Afr. j . polit. set (2003), Vol 8 No. 1 
Book Review: 
Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of 
Sudan's Civil Wars. 
Oxford, James Currey, 2003 
Civil war in Sudan has been become part of the fabric of society ever since 
independence in 1956, although there was a truce from 1972 (the Addis 
Ababa peace agreement) until 1983, shortly before the fall of President 
Nimeiri. Otherwise, with the end of the wars in Ethiopia and Angola, Sudan 
has been in a state of war for longer than any other African country. For 
much of this time the stereotypical view of the war has been a form of set 
piece simplification: a Muslim North against a Christian/animist South; 
Arabs versus Black Africans; Northern exploitation (the slave trade)versus 
Southern weakness. 
Such assertions are challenged by a new book, The Root Causes of 
Sudan's Civil Wars by Douglas Johnson. A leading expert on modern Sudan, 
he uses a wealth of detailed scholarship to disprove such ideas or, rather, to 
demonstrate that the confrontation between the two religions is only part of 
much more complex pattern. Johnson, it is true, addresses the religious 
divide first, and shows that it is far more than just a struggle between Islam 
and Christianity. Southern Sudanese are not seen as having coherent religions 
of their own, but are described with depressing regularity as Christian 
and animist (or sometimes even Christian-animist). But "animism" is an 
archaic term with little descriptive value. In its original sense it referred to 
a theory of "primitive" religion. It has since been adapted as a pseudo-scientific 
replacement for "pagan" to avoid the latter's pejorative overtones 
acquired from centuries of Christian propaganda. Although only a small 
proportion of the people in the South are Christians while the majority have 
a number of theistic religions of their own, the concept of a Muslim- 
Christian divide persists in the West more because its suits aspects of 
Western Realpolitik than because it describes the reality. 
Important as the religious question is, that of economics is just as valid. 
Much of the history of Sudan, both during the colonial period and since 
independence, has been dominated by the inequalities created by a dominant 
centre based in Khartoum. This base controlled and continues to control 
all aspects of development and the peripheries of the country (not just 
1027-0353 ° 2003 African Association of Political Science
148 Douglas H. Johnson 
the South) have been generally neglected and never receive their share of 
development finance or attention. This centre versus periphery phenomenon 
resulted from the long history of slavery and slave raiding. 
Then, when Britain gave independence in 1956 it did so in a hurry, eager 
only to divest itself of a problem that it no longer had the capacity or wish 
to resolve before disputes about development priorities between North and 
South had been sorted out. There was widespread discontent in the South 
as a result of the 1954 elections and the Sudanisation process. The 
Southerners wanted a federal system or complete independence, but they 
have always operated from a position of weakness in relation to the North 
where the bulk of the population is found. The final paradox of Sudanese 
independence was that it was thrust upon the Sudan by a colonial power 
eager to extricate itself from its residual responsibilities. It was not achieved 
by a national consensus expressed through constitutional means. 
The resource question is all important, for the bulk of Sudan's resources 
needed for the nation's revitalisation - oil, water, fertile soil and various 
minerals - are to be found in the South. And, as the author points out, the 
Khartoum government is more concerned to extract the South's resources 
with a minimum return to the South than to build a modern comprehensive 
state. As a result, when the civil war resumed in 1983, the SPLA attacked 
the Jonglei Canal (being dug in the South to increase the flow of the river 
Nile downstream) and oil extraction and brought the former to a standstill, 
though some years later oil production was started. The SPLA has seen itself 
as a movement to effect change in the government of the Sudan as a whole, 
and not as a provisional government for a future southern Sudanese state. 
The roots of North-South differences are both multiple and deep. These 
involve the centre versus the periphery resulting from slavery and the slave 
trade; inequalities of development during the colonial period that always 
favoured the North; and the arrival in the late 19th century of militant Islam 
that then and since has mitigated against a North-South rapprochement. It 
also involves a British withdrawal before it had created a satisfactory and 
viable development plan, and the failure to find a national consensus, 
which was prevented by a Northern nationalism that sought to create an 
Arab, Islamic based state. And as though these differences were not enough, 
there has always been the foreign factor: Cold War (US) support changing 
according to what was happening elsewhere in the Horn of Africa but 
always ensuring that arms were available on a massive scale. 
Against this background it is hardly surprising that Sudan has been 
divided and subdivided by civil wars for 40 years. It is the largest country 
in Africa, strategically placed between Egypt, the Red Sea, Ethiopia, East 
Africa and points further south. It is seen (wrongly for most of the time) as 
a bridge between the Arab world and black Africa. It would have been unre-
Book reviews 149 
alistic to suppose that the major powers outside Africa would leave it alone. 
They never have and probably never will. 
The author has produced an authoritative well-researched analysis of one 
of Africa's most complex countries and his book should be an essential 
addition to the library of anyone trying to understand and master the problems 
of the Sudan. 
Guy Arnold 
This review is reproduced by permission of West Africa Magazine.