Afr. j . polit. sci. (2002), Vol 7 No. 2 
Civil Society and the Democratisation 
Processes in Kenya and Uganda: 
A Comparative Analysis of the 
Contribution of the Church and NGOs 
Juma Anthony Okuku* 
Abstract 
Civil society comprises various interest groups such as human rights groups, 
co-operatives, trade unions and the church through which individuals collectively 
carry out their social enterprises. The rise of the centrality of civil 
society in much of Africa, in both development discourse and the democratization 
process, has been in response to state weakness. As a result it has become 
the cutting edge of the effort to build a viable democratic order. This 
paper contends that the success of civil society in forcing political concessions 
in Africa relates to the availability of opportunity to mobilize, agitate and bargain 
with the state from a position of strength. However, the notion that a 
generic civil society is uniformly progressive in challenging the African authoritarian 
state and advancing democratization may not be accurate. This 
comparative study attempts to bring out the underlying similarities and differences 
in the contribution of the Christian church and NGOs as civil society 
organizations to the democratization process in Kenya and Uganda. 
Introduction 
Civil society may be seen as an arena where manifold social movements and 
civil organisations from all classes attempt to constitute themselves into an 
ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance 
their interests (Bratton, 1989a: 417). The concept of civil society has become 
central to the contemporary discourse on democracy and democratisation. 
In Africa, the authoritarian character of the post-colonial state is underlined 
by its dominance of civil society. The state has tended to rationalise this 
dominance on the grounds that the imperatives of rapid economic development 
and nation building would not permit any accommodation to the 
oppositional activities of individuals and groups. 
* Department of Political Science, Makerere University, Uganda 
1027-0353 » 2002 African Association of Political Science
82 Juma Anthony Okuku 
There is, however, an emerging view of the central role of civil society, 
religious ideas and NGOs in the process of political liberalisation and democratisation 
on the African continent. Democratisation is seen as a political 
process, as it has to do with the transformation of state and political society. 
The spontaneous resurgence of civil society in Kenya and Uganda, and 
indeed in much of Africa, is a common explanation for this change. Fed up 
with poverty, economic mismanagement and authoritarianism, civil society, 
although still weak, has risen up to challenge authoritarian rule and 
demand good governance and democracy. Religious organisations and 
NGOs, in some instances, have spearheaded this trend. The proponents of 
civil society believe that the existence of an active civil society is crucial to 
the vitality of political democracy. The promise of the growing NGO sector 
is that it will contribute to the needed democratisation of African countries 
by pluralising and strengthening civil society. 
This paper examines, in comparative terms, the theoretical and empirical 
basis of these claims in the Kenyan and Ugandan context. The comparison 
serves as a pivot for arriving at a comprehensive historical and sociological 
appreciation of the differing contribution and contradictory tendencies of 
civil society to the democratisation processes in the two countries. It is 
argued that the notion that generic civil society is uniformly progressive in 
challenging the African authoritarian state and in advancing democratisation 
may not be accurate. As Kasfir (1998b: 126) observes, non-state organisational 
actors in the African civil society may be capable of no more than 
modest, tentative and often reversible contributions to democratisation. 
Assessing whether these actors strengthen democracy requires a notion of 
civil society which evaluates what is happening, not what ought to happen. 
The paper is divided into four parts. Part one is an overview of the theoretical 
concepts of civil society and democratisation. Part two looks at the role 
of the Christian church in Kenyan and Ugandan democratisation processes. It 
is argued that since the 1980s, Christian churches in Kenya, unlike those in 
Uganda have been 'at the centre' of pressures for democratisation. Part three, 
discusses the contribution of NGOs in both Kenya and Uganda at two levels: 
first, as they seek to pluralise the civil society environment, they pursue actions 
that may enable them and other interest groups in society to operate 
freely and unfettered by the state. Second, the NGO empowering role of grassroots 
communities where they pursue their development activities. Part four 
is an appraisal of the contradictory nature of civil society, the church and 
NGOs in the democratisation processes in Kenya and Uganda. 
Towards a Theoretical Framework 
Civil society is usually defined in relation to the state; that is, the way society 
is organised outside the state. For Bayart (1986), civil society is society
Civil Society and the Democratisation processes in Kenya and Uganda: 83 
in its relations to the state, in so far as it is in confrontation with the state. 
It consists of a range of organisations of self-interests, which are protected 
by various mechanisms such as an independent judiciary and a free press, 
from interference by the state. According to Chazan (1992:282), the nurturing 
of civil society is widely perceived as the most effective means of controlling 
repeated abuses of state power, holding rulers accountable to their 
citizens and establishing the foundations of durable democracy. In this 
regard, for instance, the impetus for the late democratic transitions in Africa 
has been traced to the growth and political activity of civil society across 
the continent (Ndegwa, 1996:2). Among the most vocal opponents of 
authoritarian regimes in African countries have been voluntary and associational 
groups such as churches, organised labour, professional associations 
and grassroots movements. 
However, the notion of generic civil society as being uniformly progressive 
in challenging the authoritarian African state and in advancing democratisation 
may not be accurate. As Ndegwa (1996:6) argues, 'there is nothing 
in civil society organisations that makes them opponents of authoritarianism 
and proponents of democracy'. There is no theological virtue in the 
notion of civil society. Civil society may advance without a democratic 
ideal. In Africa, where norms of hierarchy and authority are highly pronounced, 
civil society may be a significant reservoir of authoritarianism and 
anti-democratic values. Civil society could obstruct the process of democratisation. 
The recognition of the various tendencies in civil society and their 
predisposing factors is crucial to the analysis of the patterns of interaction 
between state and society (Abutudu, 1995:5). 
The definition that separates civil society from the state leads to a flawed 
conception of civil society. As Kasfir (1998a:l-3) observes, the wholesale 
belief in civil society as the basis of democratic order, leads to a distortion 
in the analysis of the relations of state and society and the possibilities of 
democracy is exaggerated. Civil society cannot be sharply divided from 
society in general. Neither can the state be separated from civil society. The 
proponents of civil society wrongly conceptualise who are the organisational 
actors playing significant roles in securing a new public sphere, or 
questions whether the civil society actors who are supposed to bring democracy 
can actually do so. 
An alternative conception of civil society could be for one to come up 
with an agenda, the definition of a common project in order to, in the context 
of authoritarian regimes, effect the transition to democracy. This project 
might be seen to mark its transition from civil society 'in itself to civil 
society for 'itself (Abutudu, 1995:6). The understanding of the interconnectedness 
between civil society and the state in this regard is crucial. Civil 
society reflects both divisions in the larger society and the needs and
84 Junta Anthony Okuku 
demands of state actors. This may limit civil society organisations' capacity 
to cause authoritarian states to become more democratic. As Kasfir 
(1998b:125) contends, patronage-based political economies like those in 
Africa produce incentives for civil society actors to organise platforms for 
gaining power rather than creating reform. Habituated by many years of 
extensive interference, and little effective capacity to implement policies, 
state officials both threaten and infiltrate organisations in order to deflect 
initiatives for reform. 
The expectation of NGOs and other civil society organisations such as 
self-help and ethnic associations as agents of democratisation remains contentious. 
Given the diversity among NGOs' positioning with regard to the 
democratisation movement, the blanket civil-society - political liberalisation 
thesis requires revision. Democratisation is basically a process of establishing, 
strengthening or extending the principles, mechanisms and institutions 
that define a democratic order. According to Ndegwa (1996:7), organisations 
in civil society may be supportive of democratisation. This is 
premised on two central factors. First, when they articulate democratic values 
as well as pursue actions to challenge non-democratic regimes. Second, 
the success of civil society in forcing political concessions in Africa relates 
to the availability of opportunity to mobilise, agitate and bargain with the 
state from a position of strength. 
The transposing of civil society and democratisation still remains problematic. 
As Kasfir (1998b: 142-5) points out, with notable exceptions, the 
African organisations specified by conventional civil society notions are 
new, lack social roots, have objectives unrelated to on going political conflicts 
and are heavily financed by outsiders. He contends that scholars and 
donors need to rethink the assumptions on which they expect civil society 
to contribute to democracy. In the process, they ought to pay at least as 
much attention to political institutions as to civil society. Any conception of 
civil society and its contributions to the democratisation processes in Africa 
must take note of the interconnectedness between civil society and the state 
as well its limitations in causing authoritarian states to become more democratic. 
It is in this light that we examine how the Christian church, NGOs 
and other civil society organisations in Kenya and Uganda have been 
involved in the process of democratisation. 
The Church and the Democratisation Process in Kenya 
and Uganda 
The Christian churches have been involved in Kenyan and Ugandan democratisation 
processes for some time. It is argued that over the decades 
Christian churches in Kenya, unlike Uganda, have been 'at the centre' of the 
pressures for democratisation. On the other hand, over this period churches
Civil Society and the Democratisation processes in Kenya and Uganda: 85 
in Uganda have rarely been spearheads of democratic change but instead 
have often mediated state power and the general population. This part seeks 
to explain the differing role of the respective churches in Kenya and Uganda 
in the democratisation process. This is discussed at three levels. First, the 
conditions that give the church the opportunity to mobilise. Second, the 
contributions of the church in the struggle for democracy and third, the limitations 
of the church in these processes. 
The Church and the Democratisation Process in Kenya 
First, the opportunity of the church to engage in the process of democratisation 
in Kenya has been created by its organisational resources, the deteriorating 
socio-economic conditions and the emergence of an oppressive oneparty 
state in post-colonial Kenya. In the process of centralisation, the 
church remained among the few institutions that managed to keep a degree 
of corporate independence from the state. It is this organisational resource 
that was put to critical use in the struggle against oppression in the 1980s 
and 90s. Originating from the colonial period, the dense network of structures, 
bodies and organisations of the church in virtually every social and 
economic sphere, gave it an organisational distinctiveness (Saber-Friedman, 
1997:26). In multi-ethnic and differentiated societies like Kenya, the church 
affords the means for a broad dissemination of its moral doctrines and social 
political views. This enables them to contribute to the socialisation of 
African citizens and thus affecting the prospects for democratic participation. 
In the period of change, the established Christian churches and their 
organisations as expressed in the National Council of Churches of Kenya 
(NCCK) and Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya (EFK), demonstrated their 
willingness to reach out to the disenfranchised and those on the margins of 
society. As a space of integration and construction of solidarities and 
because of its ability to combine both scared and profane resources, the 
church in Kenya came to enjoy a specific type of power. The power to 
deliver and the power to tame and define reality. It is from this position that 
its most important ministers spoke out (Saber-Friedman, 1997:30). Second, 
the deteriorating socio-economic conditions gave the church even more 
legitimacy as it expanded the social and economic projects that it had instituted 
since the colonial period. 
The third opportunity for the church arose as a result of the rise of an 
oppressive oneparty system in Kenya. When civil society is repressed by a 
state, churches remain 'zones of freedom' and tend to take up the political 
functions of the repressed organisations. As a result, due to its popular credibility, 
the church became one of the only remaining available tools of 
expression of dissatisfaction and the urge for change in the country. The 
church advocacy role took mainly the form of confrontation with the state.
86 Juma Anthony Okuku 
The church contributed to establishment of pluralism in a number of 
ways. First, it was central in generating and sustaining a public discourse on 
democracy and change in Kenya (Ngunyi, 1995). It criticised excesses in the 
exercise of state power. It protested against change in electoral law, which 
removed the secret ballot replacing it with a queuing system, denounced 
brutal evictions of squatters in Nairobi and the state-engineered ethnic 
clashes in the Rift valley, which had turned it into the 'unhappy valley' 
(Berman and Lonsdale, 1992). The discourse that the church forced upon 
the state created an atmosphere conducive to change by accelerating 
processes aimed at transformation that were already underway. This discourse 
was informed by the conviction that the question of power and 
oppression was not a preserve of government and politicians. This was perhaps 
summed up more aptly by the late Bishop Muge. While addressing the 
Church of the Province of Kenya (CPK) Youth Organisation, Muge warned 
that 'the church couldn't compromise theological issues with secular or 
temporal matters'. The church was urged to protest 'when God-given rights 
and liberties are violated. The church had a special duty to 'give voice to 
the voiceless' (Throup,199S:151). Rev. B. Njoroge Kariuki went a step %. 
ther: 'The church has a duty beyond the rescue of victims of oppression. It 
must try to destroy the cause of oppression. The church will have to enter 
the political arena to do this' (Saber-Friedman, 1997:36). In a sense therefore, 
the clergymen were concerned that civil liberties had been curtailed 
and saw it as their duty to contribute to bringing about change. 
The church is, however, confronted with a number of contradictions and 
limitations in the realisation of a democratic order. Much of the church based 
opposition to the Moi regime in Kenya has a distinct Luo and Kikuyu ethnic 
basis, while many of the churches giving strong support to the government 
come from the same ethnic groups, particularly Lalenjin and Kamba that up. 
hold the regime. The EFK represents a feeble Luo-Kalenjin alliance with 
Kalenjin faction assuming a preponderant position. The NCCK is a multi-ethnic 
institution with strong Luo, Kikuyu, Embu and Meru presence (Ngunyi 
1995:126). Political patronage or lack of it has also accounted for the differ! 
ent political stances on the part of the leadership of different churches. Those 
institutions pursuing advocacy politics are also those excluded from political 
patronage under Moi, while inclusion in state patronage networks largely 3ccounts 
for the position taken by the 'loyalist' institutions in defense of the 
regime. Ethnic patronage dealt a blow to the emerging democratic movement 
While the church contributed tremendously to democratisation process 
in Kenya, there are limitations in that much of the political stances taken 
during the process of political liberalisation, was largely a function of ethnicity 
and political patronage. The social bases of most of the 'activist' instj. 
tutions are ethnic groups with strong political traditions but who had been
Civil Society and the Democratisation processes in Kenya and Uganda: 87 
excluded from power, particularly the Luo, Luhya and the Kikuyu, who 
were progressively being purged out of the centres of power. For civil society 
organisations to be seen as strengthening democracy, a notion of civil 
society which takes into consideration the terrain of the discourse is 
required. For most African societies, ethnicity and political patronage 
should be taken into serious consideration in civil society discourse. 
The Church and the Democratisation Process in Uganda 
The church in Uganda unlike in Kenya, has rarely spearheaded the struggle 
for democratisation but instead most often mediated state power in the 
general population. The specific historical context and the different nature 
of the terrain on which the central political and social conflicts have been 
fought in the two countries inform the differences. In this part we discuss 
this at three levels. First, we examine the determinants of church involvement 
in Ugandan socio-political conflict. Second, we analyse the 
restricted/stunted nature of church discourse on democracy and human 
rights in Uganda and third, examine the tendency for the church to identify 
itself with existing holders of power. 
The identification of the Anglican Church as a church of the establishment 
and the Catholic Church as anti-establishment has had profound 
implications for the involvement of the church in the struggle for democratisation 
in Uganda. The animosity between the two Christian churches has 
had disastrous results for the democratisation process as it has precluded 
the presentation of any form of united front on issues of civil liberties and 
human rights (Kiwanuka, 1961). The historical origins of this animosity 
can be traced to the colonial period. The Catholic Church lost the battle for 
political power to the Anglican Church in the 1890s. Since then, the 
Catholic Church concentrated on building up a 'spiritual kingdom', parallel 
to the state but not in direct competition with it, loyally cooperating with 
the colonial government in a more or less apolitical way (Ward, 1995:72). 
The centrality of the Catholic church in the formation of the opposition 
Democratic Party in mid 1950s only exacerbated the polarisation (Kassimir, 
1998:57). This compromised the autonomy that civil society organisations 
such as the church are supposed to have by representing a section of the 
population. The position of the Anglican Church could not help matters as 
there appeared divisionism in its internal organisational structures as well 
based on ethnicity and regionalism (Mudola, 1993). The nature of churchstate 
interaction and the articulation of the democratic question by the 
church have been further compounded by unresolved regional and ethnic 
questions in the country. These divisions have obstructed the capacity of the 
Church to advance the collective will of the society on issues of democracy 
and human rights.
88 Juma Anthony Okuku 
During colonialism and especially towards independence, the ethnic 
question came to dominate the concerns of the internal politics of the 
Anglican Church. As Ward (1995:73-75) notes, if the Baganda were preoccupied 
with fears of losing their status and integrity as a nation in an independent 
Uganda, other ethnic groups were equally apprehensive about 
renewed domination by Buganda. The election of the first Anglican African 
Bishop in 1965, Bishop Erika Sabiffi, a non-Muganda, caused an uproar. 
Such ethnic chauvinism could not help to bring the church at the centre of 
broad issues of democracy and democratisation. 
The Catholic Church under the leadership of Bishop Kiwanuka emphasised 
the need for respect for human rights, the equality of the people, a spirit 
of patriotism, among others (Waliggo, 1995:113). While this was positive in 
comparison to the practices of the Anglican Church, it could not be realised 
in practical terms. The proposition of individual Bishop cannot be a substitute 
to institutional capacities. The politics of the organisations contributes to their 
potential for political influence. The Catholic Church did not escape the problems 
of the ethnic question. The combination of unresolved regional question 
and the animosity between the Catholic and Anglican Churches and the 
quasi-establishment stance of the Anglican Church, have precluded the deployment 
of organisational capacities of the Christian church in Uganda to 
mount an effective challenge to authoritarianism in the country. 
The discourse on democracy and human rights by the church has been 
rather stunted both for historical and contextual reasons. The erosion of 
human rights and civil liberties in post-colonial Uganda, in general, was met 
with silence from the church, apart from a few protests, (Pirouet, 1995:249), 
Typical comments that were made did not directly concern the internal politics 
of Uganda. On 16 January 1967, for instance, the government ordered 
ten Roman Catholic missionaries to leave the country. Archbishop 
Emmanuel Nsubuga issued a statement in protest, 'Catholics in Uganda and 
elsewhere are deeply perturbed by the government's decision this week to 
expel 10 priests who were accused of helping and sheltering Sudanese rebels 
and of involving Uganda in danger of a war with the Sudan' (Mudoola 
1993:39). Internally, however, the Church remained silent as hundreds of p^ 
litical figures were detained without trial in the 1960s. 
At the height of human rights abuse in the 1970s during Idi Amin's 
regime, a unity against oppression was forged between Buganda and the rest 
of Uganda, between Catholics and Protestants, and within the church itself. 
However, in spite of this, weaknesses in the church of Uganda, the religious 
rivalries between Catholics and Protestants, inhibited an effective response. 
Perhaps the context, particularly the character of Idi Amin's regime, conditioned 
any response. As Ward (1995:82) correctly observes, To protest was 
to risk some definable punishment which could be calculated in advance
Civil Society and the Democratisation processes in Kenya and Uganda: 89 
Rather it was to risk unspecified ills involving loss of property, torture, imprisonment 
and death, not to mention reprisals on ones family'. Anglican 
Archbishop, Junan Luwum, who was murdered and several Bishops who 
had to flee to exile during Amin's regime exemplify the fate of any protest. 
Survival became paramount to the struggle for human rights. 
Perhaps the major failing of the Christian church in the democratisation 
process in Uganda has been the maintenance of the quasi-establishment 
stance of the Anglican Church on one hand and the ambiguity of the 
Catholic Church on the question of democracy, on the other. The Protestant 
Church has viewed itself as the church of the establishment. Indeed, all past 
Presidents apart from Idi Amin have been Protestants. This precludes any 
vigorous condemnation or denunciation of the erosion of human rights and 
democratisation on the part of the Catholic Church. 
The ambiguity in the Catholic Church is exemplified by the wavering positions 
of the Church leadership on the question of democracy. In 1986, for 
instance, the Catholic bishops declared that 'a multi-party system of government 
is an expression of fundamental freedom of assembly and association 
guaranteed by our National Constitution'. Three years later they had fallen in 
line with the state position on the democratisation process and return of 
multi-party politics. They collectively stated that 'As to the concrete question 
of what form government Uganda should adopt, we must state clearly that 
the church does not advocate one form' (Kassimir, 1998:77). 
Patronage and corruption, as in the case of Kenya, has compounded the 
situation. Patronage based political economies like that of Uganda produce 
incentives for civil society actors to organise platforms for gaining power 
rather than creating reform. State officials both threaten and infiltrate organisations 
in order to deflect initiatives for reform. The increasingly dwindling 
sources of donor funds has resulted in Church leaders and even Muslim 
leaders to succumb to patronage from the state. For instance, all religious 
leaders, Christian and Muslim have received donations of four-wheel drive 
vehicles from the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government 
through President Yoweri Museveni. As a result, the Church in Uganda has 
more often than not blessed the wishes of the power holders. This is clearly 
illustrated by the stand of the church on the so-called no-party system of 
governance. As Kassimir (1998:61) correctly notes: 
Clearly the current political system under the NRM falls short of the definition 
of democracy commonly accepted by civil society approaches, with critics 
pointing not only to the unfair electoral advantages of the NRM in a no-party 
system, but also to restrictions on associational rights in civil society itself. 
In spite of this, the church has largely endorsed these infringements on inalienable 
fundamental human rights at the altar of patronage from the state.
90 Juma Anthony Okuku 
The elevation of the NRM, which is in reality a political party, to a 'system' 
and then subjecting the population to a referendum, on 'political systems' 
in June 2000, was perhaps one of the most open abuse of civil rights 
in Uganda. Yet the church, which should have acted as the voice of the 
voiceless, has largely endorsed the process. The Uganda Joint Christian 
Council (UJCC), in a joint pastoral letter of 24 May 1999, was very supportive 
of the Referendum. It had this to say: 'The referendum on political 
systems scheduled to be held in the year 2000 offers to the people of Uganda 
the opportunity to make a choice of the political system that best promotes 
the interests of the country (UJCC, 1999a: 1). 
Six weeks later, on 2 July 1999, a law to regulate the process, The 
Referendum Act (1999) was fraudulently passed in parliament without a 
quorum. Yet three months later, the same joint council was urging people, 
using the usual state arguments, to participate in the exercise essentially 
aimed at entrenching a one party monolithic state. The UJCC recommended 
that: 'The referendum is a constitutional issue. So it is being recommended 
that in the spirit of constitutionalism all citizens should participate' (UJCC, 
1999b:8). This stand of the church on democratisation in Uganda is in stark 
contrast to that of the Kenyan churches that in the 1980s and 1990s took 
upon themselves the role of advocating for democratisation effectively as 
they command massive respect. 
In comparative terms, the churches in Kenya and Uganda have played 
contrasting roles in the democratisation processes of the respective countries. 
Due to a combination of unresolved regional questions, civil conflict 
and submission to patronage, the Ugandan church has been less effective in 
the process. On the other hand, although the emergence of different political 
stances on the part of church leadership during the process of political 
liberalisation in Kenya was largely a function of ethnicity and political 
patronage as well, many members of the clergy were concerned that civil 
liberties had been curtailed and freedom of expression restricted and therefore 
they became champions of the struggle to get rid of these unwarranted 
restrictions in Kenya's body politic. To date, the church is active in the 
reform process to get rid of draconian clauses from the constitution. 
The NGOs and the Democratisation Process in Kenya 
and Uganda 
In this part, we discuss the contribution of NGOs in both Kenya and Uganda 
at two levels: one, as NGOs pluralise the civil society environment, they pursue 
actions that may enable them and other interest groups in society to 
operate freely and unfettered by the state. Second, the NGO empowering 
role of grassroots communities where they pursue their development activities. 
These processes, for both countries, are not problem free. First, NGOs
Civil Society and the Democratisation processes in Kenya and Uganda: 91 
constitute a network of resourceful organisations that are growing increasingly 
autonomous of the state. They are, therefore, unlikely to be left alone. 
Second, NGOs have the potential to change state-society relations. The 
ensuring 'political jealousy' has led both the governments of Kenya and 
Uganda to attempt to control NGOs and their resources through legislation 
in the name of preserving national sovereignty. 
NGOs and the Democratisation Process in Kenya 
The Kenyan NGOs have played a contributory role in the democratisation 
process with some successes. However, in this process they have invited 
hostility from the state as, at the same time, they have confronted some limitations. 
The NGOs involvement in the process has been analysed as a case 
of availability of opportunity, NGO collective organisation and alliance with 
international organisations. 
The opportunity for NGOs in Kenya to influence democratic change has 
arisen out of the weakness of opposition parties. As Ndegwa observes, 
'given the weak and divided opposition parties, progressive organisations 
such as churches and NGOs involved in development have an opportunity 
to pursue an empowerment agenda within their sphere of activities' 
(Ndegwa, 1996:9). Historically as well, civic associations have functioned 
as a nucleus for people's mobilisation against the state in Africa (Fowler, 
1993:46). This historical experience gives NGOs an opportunity to participate 
effectively in the process of democratisation and strengthening of civil 
society. The authoritarian character of the post-colonial Kenyan state and its 
general assault on civil society calls for a focused and systematic approach 
which the NGOs and church provided, particularly in the 1990s. 
The activities of NGOs were not interfered with by the state so long as 
they remained 'developmental' and in general support of the statist developmentalist 
ideology of Harambee (Kanyinga, 1995). This changed when, 
the state faced increasingly hard economic times towards the end of the 
1980s. In patronage based economies such as Kenya's, the increasing flow 
of development aid to NGOs instead of the state resulted in political 'jealousy' 
on the part of the state. This is because the state's diminishing development 
resources would undermine its capacity for political patronage and 
legitimization (Ndegwa, 1996:36). The state is often uneasy when confronted 
with a threat to its hegemony. It is within this context that the state 
sought to control the NGOs through legislation, by enacting the NGO 
Coordination Act, 1990. The Act resulted in the activation of the NGOs and 
other civil society organisations. 
The NGOs as a result, became one of the various actors opposing the single-
party government on diverse issues such as electoral laws, human rights 
and lent further momentum to the democratisation movement unfolding in
92 Juma Anthony Okuku 
the 1990s on Constitutional Reform. The challenge of the legislation became 
the focal point of NGO-state relations. It resulted in NGOs' success in blocking 
the obnoxious articles. As Ndegwa (1996:110-115) correctly observes, 
'the eventual success of the NGO challenge itself had important implications 
for the political reform movement: it allowed NGOs to operate freely and 
independently from state interference - thus increasing the freedom of 
actors in civil society'. This act provided the evidence that civil society 
actors opposing a repressive state can have important bearing on political 
reform process. In the Kenyan context, both the Green Belt Movement and 
the Undugu Society of Kenya show that grassroots empowerment is an 
important outgrowth of fairly mundane development activities that require 
no explicit commitment by the NGO to oppose the state. As the NGOs try to 
empower the people, there is a tendency to come in conflict with the state. 
The NGOs acting as agents of democratisation in Kenya has not been 
problem free. Contrary to civil society theorising, NGOs are not predisposed 
to opposing single-party dictatorship. In what he calls exposing the 'two 
faces' of civil society, NGOs have not always been opposed to the state, the 
Undugu Society of Kenya being pro-government and the Green Belt 
Movement being very critical of government (Ndegwa, 1996:110). 
The NGOs contribution has been further limited by the organising principle 
of ethnicity and patronage. The general observation that patronagebased 
political economies produce incentives for civil society actors to 
organise platforms for gaining power rather creating reform applies in 
Kenya. Kanyinga (1995:118) argues that the role of NGOs has probably 
strengthened rather than weakened patronage. To him, most of Kenyan 
NGOs have tended to promote 'development' in the narrow sense rather 
than democratisation and have systematically sought to 'fit in' with the 
socio-political structures, which define and reproduce it. NGOs have tended 
to avoid working through groups that are involved in political change or 
controversy. As a result, their contribution to the pluralising of civil society 
is a deeply ambivalent one. 
The alliance of NGOs with other oppositional forces in civil society in late 
1980s and early 1990s, though commendable, did not amount to much. The 
newly legalised opposition parties' embrace of NGOs cause amounted to little 
in terms of sustainability of the democratic struggle. As the opposition 
parties fragmented, the frictions came to be reflected in the entire society. 
The failure of the opposition parties to capture state power dealt a devastating 
blow to the democracy movement. like the divisions that emerged in 
the church, the NGO community came to reflect the different political 
stances in the broader society. The experience of the church as that of NGOs 
implies that nonstate organisational actors in the African civil society may 
be capable of no more than modest, tentative and often reversible contribu-
Civil Society and the Democratisation processes in Kenya and Uganda: 93 
tions to democratisation. The contribution of NGOs to the democratisation 
in Kenya is commendable despite the above contradictions and weaknesses. 
NGOs and the Democratisation Process in Uganda 
The NGO phenomenon, in its contemporary sense, is a recent phenomenon 
in Uganda's socio-political development. Apart from the church, the rise of 
NGOs involved in the discourse on democratisation, political and civil liberties 
in Uganda are a recent occurrence. In thirty years of Uganda's independence, 
the country witnessed seemingly endless terrorism and human 
rights abuses. Several regimes in succession denied the Ugandan people 
their fundamental liberties. Freedom of speech was suffocated; lives lost, 
arbitrary arrests and detentions were the order of the day. Though there was 
pretence of a multi-party system between 1981-85, the political party in 
power denied the existence and operation of any form of autonomous 
organisations within civil society not allied to it. Lack of these facets in society 
led to the rise of NGOs concerned with political and civil liberties 
(Okuku, 1997:82). Second, the rise NGOs, as in Kenya, is a result of the 
increased funding that changes in the policies of donor countries made 
available. They also sprouted on the crest waves of international sympathy 
that came Uganda's way after the fall of the regimes of Idi Amin and Milton 
Obote II that were notorious for human rights abuses. From just a few in 
the 1980s they turned into a massive movement in the 1990s. 
In civil society literature, it has been suggested that NGOs have a unique 
position in society in that it can reach the people, educate and empower them 
hence enabling them to assert themselves and struggle for the democratisation 
of the socio-political space. By looking at the practices of the civil liberties 
NGOs, their organisational capacities and how they relate to the Ugandan 
State, the capacities of selected human rights NGOs to the extension of civil 
liberties are analysed, contributing to the democratisation process. These include 
the Uganda Human Rights Activists (UHRA), Foundation for Human 
Rights Initiatives (FHRI) and Action for Development (ACFODE) among others. 
These organisations have tried to translate the civil/political rights into a 
political culture with very limited success. 
All the three organisations were formed in the 1980s and 1990s reflecting 
the growing concern with human rights issues as part of the democracy 
question. In organisational terms, the UHRA is faced with internal power 
wrangles that led to the break away of FHRI. Both UHRA and FHRI, have 
personal rule by the founder leaders, suffer from donor dependence, have 
limited spread countrywide and there is general hostility from the State 
towards their activities. This has led to their limited capacity to empower 
the population. ACFODE on the other hand, although focused on empowerment 
of women, has been limited to urban areas (Okuku, 1997:87). This
94 Juma Anthony Okuku 
has been worsened by their focus on micro-elements rather than upon 
macro-dimensions of the economy, governance and social services. They 
have emphasised projects rather than programmes (Oloka-Onyango and 
Barya, 1998:135). This has resulted in their rather dismal contribution to 
the democratisation process. 
A study on Ugandan NGOs, discounts the automatic association often 
made between liberalisation and democratisation (Dicklitch, 1998). NGOs 
as important actors within civil society, are allowed to function as long as 
they 'fit' within the liberalisation agenda, fulfilling a gap-filling role, particularly 
of poverty alleviation (John de Connick, 1992) rather than empowerment 
or advocacy. In this regard, more telling about their limited capacity 
to contribute meaningfully to the democratisation process is their practices. 
NGOs have been compelled to exercise a significant amount of selfcensorship 
to avoid confrontations with government. Unlike NGOs in Kenya 
which were central on attacks on state restrictions, Ugandan NGOs have 
avoided 'controversial' issues such as army abuses and the political restrictions 
associated with the 'movement' system (Human Rights Watch, 
Uganda, 1999). 
NGOs in Uganda are not supposed to be bastions of democracy as this role 
is assumed to be taken care of by the increasingly statist Local Councils 
(LCs). The state has appropriated the themes of the democracy question 
including human rights, good governance and accountability often by setting 
up organisations for their fulfillment. For instance, the Uganda Human 
Rights Commission (UHRC) investigates human rights abuses and the 
Inspectorate of Government (IGG) ensures accountability in public service. 
The findings of these organisations are not pushed to the logical conclusion. 
The Ugandan NGOs are strictly controlled by the state. As in Kenya, the 
state exercises significant control over NGO activities through the NGO 
Registration Board Statute that stipulates conditions for registration and 
deregistration. The NGO board is filled with members of police and secret 
services. The regime does not hesitate to clamp down on vocal critics such 
as political parties and the regime (Dicklitch, 1998:106). According to Sheila 
Kawamara, Coordinator of the Uganda Women Network (UWONET), as 
quoted in Human Rights Watch-Uganda Report, however: 'They 
(Government) often remind us of our registration, which requires us to be 
non-political, non-partisan, non-everything' (HRW-Uganda, 1999:104). The 
government has interfered in civil society activities without any critical 
response from the NGOs, the church and other civil organisations. 
Concerned with the violence in the North and the insistence by the NIZM 
government to resolve the conflict violently, the church and NGOs in March 
1998 sponsored a Kampala peaceful procession to urge the government to 
negotiate with rebels. The state cancelled it on the apparent grounds that
Civil Society and the Democratisation processes in Kenya and Uganda: 95 
the peaceful procession could be turned into a political event. As HRWUganda, 
observes, '... society in Uganda continues to be effectively prevented 
from addressing some of the most pressing human rights issues in 
Uganda, namely the political restrictions which operate under the movement 
system (HRW-Uganda, 1999:109). 
Apart from this open control, the state has responded to NGO activism in 
ways that have been suggested by Fowler (Fowler, 1993:50). Members of the 
regime can create their own NGOs. In Uganda, the members of the regime 
have not only created their own organisations, but the state has created bodies 
to act as 'NGOs'! In 1993, the government, for instance, established the 
National Association of Women's Organisations in Uganda (NAWOU), 
which is facilitated by the Ministry of Gender and Development. The state 
also has attempted to form an all-encompassing NGO forum, the National 
Council of Voluntary Social Services (HRW-Uganda, 1999:110). This distorts 
the contributions the NGOs could make to the democratisation process in 
the Uganda. 
The result has been the emergence of an NGO sector that is apolitical and 
dependent on foreign donors with lack of coordination of its own 
autonomous activities. Such a sector is currently incapable of bringing pressure 
to bear on the state and keeping it accountable. However, as Dicklitch 
(1998:155) notes 'the fact that NGOs exist and that they are engaged in some 
advocacy and empowerment projects is, however, a positive sign'. On the 
whole the NGOs contribution to the democratisation process in Uganda has 
not been salutary in comparison to Kenyan NGOs. NGOs face obstructions 
from the State and they are in themselves very fragmented and donor 
dependent. 
Conclusion 
The Church and NGOs are confronted with some limitations and contradictions 
in the democratisation processes in Kenya and Uganda. In comparative 
terms, NGOs and the church in both countries, confront similar problems 
which limit their capacity to act as agents of democratisation. Most of them 
lack internal democracy yet for them to be effective in their mission of pluralising 
society there is need to evolve an internal culture of adherence to 
democratic values. Second, they exhibit extraordinary donor dependence. 
In particular, NGOs in both countries are by and large based on charity. They 
are constituted as benefactors. What they give out is therefore charity and 
not rights, a result they are accountable to those who finance them, not to 
the people they intend to benefit. Therefore, the celebratory accounts of the 
rise of NGOs and their activities must take note of the fact that the NGO 
sphere can produce complex political possibilities, democratic and antidemocratic.
96 Juma Anthony Okuku 
The Church in Kenya contributed to the establishment of pluralism, by 
generating and sustaining a public discourse on democracy and change, 
criticising excess exercise of state power as it gave 'voice to the voiceless'. 
The churches more so in Kenya, commanding mass respect, still remain an 
important voice of criticism against the Moi regime. For the churches in 
both countries to be effective agents of democratisation, however, they must 
get rid of their ethnic and patronage stances. 
To the civil society theorists, we contend that any conception of civil society 
and its contributions to the democratisation process in Africa must take 
note of the interconnectedness between civil society and the state as well as 
limitations in causing authoritarian states to become more democratic. The 
success of civil society in forcing political concessions in Africa relates to 
the availability of opportunity to mobilise, agitate and bargain with the state 
from a position of strength. These resources are few in between and decreasing. 
Civil society should not be celebrated as an ideal. There must be a 
recognition of the various tendencies in civil society and how they may be 
harnessed to advance the democratisation process. Civil society contains 
both democratic and anti-democratic tendencies. These weaknesses, 
notwithstanding, there are possibilities for citizen empowerment and ultimate 
involvement in the process of change and democratisation. 
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