paper 
has attempted to show, the debt itself and the process of repayment 
have contributed in no small measure to debt escalation, a trend that 
could not be stemmed even by structural adjustment programmes. In 
fact, rather than ameliorating the situation, these programmes 
compounded the debt of sub Saharan Africa countries. As noted, the 
lending conditionalities of creditors and the logic of globalization have 
all combined to attenuate sub Saharan Africa's capacity to develop. 
The HIPC initiative instituted by the IMF/World Bank and supported 
by the bilateral creditors to ease the debt pressure on poor countries 
has so far not fulfilled popular expectations. The criteria for eligibility 
set by creditors appear virtually unattainable for a vast number of sub 
Saharan Africa countries. These conditions are so strict that they place 
a question mark over the sincerity of creditors and the overall objectives 
of the HIPC scheme. It is recommended that, against a backdrop of the 
weakness in sub Saharan Africa's economies and the development crisis 
facing the region, debt cancellation be done unconditionally and, as 
recommended by non-governmental organizations, be tied to a genuine 
desire to arrest poverty. 
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