Makoa/GLOBAUZATION AND DEMOCRACY 
Globalization and democracy with reference 
to eastern and southern Africa 
FRANCIS K. MAKOA1 
ABSTRACT 
Globalization has caused anxiety and uncertainty among the less 
developed countries; the reason being that it is still unclear as what 
this new political economy portends for these countries. Also at the 
heart of this unease is what seems to be globalization's profound political 
and social consequences for the Third World countries, 
especially those in poverty-stricken Africa. Would they be able to cushion 
themselves against globalizations painful effects? One of the key 
demands of this new political economy is that there should be no 
political interference in economic activity and investment decisions. 
Thus globalization presents the less developed countries with what 
seems to be an intractable conundrum. While touting democracy as a 
condition for economic success, the mo-liberal ideology which underpins 
globalization removes the economy from the political agenda 
through its advocacy of laissez-faire economic policies that preclude 
government involvement in investment decisions, hence shielding private 
capital and the bourgeoisie from social and political scrutiny. 
With reference to eastern and southern Africa, this paper examines the 
broad political implications of globalization and reflects on the possible 
strategies that might cushion the regional states against its 
vicissitudes. 
Introduction 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE fact that it has become a new model of development, 
globalization is a source of much anxiety and uncertainty for the 
less developed countries. At the heart of this unease is the increasing 
1 Department of Political Administrative Studies, the National 
University of Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho 
VOL 16 NO 1 JANUARY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 125
autonomy and power of capital and the concomitant loss by governments 
of control and influence over economic investment decisions. 
The diminished role for politics and governments in this global restructuring, 
a phenomenon attributable to globalization, occupies the centre 
stage of the ensuing political debate. As the analysis will show later, 
the increased autonomy and power of capital and the decreased role for 
the state in economic investment decisions, as the tempo towards a 
single global economy mounts, are seen as inversely related to popular 
democracy. Globalization, or the new political economy, depoliticizes 
economic activity, thereby removing it from the democratic agenda. It 
shields capital from political scrutiny, denying people the right to shape 
their national economies according to popular needs. 
The debate presents globalization as a force, "transcending space/ 
territory/state..., a world beyond states and territory which is distinct 
from such states..." (Clark 1999:39). It is possible that globalization is 
beyond the control of states, but whether it heralds an end of the state 
is a moot point. But, regardless of whether or not it circumscribes the 
role of the state in economic investment decisions, globalization needs 
to be protected by the state. It needs the protection of the state for its 
purveyors lack the capacity to maintain the law and order on which it is 
dependent. Thus, rather than being mutually antagonistic, as the neoliberals 
want us to believe, economic globalism and politics are mutually 
supportive. However, this symbiotic relationship is not without contradictions, 
as shown above, and these present serious dilemmas for the 
less developed countries that are being pressurized by the developed 
western capitalist countries to liberalize their systems of government. 
Globalization: ideological and theoretical underpinnings 
ALSO DUBBED THE new political economy fNPE>, globalization derives 
its theoretical and ideological underpinnings from the classical laissezfaire 
doctrine and liberal ideology which emerged during and dominated 
seventeenth and eighteenth century economic and political thinking. 
Both doctrines stress competitiveness and the right of individuals to 
access and exploit resources. However, competitiveness "often means 
reducing labour costs by corporate down-sizing, large-scale redundancies 
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Makoa/GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY 
and expanding market control through corporate buy-outs" (Karger 
1996:6). The slogan of competitiveness provides a rationale for cheapening 
or devaluing labour in various ways. These include, for instance, 
the adoption of policies and strategies that either lead to unemployment 
or facilitate the free movement of capital, thus encouraging capital 
flight and making it easy for corporate organizations to disinvest as 
they see fit. 
Capitalism's recurrent crisis since the mid 1970s, namely rising inflation, 
declining corporate profits and falling rates of investment, is 
attributed to trade unions and governments by the advocates of a return 
to the classical laissez-faire mode of managing the economy. Trade 
unions are said to be a factor behind wage inflation, while governments 
are blamed for excessive borrowing, spending and taxing. (Cox 1994:46) 
Those arguing for the deregulation of economic activity say that governments 
do not promote social welfare (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 
1991:13). Wielding the slogan of "the separation of the economy and 
politics", (Cox 1994:50) the underpinning doctrine of the NPEs advocates 
less state involvement in the running of the economy. The 
ideological corollary of the doctrine emphasizes democracy, presenting 
it as "the key to economic development and social progress" (Harbeson, 
1995:3). Its simultaneous appeal to and invocation of the two twin doctrines 
of economic laissez-faire and political liberalization interchangeably 
in the attempt to rationalize this new thinking follows the belief that, 
"because they point toward philosophically compatible goals, the processes 
of transition towards their realization are mutually reinforcing" 
(Harbeson: 15). 
Arguably, however, the democratization process in Africa which 
began in earnest in the 1980s is nothing more than capitulation to the 
beneficiaries of and the forces behind global capitalism. These forces 
seek to separate the economy from politics because they believe that 
this separation is a panacea to the continent's economic malaise. In 
turn, this accords with one of the strands of the laissez-faire doctrine, 
namely the public choice theory. The theory asserts that "private goods 
must be provided by the market whereas the government should provide 
public goods" (Ugorji, 1995:542-545). 
VOL 16 NO 1 JANUARY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 127
Globalization: defining features and manifestations 
THE PAPER ADOPTS what now seems to be an accepted definition of 
globalization, namely that it connotes the deepening of capitalist integration 
(Hoogvelt, 1997:115), the concomitants of which include 
increasing human interaction and the growing power and influence of 
corporate business that proceeds in tandem with and encapsulates the 
marginalization of the state. The crises of the 1970s provided the necessary 
impetus to the process of economic restructuring, paradoxically 
lessening the importance of the Bretton Woods system, which until 
this time regulated international monetary relations. Admittedly, its two 
key institutions -the International Monetary Fund (1MFJ and the World 
Bank - survived the crisis. But their functions have changed. They are 
no longer standard setters, as was the case when they had full responsibility 
for managing and overseeing international monetary transactions 
(Cohen 1995:218-220). Their new role is to subordinate "domestic economies 
to the perceived exigencies of a global economy" (Cox 1994:46). 
However, the logical corollary of this novelty is a diminished role for the 
state and the increased power and freedom for multinational corporations 
(MNCs). 
The Bretton Woods system ensured order and discipline among the 
participants for it approved par values for currencies and because it 
enjoyed a virtual monopoly in permitting the alteration of values to 
correct trade imbalances. Since its key institution, the IMF, operated as 
a reserve of national currencies and gold subscribed to by member 
countries, it was able to provide supplementary reserves for them. However, 
the trading partners had unequal drawing rights based on quotas 
assigned to each according to their relative importance in the world 
economy. Notwithstanding this, however, the money guaranteed by 
the system cushioned members against the shocks produced by trade 
imbalances, for each member was entitled to borrow an amount of foreign 
exchange equal to its entitlement. 
At the political level the Bretton Woods system served as a forum for 
international consultation and cooperation on monetary matters. More 
importantly, it committed governments to the principle of collective responsibility 
in regard to the management of the international monetary 
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Makoa/GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY 
order. The collapse of the system led to the emergence of the present 
free monetary exchange market regime, a critical factor behind ongoing 
globalization. The arrangement not only solved the problem of the 
overvaluation of currencies, it also facilitated the^ free movement of 
capital, capital flight and easy disinvestment. The ascendancy of liberalism 
as a hegemonic ideology following the defeat of socialism enabled 
Western donor countries to use aid to achieve democratic change and 
economic restructuring in developing countries, including Africa. Liberalization 
became a condition for access to development aid. The 
developing countries were blamed for their economic problems, the 
majority of which were in fact due to the dynamics of the global economy 
(Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, ibid. 1995:8) Many of these problems were, 
however, attributable to the deteriorating terms of trade associated with 
the fluctuating commodity prices. 
The 1980s witnessed a "disengagement by the developed Western 
countries from aid, trade and investment commitments in Africa and the 
deepening engagement with each other" (Harbeson, ibid. 1995:8). This 
has meant that Africa, including East and southern Africa, had to compete 
with the former Eastern Bloc countries for international aid and 
European and North American markets. This new twist in European and 
American aid and trading policies aimed to liberate "the market from the 
shackles of governmental planning and direction" (Harbeson, 1995:9) 
and to wriggle out of the burdensome foreign aid commitment. 
Unshackling the market from politics, on the other hand, supposedly 
brings about efficiency by releasing resources that are critical to private 
capital accumulation. It "implies the roll-back of the state, both in 
terms of its ownership of industries, financial institutions and marketing 
agencies" (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991:11). But in a free market 
regime private accumulation and the profit motive are the overriding 
goal of any investment decision. Thus productive capital logically gravitates 
towards the areas that promise high returns. Hence the apogee of 
globalization is marked by shifting centres of production that fragment 
existing jobs and operations and lower or freeze wages at certain levels. 
However, these shifting centres of production often do not herald new 
and increased capital investment. More importantly, it does not mean 
VOL 16 NO 1 JANUARY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 129
that their spread, if any, has been even throughout the world. They are 
usually concentrated in specific areas, regions or countries. But not 
every country can be an attractive location for foreign capital. The 
developing states, which can provide neither a viable market nor security, 
find it difficult to attract capital that might serve as an access to the 
benefits of globalization. 
Thus, clearly, the high mobility rates of capital that are associated 
with globalization do not necessarily imply a spread of funds to developing 
countries. Neither has globalization seen an integration in bilateral 
relationships between the developed nations and the less developed 
countries (LDCs,). On the consequences of this global restructuring for 
Africa, Harbeson (1995:7) notes that 
Western donors... have been able to force Africa to integrate 
with the global economy they dominate through multinational 
channels, while they discourage integration in bilateral relationships 
by... retaining barriers to African participation. 
Indeed, all they do is to subordinate African countries "to unelected 
bodies" (Harbeson, 1995:11), namely the IMF and the World Bank, including 
the international regimes such as the World Trading Organization 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Globalization has proceeded in tandem with Africa's marginalization 
from the world economic system dominated by the rich Western industrial 
capitalist countries. The continent's declining share of the world 
output seems set further to reduce its importance to the MNCs - now 
acknowledged as the undisputed sources and purveyors of investment 
capital. The commodities produced by Africa are either no longer important 
or are produced elsewhere. Its trade with Western countries 
has been declining since the mid 1970s, while credit facilities available 
to it are few and selective. Also in decline are direct foreign investment 
(DFl) flows into the continent, perhaps confirming the view that Western 
industrial countries are disengaging from Africa (Harbeson 1995:15). 
The debt problem is likely to diminish further the prospects for increased 
DFI flows into Africa as it may scare away potential investors. 
The continent's total debt increased more than tenfold from US $14.8 
130 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA VOL 16 NO 1 JANUARY 2001
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billion in 1974 to US $ 183.4 billion, that is, about 109% of its total gross 
national product, in 1992 (Onimodel992: 26). Currency devaluations 
instituted under the IMF's structural adjustment programmes have raised 
the cost of debt servicing. Table I highlights the debt burden for East 
and southern African states and the cost of servicing it in 1997. 
Table I: East and southern Africa countries' external 
debt In US$ millions for 1997 
% of GNP Debt service ratio 
as % of GNP 
External Debt 
1997 
3,707.9 
4,961.3 
6,485.8 
6,757.8 
10,159.8 
7,177.1 
25,221.0 
2,206.0 
2,471.6 
659.8 
22.1 
22.0 
21.5 
19.9 
15.9 
12.9 
12.8 
12.4 
10.9 
6.4 
5.2 
2.5
- 
56.5 
58.5 
64.7 
184.6 
231.8 
97.2 
20.0 
89.0 
57.7 
51.9 
11.6 
25.4 
2.6 
562.0 
368.2 
85.0 
Country 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe 
Kenya 
Zambia 
Angola 
Tanzania 
South Africa 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Lesotho 
Botswana 
Swaziland 
Namibia 
TOTAL DEBT 70,823.3 
SOURCE: COMPILED FROM THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT FIGURES, 1999, OXFORD, OXFORD UMVERSITY PRESS, 193-195. 
The debt burden is not evenly distributed among the individual countries 
of the region. There are gaping disparities among the debtor nations 
both in terms of the total amounts owed and their share of gross regional 
product. Eight years ago in 1991, for example, the Republic of 
South Africa's share of the gross regional product was 75%. Next in the 
ranking was the oil-producing Angola with a 6% share, followed by 
VOL 16 NO 1 JANUARY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 131
Zimbabwe which accounted for 5%. (United Nations Development Programme, 
1999: 49-52) This suggests that the benefits and costs of 
globalization differ from country to country and are, indeed, not distributed 
evenly among the regional states. 
Levels of integration into the international economy: eastern and 
southern Africa 
WITH A TOTAL population of 143.1 million in 1997, (United Nations Development 
Programme, 1999: 198-200) eastern and southern African 
countries participate in the global economy as distinct and unequal 
units. Moreover, they have historically had no significant economic 
interaction in the form of trading. Thus their degrees of integration into 
the world system and how these have affected their economies are 
similarly varied. These two phenomena are, in turn, a function of two 
factors, namely resources endowment and levels of economic development. 
The economic disparities between the regions and among their 
constituent states, on the other hand, possibly have to do also with 
their history. The richer, more developed and more resourceful countries, 
like South Africa are not just more deeply integrated into the 
world economic system but get a greater share of the benefits offered 
by the system than their neighbours in eastern and southern Africa. 
However, an important caveat is that wealth is not the only integrative 
mechanism. There are many such mechanisms and some are less direct, 
like for instance, labour migrancy which, because it finances imports of 
consumer goods, is crucial to Lesotho's survival and participation in 
the world system. 
The above notwithstanding, the quest for wealth lies at the root of 
economic interactions - intra and interstate alike. Rich countries export 
more goods and services, thus increasing their incomes and influence 
over the world system or regional economic groupings. In other words, 
wealth increases their share of the benefits offered by the world system 
or regional economic blocs. With its wealth and level of development, 
the United States is a dominant power, exporting goods and services 
worth US $856,000 million, twice Japan's value of exports, in 1996 
(Callaghy 1995: 42-45). The United States' huge internal market has 
132 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA VOL 16 NO 1 JANUARY 2001
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enabled it to prop up developing countries that it considered to be of 
strategic importance by accepting their exports, the policy's beneficiaries 
being mainly the South East Asian states or "Asian tigers". 
In relation to eastern and southern Africa, South Africa has the 
largest and most advanced economy, even though it is doubtful whether 
it deserves the label dominant, given its insignificant economic interaction 
with the other regional states. The value of its regional exports in 
1997 was US$ 34,848 million or just over 137% of the total for its neighbours 
in eastern and southern Africa and 57.9% of the two regions' 
total exports for the same year. Table II shows both the disparity among 
the countries of the two regions and South Africa's economic preponderance. 
As the right hand column of the table shows, South Africa 
also imports more than the combined total of the rest of the members of 
the two regions. The volume of South Africa's imports does not merely 
signal that country's dependence on foreign trade, but underscores its 
economic strength and level of involvement in the global economy in 
comparison with the other states in the two regions. The value of its 
imports amounted to more than eleven times those of Zimbabwe, the 
second most developed country in Southern Africa. Angola occupies 
third spot, probably because it is an oil exporter. 
While extrapolations from these statistics may be questionable it is 
clear from the table that, with the exception of South Africa, all the other 
countries are either marginal to or insignificantly linked with regional 
economies. Also clear is the fact that, as a whole, the economies of 
eastern and southern African countries are oriented away from Africa. 
Hence it would be presumptuous of us to surmise that their share of the 
benefits of globalization is significant. But, as globalization does not 
guarantee the spread of capital investment to the poorer states, it can 
be argued that the disutility of globalization will be greater for small and 
poor economies in the two regions. They are unlikely to attract enough 
foreign capital to cushion them against the painful effects of this new 
political economy. Yet the argument does not end here. We need to 
appeal to other factors that might be relevant such as the number and 
scale of the MNCs' investment, including its areas of concentration, in 
these countries. There are more MNCs, hence a bigger volume of foreign 
VOL 16 NO 1 JANUARY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 133
Table II: Eastern and southern African countries' regional 
exports and imports in US$ millions in 1996-97 
o of Regional 
Total 
53.65 
Imports 
34,585 
"Ai of Regional 
Total 
57.91 
Exports 
35,848 
Country 
South Africa 
7.76 5,003 8.39 5,196 Angola 
5.94 3,829 5.21 3,227 Zimbabwe 
5.87 3,787 4.83 2,994 Kenya 
2.94 1,901 4.61 2,857 Botswana (1996) 
4.46 2,879 4.40 2,725 Mauritius 
2.96 1,908 2.78 1,726 Namibia 
2.28 1,474 2.06 1,276 Zambia 
3.28 2,118 2.03 1,259 Tanzania (1996) 
2.09 1,350 1,463 2.36 Congo (DRC} 
1.96 1,265 .. 1,075 1.73 Swaziland 
2.07 826 1,335 1.33 Uganda 
1.34 870 0.99 613 Malawi 
Mozambique 1.45 937 0.80 500 
1.88 0.49 309 1,215 Lesotho 
TOTALS 99.93 99.21 61,894 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1999, 47-48. 
64,456 
SOURCE: COMPILED FROM THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME HUMAN 
capital, in South Africa than in any of the eastern and southern African 
countries. 
From the foregoing we can derive the following: that South Africa plays 
a less marginal role in the global economy than the rest of the other 
countries of the two regions, suggesting that it has easier and greater 
access to international markets, modern industrial technology and foreign 
financial capital. In fact, there are indications that since 1985 the 
net foreign direct investment (FDy flow into the rich developed countries 
has been phenomenal. For the United States this increased more 
than fourfold from US $20,010 million in 1985 to US $90,748 million in 
1997 (Herbst 1995:149). South Africa enjoys the largest inflow of the 
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Table III: Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows ini eastern and 
southern Africa in US$ imillions between 1985 and 1997 
Country foreign direct investment flow inflow (US$ million) 
% of regional % of regional 
total 1985 total 1997 
South Africa -449 -84.0 41.12 1,705 
2.24 Swaziland 1.80 75 
10.11 Botswana 2.41 100 
2.99 3.15 Namibia 131 
0.69 0.93 Lesotho 29 
0.73 Zimbabwe 1.68 70 
0.96 5.43 Kenya 40 
0.02 1 12.92 Congo (DRC) 
1.68 9.73 Zambia 70 
6.02 2.80 Tanzania 250 
6.02 0.74 Uganda 250 
0.04 Malawi 1.12 
12 
54 
16
5
4 
29 
69 
52 
15
4
6 2 
8.44 Angola 52.05 278 350 
0.84 - - Mozambique 35 
0.91 1.49 8 38 
95 
Mauritius 
TOBIS 
REPORT, 1999, 50-52. 
3146 
SOURCE: COMPILED FROM UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
FDI - US $ 1,705 million or 54% of the total for the two regions in 1997 - 
of any of its sister countries in eastern and southern Africa, as Table III 
shows. 
However, South Africa registered a negative net DFI worth US $449 
million in 1985, probably because of apartheid. Its gross national product 
(GNP) of US $130.2 billion in 1997 amounted to over 70% of the 
regions' total of US $183.7 billion (United Nations Development Programme 
1999: 45). Thus South Africa has some bargaining power 
vis-a-vis international capital, including the European Community (EQ. 
One third of South Africa's foreign trade is conducted with the EC. 
VOL 16 NO 1 JANUARY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 135
However, its trade with the rest of Africa is growing. Yet this does not 
mean that it is immune from the painful effects of globalization for, like 
the other states in the two regions, South Africa has to compete in this 
global market place. 
What prospects for democracy? 
HYDEN (1997: 237) observes, perhaps rightly, that "democracy to date 
has been treated as a prisoner of liberalism ... only the liberal definition 
of democracy has counted". But does this matter, given the defeat of 
socialism and the ascendancy of liberalism as a hegemonic political 
ideology? Our conception of democracy in this paper is not different 
from the liberal one. It is thus defined from the liberal perspective as a 
"government which is derived from public opinion and is accountable 
to it" (Finer 1977:63). One of the main characteristics of democracy is 
accountability. This implies "that a government must continually test 
its representativeness through a vote" (Finer 1977: 63). A democratic 
regime derives its legitimacy and theoretical basis from liberal state 
theories based on individual rights and the state acting in the common 
good, and one that relies on and guarantees the operation of a free 
market in civil society (Carnoy 1984: 13). But the erstwhile "mutual 
affection" between democracy and the laissez-faire economic doctrine 
seems set to diminish or dissipate under the new global economic order. 
In a democracy individual rights are presumed to be not only paramount 
but also sacrosanct, their sacred character having been 
underscored by the United Nations via its Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights. However, democracy is not just about the right to vote, 
to compete for a leadership position, to move freely without restrictions 
and to choose rulers (Makoa 1995:4). For the vulnerable majority of 
people in eastern and southern Africa this list constitutes a meaningless 
menu. This is because none of these values help poor people to 
gain control over their governments and resources, including the processes 
that sustain or threaten their livelihoods. Without this control, 
they cannot determine their countries' destiny (Makoa 1995: 5). 
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The eastern and southern African political landscapes have changed 
since the beginning of the last decade. The two regions finally succumbed 
to the IMF and World Bank pressure for a double-pronged 
social programme involving economic and political liberalization. By 
the end of the last quarter of 1999 nearly all the countries within the two 
regions had held multi-party general elections which provided an opportunity 
for people to appoint their rulers. The elections enabled the 
voters, at least in principle, to express their policy preferences. These 
ensured a modicum of popular sovereignty. 
That said, the real forces behind this democratization project were 
the same advocates of laissez-faire economic policies who preached 
the separation of the economy and politics. Thus, at the outset, the 
IMF- and World Bank-instigated programme of economic and political 
liberalization sets out to achieve this separation and, in particular, to 
subordinate the states concerned to international capital and to transform 
them into its own tool. The democratic agenda was recast in terms 
of the Lockean theory of political authority deeply sceptical about a 
powerful state. According to this theory, government is both a potential 
danger to individuals and a guarantor of their property rights (Dunn 
1998: 54). It is a potential danger to individuals because it can abuse 
power. For Locke, "in civil societies political authority rests in the last 
instance on the consent of the ruled" (Dunn 1998:54). With regard to 
economic liberalization, the hypothesis of a "predatory state" was invoked. 
The state had to pull out of economic management not only 
because it was inefficient, but also because it consumed a large amount 
of resources (Zacher 1995:11). 
At the outset, therefore, the democratization wave in Africa beginning 
in the 1980s was destined to become a project of the international 
bourgeoisie and protect its interests, namely its "rights of private property" 
(Karger 1996:8). These are in the main freedom to exploit resources 
and labour without state interference and the ownership of private property. 
Under pressure from both the IMF and Western donor countries, 
eastern and southern African states introduced wide-ranging economic 
VOL 16 NO 1 JANUARY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 137
liberalization measures. The measures include privatization and selling 
off state-owned enterprises, slashing subsidies on food, education, 
medicine and housing, currency devaluations, tax concessions, cuts in 
public expenditure, market reforms and removal of tariffs and other protectionist 
policies. 
Towards an appropriate response to globalization: issues for possible 
reassessment 
GLOBALIZATION DOES not take place outside states and trading regional 
blocs, even though the process itself transcends state borders and is 
increasingly autonomous. States and trading blocs remain its crucial 
framework. In any case, "the state is the architect of globalization" 
(Clark 1999:46). Therefore minimizing the adverse effects of globalization 
rests on creating or equipping these frameworks. These can "contain 
and mediate competitive global pressures which national policies cannot 
handle effectively..., for, after all, 60% of world trade transactions 
take place in regional blocs" (Clark 1999:46). Regional integration "is a 
means of gaining a better position within the global economy, while at 
the same time it can be used as a defensive response to the global free 
trade with the north, and a strategy for collective self-reliance" (Chasinga 
2000:8-9). 
Africa and eastern and southern African states can emulate the countries 
in the North by creating new mutual trading arrangements and 
stimulating or strengthening their existing regional economic blocs as 
means of increasing their share of the benefits yielded by globalization 
and creating a bulwark against the harmful effects of the process. As 
one analyst notes, for example, "integration in southern Africa would 
result in saving of costs due to coordinated investments in physical, 
social and institutional structures..., larger investment flows, increased 
output ... and produce greater economies of scale" (van Rooyen, 
1998:125). 
Leistner (1997:113) identifies the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) as a successful regional cooperation which has promoted its 
members' vital economic interests. The SACU ensures the free movement 
of goods and has a common tariff system on all goods imported 
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from outside the union. It also provides "an element of a common monetary 
arrangement for Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa 
that enables members to access capital market and to obtain foreign 
exchange from the South Africa Reserve Bank." However, Leistner does 
not underestimate the problems attendant to economic blocs. Disparities 
among the different regional states would lead to number of problems. 
One of the examples is that smaller and economically weaker states 
would suffer from the "polarization of development effect", that is, capital 
flowing into the banks of developed members and, indeed, capital flight 
from the less developed ones. But this is not insurmountable provided 
that there is a political will to solve it. In fact, this did not prove to be a 
serious problem for the now-powerful European Community (EC). 
Conclusions 
THE COUNTRIES OF the two regions are clearly affected to varying degrees 
by globalization. The more economically advanced South Africa 
enjoys a better position within the global economy, hence it can absorb 
the pressures of globalization. It can thus serve as a catalyst and core 
of a regional economic bloc that might be envisaged. The two region's 
fledgling democracies would benefit from this arrangement that, in turn, 
would facilitate a collective approach to the problem and ensure common 
policies and political norms, including mutual assistance among 
members of the grouping. These arrangements would no doubt help 
the states concerned to withstand the vicissitudes of globalization whilst 
also enhancing the prospects for stability and democracy within the 
regions. Efforts regarding the harmonization of national development 
policies and principles of government are already being tried in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, and these 
seem set to succeed. Success in forging an economic community in 
southern Africa will, no doubt, enhance the prospects for increased 
flow of development capital into the region which is, in turn, crucial to 
social stability and democracy. However, effective regionalism and the 
economic co-operation here suggested as a palliative for the pain inflicted 
by some aspects of globalization depends, in the final analysis, 
on the political and social accountability of the leadership. 
VOL 16 NO 1 JANUARY 2001 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 139
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