AJr.j. polit. sci. (20O0), Vol. 5 No. 1, 124-145 
Trapped in Development Crisis and 
Balkanisation: Africa Versus 
Globalisation 
Kwame Boafo-Arthur* 
Abstract 
Undoubtedly, globalisation is a complex process. It is touted as having the 
potential to accelerate Africa's development if the continent's economies wouldbe 
reformed in accordance with market principles. But clearly, globalisation is 
widening the disparities between the developed and developing economies. 
Africa's economies, in particular, are experiencing severe stagnation and, in some 
case, decline. By exacerbating Africa's development crisis, globalisation further 
poses a challenge to Africa. It emphasizes economic integration as the only viable 
alternative for survival in this New World order, and the urgency for a renewed 
commitment to the African Economic Community (AEC). Given the inherent 
weakness of existing regional integration schemes and the constraints in the 
development environment, there is also the need to reformulate the theoretical 
basis of the African Economic Community by incorporating the idea of "variable 
geometry " to enable countries to join the AEC as and when they can cope with the 
economic and political demands of integration. 
Introduction 
The current attention to globalisation coincides with the general conceptualisation 
of regional economic integration as a potentially viable option for economic 
growth and development in Africa. However, not all analysts agree on globalisation's 
positive contributions to African development. Consequently, its potential impact 
on economic development has been a matter of intense debate. While some 
analysts see it as necessary for Africa's development and the wellbeing of its 
people, arguments outlining its negative implications for Africa, and the develop- 
1027-0353 © 2000 African Association of Political Science
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation 125 
ing world as a whole, appear overwhelming. Regarding production and exports of 
goods. Africa is marginalised in the international system. This should be a matter 
of concern when one also considers Africa's elusive pursuit of viable integration 
schemes and the crusading nature of globalisation. 
Between 1970 and 1974 the share of developing countries in world trade was 20 
percent. This increased to 28 percent in 1996. Africa's share in world exports 
(excluding major oil producers) declined from 3 percent in 1970 to 1.5 percent in 
19%.' There are growing imbalances in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows as 
well. UNCTAD's 1997 report shows that slightly over 4 percent of FDI for the 
developing world came to Africa. This amounted to a paltry $3.5 billion. Of the 37 
percent of the total OECD's foreign direct investment that went to the developing 
world in 1996. over one third or nearly $45 billion went to China. The World Bank 
noted also in 1996 that 73 percent of such FDI went to just twelve countries. 
Estimates from the African Development Bank (ADB) show that Africa's share of 
the FDI to developing countries over the years has declined from an average 16 
percent in the 1970s to 10 percent in the 1980s; and an insignificant 5 percent by 
the mid-1990s.: For such precipitous decline to take place during a period most 
African countries had liberalised their economies, become caught in the global 
conundrum: and adopted several measures to strengthen regional economic 
integration indicate senous developmental problems for the continent Globalisation, 
the half-hearted attempts at integration and poor domestic policy formulation 
might have exacerbated these problems. It is also likely that African economies are 
incapable of growth irrespective of the measures taken. 
Four main issues inform the analyses in this paper. First is the debate over the 
extent of African integration into the global economy. The presumption of die 
proponents of the intrinsic salience of globalisation to Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
development seems to be that the more extensive or deeper the integration of a 
particular economy into the global economy, the greater the benefits in developmental 
terms Second is the nature of globalisation and how it relates to current 
African developmental conditions. Third is the nature of African responses in the 
form of liberalisation and economic integration and development The fourth is the 
challenges such an interplay of globalisation and economic integration pose to 
Africa. 
I argue that even though globalisation has positive sides, its overall impacts on 
African economies pose serious challenges to African economic integration. Due 
to globalisation's crusading nature (propelled largely by international finance 
capital), states appear to have lost the capacity to regulate economic relations 
between people, sectors and certain acton in society and countries. Consequently, 
states within various integration units have difficulty implementing agreed protocols. 
This is a situation that impacts negatively on an individual nation's development 
as well as regional co-operation and development And it has been com-
126 Kwame Boafo-Arthur 
pounded by the current phase of globalisation and the uncritical adoption of neoliberal 
economic measures that have undermined industrial expansion and production 
capacity within regional blocs, especially in developing countries. First, I 
examine the features of the historical antecedents of the current globalisation 
phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa (SS A) This is done in the context of the debate 
on whether or not Africa has been sufficiently integrated into the global economy. 
The second section is devoted to the nature of globalisation as it relates to the 
economic conditions of the developing world, including Africa. Section three 
discusses Africa's responses to its developmental conditions in the form of 
economic and political liberalisation and economic integration. 
The final part highlights the challenges posed to Africa's integration. I argue 
that some of the current obstacles to integration in SSA are carry-over from earlier 
phases of globalisation, among others. Nonetheless, Africa's increasing 
marginalization is attributable to the impacts of failed domestic policies, halfhearted 
approach to economic integration and the nature of globalisation itself. I 
suggest, among other consequences, that acceding meekly to the dictates of 
globalisation equally constitutes a serious threat to Africa's economic integration 
and ipso facto the development of individual countries. The logic of globalisation 
is a threat to weak, impoverished and dependent states with weak and fragmented 
markets. To counteract this developmental threat to individual countries, African 
leaders should move beyond the realm of rhetoric and renew their commitment to 
African economic integration. 
Globalisation: A Historical Note 
Undoubtedly, the globalisation phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa has strong 
historical underpinnings. Colonial conquests of Africa in the late 19th and early 20* 
centuries represent the first major wave of globalisation. Internationalisation of 
capital was the linchpin of globalisation during those periods, which resulted not 
only in the domination but also balkanization of Africa by the imperial powers of 
Europe. European interests were the driving force. Karl Marx notes how 
the colonies provided a market for the budding manufactures, and a vast 
increase in accumulation which was guaranteed by the mother country's 
monopoly of the market ... Today, industrial supremacy brings with it 
commercial supremacy. In the period of manufacture, it is the reverse: 
commercial supremacy produces industrial predominance.3 
Under the cloak of a civilising mission, territories were acquired by European 
powers spearheaded by Britain. Contrary to this imperial mission, Africa's 
underdevelopment has been attributed, among others, to several centuries of 
Western domination during which economies and societies were structured (and
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation 127 
continue to be structured) through several mechanisms, in ways which continually 
reproduce poverty, inequality and political and economic crisis.4 
The earlier phases of globalisation that in effect were characterised by imperial 
domination of underdeveloped areas represent epochs in African development. 
They were periods of domination and exploitation that effectively consigned 
Africa to produce primary raw materials for industries in Europe; while Africa 
served, by and large, as markets for European manufactured goods. Consequently, 
the existing mode of indigenous intra-African trade was curtailed or suppressed 
and Africa's trade was redirected toward Europe. With few exceptions, transport 
networks were not designed to link the colonies with one another but rather to 
facilitate the exploitation and export of raw materials to Europe.5 
The immediate post-war era represents yet another phase of globalisation in 
Africa. Whereas giant multinational corporations effectively took over the role of 
European states in the exploitation of the developing world, internationally 
financial institutions like the Bretton Woods institutions emerged to regulate 
international economic relations. They enforced rules for commercial and financial 
relations among developed industrial as well as developing countries. African 
states, then politically and economically weak and subordinate during the period, 
were not represented at the Bretton Woods conference; but the system for 
regulating international finance and development applied to them as well. This is 
because although some of the former colonies had achieved some form of 
industrialisation based on the processing of local raw materials "productivity 
levels outside the primary-export 'enclaves' grew slowly and the state remained 
weak in most countries".6 And since Sub-Saharan Africa had been structurally 
linked with the industrialised countries for centuries through "formal and informal 
imperial relations, these states had little choice but to acquiesce in the international 
economic system established for them".7 Is Africa well integrated into the global 
economy? Nicholas van de Walle (1999) for example, points to Africa's longstanding 
integration into the world trading system. In 1854, for instance, West 
Africa exported some 37,631 tons of palm oil to Great Britain. By the close of the 
century this figure had reached 50,000 tons. Again, in 1854, trade in groundnut 
between France and Senegal had reached 5,500 tons.8 Europe exported assorted 
merchandise to Africa in return. This trend has continued till now. Therefore, the 
assumption that Africa "is not rapidly becoming more integrated into the world 
economy today",9 is clearly untenable. 
Obviously, this flawed assumption is premised on the World Bank's index to 
gauge the speed of Africa's economic integration in the 1980s using four main 
indicators: the ratio of real trade to GDP; the ratio of FDI to GDP; the credit ratings 
of The Institutional Investormagazine; and theshare of manufactures in exports.10 
Others use Africa's diminishing exports to the international market between 1970 
and 1996 as the criterion for assessing the level or extent of Africa's integration into
128 Kwame Boafo-Arthur 
the global economy." The use of manufacture export as one of the criteria and the 
exclusion of primary and semi-processed exports from the developing world, 
implies that a country or region that depends on the export of primary products as 
opposed to manufactured exports is not a key part of the international trading 
regime, and is in effect marginalized. Also, if one takes the ratio of FDI to GDP, 
it cannot be assumed that a low FDI is indicative of low integration in the world 
economy. There are several other mechanisms by which Africa has been integrated 
in the world economy - trade, communication, financial markets for example. 
Diminishing volume of transaction in such sectors compared to other regions of the 
world should not be construed as insufficient integration in the international 
system. Rather they are indicative of Africa's inability to expand its productive 
base and lack of flexibility in responding to changes in the international economy 
(Elbadawi and Ndulu 1996: 79-86). 
Globalisation: Current Trends 
In contrast to the earlier phases of globalisation, the current globalisation is an 
elusive and complex phenomenon,12 whose distinguishing features include the 
extensiveness and intensiveness of the interconnectedness of different peoples and 
societies.13 Globalisation is neither obstructed nor constrained by territorial or 
jurisdictional frontiers of nation states. Although it manifests itself in different 
forms through the centuries, the current trend differs from earlier phases in several 
ways. On account of the sheer magnitude of current economic development in the 
industrial world, the rapidity of technological innovations, and the speed of 
dissemination and adaptation of new ideas in almost any other sector or country, 
earlier phases of globalisation were not as obtrusive or pervasive. 
Globalisation, has several facets and is propelled by numerous forces which 
concurrently shape current economic, political, technological, financial, and 
socio-cultural interactions on a global scale. The current trend is being driven 
across the developing world through the generalised implementation of the neoliberal 
economic paradigm. Neo-liberalism lays emphasis on deregulation, fiscal 
balances, open markets, withdrawal of the state as an economic agent, and the reenactment 
of labour and investment laws to induce the movement of international 
capital around the world.14 These have given globalisation a distinctive economic 
character with the following features or underlying causes, among others: 
• the interpenetration of national markets for assorted goods, such as, industrial 
products and labour across national boundaries. This was made possible by the 
mobility of capital; 
• the technological revolution that has led to several inventions and discoveries 
in the scientific fields that are quickly disseminated across borders, replacing 
Fordism whereby capital intensive assembly line replaced dependence on
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation 129 
unskilled labour, and mass production of goods that need outlets in the global 
market became a distinctive feature of industrial activities;15 
• the emergence and strengthening of private and public economic institutions 
embracing multinational or transnational enterprises and strategic business 
alliances;16 and 
• the phenomenal growth in financial markets whose global turnover is estimated 
to have risen from $188 billion in 1986 to $1.2 trillion in 1995 with a 
corresponding tenfold increase in cross border transactions in bonds and 
equities between members of the Group of Seven. 
The pervasiveness of international financial transactions is not limited to the 
highly industrial countries. The developing world had its share within the period, 
no matter how minuscule. For instance, private capital flow as a component of 
the GDP of the economies of developing countries increased from 0.5 percent in 
1983-9 to over 3.5 percent in 1994-6.17 
As a political phenomenon, globalisation implies the shaping of the international 
political arena in such a way that political actions find expression in a global 
arena instead of within insulated and relatively autonomous units. In this regard, 
the state loses its position of pre-eminence, in strictly realist terms, on the grounds 
that state actors are compelled by the logic of globalisation to share the political 
arena with transnational market actors of varying colouration. Such developments 
have revolutionalised political practices and institutions, and ensured proper 
adaptation by various political actors, in the face of mounting shortcomings of 
nation states.18 The political sphere has also been characterised by "intensive 
pressures, lobbying and financial inducements to governments by powerful 
corporations; and by the determined defence of such business-or 'national economic' 
- interests by governmental representatives".19 
The political dimensions of globalisation appear to have been influenced by 
three main factors. These are the general acceptance of liberal democracy, 
especially after the collapse of communist regimes, the obsolescence and consequent 
rejection of most dictatorial regimes in Africa and Latin America, and the 
imposition of political conditionalities on dictatorial and economically dependent 
states. 
Contradictory Perceptions and Effects 
Every process, be it economic, political, technological, etc., is bound to have a 
differential impact on peoples and societies. What is of the essence is the 
magnitude of the effects, especially on weak societies with weak economies and 
political institutions as is the case in most of the developing world. Consequently, 
two main views have emerged with regard to the effects of globalisation, especially 
on African countries in particular, and the developing world in general.
130 Kwame Boafo-A rthur 
Defenders of globalisation see it as an irreversible phenomenon with no 
alternative;20 it has the potential to improve the lives of citizens of developing 
nations that allow deeper penetration of external capital, technology, expertise, and 
at times cultural practices prevalent in advanced industrialised countries. Some 
perceive it as both bounded and well defined with a discernible driving force (for 
example, the convergence of interest rates or the information technology revolution) 
that would ultimately homogenise societies. Other analysts argue that 
globalisation is basically complex and heterogenising, even divisive in its nature 
and effects. Those of the heterogenising persuasion further view globalisation as 
the fore-runner of a new world disorder due to the creation and sustenance of 
overlapping and competing authorities, multiple loyalties and identities, as well as 
multifaceted ideas and beliefs.21 
Philip Cerny argues that internationalisation or the operations of transnational 
forces has influenced policy change and foisted four main political agendas on 
many nations. 
1. a change from macroeconomic to microeconomic interventionism, as exemplified 
by governmental deregulation; 
2. a shift from economic activities that aimed at ensuring minimal economic selfsufficiency 
in key sectors to one of flexible reaction to competitive conditions 
in a rapidly evolving international market place. That is, the emphasis now is 
on 'competitive advantage' as opposed to 'comparative advantage'; 
3. the concentration of policy makers on neo-liberal monetarism that serves as the 
linchpin of state economic management and interventionism; and 
4. the contraction of welfare politics (full employment and social service provision) 
by government and party in favour of the promotion of free enterprise, as 
well as innovation and profitability in both private and public sectors. 
This political agenda, foisted directly or indirectly on many countries in an era 
of globalisation, conforms to mainstream classical and neo-classical economic 
theory. The theory, among others, favours restraining the state from intervention 
in national economies save the maintenance of the requisite legal framework 
essential for a market economy (private property rights, sanctity of contracts, 
etc.).22 Even though an exception is generally made with regard to the operation of 
some activities (e.g. strategic industries or essential services such as water and 
electricity), in some developing countries, including Ghana, the privatisation of 
such utilities is far advanced. 
Financial integration that implies the opening up of domestic markets to 
external transactions, including capital flows, has engendered what Barry 
Eichengreen terms "financial deepening" (i.e. more active, liquid, and efficient 
financial markets). This promotes higher investments, faster growth, and improved 
living standards.23 
Admittedly, capital flows to developing areas have been an essential element of
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation 131 
globalisation. But have such flows been an unmitigated blessing to receiving 
economies? Has there been financial deepening, and if so has it been to the 
advantage of developing economies? Jagdish Bhagwati, a world renowned trade 
theorist, argues that "the claims of enormous benefits from free capital mobility are 
not persuasive". And, David Rodrik, a trade specialist of Harvard University, notes 
that there is no hard evidence to support the claim that free capital mobility "will 
solve any of our problems, and some reason to think that it may make them 
worse".24 For Jeffrey Sachs, even though the real meaning of the Mexican and East 
Asian financial crises is not too clear, it seems that financial markets are prone to 
key market failures "that are exacerbated, rather than limited, by globalisation".25 
Liberal economists are of the conviction, however, that international poverty is 
due to inadequate integration of the less developed countries into the global 
economy and irrational national policies that impede the development of a well 
functioning market. Thus, for instance, countries of SSA are poor because, among 
other reasons, national political leaders are inefficient.26 Most liberals assume 
further that the key to economic development is the capacity of the economy to 
transform itself in response to changing conditions. The failure of many less 
developed countries to adjust to changing prices and economic opportunities is 
rooted in their social and political systems rather than in the operation of the 
international market system.27 In other words, Africa's unenviable extent of 
development, for instance, is the outcome of globalisation, not in its historical and 
current phases, but the of continent's inability to capitalise on the opportunities 
opened up through globalisation. 
On the contrary, globalisation in both its historical and current forms has 
contributed immeasurably to Africa's developmental crises. Of course, there is 
much to be said about domestic constraints to development. Nonetheless, the 
external factors in Africa's developmental crisis are too important to be ignored. 
For example, Rosenau is of the view that globalisation has engendered fundamental 
tensions in societies due to "the pervasive interactions between the fragmenting 
forces of localisation and the integrative forces of globalisation".28 Accordingly, 
Barry Gills points to, 
the economism of globalisation; its economic reductionism; its technological 
determinism; its political cynicism, defeatism, and immobilism; its desocialisation 
of the subject and re-socialisation of risk; its teleological 
subtext of inexorable global "logic" driven exclusively by capital accumulation 
and the market; and its ritual exclusion of factors, causes, or goals 
other than capital accumulation and the market from the priority of values 
to be pursued by social action.29 
Barry Gills' position conforms to the view of structuralists that international
132 Kwame Boafo-Arthur 
market imperfections increase inequalities among the developed and less developed 
countries. This is because of the disproportionate beneficial effects from 
international trade that accrue to developed countries. For sure, developing 
countries now face formidable obstacles to development in an era of globalisation 
because of the widening technological gap, their long experience of marginalisation, 
and the monetarist logic of globalisation that ignores potential negative social 
implications of policy choices. These economies are thus caught in a vicious cycle 
of poverty from which escape is nearly impossible; and free trade worsens it.30 
Admittedly, African leaders have contributed one way or the other to Africa's 
predicament because of dictatorial tendencies, crass cronyism, poorly executed 
national economic programmes, and other weaknesses. But could these be the 
primary cause of the continent's development crisis? Africa has always been a 
weak partner in international interactions for reasons that date back to the time of 
colonialism. And, the present dispensation under a supposedly new global ideology 
cannot be so different from conditions, issues, driving forces, and dynamics 
of interactions on the global stage. The question therefore is whose interest is being 
served under the current globalisation? 
At the corporate level high-tech companies like Microsoft, IBM, AT&T and 
many others are at the forefront in highlighting the virtues of globalisation. The 
argument that these companies have the bulk of their operations in other developed 
countries oversimplifies the point, because the tentacles of American, European 
and Japanese corporations stretches across the globe. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
become a victim because of its inability to negotiate beneficial terms for the 
operations of these transnationals. At te same time the impetus for domestic 
initiative and innovation has been seriously compromised. As William Pfaff notes, 
globalisation has led to the destruction of indigenous industry.13 A key member of 
the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) that 
implemented Ghana's structural adjustment policies, P.V. Obeng, also 
alluded in an interview granted to the West African magazine in 1990 to the 
inappropriateness of unbridled internationalisation and its negative implications 
for indigenous industries. He noted: "We would certainly (with 
hindsight) have avoided the over-liberalisation of certain economic activities. 
We pursued a policy of trade liberalisation even though we had not put 
some of our local industries on a sound footing." Subsequently these 
industries suffered from dumping practices and other externally induced 
problems, that rendered their recovery a rather slow and painful process. 
In most cases, the corporate interests of transnational have the backing of their 
home governments. In the United States, for instance, government officials 
construct current globalisation policies as an indivisible part of a grand "proactive"
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation 133 
government strategy aimed at restoring America's relative economic position on 
the world stage. To be precise, economic nationalism has been the driving force. 
Globalisation in this sense, is the pursuit of America's national interests against the 
predations of foreign actors.33 It is economic nationalism. 
Much more telling on developing nations is the extent to which national 
autonomy or sovereignty is compromised for the sake of ensuring integration of 
national economies in accordance with the globalisation creed. As a result, 
globalisation undermines national sovereignty by lessening the degree of policy 
discretion available to government anxious to maintain sustainable policies, what 
Mkandawire(1999:119-136) calls "choiceless democracies". Furthermore, international 
capital mobility undermines governmental ability to pursue independent 
monetary and fiscal policy.34 The ability of the state to efficiently provide 
redistributive public goods has come under severe direct and indirect attack. 
Corporatist bargaining and employment policies with regard to labour market 
policy have come under intense pressure on account of international demands for 
wage restraint and flexible working practices. Globalisation has indeed "undercut 
the policy capacity of the nation state".35 
The Trap 
What has been Africa's condition since capital assumed its current global thrust, 
especially in the 1980s? Have African countries experienced qualitative improvements 
in the economic and social spheres since the 1980s? What has been Sub- 
Saharan Africa's response to globalisation? 
As indicated above, Africa's share of the global market transactions has 
continued to dwindle. General development indicators are not encouraging. Much 
worse than this Africa trails in Global Human Development Indicators. According 
to the UNDP's 1998 Report, 14 African countries are at the bottom of the 174 
nations which were the subject of the study. In the report which was based on an 
assessment of overall health, the general standard of education and the standard of 
living, Seychelles which ranked first, tops the 50 African countries; Mauritius is 
listed 61 st, Libya 64th, Algeria 82nd, and Tunisia 83rd. South Africa is ranked 6th 
on the continent and 89th globally. Nigeria lies 23rd on the continent and 142nd 
in the world ranking. The Democratic Republic of Congo ranks 24th on the 
continent and 143rd in the world. The so-called best economic performers in 
Africa-Morocco, Ghana and Uganda rank 125th, 133rd and 160th respectively in 
the world. Due to lack of data, Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia were not included in 
the assessment. 
Foreign trade has been Africa's main source of revenue for a number of 
countries even though external aid has been amajor source of supplementary funds 
for economic development. The bulk of Africa's trade has almost always been with 
countries outside the continent; and her exports have grown less rapidly than GDP.
134 Kwame Boafo-Arthur 
Between 1970 and 1980, African commodity exports grew at 2.8% per annum, 
compared to 3.6% for South Asia. Between 1980 and 1992 African export growth 
decreased to 2.4% whilst that of South Asia increased to 6.8%. Another problem 
is the high ratio of primary products in total exports. In 1970, primary commodities 
constituted 83% of Africa's exports. By 1992, after over a decade of structural 
adjustment in many countries, 76% of Africa's exports were still primary products. 
In the 1960s, export earnings from cocoa and coffee averaged 35% of total export 
earnings. By 1989-90, the two crops constituted 40% of export earnings. 
Intra-African trade constitutes only 4% of overall African trade. Apart from 
South Africa whose exports has a sizeable component of manufactured products, 
most African countries are primary commodity exporters (made up of either 
agricultural products, or minerals, or both). A small minority depend on the export 
of petroleum. Without exception, African countries are major importers and 
consumers of manufactured products. In view of price fluctuations on commodity 
markets and the tardiness associated with diversification of export products, 
African countries have little influence over the prices of both exports and imports. 
Consequently, they have become what Robert Browne terms "price-takers rather 
than price-makers" x even though the quest for economic independence depends 
critically on enhanced external trade. But in an era of globalisation, the prospects 
for increasing value added exports are dim because transnational corporations have 
virtually forced indigenous manufacturers out of business, often with the connivance 
of the economic and political elite which "makes it extremely difficult to bring 
them under national rules and regulations".37 
The debt burden of Africa shows no sign of reduction. In 1996, 41 countries 
were designated by the World Bank and the IMF as "heavily indebted poor 
countries" (HIPCS) who were incapable of repaying their debts. The total external 
debt of such countries from public or official sources, increased from $55 billion 
in 1980 to $183 billion in 1990 and to $215 billion by the end of 1995. The debt 
was double their expected earnings from exports. Out of the 41 HIPCs, 32 are from 
Sub-Saharan Africa; and 26 of these are within the UNDP's lowest human 
development category. 
In contrast to other developing areas in Latin America and South East Asia, the 
32 HIPCs in Africa have weak export base and performance, with an average GDP 
growth of 2.2% between 1985 and 1990. Between 1990 and 1995, the average GDP 
growth had fallen to 1%. These countries also have debt to export ratio of over 
220% and debt to GNP ratio of more than 80% Zambia, for instance, uses 50% of 
total aid revenue to service its debt. Although Ghana, Uganda and Mozambique are 
classified as progressing, their debt payments are more than double the budgetary 
allocations for health and education, which prompted Thomas Callaghy to classify 
the Highly Indebted Poor Countries as the 'underclass' in the global economy.38 
In most developing countries, formal-sector employment as a proportion of total
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation 135 
employment has been rising; but in Africa it has fallen from 12% to 9% in the last 
decade. The forecast, according to Panford, is even more gloomy. ILO/UNDP data 
for 1997 indicate that urban unemployment rate has risen to over 20% in the past 
15 years. The ILO/UNDP forecast an increase in urban unemployment to 30% by 
the year 2000. Already, Zimbabwe has an unemployment rate of 50%.39 Clearly, 
Africa's developmental indicators, its export performance, high debt burden, e t c . , 
in an era of globalisation portend a bleak future. How have African countries 
responded to these trends? What have been the outcomes of such responses? 
Africa's Responses: Integration or Balkanization? 
Attempts by African countries to improve the deplorable development conditions 
have taken various forms. These include the adoption of import substituting 
industrialisation in the immediate post independence era; central planning which 
led to the establishment of several state owned enterprises; economic integration; 
and economic liberalisation or reforms with the support of the international 
financial institutions (Ms), especially the Bretton Woods institutions. With the 
exception of economic integration and economic liberalisation that are still being 
pursued, the other measures failed to check Africa's slide into a cycle of poverty 
with serious developmental consequences.40 Economic liberalisation, which has 
been pursued since the early 1980s, has had mixed results. The indications are that, 
in the long term, this policy will also end in utter failure because after more than 
a decade of economic reform no single African country has overcome the structural 
problems of the economy; nor have the social and economic conditions of the mass 
of the people improved. They still remain beggar nations; some economies such as 
Ghana and Zambia are aid-driven. The debt burden, rigid debt repayment criteria, 
and the wanton sale of national assets (in some cases, to faceless external 
investors), appear to have effectively mortgaged Africa's future and surreptitiously 
led to the second colonisation of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Economic integration appears to be the remaining option of promise. It must be 
noted, however, that economic integration is not a new phenomenon in Sub- 
Saharan Africa.41 The continent appears to have spawned integrative groups more 
than any other region in the world. The need to revamp Africa's economic 
integration projects in order to enhance overall development in the 21 st century has 
become more compelling on account of two main factors. The first is the nature of 
globalisation, and the spartan zeal with which it is being defended by its proponents. 
The second is the strengthening of integration blocs by the 'apostles' of free 
trade-the OECD countries and the United States. 
Africa has six broad regional groups-the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(UEMOA), Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Develop-
136 Kwame Boafo-Arthur 
ment Community (SADC), and the South African Customs Union (SACU).42 The 
failure of earlier development models and the nature of globalisation appear to 
have shifted the heavy task of development from individual countries to the 
regional economic groups. Perhaps, it was in light of this that in July 1991, the 
Treaty of Abuja, establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), was 
signed. The six broad regional groupings, together with countless smaller ones, are 
to operate alongside the African Economic Community, with the former giving 
way eventually to the Pan-African economic community. Serious challenges, 
therefore, face integrative groups in general and the AEC in particular. 
The African Economic Community is not to be built on these weak and problemprone 
regional groupings. To be sure, almost all the broad regional groupings have 
serious problems, which to my mind, have been compounded by globalisation. 
With regard to ECOWAS, for instance, the treaty endorses trade liberalisation and 
trade promotion as the key means to facilitate regional economic integration. 
However, very little has been achieved on this score. Moreover, there has been no 
harmonisation of economic policies by member states. It appears that the adjustment 
policies that have become the handmaid of neo-liberalism have foreclosed 
concerted economic policy making by members of ECOWAS. Accordingly, there 
has been very little intra-regional trade so far. In 1995, intra-regional trade among 
members of ECOWAS constituted less than 6 percent of total trade; because 
member countries are tied inexorably to the markets of the former colonialists. 
Although there is a commendable degree of monetary integration within 
UEMOA (this may be due to the fact that the CFA is tied to the French franc), this 
remains at about 10% and forms a small proportion of, total trade. Within the 
Central African Customs and Economic Union intra regional trade in the early 
1990s was about 3% of total trade. Intra-regional trade among members of 
COMESA is less than 6%. Although COMESA had a functioning Clearing House, 
which it inherited from the Preferential Trade Area (PTA),43 the insistence on 
financial markets' liberalisation under structural adjustment programmes has 
undermined the use of the Clearing House. SADC on the other hand suffers from 
monumental over dependence on donor funding for its activities. Keen competition 
for dwindling external funding in the wake of the collapse of the Eastern bloc 
and the dismantling of apartheid are bound to have negative impact on SADC's 
resources and hence its operation.44 Unlike the odier regional groups, however, 
SACU has vibrant intra-regional trade that revolves around South Africa. Thirty 
percent of South Africa's manufactured exports go to other members of SACU; 
and die proportion appears to be increasing.45 
The Challenge 
Given the nature of globalisation, what challenges do African leaders face? One of 
the factors that influenced the formation of the European Community (now EU) is
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation 137 
the limited leverage they had in negotiations with the United States, and the 
conviction that acting as a single trading bloc would enhance their negotiating 
leverage.46 The greatest challenge for policy makers in Africa, therefore, is to 
pursue economic integration as a means to weaken the powers of entrenched 
oligopolies and rent seekers. This calls for concerted action and commitment that 
will ensure negotiations with exploitative transnational corporations from a 
position of strength. 
Economic integration, as asolution or part of the solution to SS A's developmental 
dilemma obliges African leaders to renew their commitment to the AEC. The 
existence of numerous integration blocs on the continent may even call for a new 
strategy of economic integration. For clearly, relying on the existing regional 
groupings has become problematic at the moment. It has not been easy to forego 
existing regional identity in a jiffy. The developmental differences in development 
and the resource base of African states are such that the majority of them cannot 
for instance forego customs duties which may be the major source of internal 
revenue for the state. This calls for the reconceptualisation of the theoretical basis 
of the economic integration projects which are modelled on the EU—for example, 
the ECOWAS, COMESA and AEC. Africa should not ignore the various processes 
that brought the EU to its present stage where it now has a common currency. In 
particular, the idea of "variable geometry", which, to a large extent, explains what 
the EU is today should be closely considered. African countries that are endowed 
with amore extensive manufacturing base could constitute the nucleus of the AEC. 
Others that are less endowed may be given the option to join it as and when they 
feel they can cope with the economic and political imperatives of the integration 
project. 
Another challenge is the role of the private sector in economic development. 
Globalisation extols the salience of the private sector in economic development. 
That may sound fine on paper. What is often ignored, at times deliberately, is that 
the private sector could drive the economic development of the Newly Industrialising 
Countries (NICs) only with the support of the state. According to Yasutami 
Shimomura, an economist at Saitama University in Japan, the Asian Tigers did not 
simply open their economies as a policy measure. A dual policy of promoting 
exports while at the same time sustaining various import control measures were put 
in place and resolutely defended by the state.47 In fact it has been argued that, the 
major economic achievements in'this century have all been realised under the aegis 
of the interventionist states; and this applies equally to the US, Germany, and the 
former Soviet Union. The much vaunted industrial strategy of the so-called Asian 
Tigers were state driven.48 
Furthermore, tariff and related trade barriers played a key role in the economic 
development of Britain and Germany in the 19th century.49 But as Robert Browne 
points out:
138 Kwame Boafo-Arthur 
The developed countries continue to impose the insidious practice of 'tariff 
escalation,' by which the tariff rate rises with the degree of processing to 
which an imported commodity has been subjected, thus effectively precluding 
Africa from developing an industrial sector around its substantial 
mining and agricultural interests.50 
The history of the world trade system makes the "immorality of protectionism" 
untenable. It amounts to what Peter Beinart calls "clever device that when anyone 
has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has 
climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him".51 This 
leaves African countries in double jeopardy. They are expected under the rule of 
thumb of globalisation, WTO, the Bretton Woods Institutions etc., to open up 
their economies and increase their exports. According to the canons of globalisation 
and the theoretical underpinnings as well as rules of these multilateral 
institutions, protectionism is against the rules of free trade which is to say that all 
actors have the same freedom and the same economic capacity for competition on 
the global market place. The fact however is that, like the Bretton Woods 
institutions in which Africa's interests are not represented, the WTO created at the 
end of the Uruguay Round of tariff negotiations, marginalised the continent. Hence 
in international trade negotiations African countries have become mere spectators 
and consumers of decisions that are made by the powerful nations. If African 
economies would achieve appreciable growth and development then African 
interest should prevail. This means that a minimum of state intervention in 
production , coupled with a certain degree of protection for indigenous African 
industries, is required.52 This will enhance economic growth and development and 
to a certain extent, reduce foreign domination of African economies. Such defiance 
of free trade rules could be successfully implemented only within the framework 
of a homogenised African Economic Community. 
The WTO frowns on subsidies and other tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. 
Nonetheless, the EU was able to secure special safeguards aimed at protecting 
Europe against "import surges" and export subsidies or dumping. In contrast, 
African countries have been pressured - courtesy of structural adjustment programmes 
and ipso facto globalisation - to implement policies of blanket trade 
liberalisation and commercialization of a wide range of services, including 
services previously provided to farmers almost gratis The North in general, and the 
USA in particular, heavily subsidise agriculture on grounds of food security, and 
for political reasons. European Union Agricultural Ministers agreed tentatively to 
cut subsidies to farmers by 20 percent only in March 1999.53 
In sectors where the developing world has an advantage such as textiles and 
clothing, protective measures for this sector are weighted in favour of manufacturers 
from the North. Globalisation calls for an open global economy. "Yet the
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation 139 
integrated 'global' economy is characterised by a vast proliferation of less than 
'open' and sometimes quite protectionist regional economic groupings of limited, 
although frequently overlapping memberships."54 The issue of tariff escalation is 
of considerable interest to Africa because, compared to raw materials, industrialised 
countries impose a higher tariff on manufactured products from the South. For 
instance, raw hide attracts a low 0.1 % tariff, finished leather attracts a tariff of 5% 
while a tariff of 8% is imposed on leather goods.55 These and many other examples 
would show clearly that the signing of the WTO at no other place than Marrakech, 
an African city in Morocco was farcical, although it may have been planned to 
create the impression that this 557 page document would bring benefits to Africa. 
On this, Yash Tandon aptly argues that Africa has been short-changed, but that 
African leaders are partly responsible for this predicament. 
It is doubtful if, before signing the document, and (signing away) the fate 
of their countries, many African governments were able to find time to even 
read the document, let alone analyse the implications of the new trading 
order for their countries. Matters of critical importance that Europe and 
America fought tooth and nail, every inch of the way, clause by clause, word 
by word, for eight years, were handled by African Plenipotentiaries as if 
they were taking a cosy breakfast with the very countries that in 1884, at 
Berlin, had carved out Africa's fate over a dinner table.56 
This practice is widespread. For example, John Loxley points out that 
it was common knowledge that major agreements are typed in Washington 
for signature by the Ghanaian government and that often, because of 
bureaucratic delays in the government, the Bank will actually draft its 
responses to its own proposals on behalf of the Government?1 (my emphasis). 
This canker of African leaders poses a deep-seated challenge to Africa's capacity 
to identifying what favours its long-term interest. It is unthinkable that a united 
continental bloc would be so negligent and irresponsible. Cases like Ghana's will 
then be handled with the collective resource of a united Africa acting through the 
AEC. 
These instances of marginalization and powerlessness constitute a challenge to 
Africa's ability to come to terms with what is important for the well-being of its 
citizens. This challenge could only be tackled within the framework of a viable 
continental economic trading or integration bloc. It is unthinkable that the EU, 
without due participation in the deliberations on an agreement, with for instance, 
the US or Japan, will rush to sign the resultant agreement. It is equally unthinkable 
that a single country with a reasonable amount of autonomy will rush to sign an
140 Kwame Boafo-Arthur 
agreement without first scrutinizing such an agreement and, above all, without 
assessing its implications, long or short term, for its interest. 
The point then is that Africa's leaders are undermining the continent's development 
by failing to address the issue of economic integration with unqualified 
commitment. 
Confronting globalisation implies imposing or negotiating terms that serve the 
interests of local, national and regional constituents and requires the collective will 
and power embodied in Africa and expressed in the EC. That further connotes the 
implementation of domestic policies capable of strengthening African economies 
to counteract the negative effects of globalisation. If it is indeed irreversible then 
Africa's globalisation should be based on teh need to maximise the potential 
benefits. 
Conclusion: Escaping the Trap 
African leaders - the political and economic elite, intellectuals and technocrats 
should eschew Afro-pessimism. This is an attitude that has been instilled in 
educated Africans through various instruments of indoctrination since colonial 
times. The current condition of the continent obliges its leaders to reconceptualize 
African problems, re-theorise and operationalize the solutions; re-construct state 
power within the parameters of an African economic community; and reformulate 
strategies to resist or contain the negative aspects of globalisation. The continent's 
leaders must ensure that future programmes take cognisance of the socio-political, 
cultural, environmental and economic needs of Africa's people. In this way, Africa 
will realize its renaissance in a wave of industrialization and prosperity for its 
people, and not be dominated and exploited by the forces whose raison d'etre for 
global transactions is the maximisation of profit. 
As the world inches into the 21 st century, the nature and operations of the global 
system shows clearly that Africa's future does not reside in fractious, rudderless 
and often acrimonious regional groupings. It does not lie in substantial aid flows 
that inhibit the industrial development of the continent. The future appears 
embedded in a viable continental economic community capable of dealing with the 
adverse effects of globalisation, which means the rejection of the so-called "logic 
of inevitability" of globalisation which forecloses all alternatives to the neo-liberal 
path to development.58 Realizing the African Economic Community will help in 
tapping the opportunities embedded in global interconnectedness for the long term 
development of Africa. It would at the same time facilitate focused assessment and 
ensure the implementation of the practical aspects of viable alternative models of 
development. Some of these African initiatives on alternative development models 
such as the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the 1988 United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa's Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs 
(UN-ECA-AAF-S AP) were, in the past, killed by the international financial
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation 141 
institutions (Ms) that insist on the liberal development model as the only option 
for Africa. 
For the interim, there must be a serious attempt to combine a tolerable degree 
of austerity with the retention of minimal welfare in individual states. This will 
reduce to a tolerable size, the growing chasm in the standard of living between and 
within nations as a result of the dogmatic pursuit of monetarist policies. 
A successful integration project should address the prevailing political environment 
in many African countries. Quite often the prevailing political regime has 
undermined meaningful economic development. The development of legitimate 
democratic government would restore the moral and political authority of the state 
to negotiate with external actors within parameters that would be set by a pan- 
African economic community. It would also constitute a lasting framework for 
resolving internal and inter-state conflicts, and constructing domestic consensus 
for development. 
The Bank and the Fund have seen the need to stop behaving like colonial 
headmasters, and have initiated a process of consulting adjusting nations for their 
input in policy formulation. The first national forum on the Structural Adjustment 
Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) took place in Accra, Ghana from 
19-21 August, 1998. A united Africa, through the AEC, should pursue a policy 
of redefining Africa's relations with the international financial institutions and 
global bodies such as WTO in ways that will be advantageous to Africa's 
integration and development generally. This must include a sustained campaign 
for legitimate protective policies as well as effective instruments for disadvantaged 
African economies. As argued by Dot Keet, a clear distinction must be 
drawn between "legitimate protection for weaker economies and the protectionism 
of the strong".39 
Whether globalisation is irreversible or not is still a moot question. The fact 
remains that the African condition has been aggravated by centuries of deprivation, 
exploitation through unfair pricing by the industrialised world, and currently by 
marginalisation in the world economy. Given the nature of globalisation, the wide 
scientific and technological gap between the developed countries and Africa, and 
the persistent decline in the standard of living of millions of Africans on every 
conceivable development index, it would be a mark of failed leadership if the 
continent's leaders remained prisoners of their balkanised and ineffective integration 
projects. The response to globalisation does not lie in such phantom integration 
projects. Nor does it lie in the "modification of the principle of laissez-faire" l.60 
Africa must pull its bootstraps, and be demonstrably committed to the African 
economic community, which for the moment appears the only logical and viable 
alternative. Tackling internal structural distortions, dealing with the high incidence 
of official corruption, minimising patronalism and personalised rule among the 
complementary policy actions are necessary for sustainable development.
142 Kwame Boafo-Arthur 
Notes 
* Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, 
Legon. 
1 Montek Ahluwalia, "Globalization and its impact on Developing Countries: 
An Asian Perspective" in Pierre Fruhling (ed.) International Solidarity and 
Globalisation: In Search of New Strategies, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Stockholm, Sweden, 1998, pp. 38-44. 
2 See Dot Keet, "Integrating the World Community-Political Challenges and 
Opportunities for developing Countries". Presentation at a Workshop on The 
Future Partnership Between The ACP States and The European Union, 
Pretoria, 22-23 October 1997, p. 3. 
3 Cited in Ronaldo Munck, Politics and Dependency in The Third World, 
London, Zed Books Ltd., 1985, p. 53. 
4 Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, Heinemann, London, 1977, p.xiv 
5 The French constructed railway lines to link some of her territorial possessions 
in West Africa. The objective was to facilitate the transportation of 
cheap labour from Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso to agricultural plantations 
owned by local elites in Cote d'ivoire and Senegal. 
6 Charles Oman, Globalisation and Regionalisation: The Challenge for 
Developing Countries, OECD, 1994, pp. 40-41. 
7 Joan E. Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 2nd edition 
New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981, p. 2. 
8 Nicholas van de Walle, "Globalisation and African Democracy". 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Montek Ahluwalia, op. cit, p. 39. 
12 See Philip G. Cerny, "Paradoxes of the Competition State: The dynamics of 
Political Globalisation", Government and Opposition, Vol. 32, No. 2, Spring 
1997, pp. 251-254. See also, Alan Tonelson, "Globalization: The Great 
American Non-Debate", Current History, Vol. 96, No. 613, November 1997, 
p. 355. 
13 David, H. (1997). "Democracy and Globalisation", Global Governance, 3, 
pp. 251-267. 
14 Marcia Rivera sees neo-Iiberalism as globalisation's theoretical base, while 
the spread of democratic ethos, the fall of dictators in Africa and Latin 
America as well as the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
served as political impetus. See her "Gender Perspectives on Globalisation 
and Technological Change", in Pierre Fruhling {ed.) International Solidarity 
and Globalisation: In search of New Strategies, Stockholm, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1998, p. 72. 
15 Susan Strange, "The Erosion of the State", Current History, Vol. 96, No. 613,
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation I A3 
p. 367. 
16 Philip G. Cerny, 1997, op. cit., pp. 252-253. 
17 Barry Eichengreen, "The Tyranny of the Financial Markets", Current 
History, Vol. 96, No. 613, p. 377. 
18 Ibid., p. 253. 
19 Dot Keet, op. cit, p. 6. 
20 Prior to the meeting of the eight industrial nations in Denver in June 1997, 
President Bill Clinton noted that "protectionism is simply not an option 
because globalisation is irreversible". See Peter Beinart, "An illusion for our 
time: the false promises of globalisation", New Republic, Vol. 217, No. 16, 
October 20, 1997, p. 20. 
21 Philip G. Cerny, "Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of 
Political Globalization" Government and Opposition, Vol. 32, No. 2 Spring 
1997, pp. 255-256. 
22 Ibid, p. 260. 
23 Barry Eichengreen, op. cit., p. 377. 
24 Cited in Sidiqi Moin, "A Double-edged Sword: Negative effects of Globalisation 
on emerging Economies," African Business, 234 (July-August, 1998). 
25 Sachs, Jeffrey, "Interlocking Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalisation," 
Foreign Policy, 110 ( Spring, 1998), p. 102. 
26 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 269. 
27 Ibid, p. 267. 
28 James N. Rosenau, "The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalization," 
Current History, Vol. 96, No. 613, Nov. 1997, p. 362. 
29 Barry K. Gills, "Editorial: 'Globalization' and The 'Politics of Resistance," 
New Political Economy, lol.2(March 1997, p. 12. Cited in Rosenau, op. cit, 
p. 363. 
30 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy ofInternationl Relations, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 275. 
31 William Pfaff s comments on a seminar theme entitled "Economic Potential 
and Issues of Equality". See Pierre Fruhling op. cit, p. 57. 
32 See West Africa, March 5-11, 1990, p. 359. 
33 Alan Tonelson, "Globalisation: The Great American Non-Debate," Current 
History, Vol. 96, No. 613, November 1997, pp. 355-359. 
34 Nicholas van de Walle, op. cit, p. 4 
35 See Cerny, Philip G., "Globalisation and the changing logic of collective 
action" International Organisation, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn, 1995): 595- 
625. Similar or related position on the lost of political autonomy has been 
taken by other writers. See Blanca Heredia, "Prosper or Perish? Development 
in the Age of Global Capital," Current History, Vol. 96, No. 613, Nov.
144 Kwame Boafo-Arthur 
1997, pp. 383-388; David Held, Global Governance 3 (1997) pp. 251-267; 
36 See Browne, Robert S., "How Africa can prosper," World Policy Journal, 
Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall, 1994, p. 29. 
37 See the World Bank's Human Development Report, 1999, p. 96. 
38 See Thomas M. Callaghy, "Globalization and Marginalization: Debt and 
International Underclass". Current History, Vol. 96, No. 613, November 
1997, pp. 392-397. 
39 Kwamina Panford, Poor Economic Prospects and the Employment Crises in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, mimeo, 1998. 
40 Discussions of the causes of the failure of the other measures are beyond the 
scope of this paper. It suffices to state, however, that the earlier phases of 
globalisation were as much to be blamed as the domestic issues of dictatorship, 
political instability, poor execution of plans, and ever declining terms 
of trade for African primary exports. Poor terms of trade constrained most 
government in terms of revenue to execute development plans. Coupled with 
the oil price hikes of the early and late 1970s, most African non-oil producing 
countries had no alternative but to borrow at high interest rates on the 
international finance market thereby compounding their debt burdens. 
41 For instance, the history of the South Africa Customs Union (SACU) goes 
as far back as 1889. The Cape Colony and the Orange Free State formed a 
customs union which was later joined by Basutoland (now Lesotho), and 
Bechuanaland (Botswana) in 1891 and 1893 respectively. In 1889, the South 
Africa Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State also formed a free 
trade area. Swaziland joined in 1894. With the formation of the Union of 
South Africa in 1910 SACU came into existence with Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland (BLS) being the other members. South West Africa (present day 
Namibia) was made a member in 1915. 
42 There are several smaller integrative groups. West Africa alone has not less 
than thirty integrative units. 
43 The PTA for Eastern and Southern African States was the predecessor of 
COMES A. Leaders of Southern and Eastern Africa decided to transform the 
PTA into COMESA in 1993, and COMESA was officially inaugurated in 
December 1994. 
44 Michael Niemann, "Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: Strategies for 
the \990s,"TheJournalofAfricanPolicyStudies,Vo\. l,No. 1,1995, p. 141. 
45 For details on the performance of the various sub-regional economic integration 
groups, see Fredrik Soderbaum, Handbook of Regional Organizations 
in Africa, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikaininstitutet, 1996. 
46 John Whalley, "Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?", in 
Jeffrey A. Frankel (ed.), The Regionalization of the World Economy, Chicago, 
The University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 72.
Trapped in Development Crisis and Balkanisation 145 
47 Yasutami Shimomura's comments on the economic potential and Issues of 
Equality during the 1997 Stockholm Conference on International Solidarity 
and Globalisation. 
48 Blade Nzimade, "Towards Global Solidarity and Alliances in the Era of 
Globalisation", in Pierre Fuhrling, op. cit., p. 130. 
49 See Peter Beinart op. cit., pp. 20-25. 
50 Robert S. Browne, "How Africa can Prosper", World Policy Journal, Vol. 
11, No. 3 (Fall, 1994) p. 1. 
51 Beinart, op. cit., p. 22. 
52 World Bank, Human Development Report, 1999, p. 88. But the Bank in its 
1999 Human Development Report stressed the need for countries to 
provide indigenous enterprises with the necessary incentives and protect 
their interests. 
53 BBC World News, 1 lth March, 1999. 
54 Dot Keet, op. cit, p. 8. 
55 Yash Tandon, "Global Issues and Africa's Marginalisation". Presentation at 
the Canberra African Studies Conference, 1997, pp. 4-5. 
56 Yash Tandon, 1997, p. 1. 
57 Cited in Kwesi Anyemedu, "The Economic Policies of the PNDC," in E. 
Gyimah-Boadi (ed\), Ghana Under PNDC Rule, CODESRIA, 1992. 
58 See Barry G. Gills, "Editorial: 'Globalisation' and the 'Politics of Resistance'," 
New Political Economy, March 7, 1997. 
59 Dot Keet, op. cit., p. 33. 
60 Cited in Alan Tonelson, op. cit., p. 355. 
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