Afr. j . polit. sci. (2002), Vol 7 No. 1 
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading 
Agent of Development in the Context of 
Globalization in Africa 
Tlikumbi Lumumba-Kasongo* 
Abstract 
Despite improvements in some social sectors in some countries, conditions in 
African countries worsened over the last two decades of the 20th century. As 
corporate globalization continues to make inroads into national policies and 
politics, further weakening the ability of African countries to act, there is a need 
to explore other alternatives for development in Africa. Although this article is 
essentially an effort to articulate a theoretical deconstruction and reconstruction 
of the African State, in its content, it is based on numerous empirical case studies 
and research projects developed by the author over the years on Africa's 
international relations, political economy, development, and world politics. 
Reconceptualizing the African state is a must because, firstly, about four 
decades of preoccupation with development have yielded only very meager 
returns. It has proven a mistake to attempt to analyze something that has not yet 
been seriously on the agenda, dealing mainly with symptoms related to behaviors 
of the state instead of its substance. Secondly, all the available evidence 
points to the inescapable conclusion that political conditions in Africa are the 
greatest impediment to development. Thirdly, despite the explosion of the number 
of actors in the global system and the deliberate efforts of mega financial, 
multinational and multilateral institutions to African States, and also despite the 
fact that the African systems of delivering services or performance at the 
national level are highly problematic, the African State is still the most visible 
actor in world politics. Finally, the fate of Africa's peoples and cultures has been 
historically defined by the dynamics of the state, especially its role in international 
political economy and in making alliances for its own immortality. 
Colonial Africa was created essentially as states and not as nations, and neo- 
* Co-founder and Director, Pan-African Studies and Research Center in International Relations and 
Education for Development (CEPARRED), Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire; Professor of Political Science and 
Herbert J. Charles and Florence Charles Faegre Professor of Political Science, Chair, Department of 
International Studies, Wells College; Visiting Scholar, Department of City and Regional Planning at 
Cornell University; Senior Fellow, Institute for African Development at Cornell University; and 
Visiting Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts at Boston. 
1027-03S3 o 2002 African Association of Political Science
80 Thkumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
colonial political elites inherited African States as the central agencies defining 
the parameters of economy, culture, and the people or citizens. 
The typologies used here are shaped by an historical structuralist approach 
that stipulates that systems, states, corporations or social institutions do not 
function randomly. The system is not just the sum of its elements. It is more 
than what is tangible. This holistic approach puts the emphasis on change. The 
African State in its current form is not an agent of positive social change 
because this state was created to advance the interests of metropolitan capitalism. 
Development has not started in Africa for many reasons, despite the good 
will of many Africans and African social movements. African people need to 
reinvent new state forms that can effectively address issues related to poverty, 
gender inequalities, etc. Despite corporate globalization and the struggles to dismantle 
welfare states, African people can learn a great deal from the policy and 
politics of such states. 
Introduction: Objectives, Issues and Perspectives on 
Development 
The debate on the nature of the African state has re-emerged after the collapse 
of the African economies in the 1980s, the failures of the global liberal institutions 
in the 1990s to improve the social conditions of the majority of people 
through their austerity programs, the systematic marginalization of Africa since 
the 1970s in the international political economy, and the major neocolonial 
wars in West Africa, the Great Lakes region, the Horn, and Central Africa at the 
end of the Cold War era. 
On 2 March 2001, the Assembly of the African Heads of State and 
Government met in an extraordinary summit (the 5th summit) in Sirte, Libya. 
It made unanimously a Declaration for the Creation of the African Union. There 
had been about 17 months of discussion from the time that Col. Moammar 
Kadhafi of Libya had revived the idea of union, at a previous summit in Sirte in 
September 1999. The process of creating the greater unity of Africa has just 
started. With this declaration, a major idea or dream is being introduced into 
the African political lexicon. However, some important questions should start 
to be posed: What does this declaration mean in the world of the African states? 
How will this major idea fit into the peripheral, militarized and artificial structure 
of the weak African State? When will this idea become a political tool for 
development? 
Although this article is essentially an effort to articulate a theoretical deconstruction 
and reconstruction of the African state, in its content, it is based on 
numerous empirical case studies and research projects that I have developed 
over the years on Africa's international relations, political economy, development, 
arid world politics. Despite the fact that African states are different from 
one another in terms of their size, the nature of their resources, the human or
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 81 
demographic and cultural compositions of their people, and the internal deterministic 
forces, all of which have historically shaped their policies, they have, 
in relationship to world politics and the structures of the international political 
economy, similar and/or common philosophical and historical roots. 
This article has four sections. In the first part, I introduce some major elements 
of my approaches/perspectives or methodological guidelines and premises. 
Here, I also raise the issues about the subject matter within the framework 
of social sciences in general. The second part deals with what I call epistemological 
questions related to the ontology or phenomenology of being an African 
state and its characteristics. I also discuss the reasons why I believe that we 
should continue to promote the discourse on reconceptualizing the African 
state. In the third section, I briefly discuss some claims, characteristics, and the 
relevance of welfare states. Finally, in the conclusion, I deal with the question 
of where to go from here. 
Despite the fact that we have been told over and over again at the end of the 
Cold War that the world is being unified under the victory of global capitalism, 
comprehensive historical and sociological facts, their ramifications and the 
dynamics of social movements in various regions or sub-regions of the world 
system are revealing different stories. 
All that should be emphasized is that the world is moving at the same time 
through a complex and hybrid transition with multiple dimensions. This transition 
is being defined differently depending on the nature of the actors involved 
in this redefinition of the global system, where they are geopolitically located, 
what they are capable of offering, what they actually have both in terms of 
human and material resources and historical and cultural background and, 
finally, who they are. In short, on empirical and scientific grounds, the views 
articulated within the premise of the victory of one system over the rest are not 
ontologically or historically telling the whole story and, therefore, they should 
be intellectually challenged and even occasionally categorized as an invalid or 
unscientific foundation of intellectual debates. It is within this perspective of 
rejecting the epistemology based on a unilinear perspective of the hermeneutics 
of world politics that my topic is examined. 
The term 'development' has been used, like the concept of national security 
by the state, to mean, in some cases, everything concerning changes or, in other 
cases, to mean nothing, depending on who is using it, in which context and/or 
for what purposes. While, in some cases, it has been used popularly to describe 
the complex processes and mechanisms of political, social, and economic 
changes at the individual, local, regional, and international levels, in other 
cases, it has been utilized to describe the symptoms of social and economic 
indexes such as GNP, GDP, personal income, life expectancy, infant mortality, 
the strength of a currency, etc. In most cases in 'undeveloped' countries, these 
indexes, have had very little positive significance beyond the macroeconomic
82 Thkumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
and political levels. To be able to understand this concept intellectually in its 
complex dimensions, one needs to contextualize their analysis within the dominant 
schools of thought. Something that has been consistently missing in studies 
on development is the epistemological question of its origins, its nature, the 
power relationships behind it, and how this power relates to the real living conditions 
of the majority of the people who are trying to better their lives. 
In his book, The African Predicament: A Study of the Pathology of 
Modernization, Stanislav Andreski asks, in Chapter 16, the old question "Is 
there a Way out?" His controversial point is that the main problem that Africa 
faces presently "is not how to ensure quick progress but how to prevent, or at 
least to slow down, the spread of misery and violence under the impact of the 
population explosion and of the rapid growth of parasitic power groups" (1968: 
214). He goes on to state that "What African needs most is the human capital of 
millions of knowledgeable, hard-working and enterprising small businessmen; 
and this capital cannot be imported from abroad" (1968: 215). His ahistorical 
perspective in focusing on birth control and parasitism are symptomatic of neomodernization 
theorists in sociology and economics who blame Africans for 
being partially responsible for their own misery. In this paper, using a dialectical 
relationship perspective, the same question of 'is there a way out?' is 
explored structurally. 
Since the 1960s, especially between the 1970s and '80s, the concept of development 
has become intellectually popular and controversial as its advocates, 
especially elements associated with the modernization school of thought on its 
so called universalistic assumptions, unilinear basis and economistic perspectives 
of the global market, supported 'non development' policies in the developing 
world. They have, at the same time, politically promoted militarization of 
global politics with negative consequences for the efforts to promote so called 
development up until the end of the Cold War era. 
Neo-Marxists, especially theorists of the dependency school, those of the 
world system and the Third World Forum, demystified the concept in its functionalist 
and behavioral usages by emphasizing the contradictions in global 
structures at the production and distribution levels of the global system, as some 
of their scholars proved how the similar mechanisms and processes that created 
development in the north have engendered underdevelopment in the south. 
In the 1990s, the concept became even more confused as (mainstream) liberal 
theories of economics became central discourses through which so-called 
development programs were carried out. The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
its satellite countries in the south intensified the centrality of the liberal economics, 
both in domestic policies and international relations. 
It should be emphasized that the intellectual debates coming out of passive 
academic traditions have always influenced, directly or indirectly, decision making 
and policy in the world. Our efforts as theoreticians are not only intellec-
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 83 
tual. Yet, it should be noted that these central discourses did not lead to any consistent 
or systematic developmental changes in Africa. The key questions are 
the following: What is the origin of the concept of development? Who invented 
it in the way it is being used today? What is its meaning in Africa? Who controls 
developmental processes and means? Who should tell Africans what to do to 
produce development? Who, or what social classes, should be the agents of 
development? What should the role of Africans themselves be in the struggle for 
social progress? I will not be able to elaborate on these questions in this article. 
However, they are posed as part of the ongoing debates on development and 
globalization in Africa at large. 
What are my intellectual premises? The way one perceives, defines, and analyzes 
a social phenomenon determines not only the nature of the understanding 
of it but, more importantly, the kind of prescriptions or policy recommendations 
to be used to solve problems associated with such a phenomenon. That 
is to say that, philosophically, there may be a correlation between approaches in 
minds/heads or paradigms, and the forms of questionnaires and policy. This is 
why it is important to identify and localize the intellectual and philosophical 
elements that guide my discourse. In addition, in social sciences, despite our 
efforts at rigorous analysis using quantitative methodologies and Cartesian logic 
to attempt to create the Weberian ideal types in building theories, there are no 
such things as ideologically and philosophically neutral social science methodologies 
and approaches. 
In this article, I use the concept of development to include fulfillment of the 
basic necessities of an everyday life, as Amilcar Cabral, one of the best African 
theorists of the national liberation movements, quoted by Georges Nzongola- 
Ntalaja (1999: 68) says, "Remember always that people do not fight in ideas for 
things that exist only in the minds/heads of individuals. The people fight and 
accept the necessary sacrifices in order to gain material benefits, to live better 
and in peace, to experience progress, and to guarantee the future for their children." 
As quoted by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, the phenomenon has been 
defined by a distinguished Nigerian historian, Professor Jacob Ade Ajayi, as people's 
expectations that "include improved standards of living in housing and 
clothing, greater returns for their labor, better transportation for exporting and 
marketing their surpluses, education as a means to social mobility that would 
ensure a better life for their children, and an adequate supply of electricity, 
health-care facilities, and other such amenities" (1999: 69). 
For Claude Ake, "Development is not economic growth; it is not a technical 
project but a process by which people create and recreate themselves and their 
life circumstances to realize higher levels of civilization in accordance with 
their own choices and values. Development is something that people must do 
for themselves. If people are the end of development, they are also necessarily 
its agents and its means" (1996: 125).
84 Thkumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
These three scholars perceive development in terms of its characteristics of 
permanency, futurism, and continuity. Two of them refer to "children" as they 
refer to futurism and preservation. For my purpose in this article, these perspectives 
on development should be guided and supported within the framework 
of rights as defined by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
adopted by the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) in 1981. They include: 
political and civil rights; economic and social rights; and the rights of peoples. 
Peoples' rights include freedom from discrimination, oppression, and exploitation; 
and the right to self determination, national and international peace and 
security and a satisfactory environment for economic and social development. 
What kind of state would be able to promote this kind of social progress in 
Africa? Is the existing African state capable of dealing with the above perspectives 
on social progress comprehensively? 
Why am I examining the African state as the leading agent of development? 
First of all, it should be noted that about four decades of preoccupation with 
development have yielded only very meager returns. We have made a fallacy of 
analyzing something that has not yet been seriously on the agenda. That is to 
say that we have dealt mainly with symptoms related to behaviors of the state 
instead of its substance. Secondly, all the available evidence points to one 
inescapable conclusion that "political conditions in Africa are the greatest 
impediment to development" (Ake, 1996: 1). Thirdly, despite the explosion of a 
multitude of actors in the global system, and deliberate efforts and policies of 
the mega financial multinational and multilateral institutions to weaken the 
African states, and also despite the fact that the African systems of delivering 
services or performance at the national level are the most problematic of all, the 
African state is still the most visible actor in world politics. And, fourthly, the 
fate of Africans as peoples and cultures, has been historically defined by the 
dynamics of this state, especially its role in the international political economy 
and in making alliances for its own immortality. Colonial Africa was created 
essentially as states and not as nations, and the neocolonial political elites 
inherited African states as the central agencies in defining the parameters of the 
dynamics of economy, culture, and people or citizens. 
. Within my intellectual framework, 'the state' as a social phenomenon is an 
historically constructed entity. This construction always embodies an ideology 
or some belief systems. State, like social class, is neither biology nor physiology. 
It is a construction that emerges out of social contradictions with specific 
interests and objectives. Before advancing further with some of the elements of 
my core arguments, let me briefly cite the premises that shape my thinking. 
The first premise is that, despite the good intention of many African political 
leaders, states and ruling elites in continuously imitating European experience, 
with its unilinear models of political development, and regardless of the quality 
of their imitations, Africa will never organically or ontologically develop out of
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 85 
Europe's history, languages, or metaphysics. However, no society can develop 
out of autarchy. Africans also can learn or borrow from others, but whatever 
they borrow from other people's experiences has to be selectively injected into 
African projects, and appropriated and owned by Africans, before it can positively 
be part of the African metaphysics, ethos, and experience. Development 
or social progress is organic. 
The second premise is that no people, nation or continent can progress 
socially without building the foundation of its actions on its own history and 
culture. This premise stipulates that African political history and culture, and 
their contradictions, must be critically engaged to avoid the projection of their 
romantization as a tool for social synthesis. Romantization of a culture and history 
is as dangerous a phenomenon, with serious damaging social and political 
effects, as fascism or any kind of biological argument in a nation building plan 
can be. It should be emphasized that the contradictions should not always be 
perceived and defined as pathological. Out of contradictions, humans have 
always made synthetic judgments or assessments on what directions to follow 
in defining and redefining them. Africa must be re-invented. 
And the third premise is about the role of 'social consciousness' toward 
development efforts. Social consciousness means knowledge of the self. It is a 
product of dialectic relationships between cognitive knowledge and social 
awareness. As Karl Marx says: "It is not consciousness of men (sic) which determines 
their existence, but on the contrary, it is their social existence which 
determines their consciousness" (1959: 11). 
Human beings do not consciously choose to be born in any given place. They 
do not choose their parents either. But they define themselves as Africans, 
Asians, Europeans, blacks, whites, yellows, etc., based on complex processes of 
interactions of physiology, geography, mythology, power, and history. The 
process of becoming is, firstly, a result of some immanent historical accident. 
An infant's individual, conscious contribution to this historical determinism at 
the beginning of its life is zero. However, what is more important in our definition 
of Africans, Americans, Asians, Europeans, etc., is what people can or 
should do after they have been projected out there in the context of the jungle 
or divine forces or historical accident. Individual choices and decisions to shape 
their destinies, and to create social meanings and define things, including themselves, 
in a transcendental way are more important than what gods or divinities 
do on people's behalf, even if humans should respect them. 
That is to say that social consciousness of being someone is the most important 
determining factor in the way one defines and redefines oneself in a given 
physical and social environment. It is partially related to the notion of sociological 
nation or what Mwayila Tshiyembe has also called "sociological citizenship" 
that is founded on "shared language, blood ties, religion, a common history, 
and an evident desire to live together" (1999). It implies an historical, col-
86 Thkumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
lective memory of people or an embodiment of the concept of 'social capital'. 
Without such a social consciousness of systematically making history and recreating 
the self, human beings would not be very much different from other animals. 
Consciousness is a critically and objectively defined phenomenon. If we 
are, we have to act. The question is, act to do what and be what? 
From the above premises, my typologies are shaped by an historical structuralist 
approach that stipulates that systems, states, corporations, and social 
institutions do not function randomly. They have a certain logic that is related 
to the role and the nature of each element within them. The system is not just 
the sum of its elements; it is more than what is tangible. In order to understand 
why a system behaves the way it does, we have to ask the questions of the origins 
of its elements, examine the nature of the relationship among those elements 
and discuss the nature of the interaction between the system itself and 
other phenomena within its larger environment. 
All the elements of the systems or the subsystems interact dynamically with 
one another. Performing to reach their various objectives, the elements are 
maintained through a complex process of historical configurations. The behavior 
of an actor is determined by the dynamics of the subsystems, the systems 
and the environment where they are located. This thinking assumes the local 
conditions to be as structurally dynamic as those of the global system. On the 
basis of my critical theory, which emphasizes the need to combine empirical 
investigation with a critique of reality, we have to assess the way in which dominant 
ideologies are constituted and mediated through specific cultural formations. 
This way of thinking goes beyond cybernetics and the logic of functionalist 
scholarships. 
Methodologically, I argue in this article that the perception of Africa only in 
terms of negativity and failures or conflicts and crises, as has become part of the 
dominant scholarship in the west and its African Studies programs, contributes 
enormously to weakening the foundation of a critical theory about Africa that 
is emerging in and out of Africa. A methodology to study Africa comprehensively, 
and to also elevate its achievements, can create the balanced way of 
thinking needed to objectively redefine the African reality. 
My holistic approach emphasizes change. Things do not just happen. 
Contradictions are not all the time or always pathological. We have to distinguish 
between primary contradictions and secondary contradictions. If contradictions 
are carefully studied they can also serve as a foundation for paradigm 
shifts. 
Thus, I argue that the African state, in its current form, is not an agent of positive 
social change because this state was created essentially to advance the 
interests of metropolitan capitalism. It has tendencies of monopoly and tyranny. 
As compared to the notions of security and environmental conservation, the 
concept of development was never part of the political lexicon of the colonial
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 87 
state. After the reconstruction of Europe, with United States' public and private 
capital and that of the newly established institutions such as the International 
Bank for-Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the GATT, the term development started to become 
the magic concept in social sciences and policy studies. When the concept was 
introduced and promoted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
it was set up within the notion of the Rostowian 'catch up' premises and top to 
bottom approaches as perceived within the dominant America-European perspectives. 
Obviously, these approaches have not worked in Africa. 
If we are serious about transforming African conditions, we have to start the 
debates by reconceptualizing, or structurally rethinking, the African state. This 
reconceptualization should promote a new role, responsibility, legal body, and 
social progress agenda for Africa. And this process and its supportive mechanisms 
should create new African leadership, new definitions of citizenship and 
new concepts of territoriality in legal, political and economic terms. 
I also argue that development has not started in Africa for many reasons, 
despite the good will of many Africans and social movements. The structures or 
institutions that could possibly advance development are either absent or, as is 
mostly the case, too weak to carry out the task. In addition, the executive powers 
of the states (governments and political leaderships) are confused about creating 
an agenda for social progress for Africa. This confusion is multidimensional. 
On one hand, we are being told that the strong state is a malady when it 
comes to development and globalization and, on the other, this globalization 
with its so called development schemes means marginalization of Africa. 
Africa's social progress cannot and will not be engendered from a dysfunctional, 
incapable, myopic, and confused state. Both concepts of the state and development 
must be reconceptualized in light of the current struggles between the 
African States, peripheral capitalists, social movements, and huge multinational 
corporations. This reconceptualization should take into account the various 
struggles that are promoting the movement toward multipolarity in international 
relations and world politics even if, in most cases, its philosophical foundation 
is still unclear. 
Phenomenology of an African State, its Dynamics and its 
Characteristics 
What are the elements that constitute the essence of being an African State? As 
Ann Kelleher and Laura Klein state: 
Europeans used their version of the state to achieve worldwide dominance. Its 
highly centralized organizational structure was capable of concentrating a largescale 
of human and material resources over long periods. During the colonial era 
European State spread worldwide and became the primary institution for people to 
interact internationally. Since states have been, and many people think still are, the
88 Thkumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
most powerful decision makers affecting international events, learning about current 
world issues begins with analyzing the nature of the modern state (1999: 7). 
In general terms and for the purposes of this discussion, four major characteristics 
of the state are defined. Firstly, a concise territory with determinant 
boundaries that should be effectively controlled. This is also called land or physical 
resources. In this confined land, the population has to be defined and classified 
culturally and economically according to the criteria of the ruling powers. 
Secondly, a government that is the executive organ of the state. It makes 
decisions and regulates behaviors of people, makes laws, and enforces them. 
Historically, it is the most visible phenomenon in international affairs, especially 
in diplomacy and the world economy. It claims to use force legally. Its 
legitimacy in terms of forcing or persuading the people to believe in its action is 
based on its performance. Thirdly, a loyal population. This is what is called 'citizenry'. 
Citizenry is defined not as a divisible entity. Citizens must speak common 
language (s) and have common nationalistic and patriotic identity. And, 
finally, recognition by and of other states. This can be summarized in the notion 
of sovereignty of the nation state. In principle, this state has the right to make 
its internal/domestic laws without necessarily asking permission from others or 
having a consensus with others. It has, in its territoriality, a jurisdiction to act 
and speak on behalf of the people who inhabit such a space. It has autonomy to 
conduct its foreign policies according to the aspirations of its citizens or its leaders 
even if neighbors may not be happy for them. 
In Europe, these characteristics were developed through political violence, 
invasions, and wars. For instance, it was Napoleon Bonaparte of France who 
redefined and unified Germany in 1806 for the first time in banning the first 
Reich, as he forced hundreds of principalities into a confederation of 30 states. 
The contemporary characteristics of the state in Europe are the result and the 
political evolution of the 1648 Westphalia Peace Accord after the end of the 
30 Years War. What is the situation in Africa and how have these characteristics 
been developed over time in Africa? 
African states, including Ethiopia and Liberia, which were not formally colonized 
by the European powers, are not the products of internal evolutionary 
and revolutionary processes and struggles. They are the products of colonial and 
neocolonial configurations of powers. As such, African states, as well as states 
elsewhere, are, in their behaviors and structure, essentially the reflections of 
the dynamics of world politics as defined by the European powers and political 
history. 
This form of state was created by the then emerging European powers to foster 
their interests through global capitalism as viewed and articulated by the 
European monarchs in the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. So it is an instrument 
of international capitalism par excellence. The colonial powers conceived and
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 89 
established an Africa that would be politically ruled, militaristically controlled, 
and economically and culturally exploited by the European invaders. Territory 
or land was divided arbitrarily. King Leopold II of Belgium, for instance, was 
given what was known as the Congo Free State as his personal property. 
All the boundaries which are part of the definition of the contemporary 
African state were artificial. In addition, what lay within those boundaries was 
not accepted by the imperialists as fixed entities that would support the internal 
evolution of cultures and foster their stability. In most countries, these 
boundaries were fixed and redrawn several times, depending on .the political 
configurations of the politics in the north and international relations. In many 
countries, even around the 1950s at the beginning of the Cold War, when colonial 
experiences had become relatively mature, issues related to boundaries 
were still being raised by the European authorities. Some African groupings 
between two or more countries have had experiences of sharing more than two 
colonial experiences in their social settings, organizations and political economy 
in various periods. After independence, these groupings were likely to 
challenge the contemporary state if any political opportunity arose. 
However, it should be noted that, despite the artificiality of the state, the 
boundary question did not lead, until recently, to major wars among different 
social and ethnic groupings, as has been the case after the political independence. 
Despite the militaristic character of the colonial power in dealing with the 
boundary issue generally, the flexibility of African culture and African tolerance 
were instruments of temporary peace. There were also internal mechanisms to 
deal with those claims related to the boundary issue. The issue of native citizenship 
associated with land was not strictly codified or legalized before the 
second stage of colonization after World War I and the 'great depression'. The 
British and Germans used so called 'indirect rule'. But many laws in 
Anglophone Africa, for example, despite reforms, have their origins not in the 
African traditions but, rather, in the Indian Codes that were developed during 
the nineteenth century to help resolve disputes on the multi-ethnic Indian subcontinent 
(Widner, 1999: 186). 
The Belgians used an eclectic system with elements of both direct and indirect 
rule, depending on the period. In these models, colonial powers used and 
exploited the existing African system of powers as agencies of new governance. 
This gave the appearance of the colonially constructed or imagined flexibility of 
various cultures to co-exist and flourish according to their own norms. This 
appearance of preserving the existing structures, though, did not have any traditional 
legitimacy in the eyes of native societies and it did not lead to a fundamental 
questioning of their nationalities, customary laws or ethnic citizenship. 
The colonial state, as is still the case in the post colonial period, is militaristic 
in essence; any territorial boundary question was also met with military 
forces. As mentioned previously, between the 1920s and 1930s, some state
90 TUkumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
reforms were introduced to make colonial systems more effective in the 
exploitation of labor and raw materials. This situation came with new definitions 
of power systems as either customary authority or civic colonial code. 
Controls over native systems of governance were instituted. However, in the 
case of the Belgian model, for instance, each ethnic grouping was governed 
according to different sets of rules. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (then 
Zaire), as well as in Rwanda and Burundi, the introduction of the ethnic identity 
card did have an impact among groupings but also in the way so called 
"indirect rule' was organized. 
The European monarchs established states as instruments of mobilization of 
human and material resources, mainly for the benefit of European political 
Elites and the consolidation of their concept of 'peace'. All the state apparatuses, 
such as institutions of security, public administration, churches, formal education, 
etc., despite the differences in the ways they were defined in the colonial 
setting, were part of the plot to destroy or to weaken Africa. Through so called 
'Christianizing' and 'humanizing', the state was deliberately established to produce 
a docile populace. Despite differences among colonial states, all of them 
were structurally fashioned as Eurocentrically dominated entities, philosophically 
and culturally alien to Africa, and economically capitalistic. As Claude Ake 
says: 
Since the colonial state was called upon by the peculiar circumstances of the colonial 
situation to carry out so many functions - indeed to do everything - it was allpowerful. 
It needed to be all-powerful not only to carry out its mission but also to 
survive along with the colonial order in face of the resentment and the hostility of 
the colonized.... The power of the colonial state was not only absolute but also 
arbitrary. For instance, the colonial governments made the colonies produce the 
commodities they needed [1996: 2). 
The African state, like any state, has to have a population that should produce 
labor and be controlled, and from which loyalty is required. This population 
was essentially perceived and defined as laborer and taxpayer. However, despite 
the efforts to destroy their cultural identities and their history, people succeeded 
in making various claims and maintained many loyalties functioning in tandem. 
I argue in this article that the new African realities of the fixed physical territory, 
forms of government, and notion of sovereignty have been more fluid, 
open and constantly challenged in Africa than in many parts of the world in the 
contemporary situation. This is why it is important to study the nature of these 
challenges as we continue to formulate policies of development that do not 
work at aggregate levels. The challenges have not created any space for genuine 
debates about development to take place. 
The African colonial conditions, despite their internal dynamics, were not 
intended to create states in which Africans would be citizens. Despite differ-
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 91 
ences in the ways colonial politics was articulated, from the colonial administration's 
point of view, all Africans were legally defined as subjects in the colonial 
systems. The notion of civil citizenship is relatively new within the context 
of colonization. But Africans, in their regions, localities, and old political divisions, 
did not perceive and define themselves as subjects. They defined themselves 
according to the classification that was reflected in their traditions, customs 
and hierarchy of powers. Despite the efforts of the colonial powers to use 
or to codify some elements of the traditions and customs, especially via so called 
indirect rule within imposed western paradigms, the dual citizenship claims 
and practices have not been totally destroyed up until today. The majority of 
Africans still define themselves as citizens of their own social groups or nations. 
Europeans defined Africans using civil laws in relationship to their labor. The 
exceptions were the very small percentage of Africans who were born in the 
four communes in Senegal. The full development of the notion of citizenship, 
as a legal definition or status of people with certain social and political rights, 
duties, and responsibilities, came only late in the colonial experience as 
Africans were reclaiming their citizenry through popular movements or various 
forms of negotiation. 
In short, the colonial state was essentially a state of violence, of exploitation, 
of alienation, and of deconstruction of Africa and reconstruction of the western 
power systems and their dominant economies. With few exceptions, like these 
in the four communes in Senegal, (Dakar, Saint Louis, Goree Island, and 
Rufisque), where the Africans were granted French citizenship by birth, and the 
later process of assimilation in the Portuguese colonies in the 1950s, the 
Africans were, in most colonial experiences, the subjects. They developed, 
legally and politically, the culture of the subject. The subject culture is the one 
in which people are aware of their social status as laborers or slaves. 
After the independence of many countries, gained either by national, popular 
struggles, armed struggle or political negotiation, the African political elites 
decided to maintain the geopolitical status quo. In most cases, political reforms 
were not structural in relationship to the world of old states and the international 
political economy. However, it should be noted that most of the new political 
leaders produced some elements of the national project, embodied in patriotic 
language and slogans and universalistic philosophy. Nationalist African 
leaders believed that their mandate was, first, to continue with the traditions of 
the strong state approach (in its militaristic sense) in order to build new nations. 
The state claimed to do everything for everybody and it was everywhere. In 
most cases, the strong state was associated with a personality or small group of 
individuals and the vision of individual leaders. We find this tradition also in 
Medieval Europe. For instance, in France Louis XIV declared that "the state is 
me" or "I am the state" and the Napoleons operated in a similar manner. The 
imposition of the French language, as the civilizing language in rural France
92 Tkkwnbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
was not different from what the French administration claimed or did in the 
French colonies in Africa. 
The actualization of this national project was associated with privatization of 
the state in the post colonial era, an important dimension in the analysis of the 
state and its raison d'etre. It is so because this state has attempted in many ways 
to render the public domain of social life irrelevant. Privatization is one of the 
most important dimensions of the state that has impeded any kind of consensus 
emerging in relation to the dogmas or programs of social progress. 
This first form of privatization of the state is, strangely, associated with the 
early rise of nationalism in Africa. The state as a private domain also meant the 
law of exclusion of people who were perceived directly or indirectly as antinationalists 
or dangerous to particular ideologies of the new regimes. At the 
same time, most states, as controlled by heads of states were also partially active 
in the public sector. It should also be noted that social services, such as education 
and medical services, were either given free or at low cost. Although multinationals 
intended to work with states in the areas of laws, labor policy, taxation, 
etc., they superimposed themselves on the states and have challenged the 
claims of the states. To protect themselves from possible or potential conflicts 
with the interests and forces of multinationals, and also to use them as another 
source of accumulation, many states find refuge in developing a conservative or 
petty bourgeois type of nationalism, such as the politics of authenticity of 
Mobutu in Zaire. 
Many of the new leaders were afraid to confront the popular demands for reunification, 
for articulating pan-Africanism or for reconsideration of new possibilities. 
Many nationalities in Africa favored reconsideration of 
frontiers/boundaries as a means of redefining their cultural identities and politics. 
Despite the cultural and ideological conservatism of some of these movements, 
for instance, the Pan-Ewe movement in Togo and Ghana, the Bakongo 
movement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, and 
Angola, and some Akan groups in the southern part of Cote d'lvoire who made 
cultural claims to join other Akans in Ghana, they challenged the nature of the 
post colonial state on its historical and political foundation. Their leaders and 
members were willing to rethink their affiliations to the state and the world 
system. 
Since the 1960s, African conditions have produced more than 90 incidences 
of territorial disputes among the African States. And more than 75 of these led 
to either short term or long term war or warlike situations. For instance, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Mali, Cameroon and Nigeria, Togo and 
Ghana and, recently, Eritrea and Ethiopia went to war on the territorial claim 
issue. In most cases these disputes or wars tend to reclaim the colonial legacy 
of frontiers rather than discussing possibilities for challenging them. 
Contradictions between the historical legacy of the African state and the basis
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 93 
for its local legitimacy have been the origins of many tensions in the past 115 
years. The artificial boundaries and artificial states could but create artificial stability. 
While in terms of territorial political affinities, the African state tends to perceive 
itself as a finite phenomenon, in terms of its legitimacy, the African state 
is an unfinished business. Like any unfinished business, it embodies many elements 
of instability but also of promises. As Adedeji Adebayo states: 
While Africa is one of the most geographically distinguishable continents in terms 
of coherent solid mass, it is also sadly one of the most parceled up in terms of the 
number of separate national units that it contains. While continents like Asia, 
Europe or America have only a handful of countries, Africa has as many as 52 
countries. Worse still, of these 52 countries, 23 have populations of less than 5 million 
each and ten of these have populations below one million—meaning that there 
are as many as ten African sovereign countries with a population that is far less 
than that of the 23 square miles of Manhattan Island (1991: 7). 
This first form of privatization that maintained the boundaries of more than SO 
states intact transcended the ideological dispositions associated with political 
choices or orientations of particular leaders. Most of the Marxist, socialist, and 
nationalist African leaders, like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny, "Leopold Sedar Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta, Milton Obote, 
Sekou Toure, to cite only a few, believed in the immortality of the state and its 
strength for becoming an effective merchant force in the global system as an 
agency of reconciliation and unification. Even the revolutionaries, like Samora 
Machel of Mozambique and Augustino Neto of Angola, believed in the power of 
a revolutionary state with a ruling party as its vanguard. With a vanguard party, 
as its mobilizing and educating force, colonial powers and their apparatuses 
could be challenged and eventually changed. Most African political leaders, 
regardless of their ideological and political differences, have claimed to create 
some elements of a national project. 
The national project that was articulated in the form of privatization of the 
state was intended to produce development programs. In various contexts, this 
project was produced through the process of national struggles, making 
alliances or accommodation. In other cases, it embodied some reconciliatory 
elements internally and externally. 
But this national project focused on acquiring political independence as a 
prerequisite for change. The serious debates on economic issue were not part of 
the general agenda among most nationalists whether they called themselves 
Marxist-Leninists, African socialists or Liberals. Later, there were some nationalists 
who even believed that it was possible to Africanize capitalism, that is to 
say, to give capitalism an African flavor or symbolism, or to associate capitalism 
with the African ethos and the African way of life. There were others who 
thought that it was possible to try the Marxist-socialist model (command econ-
94 Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
omy, centralization, and high level of planning) without necessarily going 
through the capitalist stages of development. Others decided to maintain the 
existing semi-liberal model in the arena of political economy. 
Despite some efforts from a few nationalists, the question of what the new 
role of Africa in the world economy, and of what kind development programs 
for Africans should be, were not systematically debated in their national project. 
'Africa for Africans', for instance, was, in most cases, an empty slogan, a discourse 
without structural realities. Between the 1960s and 1980s, Africa continued 
to play the classical role of producer of raw materials and cheap labor 
and of being eclectic consumerists in the world. As is well known, the nationalist 
project of the 1960s in Africa was partially a fiasco because political independence 
was granted or obtained without economic independence. Economic 
independence cannot be fostered without changing structural relations of production 
within the continent and the relationship between Africa and the rest of 
the world. 
Another issue that is associated with this nationalism is the question of state 
security. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, within his vision of pan-Africanism, 
believed that Africa needed a continental military arrangement to deter potential 
or possible invasions. The former French African colonies decided, through 
their notion of acquiring independence within the French community framework, 
not to establish their own strong military agency. France agreed to take 
care of their security in cases of internal political struggles. Thus, in the past, 
France effectively used its military bases in Senegal, Cote d'lvoire, and Gabon to 
intervene in any situation where French interests were threatened. The recent 
coup d'etat in Cote d'lvoire in December 1999 would not have succeeded if 
Matignon and Elisee had not been divided in terms of what course of action 
should be taken. Thus, both became strangely and strategically silent even after 
the condemnation of the putsch of Gen. Robert Guei and his 11 soldiers. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, African states justified their military and police 
behavior and actions on the basis of state security claims and they have been 
spending millions of dollars annually for that security instead of investing in 
social and scientific domains. As Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja states: 
The ideals of participation and democracy have been subordinated to the security 
imperatives of those who control the state as well as the economic and strategic 
interests of their external patrons and allies. Economic development, the most frequently 
mentioned public policy objective, remains as an elusive goal because the 
priority tasks of the state revolve around resources extraction, social control, order 
maintenance, and wealth accumulation by the rulers (1999: 70). 
For instance, between the 1970s and the time of his death in 1997, Mobutu of 
Zaire/DRC annually spent more than 30 percent of the national revenue on his 
security; the proportion allocated to education, for instance, decreased from 20 
percent in the 1960s to only about 8 percent in the 1980s. One consequence of
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 95 
this is that, since 1990, formal education has totally collapsed in that country. 
Most of the heads of the African States have developed a paranoia vis-a-vis 
the real or imagined opposition leaders and most of them tend to see their enemies 
on every corner of cities, towns or villages in their countries and in neighboring 
countries. Militarism in Africa, though it was far from being professional, 
created its own institutions, arbitrary and fragmented rules, and bureaucratic 
structures and behaviors that have survived even after civilians have been 
elected to state power. 
The African state's security arrangements in many countries have been 
directed against the poor people (and not against the real enemies of the people) 
and those segments of society which cannot defend themselves. In recent years, 
women, students, lumpen proletarians, and peasants have been the particular 
targets of the states' security. Many have been attacked, tortured and even killed 
in the name of the security of the state. In short, the police and military apparatuses 
in many African countries have been anti-people and anti-development. 
The security of the state is an instrument of the ruling classes, generally used 
to kill and destroy anything that can threaten their interests. 
The second form of privatization of the state in the post colonial era is the 
one associated with multinationals and international financial institutions. 
Although multinationals have worked with, and through states in the areas of 
laws, labor policy, tax, etc., in order to accumulate their capital, they superimposed 
themselves as supra-state agencies with power to challenge the claims of 
the states. They developed corporate privatization state mechanisms. 
'Corporate' in this context is used "not only to the institutional driving force 
of an increasingly globalized capitalism (multi- and cross-national corporations) 
but also to what appears to be a more general tendency toward supranational 
economic and political organization at the expense of the state power and identity" 
(Lafferty, 1999: 6). 
There are differences between the concept of corporate state, like the one 
developed in Japan that related to the characteristics of European states, where 
corporations operate legitimately with the state in order to produce policy 
frameworks, and the corporate private state that is developed in this context. 
Corporate privatization of the state is not new. It should be noted that, during 
the colonial period in Europe, the dynamics of corporate privatization of states 
contributed enormously to dividing the working classes, colonialists, and colonial 
political elites both in the metropolis and the colonies. In fact, some 
alliances that occurred between some social classes in Europe and the then 
emerging African leaders, and which contributed to accelerating the development 
of political movements, were partially due to the contradictions associated 
with this phenomenon of corporate privatization of the state. In this case, 
recently in the name of free market dogmatism and globalization, private companies 
or multinational corporations have been buying the state apparatuses
96 Thkumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
and their resources, such as electricity, water, transportation systems, medical 
services and land, in order to make money. Yet, the contemporary notions of 
state and citizenship were articulated on the basis of land and the sovereignty 
issue. In most cases, this privatization has been essentially anti-development 
and anti-people. Without having land to produce goods and having a control 
over it, one is not able to claim to be a free citizen. As a result, this expropriation 
has led to an increased level of poverty and political instability despite the 
appearance of multi-partyism. 
The third form of privatization of the state, which is related to the second 
form, is associated with the militarization of African politics and power struggles. 
Militarization is part of the ethos and structure of the global capitalist 
economy. Colonization, for instance, was essentially a militaristic operation. 
With the end of the Cold War era, arms are smuggled and sold more easily and 
cheaply than significant amounts of foods in open markets in most parts of the 
world. The sale of arms has been intensified as, within the framework of globalization, 
the market of the arms has become a lucrative business. 
The militarization of African politics during the first phases of the adoption 
of the SAPs in the 1980s in many countries such as Congo-Brazzaville, Central 
African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, etc., produced de facto private governments, 
most of which were supported by private military systems which did 
not accommodate discussion of the SAPS in any public national forum. In addition, 
militias have created governments in Africa and imposed themselves on 
the people and international affairs. This is the case in Uganda, Ethiopia, Congo- 
Brazzaville, Burundi, and Rwanda. Within these systems that were produced by 
militias, the majority of people, including technocrats, professional military and 
peasants, were excluded from the security apparatuses of the state and also from 
the distribution of resources and political schemes. This situation has led to 
serious violent conflicts in many countries. In the current power struggle in the 
DRC, for instance, the effort toward privatizing the state has been promoted by 
the discourses of Congolese intellectuals and lumpen-proletarians who are literally 
looting the country for their own benefit and that of their foreign supporters. 
This is not the first time in the history of state and city state formation 
that private military agencies have emerged. 
Despite the differences in their strategies and survival mechanisms, these 
three forms of privatization of the state have dangerously weakened the governance 
of African societies. 
It should also be added that African states are essentially ideologically conservative 
political phenomena. That is to say, African leaders and their agencies 
cannot consciously formulate and advance policies or create institutions that 
would render them irrelevant or challenge their very existence. Strangely, with 
the rise of multi-partyism, both the African states and new nationalisms are 
likely to become more conservative, despite some apparent constitutional
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 97 
changes and adjustment programs that may be formulated. The question that 
must be posed is, however, how long will the African states survive in their 
existing form of complete or partial dependence, political immaturity and instability, 
and underdevelopment? These states want to see themselves as immortal, 
yet political history in non industrial countries shows that dictators, and the 
conditions of underdevelopment they create, do not, cannot, and will not 
change by themselves. Duvalier of Haiti, Mobutu of Zaire, Houphouet-Boigny 
of Cote dTvoire, and Eyadema of Togo, among others, used in various periods 
different approaches and policies to actualize their state and advance their personal 
objectives. But all of them had one thing in common: they would have 
preferred, if they had any choice, to remain in power for life because, to them, 
'state' means power, privilege, interests, and influence. Houphouet-Boigny died 
in power in Cote d'lvoire. Mobutu was forced out of power by Laurent-Desire 
Kabila and died in Morocco. Duvalier (the son) has become almost a homeless 
person in France. 
As discussed earlier, with a few exceptions, the African state is essentially elitist. 
It behaves as a pyramidal institution through which the interests of a few 
are articulated and secured a in vertical, hierarchical manner from the top 
down, while the interests of the majority of people are not articulated at all. 
Thus, Africans are alienated from their own history and labor. 
Within the existing global movement toward political liberalization, in most 
cases, the Africa state has responded with ruthless asphyxiation of civil society, 
closure or narrowing of political spaces, and the kind of rapid politicization of 
nationality and identity platforms that precipitates violent conflicts. This has 
been a formidable impediment to the goals of development and democratization. 
Constitution making and development of plural societies have faced serious 
militaristic challenges from the state. In the absence of real dialogue among 
the people, states and political elites have used military means, ethnicity, religion 
and even African traditional medicines to reach their goals. In many cases 
presidential elections take place without real people's participation in the 
process and without respect for human and social rights (Ihonvbere, 2000). 
Although the African state and political parties have started to see the value 
of constitution, the debates that take place, out of which constitutions are produced, 
have been very limited in terms of the involvement of civil society and 
the masses. It should be mentioned that all the African dictators have had a 
'constitution'. The most important question is what kind of constitution would 
be an instrument for the protection of people's rights and political and social 
institutions? 
The illegitimacy of the majority of constitutions in Africa arises from the fact 
that they were not set up through a truly open and democratic process that paid 
attention to the dreams, pains, and aspirations of African people, their communities, 
and constituencies. In most cases the negotiations, if any, were imposed
98 Takumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
by the hegemonic party system. In fact, most of the constitutions were directly 
imposed or came about as a result of elite driven processes that treated the people 
and their ideas with disrespect, if not contempt. The hallmark of imposed 
constitutions is that they are never subjected to popular debates or referendums. 
If at any point the constitutions were subjected to public debates, these were 
usually brief, carefully monitored and manipulated (Ihonvbere, 2000). 
Mwayila Tshiyembe defines the failure of the African states as follows: 
The failure of the post-colonial state reflects a questioning of the will to co-exist 
and a loss of purpose and direction. Nations (or ethnic groups) are in fundamental 
disagreement about the community's basic values. How are we to define a free 
society, authority that is properly conferred and shared, and law that seems to 
come naturally? State and society seem to have been in conflict ever since Africa's 
plurinational societies saw their own model destroyed to make way for an enforced 
Western caricature (1999). 
His main argument is that, although colonial domination disrupted the process 
of state building, African societies remain plurinational in nature and that the 
solution for the African malady is to revive and promote this multinational state. 
The illegitimacy of the African State, the nature of its multicultural neocolonial 
leaders, and its peripheral role in the process of reproduction of global capitalism 
have been the most important causes of social calamity in Africa. Despite 
its illegitimacy, the African state is still locally powerful in its physical action, 
in its appropriation and extraction of resources, and in the arbitrariness of its 
decisions, but internationally weak in its bargaining power. 
Some Arguments Concerning Welfare States, their Essence 
and their Characteristics 
As stated earlier, I am also interested in what we can learn from the contemporary 
policies of the welfare states. Many regimes, including authoritarian, totalitarian 
and military forms of government, in various periods of their development, 
have formulated, produced, and implemented different forms of welfare 
policies and programs to deal with inclusion, participation, questions related to 
people's rights, and social distribution of resources. In the contemporary world, 
especially in the west, the development of welfare programs or policies can be 
found in the dynamics of the polyarchy, which contains elements of democracy, 
liberalism, and republicanism, such as competitive elections, freedoms, and 
rights. But the concept is as old as the idea of a social contract as part of human 
experience in various societies. For instance, the formal discussion on the welfare 
state in India goes back to the classical writings of Kautilya in his theory of 
prince as the safeguard of the social order based on the Varna and Ashrama system 
(Kohli, 1995: 36). In many parts of Africa, the philosophical idea of a welfare 
state can be located in the notion of a 'harmonious' organized or divine cosmology 
and communal ethos, or in the role of chieftaincy. Despite many
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 99 
changes that have occurred in the past 500 years in the nature of the structure 
of Africa's relations with the western world, many dimensions of the communal 
sense of the family and the society as a whole are still significantly alive and 
practical. 
The concept of the welfare state in its most current popular usage was born 
out of the liberal philosophy in Europe. It was in the 17th century that the philosophy 
of liberalism appeared in England and it dominated this area of thought 
in western civilization throughout the late 19th century and early 20th century. 
England was the first country to produce a liberal democratic party and traditions. 
While European nation states were pursuing their interests in Africa and 
other regions through colonization and other types of mercantilist adventures, 
in Europe itself the debate on the liberal philosophy taking either the form of 
power struggle or intellectual discourse, which is the foundation of welfare 
states, was taking place between the emerging petty bourgeoisie and the ruling 
elites. As Sankhdher and Cranston state: 
In explaining the liberal concept of the welfare state in England during 1889 and 
1914, we should begin by a precision of its symbolic representation at the point of 
culmination in Lloyd George's mind. The Liberal philosophy, which had its origin 
in John Locke's ideas, was given a new turn by the philosophical Radicals and the 
Utilitarians. In practical politics, however, liberalism in this period, though rooted 
in individual liberty, extepded the meaning of liberty to incorporate the idea of 
welfare state (1985: 245). 
This is to say that representation, as one of the key characteristics of liberal politics, 
has been the most important force of welfare state. After the French revolution 
and the industrial revolution in England, the attributes of liberalism were 
expanded from the individual quest for freedom to societal struggle against 
'undemocratic parliaments' and despotic monarchs. This expansion was not 
applied without the bourgeois power struggles and proletarian struggles as well. 
It should be noted that, in an earlier development of European nation state 
building, both classical liberalism and, later, Marxism were distrustful of the 
state. The classical state was conceived as an instrument of coercive force and 
thus was perceived as anti-individualism. In England, such philosophers as 
Edmund Burke, Herbert Spencer, T. H. Green, William Berridge, J. M. Keynes, 
and Ludwig von Miesses articulated liberalism. None of them paid sufficient 
attention, for instance, to the gender issues in the development of rights and 
capitalism. However, they were against the exercise of unlimited power by the 
state and the monopolistic law of capitalism. The main characteristics of liberalism 
include: the ideology of representative democracy, based on the rule of 
law, limited government, and individual rights to life, liberty and property 
(Sankhdher and Cranston, 1985: 245). As Mimi Abramovitz says: 
Classical liberalism originated in seventeenth-century England, took root in the 
eighteenth century, and with the rise of industrial capitalism, became the domi-
100 Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
r 
nant political theory of twentieth century Western societies. Reflecting new 'views 
of human nature which placed selfness, egoism, and individualistic self-interest at 
the center of human psyche, liberalism held competitive pursuit of individual selfinterest 
in a market free of government regulation would maximize personal and 
societal benefits (1989: 14). 
The struggles against the monarchic and strong states in their militaristic and 
personalized forms produced the welfare states in Europe. Welfare states in the 
20th century sought to limit the power of the ruling class. And they promoted 
space for the intervention of the state on behalf of individuals so as to create the 
conditions that would allow individuals the ability to maximize, in principle, 
self interest and to secure liberty, equality, and justice. Most of the welfare programs 
or packages that were produced in Europe included laissez faire doctrine 
that restricted the responsibilities of the state without eliminating its regulatory 
role as protector of capital, property, and national security (Abramovitz: IS). In 
practical terms, Sankhdher and Cranston describe the welfare functions as: 
The key functions of a welfare state were, in addition to police responsibilities, promotion 
of economic development and social welfare by providing full employment, 
equal opportunity, social security and insurance of a minimum standard of living 
for those downmost on the social ladder. Such an idea materialized largely in the 
Beveridge plan which prescribed, within a liberal democratic framework, provision 
of basic needs, as also remedies for problems of disease, ignorance, squalor, 
and idleness. It was the application of collectist methods for the individualistic 
aims of laissez-faire (1985: 246). 
Theoretically, how have the European welfare states perceived and defined 
social inequality? First of all, it should be emphasized that each country has produced 
its own welfare programs based on its social, historical and political 
specificities and needs. And secondly, all, the formulation and implementation 
of the welfare programs should not be generalized. The success of each welfare 
program depends on the political culture of each country, the nature of its leadership 
and that of its state. Thus, the Nordic countries have produced stronger 
and more elaborated welfare states than the countries in continental Europe. 
However, the idea that the government ought to protect minimum standards 
of income, nutrition, health, housing and education assured to every individual 
as a political right, not as charity (Abramovitz: 1989:16), can be generalized as 
the universal claim associated with liberal political thought. Within the Marxist 
tradition, the welfare state is to use the state power to modify the reproduction 
of labor power and to shift the costs of socializing and maintaining workers 
from the private capital to the public sphere (Abramovitz: 1989:17). 
The concept of justice that has been the philosophical and social engine in 
welfare states is summarized in the following statement of John Rawls: 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A 
theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue;
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 101 
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be 
reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses inviolability 
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For 
this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a 
greater good shared by others. It does not allow the sacrifices imposed on a few 
are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a 
just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured 
by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests 
(1971: 3-4). 
In addition to legalism, other related notions developed in the welfare states are 
those of equal citizenship and equal participation in the political affairs of the 
states. 
Before making my concluding remarks in this section, it is important to mention 
some differences between the welfare states that were promoted by liberal 
political thought as described above and those developed out of socialist traditions. 
The liberal theory of politics allows social changes through legalistic 
reforms with the focus on individual rights. But not all legalisms can promote 
social justice as Alan Wolfe has stated in the case of the United States. That is: 
America's failure to contemplate, let alone redress, social injustice and inequality 
is another indication of its impasse, a backhand confession that ills are beyond the 
reach of human action to remedy them. For a "can do" culture, such an intimation 
of impotence was found relatively easy to accept (1989: 81). 
A selective approach to welfare programs puts the case of the United States neither 
on the liberal crusade against injustice nor on a path of preference for the 
status quo especially during the new 'deal era' (Wolfe, Ibid.). But the social cost 
in choosing this approach has been heavy with a long term impact that is 
extremely difficult to deal with for many generations in the era of globalization. 
The principle of each according to their merit has retarded the discourse on 
the pursuit of social equality, including gender relations in the US. As I stated 
earlier, different states have formulated different policies at various periods to 
deal with their perceived social development and political issues. The major 
principle with a distributive capability that the socialists have used is 'each 
according to their needs'. Whether, in fact, all socialist welfare states, or welfare 
states within social democracies attempted to transform their social and productive 
relations can be questioned but their principle of each according to their 
needs is worth pursuing in Africa, especially given that it is not an alien one. 
Conclusion: Where to Go from Here? 
There are some writers, like Stanislav Andreski, who tend to see the African 
problem as essentially internal and cultural and the solution as lying also in the 
native enterprise scheme (1968: 215). How this native enterprise can be isolated 
from the dynamics of the state and the global peripheral African economy is not
102 Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
clear. The neo-modernization and liberal theorists believe that the major problem 
that Africa faces is its inability to cope with the growth of its population 
and the rigidity of its belief systems, and that its inefficient resources management 
is an impediment towards capital formation. This author agrees with 
Andreski that industrialization can help only up to a point (1968: 212) and that 
"reliance on foreign aid amounts to wishful thinking or an ostrich-like attitude 
firstly because this aid is unlikely ever to become commensurate with the need" 
(1968; 214). However, the major question is what is internal or cultural in the 
above logic? 
It is argued in this paper that, even if small African businesspeople are given 
the means to invest and to export what they produce, the imperatives of the 
global system at the local level and the nature of the political discourses of the 
major actors are likely to negatively affect the African culture of investment 
and capital formation. There is a need to promote local capital or local capitalism 
wiihin the dominant ideological perspective. The goal in this paper is not 
to explore the perspective on local capital formation but to understand the behavior 
of the African state within the dynamics of the international political 
economy. 
The African state has to be moved into the public domain. It is the political 
space where people should meet with their needs, dreams, ideas and resources. 
However, the African experience shows that there is a struggle among those 
who are fighting for power to re-create the Leopoldian notion of state as a personal 
property of certain individuals and their sponsor institutions, and the 
people. 
The African state has to be reconceptualized if it is to meet the challenges of 
social and popular movements because, despite its claims of legality, sovereignty, 
and independence, in its current form, it is highly dependent on the capitalist 
world that is dominated by the north and extremely weak in international 
relations. It cannot produce a program that could consistently and systematically 
promote a comprehensive agenda of social progress. It has produced many 
misleading, weak, or ad hoc projects for so called 'development'. But, by and 
large, these projects have been parts of peripheral capitalism and its structural 
contradictions. Until recently, the state has been highly exclusive and militaristic. 
Compared to certain types of militarism that have occurred between the 
1960s and '70s in Southeast Asia, for example, Thailand and South Korea, 
which had some personalized nationalistic economic projects and industrialization 
plans, those in Africa were mostly tyrannical and reactionary with no 
sense of political direction. The African state's involvement in the global economy 
has proven to be more productive in securing the wealth of capitalists than 
its involvement in its local and regional base. 
Privatization of the state, either by African nationalists, people in uniform 
bearing guns, or by foreign corporations, is the most devastating process in the
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 103 
efforts of Africans to identify their priorities, define their agenda for social development 
with confidence and liberate themselves from the yoke of western domination. 
People who are poor cannot produce any consistent development project. 
States, that have sold their land and their fresh air, and do not own the 
means of production cannot conceive any consistent project that will ensure 
social progress. 
As of the year 2000, many African states, which fully adopted the adjustment 
programs, have become literally slaves of the multilateral financial institutions 
under global reforms. In practical, political and economic terms, the notion of 
citizenship and sovereignty cannot be applied any more in these cases. 
What to do with this type of state? If Africans consciously decide to remain 
in the world of the states as it is now, and if they want to make their state functionally 
relevant and performing, the people must recapture and appropriate it. 
Appropriating the state means gaining access to the state's resources, managing 
the states' affairs according to people's objective conditions, owning the state 
apparatuses, and participating in its decision making. 
Within the existing nature of the world system, the African state is basically 
an instrument of accumulation by the global economy. It is the dynamics of this 
economy that determines, in a large measure, the behaviors and laws that govern 
African states. This form of state behaves as an alien to most of its people. 
Why is it that many people do not see or define themselves as part of the state's 
apparatuses? There is a need to continue with empirical studies on this question. 
However, the general observation is that the state does not have any legitimacy 
because it does not render the expected services to the majority of its citizens. 
An exclusive and alien state cannot produce a comprehensive development 
project. 
Africans could also reconceptualize the state in owning it through the process 
of renaming it according to Africa's own objective conditions. 'Renaming' is a 
cognitive and social process. They should change the rules and structures of the 
state through social, popular and democratic movements. I am not convinced 
that through the current form of 'autocratic multi-partyism' or hegemonic party 
politics, as practiced in many countries, or total liberalism, Africans would be 
able to own their states. Here I have suggested that we critically and carefully 
examine another option that is associated with the notion of the welfare state as 
an alternative form of democracy that can help reconceptualize the state. Given 
the nature of African society, which is essentially communal, with a high level 
of tolerance of differences among various people and nations, it is possible to 
learn more from a social democracy approach to development than from an individualistic 
capitalist model of development. 
Another option for reconcetualizing the African state is through social or 
popular revolution of radical change of the structures of the African economies 
within pan-African perspectives, while the last option is to examine it from the
104 Takumbi Lumumba-Kasongo 
point of view of a revival of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere's African perspective, that 
is to say from the dynamics of African traditions, culture, ethos, and theories of 
management and governance. 
However, some important initiatives have been taken in Africa and need to be 
mentioned and critically examined. The most important decision that the 34 
African political leaders made was taken on 5 June 1991, at the OAU summit in 
Abuja, Nigeria. They signed the treaty for the establishment of the African 
Economic Community (AEC). 
The treaty sets out a timetable for the phased removal of barriers to intra- 
African trade, the strengthening of the existing regional economic groupings 
and other steps toward African economic cooperation and integration that are 
expected to culminate in the formation of an African economic community by 
the year 2025. 
This initiative is the most important ideal ever to have been initiated by the 
OAU and the UN ECA. It came about as a result of the continuous individual 
failures of most national economic policies to deal with the conditions of underdevelopment. 
This option is an effort to approach African social and economic 
problems collectively from an African perspective but within the global capitalist 
orbit. 
The world system produced the merchant state and African forces and conditions 
have maintained it. The psychology and the power base of such a state 
have focused on the obsession over what to sell and what to buy. Who really 
has been benefiting from these selling and buying businesses? The raison d'etre 
of this state, as defined by the powerful nations and maintained and articulated 
by the African ruling elites, has been not development in any comprehensive 
sense but, rather, to simply and passively react to the imperatives of liberal globalization 
as a consumerist entity of capitalism. This globalization has not been 
open and free in Africa. In fact, African commodities have not been able to 
compete well in the world economy, not just because of the so called 'poor quality' 
or 'tastes', but because the global market is highly politicized and Africa is 
at the periphery of world politics. It should be noted, however, that, during the 
1980s and '90s, the processes of global marginalization and global economic 
reforms have seriously challenged even the consumerist dimension. The so 
called middle class, for instance, is shrinking and, in some cases, even disappearing. 
Another new initiative that could produce new definitions of state and development 
is the project of African renaissance that is being articulated by 
President Thabo Mbeki in South Africa. 'African renaissance' is essentially a 
dynamic concept. It involves a processes of critical thinking that has two components: 
learning and questioning the present order of things as they are in 
order to project the past into the processesi of remaking and renaming the future 
of Africa. These two components of requesting knowledge should provide
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 105 
answers to African maladies. It rejects the notion of 'tabula rasa' tha't western 
powers intentionally constructed in order to redefine Africa according to their 
own fixed objectives and images. It embodies a deconstruction process without 
which an individual human being may not be able to build a social self. 
African renaissance, as a new movement of ideas and a potential political 
movement, is taking place at a complicated period in which the African state is 
further confused about which direction to take in order to engage its people 
with confidence toward a search for social progress. Neocolonial wars have multiplied. 
The African people have become materially poorer today than 20 years 
ago. The real social and political conditions in Africa and the contradictory 
behaviors of African leaders and states show that most Africans have lost confidence 
in them and in what they can do collectively. People without confidence 
are people without dreams and ambitions. In a very complex world system, 
these people are confused, degraded, and enslaved. There is no doubt that the 
colonial project, as objectively reflected in the neocolonial economies, the structure 
of the states, and the global marginalization of Africa, has totally failed the 
African people. Thus, the search for alternative theories of social progress is scientifically 
imperative. No people can progress without actions oriented toward 
social projects and a collective agenda. The African renaissance should not be 
another imitation of the western paradigm to deal with poverty and desperation. 
The last call that Muammar Kadhafi of Libya made in 1999 to establish a 
common currency and achieve political union of some sort is being explored 
and discussed in many parts of Africa. But how far can it go in the current situation 
of wars and poverty produced by the actions and programs of the international 
institutions? 
If Africa would like to remain in the world of states as it is, it should develop 
a collective security approach. This would decrease the chances of potential tensions 
among the states, as there would be common rules governing the behavior 
of all the states. Collective security arrangements are likely to work better 
within some forms of the federal system. This approach should not follow the 
model of the hierarchy and structures of the United Nations, for these are too 
costly and their bureaucracy is too slow and inefficient. The collective security 
approach should be built into the structures of a united government, to be promoted 
for the interests of all. Its operations must be decentralized but its command 
system should be centralized. This may also decrease the chances of military 
coups d'itat, as all the armies would be commanded by one higher military 
institution that would divide its responsibilities into three structures: continental, 
regional, and national/state. 
At the continental level, Africa cannot afford to adopt the early Costa Rica 
model of choosing not to build a strong army. The history of nation states and 
international capitalism shows that building a defensive military system is a 
necessity as a deterrent force against internal and external aggression. What
106 Thkumbi Lwnumba-Kasongo 
kind of military system, then, ought to be built in order to respond effectively 
and efficiently to African imperatives? Clearly, modern military systems are 
always costly to maintain and their proper functioning depends heavily on the 
military technologies developed by the industrial powers. In 1960, Sylvanus 
Olympio of Togo attempted to develop a state without a national army. He was 
overthrown in a coup d'etat in which he was violently assassinated by ex- 
French soldiers, led by Sergeant Eyadema, who became a general and the 
President of Togo. The coup leaders were trying to argue for their incorporation 
into the Togolese security system. Though this position has not yet been documented, 
some scholars have argued that France was behind this coup because 
it disagreed with Olympio's political language and the structure of the new 
state. There is a need for building a military division in each region. 
The question of the nature of the military systems to be adopted in Africa 
cannot fully be discussed in this article because it is an enormously complex 
issue, one that would require a continental political debate. Despite the fact that, 
with the exception of the north, Africa is not geographically located near the 
industrial powers, the political actions of Africa which may displace the interests 
and the role of the industrial powers will not be accepted by those powers 
because political elites in those countries, and most of their people, treat Africa 
as a collection of subordinate states and people. It is certain that strong African 
projects would be met with the politics of intimidation and with indifference, 
and they would also be the objects of political and perhaps even military 
attacks. This is why it is realistically imperative to have a defensive army to protect 
African value systems and people. Its ideology and mission would be to 
defend the people and to contribute to the development projects. In light of such 
a mission, what can we do with the existing military academies and training 
centers? 
They must be centers for re-educating soldiers. Their objectives can be converted 
to fit the purposes of the new approach to the new nature of African politics 
and international relations. Some of those centers could even be converted 
into centers for social education and local factories of ideas or commodities; 
they could be converted into school enterprises. They could also be transformed 
into the national police academies. Furthermore, the process of actualizing this 
structural military transformation has to be democratic, and in a democratic 
process, those academies would come to better serve people. 
Finally, Africa is capable of governing itself effectively, and of producing 
states from within its own dynamics, if the old state apparatuses, laws, and paradigms 
are dismantled through popular movements, democratic processes, 
internal and regional alliances of power, and innovative initiatives. In the 21st 
century, we must forcefully examine how to promote the notion of strong welfare 
states that can take care of people's needs and be responsible and accountable 
for their actions. As Julius Nyerere said:
Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development 107 
In advocating a strong state, I am not holding brief for either an overburdened State 
or a State with a bloated bureaucracy. To advocate a strong state is to advocate a 
state, which, among other things has power to act on behalf of the people in accordance 
with their wishes. And in a market economy, with its law of jungle, we need 
a state that has the capacity to intervene on behalf of the weak. No state is really 
strong unless its government has the full consent of at least the majority of its people; 
and its difficulty to envision how that consent can be obtained outside democracy. 
So a call for strong state is not a call for dictatorships either. Indeed, all dictatorships 
are basically weak because the means they apply in governance make 
them inherently unstable (1999: 3). 
Africa has to reinvent its own complex political systems with relevant and 
appropriate elements of republicanism, democracy, and liberalism, built on a 
strong basis of economic nationalism. 
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