Journal of Social Development in Africa (2000), 15, 1,49-60 
African Social Security Systems: An 
Ordinal Evaluation 
JOHN DIXON* 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to rank the soeial security systems in 45 African 
countries using a comparative evaluation methodology that enables an assessment 
to be made of a country's statutory social security intention. The conclusion 
drawn is that the spread of African social security system design standards are 
comparable to those of Latin American countries, although the poorest designed 
African systems arc somewhat superior to their Latin American counterparts. The 
very best designed African social security systems are in North Africa: Tunisia 
(with its world-class family support program), Algeria and Libya, although 
Mauritius also stands out. 
Introduction 
Descriptive and analytical comparative social security research on Africa began 
in the 1960s (Gcrig 1966, Kessler 1966) and has continued on a modest scale ever 
since (Moulton 1975, ILO1977, Ejuba 1982, Dixon 1987,Gruat 1990). This study 
contributes to this literature by incorporating an evaluative dimension that 
permits the ranking of African social security systems. 
The major social security strategics used in Africa to meet the social security 
needs arc: social insurance, social assistance, social allowances, mandatory 
public savings (National Provident Funds) and employee liability (see Table 1 and 
Dixon 1999: 20-24). 
The objective of this paper is to rank the 45 African social security systems 
using a comparative evaluation methodology that enables an assessment to be 
made of each country's statutory social security intention. Itdraws upon areccnlly 
completed global study, which ranks the design standards of social security 
programs and systems in 172 countries (Dixon 1999). 
*Dr John Dixon, Reader in International Social Policy, Department of Social Policy and 
Social Work, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth PL4 8AA, UK, Tel: 44- 
1752-233274; Fax: 44-1752-233209; email: J.Dixon@plymouth.ac.uk.
50 John Dixon 
Table 1: Social Security Strategies 
SlK'Ul 
Secuntv 
Strategy 
Social 
Assistance 
Social 
Insurance 
Social 
Allowances 
Mandatory 
Public 
SavinRs 
Emp lover 
Liability 
Source: Dixon 1999: 6 
Approaches to Evaluating Social Security Systems 
A variety of evaluation methodologies could be used to assess national social 
security systems (Dixon 1998, ISS A 1976). First, they could be evaluated by their 
inputs (using as measures, say, public social security receipts or expenditure as a 
percentage of Gross National Product (GNP), public social security receipts or 
expenditure per capita, indices of average annual benefit expenditure per capita 
over time, or indices of the real average annual benefit expenditure per capita over 
lime). Undoubtedly, public social security expenditure dam permit a statistical 
portrayal ol social security system input levels and trends over time, but it docs 
exclude programs financed only by employers or individuals and a careful 
appraisal of the comparability of expenditure data is obligatory. As a comparative 
evaluative methodology capable of broad application, input evaluation methodologies 
are found to be wanting. 
Second, social security systems could be judged by their efficiency (using as 
an cllicicncy measure administrative cost per unit of social security benefit 
dispersed), which is problematic because of double counting and the existence of 
Coverage 
Primar> 
Sources of 
Funding 
Primary 
Social Security 
Goal 
Poverty 
alleviation 
Public 
revenue 
Entire population 
or designated 
categories 
Poverty 
prevention 
Employees 
in designated 
categories and 
their dependents 
Contributions 
frum covered 
employees, 
their employers, 
and government 
Public 
revenue 
Social 
compensation 
Entire population 
or designated 
categories 
Poverty 
prevention 
Employee* 
m designated 
categories and 
their dependents 
Contributions 
(rum covered 
employees 
and their employers 
Povcm 
prevention 
Designated 
emplmers 
Employees 
and their 
dependents 
Primary 
Forms of 
Benefits 
Primary 
Benefits 
Eligibility 
Flat-rate periodic 
payments 
In-kind benefits 
Domicile 
Categorical tests 
Means test 
Categorical test> 
Contribution or 
employment record 
Earnings-related or 
contribution related 
periodic payments 
In-kind bent-fits 
Healthcare benefits 
Flat-rate periodic 
payments 
Categorical tests 
Domicile 
Lump-sum, perhaps 
convertible to 
periodic payments 
Categorical tests 
Past payment 
of contributions 
Current 
employment 
Earn ing-related 
periodic payments 
Lump-sum 
payments
African Social Security Systems 51 
gaps caused by social security services being delivered by agencies delivering a 
multiplicity of services (ILO 1988b: 6). As a comparative evaluative methodology 
capable of broad application, efficiency evaluation methodologies arc also 
found wanting. 
Third, a performance evaluation of social security systems can take a variety 
of forms, given the availability of reliable and compatible data. Program coverage 
measures could be used (such as the percentage of population or work force 
covered or the percentage program coverage of target population categories), but 
they arc problematic because of the difficulties in determining, at any given 
moment, the number of people who are actually, rather than potentially, eligible 
for program benefits under general qualifying criteria specified (such as minimum 
residency, employment or contribution qualifying periods) (ILO 1972: 385). 
Benefit adequacy measures could be used (such as cash entitlements as a 
percentage of a poverty income threshold, of minimum earnings, of average 
earnings, or of GNP per capita), but they are all dubious because they ignore 
differential social security needs and the distribution of benefit payment above or 
below the chosen standard or benchmark (such as a poverty income threshold, an 
average wage level, GDP per capita). Beneficiary needs satisfaction or benefit 
adequacy perception measures could be used (such as measures of household 
financial security, of subjective deprivation and of subjective poverty), but they 
can be biased by the form of question posed and the measurement scales used. 
Additionally, two quite formidable efficiency or performance evaluation challenges 
remain. As a comparative evaluative methodology capable of broad 
application, performance evaluation methodologies are also found wanting. 
Finally, social security systems could bcasscssed on the basis of ihcacccplabilily 
of their design features. This methodology permits a comparative evaluation 
of the statutory intentions of national social security systems. Only this evaluation 
methodology meets the long-standing comparative evaluative challenge issued 
by Rys (1966: 268) of defining the "classification scales by which to judge the 
respective merits and shortcomings of individual members of the [social security ] 
universe observed." 
A Design Feature Evaluation Methodology 
A comparative evaluation methodology has been developed to assess a country's 
statutory social security intention (Dixon 1998, 1999). There is of course a 
potential, sometimes an actual implementation gap between what a social security 
system promises to deliver in terms of statutory program coverage, benefit 
eligibility, benefit generosity and program finance and administration; and what
7-4 3 32 
3 36 7S 
33 98 3 
52 John Dixon 
Table 2: Social Security Design Feature Kvaluative Dimensions 
SYSTEM PRIMARY STRATEGY: SUPPLE. TOTAL 
COMPONENT COVER- EI.IGIB- 15ENE- MENTARY 
AGE ILITV FITS STRATEGIES 
OLD-AGE 
PROGRAM 21 
DISABILITY 
PROGRAM 22 
SURVIVORS' 
PROGRAM 23 
SICKNESS 
PROGRAM 27 
MATERNITY 
PROGRAM 25 
EMPLOYMENTRELATED 
TEMPORARY 
INJURY 
PROGRAM 20 
EMPLOYMENTRELATED 
PERMANENT 
INJURY 
PROGRAM 21 
EMPLOYMENTRELATED 
SURVIVORS' 
PROGRAM 20 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
PROGRAM 12 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
PROGRAM 24 
CHILD BENEFITS 
PROGRAM 
HEALTHCARE 
BENEFIT 
PROGRAM 
FINANCIAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
TOTAL 25; 189 348 3 7 
Source: Dixon 1999: 200
African Social Security Systems 53 
it ultimately delivers. This gap can, of course, become very significant in 
countries where public administration and/or public finances have largely or 
totally collapsed, or have become severely restricted, because of war, natural 
disasters or severe economic dislocation. Opcrationalising this evaluation methodology 
involved the articulation of a comprehensive set of 860 design features, 
and the systematic attachment of a subjective score to the inclusion or exclusion 
of particular design features that makes a social security system "more" or "less" 
acceptable (see Table 2). 
Central to any qualitative evaluative judgments must bca set of value premises. 
The ones adopted in this study relate to the set of benchmarks embodied by the 
International Labor Organization's (ILO's) conventions on minimum social 
security standards (ILO1952,1966,1967 and 1989). These conventions are longstanding 
and define an internationally accepted set of conservative, minimumstandard 
benchmarks identifying the design features that should be embodied in 
"minimally acceptable" social security systems in both developed and developing 
countries (ILO 1989, Tamburi 1981), as targets to be achieved in most instances. 
This set of standards can, of course, be challenged. Yet they remain the only 
articulated set of social security values that have emerged from any international 
discourse as "universal" in their applicability and acceptability. Oiling (1993: 
169) considers that these conventions provide "an internationally accepted 
definition of the very idea of social security." Social security systems arc thus 
considered more acceptable (to varying degrees) if their design features: 
• cover all social security contingencies, which penalises countries that have made 
the policy choice, whether for ideological, political or economic reasons,'of 
either: 
• using other public policy strategics (such as lax expenditure strategics) 
to achieve social security goals; or 
• not establishing social security programs for particular contingencies; 
• has embodied in its constituent programs: 
• universality of coverage, which penalises countries that have made the 
policy choice of restricting coverage by excluding specific population 
categories, whether for ideological, political or economic reasons; 
• minimal restrictions with respeel to their categorising and general 
qualifying eligibility requirements, and the specification of needs-assessment 
criteria, which penalises countries if they have made the policy 
choice of restricting eligibility on any basis other than need, whether for
4 John Dlxon 
ideological, political or economic reasons; 
• provision of periodic cash entitlements that enable recipients to maintain 
their accustomed lifestyle, relative to the prevailing community living 
standards, which penalises countries that have made the policy choice, 
whether for ideological, political or economic reasons, of: 
• providing benefits on any basis other than past earnings; and/or 
• not regularly adjusting such cash entitlements so as to ensure that they 
remain commensurate with prevailing community living standards; 
• provision of health care benefits thai include appropriate medical, 
hospital and paramedical care, of a standard comparable to that available 
to the community as a whole, to those covered by social security programs 
(including dependents) and to social security recipients who arc in need of 
such services for as long as such services arc medically required, which 
penalises countries that have made the policy choice, whether for ideological, 
political or economic reasons, of restricting the availability, and/or the 
range of health care benefits provided under the auspices of their social 
security systems; and 
• provision of incentives to encourage and/or enable the social security 
recipients who arc able to work to enter the work force, which penalises 
countries that have made the policy choice of not introducing a set of 
wclfarc-lo-work measures in an effort to reduce dependency; 
• minimises its costs, and share them amongst employers, employees and 
government in such a way as to ensure that cost burden to individuals (as 
taxpayers and contributors) is progressive rather than regressive, which 
penalise countries thai have made the policy choice, whether for ideological, 
political or economic reasons, of: 
• not adopting tripartite financing for all social security programs; and/ 
or 
• limiting the degree of vertical income redistribution sought; and 
• has a mode of administration that is as simple and as decentralised as 
possible, especially from the perspective of the end user, which penalises 
countries that have made the policy choice, whether for ideological, 
political or economic reasons, of constructing a complex and/or centralised 
social security system.
African Social Security Systems 55 
For each country's social security system, the ranking score (R) has been 
calculated as follows: 
R = a UP sum + 11)11 I) + b(F) + c(A) 
• where Psum is the sum of all the national social security program design 
assessment scores, where for each social security program: 
P = 0.3 ((100 - Cd + Cb) + (100 - Ed + Eb) + (100 - Bd + Bb) + Sb) 
• where Cd is the sum of all primary strategy coverage design shortcoming 
deductions, Cb is the sum of all primary strategy coverage design merit 
bonuses, Ed is the sum of all primary strategy benefit-eligibility design 
shortcoming deductions, Eb is the sum of all primary strategy benefiteligibility 
merit bonuses, Bd is the sum of all primary strategy benefit 
design shortcoming deductions, Bb is the aggregate primary strategy 
benefit merit bonuses, and Sb is the merit bonus assigned to any supplementary 
strategics; 
• F is the national social security financing assessment score, where: 
F= 1OO - Fd + Fb 
• where Fd is the sum of all social security financing design shortcoming 
deductions, and Fb is the sum of all social security financing design merit 
bonuses; 
• H is the national social security health services design assessment score, 
where: 
H = 0.3 ((1OO - HCd + HCb) + (1OO - HEd + HEb) + (1OO - HBd + HBb) 
+ HS) 
• where HCd is the sum of all primary health care benefit program coverage 
design shortcoming deductions, HCb is the sum of all primary health care 
coverage design merit bonuses, HEd is the sum of all primary health care 
benefit-eligibility design shortcoming deductions, HEb is the sum of all 
primary health care benefit design merit bonuses, HBd is the sum of all 
primary health care benefit design shortcoming deductions, HBb is the 
sum of all primary health care benefit design merit bonuses, and HS is the 
design merit bonus assigned to any supplementary health care strategies; 
• A is the national social security administration assessment score, where: 
A = (100 - Ad + Ab) 
• where Ad is the sum of all social security administration design short-
56 John Dixon 
coming deductions, and Ab is the sum of all social security administration 
design merit bonuses; and 
• a, b and c are coefficients of relative importance that sum to unity, 
assigned the values of 0.8,0.15 and 0.05 respectively. 
The output is an African regional ranking of national social security systems: a 
league table (sec Dixon 1999:249-250). League tables, as Rose (1995:113)quitc 
correctly points out: "ignore whether a country is not only making progress in 
relation to its own past, but also catching up in relation to other nations." 
The Database 
The social security system features derive very largely from the 1995 edition of 
United States Social Security Administration's SocialSecurityProgramsThroughout 
the World (US SS A 1996). This information source is unique in both its scope 
which is global and its content which is program specific, although it is not without 
its blemishes (see Dixon 1998,1999). 
A Ranking of African Social Security Systems and Programs 
The African social security system design standards arc comparable to those 
achieved in Latin American countries, although Africa's poorest designed systems 
arc superior to those of Latin America. The best designed African systems 
can be found in North Africa: Tunisia (1st), Algeria (3rd) and Libya (4th) (with 
Mauritius 2nd); while at the other end of the African design-standard spectrum 
comes Southern Africa, although the bottom ranked countries are Sierra Leone 
(45th), Malawi (44th) and Somalia (43rd) (sec Dixon 1999: 249-250). 
Sub-Regional Ranking 
North Africa. This sub-region's social security systems are unequivocally the best 
designed in Africa. Tunisia unquestionably has the best designed system, containing 
Africa's best designed employment related permanent disability and family 
support programs (the latter being ranked equal 9th in the world (with Bulgaria)), 
being in the same class as Bolivia's and Uruguay's, Latin America's best designed 
systems. Of the remaining five countries in the sub-region, three arc in the African 
top 10: Algeria (3rd, with Africa's best designed sickness program, employment 
related temporary disability programs), Libya (4th, with Africa's best designed 
disability program) and Egypt (equal 9th Egypt, which has Africa's best designed 
survivors' program). At the bottom of the sub-regional league table is Sudan, 
which is still only just within the bottom half of the African league table (24th).
Ranking 
Region/ 
Country 
Africa 
Social 
Security 
Design 
Score 
1 898 Tunisia 
2 865 Mauritius 
3 854 Algeria 
4 843 Libya 
829 Cape Verde 5
6 821 South 
Africa 
Burundi 810 
804 Congo 
800 Eygpt 
800 Zaire 
Rwanda 797 
789 Togo 
7
8
9
9
11 
12 
13 783 Gabon 
14 780 Morocco 
Niger 780 
778 Mali 
774 Benin 
769 Chad 
14 
16 
17 
IS 
763 Cameroon 19 
754 ZambU 20 
21 751 
Central 
African 
Republic 
748 Guinea 22 
Table 3: African Regional Social Security Rankings, 1995 
African Social Security Systems 
Region/ 
Country Ranking 
Africa 
Social 
Security 
Design 
Score 
23 743 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Sudan 24 740 
Madagascar 25 734 
26 720 
C6te 
d'lvoire 
Mauritania 27 705 
28 701 
Burkina 
Faso 
Kenya 698 
Nigeria 680 
Uganda 667 
662 Zimbabwe 
Senegal 659 
Seychelles 653 
Ethiopia 624 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
610 36 
Sao Tome' 
&
Principe 
610 Tanzania 
604 Botswana 
599 Liberia 
593 Ghana 
36 
38 
39 
40 
41 590 Gambia, 
The 
590 Swaziland 41 
542 Somalia 43 
462 44 Malawi 
429 45 Sierra 
Leone 
Source: Dixon 1999: 249-250 
57
58 John Dixon 
Middle Africa. This sub-region's social security systems design standards 
match those of the middle league countries in Central America (namely Panama 
(4th), Honduras (5th) and El Salvador (6th)). Its best two, Congo and Zaire (in that 
order), arc ranked 8th and equal 9th in Africa. The sub-region's poorest designed 
system in the Central African Republic is still in the middle of the African league 
table (23rd). 
West Africa. Design standards of social security systems in this sub-region 
correspond to those achieved in the Caribbean, although its poorest design system 
in Sierra Leone (19th and last) is clearly belter than Surinam's, the poorest 
designed system in the Caribbean. Cape Verde, undoubtedly the sub-region's best 
designed system, is of a similar standard to that achieved by Trinidad and Tobago 
(ranked 2nd in the Caribbean behind the Bahamas), being the only country from 
this sub-region in the African top 10 (5th). Next come Togo (2nd) and Gabon 
(3rd). Cote dTvoire stands out only because it has a world-class designed 
maternity program, ranked equal 9th in the world (with Luxembourg, Sweden and 
Russia). The poorest designed system in the sub-region is in Sierra Lconc, which 
is also the poorest designed in Africa. 
East Africa. The design standards of this sub-region's best social security 
system in Mauritius, containing Africa's best designed old age, unemployment 
and health care benefit programs; compare la vourably to the standards achieved 
by the Mexican and Chilean systems (ranked 6th and 7th in Latin America 
respectively), which makes Mauritius the second ranking country in Africa. 
Following it arc Burundi (2nd) and Rwanda (3rd, with Africa's best designed 
employment related survivors' programs). The sub-region's poorest designed 
system in Malawi is considerably better than that of Sierra Lconc (West Africa). 
Southern Africa. The best designed system in this sub-region is that of South 
Alrica, containing Africa's equally best designed health care benefit program, 
which compares favourably to systems in Barbados and Colombia (ranked 12th 
and 13th in Latin America respectively), being in the African top 10 (6th). The 
poorest designed system in Swaziland is considerably belter than that of Malawi 
(East Africa). 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to extend the comparative social security literature by 
incorporating an evaluative dimension, using a methodology that permits an 
evaluation of national statutory social security intent. The design feature evaluation 
mclhodology adopted, involved qualitative judgments taken from a set of 
value premises, derived from the ILO's conventions on minimum social security
African Social Security Systems 59 
standards. 
The conclusion drawn is that African social security system design standards 
arc comparable to those achieved in Latin America, the best being of comparable 
standard, while the poorest arc somewhat superior to those in Latin America. The 
very best designed African social security systems are in North Africa: Tunisia 
(with its world-class family support program), Algeria and Libya; and in Mauritius, 
which dominates the East Africa sub-region, as does Smith Africa in its subregion; 
and Cape Verde in West Africa. Cote dTvoirc stands out due 10 its worldclass 
designed maternity program. 
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