Afr.j. polit. sci. (2000), Vol. 5 No. 1, 105-123 
Human Rights and The African 
Renaissance 
Kenneth Asatnoa Acheampong* 
Abstract 
This article examines the idea of African renaissance in relation to the 
teaching of human rights in African schools. It explores the connection 
between the African Renaissance and human rights, and whether there is a 
specific African concept of human rights. In the light of these discussions, the 
article sketches a perspective that should underpin the teaching of human 
rights a task that the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981 
obligates its States Parties to undertake. 
Introduction 
The 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
presents Africa with the opportunity to soberly reflect on the concept of human 
rights as it relates to national development and the protection of the basic rights 
of citizens either as individuals, or as members of a social group. Article 2( 1 )(e) 
of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 1963 imposes on its 
members the need "to promote international co-operation, having due regard to 
the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights." This provision was reiterated in the preamble of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981. Article 45 of the African Charter, which 
spells out the mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, obliges the Commission to, inter alia: 
collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems 
in the field of human and peoples' rights, organize seminars, symposia 
and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local 
institutions concerned with human and peoples' rights, and should the 
1027-0353 © 2000 African Association of Political Science
106 Kenneth Asamoa Acheampong 
case arise, give its views or make recommendations to Governments 
(1981: article 4.5.1.a). 
It is in this context that the Commission has recommended to States Parties to 
the African Charter that they should integrate human rights into the teaching 
curriculum of schools at all levels. This paper is about the need to teach human 
rights in schools. The subject is examined in the context of current debates on the 
African Renaissance, and in the framework of the following questions: (i) What 
is African Renaissance? (ii) Is there any connection between African Renaissance 
and human rights? (iii) Is there a specific African concept of human rights? 
(iv) In the light of discussions regarding issues (i), (ii), and (iii) above, what 
should be the content of the teaching curriculum on human rights in Africa? I 
consider this approach to be germane not only to the teaching of human rights in 
Africa but also to the realisation of the duty assumed by African States, in the last 
paragraph of the African Charter on Human & Peoples' Rights, "to promote and 
protect human and peoples' rights and freedoms taking into account the importance 
traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa." 
The African Renaissance 
The following discussion is based on the assumption that human rights can be 
taught in the context of the African Renaissance. The notion of African Renaissance 
has become extremely controversial. Some analysts regard it as a fanciful 
idea while conceding that it is quite popular, comparing it rather satirically to the 
story of the Emperor's New Clothes. According to Ronge, for example, 
We South Africans have seen many a version of the Emperor's New 
Clothes pass along the ramps of political fashion. They have had a variety 
of names and huge crowds have admired them but, as in the famous story, 
they have all turned out to be illusions of one kind or another. 
The latest of these invisible suits, one being worn with increasing 
frequency by politicians and media gurus, is the so-called "African 
Renaissance" and I have learned that it is a risky thing to admit that you 
can't see it. That's one of the reasons it has become so very chic. If you 
can see it, it makes you part of a visionary African inner circle those who 
have been blessed with an almost mystic perception of a new dawning of 
Africanness. Not to see it makes you an outsider ... when I ask people 
about it, they say: "If you can't see it, then you are not a real African and 
probably don't really belong here" (Ronge, 1997: 8). 
Clearly exasperated by the efforts in some circles to link the African Renais-
Teaching Human Rights in the Context of the African Renaissance 107 
sance with the future of Africa, Jonathan Moyo contends that "Stripped of the 
feel-good pretences about the destiny of Africans beyond their ill-fated past, 
prevailing notions of the African Renaissance are no more than [a] little political 
nonsense" (1998: 9). To him, "One of the major reasons why this alleged 
renaissance has acquired the status of political nonsense is that, it is now a 
catchall phrase full of promise without signifying anything important or new" 
(1998:9). Though Moyo characterizes as "manifestly vacuous and misleading" 
pronouncements about the African Renaissance, which are rooted in South 
Africa's experience, he nevertheless concedes "the possibility of an African 
renaissance" which contains some potential as a prospective political device for 
positive social mobilization and cultural revival in the new Africa" (1998:11). 
Whether or not one agrees with Moyo that "South Africa is not Africa and 
Africa is not South Africa" and that "the new South Africa is a result of the 
African renaissance and not a prime mover" (1998:10),1 it is true that the current 
debate about African Renaissance has been initiated in South Africa with the 
principal exponent being its President Thabo Mbeki. It is equally true that the 
discourse on African Renaissance has so far lacked specificity. There has been 
deliberate attempts "to conflate South African interests with the African agenda" 
and, in the process, distort the debate on the new Africa (Moyo, 1998:10).2 It has 
even been argued that South Africa cannot claim to "lead an African Renaissance, 
it cannot: indeed, it dare not" (Vale and Maseko, 1998: 283). 
There is also the politically sensitive issue of who is an African. Consider 
Thabo Mbeki's unequivocal assertion "I am an African", made in South Africa's 
Constitutional Assembly as that country sought to find a proper constitutional 
grounding for the new political dispensation.3 And relate it to the retort by F.W. 
de Klerk (former President of South Africa), soon after Mbeki's speech, that "I 
am also an African", as well as the claim by the Freedom Front's Constand 
Viljoen4 who, in the same context, also claimed to be an African. From a legal 
perspective, an African is any person deemed as such by the citizenship laws of 
an African country. For our purposes, however, we go beyond this legalistic 
perception of an African. We would also regard as Africans all peoples of African 
descent who, for one reason or another, find themselves in the African Diaspora 
and who may be emotionally and culturally attuned to the hopes and aspirations 
of Africa as outlined in, for example, such documents as the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity, 1963, and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, 1981. An inclusive definition of the African identity is 
important because an African "... identity is still in the making. There isn't a 
final identity that is African. But, at the same time, there is an identity coming 
into existence. And it has a certain context and a certain meaning" (Appiah 
1992: 117). 
In spite of his profound scepticism about this notion, Ronge still contends that
108 Kenneth Asamoa Acheampong 
"One definition which seems workable is that it (African Renaissance) is the 
rediscovery of Africanness at a moment when, for the first time, Africa is free 
from domination by alien cultures" (1997: 8). Moyo for his part provides the 
following six defining characteristics of the African Renaissance: 
• That Pan-African political independence has now been achieved. 
• That the majority of African governments are now democratic. 
• That African governments are now running liberalized market driven 
• That many African governments now enjoy considerable autonomy in the 
• That there is now a new breed of African leaders in countries like Democratic 
• That the end of the Cold War has made globalization possible with the result 
economies. 
formulation of their foreign policy. 
Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ghana, South Africa and Uganda. 
of new trade and investment opportunities for Africa (1998: 11). 
Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko, on the other hand, posit an Africanist interpretation 
that "uses the African Renaissance to unlock a series of complex social 
constructions around African identity" (Vale and Maseko, 1998: 278). They 
imply that the African Renaissance must be nurtured in an African environment 
and not in an externally engineered environment propelled by a globalisation 
which has room for Africa only as long as Africa provides a ready market for all 
kinds of foreign goods, services, ideas and expertise. The argument here is not 
that Africa, like the proverbial ostrich, can avoid the negative aspects of 
globalization. Rather, it is that Africa should nudge itself out of its political, 
economic, social and cultural slumber and engage globalization in such a manner 
as to secure the best interest of the overwhelming majority of Africans. This, in 
their view, must be distinguished from the call for Africa's rebirth in the classical 
meaning of renaissance (Kirkpatrick, 1983: 1095). It is a spirit of awakening. 
According to them, 
In drawing upon the distinctive image of Renaissance, the intention seems 
not to pronounce or deliberately proclaim a renewal; to do this would be 
plainly absurd. The resonance of the term 'Renaissance,' however, is 
patent: an 'outburst of mental energy' (Rowland, 1997:30) to promote a 
spirit of awakening in Africa in the late twentieth century (Vale and 
Maseko, 1998: 278). 
It is this spirit of awakening in Africa which undergirds the issues discussed 
here.
Teaching Human Rights in the Context of the African Renaissance 109 
The African Renaissance and Human Rights 
On 10 December 1998, the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948, the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, 
stated: 
Today, we honor the highest of human aspirations and renew our promise 
to conquer the worst of human cruelty. We pay tribute to the minds of 
those who conceived of these human rights, and to the memory of those 
who died for them.5 
He was paying tribute to the statesmen whose endeavours gave dynamism to 
the freedoms that formed the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter in 
1945. The preamble to this historic document states: "... THE PEOPLES OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS, DETERMINED ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights 
of men and women and of nations large and small..." The horrors committed by 
the Axis Powers, against human kind had made this commitment a historic 
responsibility. Hence the United Nations Charter makes reference to "human 
rights " and "fundamental rights".6 
The United Nations defines human rights, as follows: "Human rights could be 
generally defined as those rights which are inherent in our nature and without 
which we cannot live as human beings" (UN1987: 4). Shridath Ramphal, a 
former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, gives an expanded description 
of human rights in the following terms: 
Human rights are as old as human society itself, for they derive from every 
person's need to realise his essential humanity. They are not ephemeral, 
not alterable with time and place and circumstance. They are not the 
product of philosophical whim or political fashion. They have their origin 
in the fact of the human condition; and because they have, they are 
fundamental and inalienable. More specifically, they are not conferred by 
constitutions, conventions or governments. These are the instruments, 
the testaments, of their recognition; they are important, sometimes 
essential, elements of the machinery for their protection and enforcement; 
but they do not give rise to them. They were born not of man, but with man 
(1981: 10). 
Such definitions of human rights, though useful, have not ended the controversy 
over the term, which has centred mainly on the content and prioritization of 
rights.7 The confrontation between the West and the East, during the Cold War 
era, exacerbated this controversy over human rights issues, which ultimately
110 Kenneth Asamoa Acheampong 
produced two UN convenants, viz., the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966. 
The controversy notwithstanding, the Member States of the United Nations 
have pledged themselves, in accordance with articles 55 and 56 of the United 
Nations Charter, to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the United 
Nations for the achievement of "Universal respect for, and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion." The International Bill of Human Rights constitutes the 
foundation of the norms which are internationally accepted as the bedrock of the 
protection of human rights. This Bill comprises: (i) the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948; (ii) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 1966; (iii) the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966; (iv) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966; and (v) the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty, 1989. All other human rights instruments of the United Nations take 
their roots from these documents. The rights embodied in them are enjoyed on 
the basis of equality and non-discrimination and not on the accident of birth or 
life's circumstances.8 They enure to human beings both in their individual 
capacities and as members of social groups or collectivities. 
Furthermore, there is consensus at the international level concerning the 
expectations aroused, and the demands made in the name of human rights 
(Wilson, Jnr., 1978:61 and McKay, 1978:70).Forexample,onthebasisofthe 
principles of the universality of human rights, interdependence of human rights 
and interrelatedness of human rights, norms of human rights are deemed to be 
composite and mutually reinforcing. Mainly because of philosophical and 
ideological differences, however, human rights have been and remain categorized 
as (i) civil and political rights, (ii) economic, social and cultural rights, 
and (iii) solidarity rights. Civil and political rights include the right to freedom 
of speech or expression, the right to freedom of movement, the right to peaceful 
assembly and association and the right to a fair trial. Included in economic, 
social and cultural rights (the so-called second generation human rights in 
contrast to the civil and political rights which are labelled first generation 
human rights) are the right to work, the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of oneself and one's family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care, the right to education, and the right to 
participate freely in the cultural life of one's community. The solidarity 
rights (which are known as third generation human rights) include the right 
to peace, the right to a healthy environment, the right to the common heritage 
of mankind and the right to development.
Teaching Human Rights in the Context of the African Renaissance 111 
It has been contended that from South Africa's standpoint: 
... the visionary language of the African Renaissance was underscored by 
five suggested areas of engagement: the encouragement of cultural 
exchange; the emancipation of the African woman from patriarchy; the 
mobilization of youth; the broadening, deepening and sustenance of 
democracy; and the initiation of sustainable economic development (Vale 
and Maseko, 1998: 274). 
These issues, coupled with Moyo's six defining characteristics of the African 
Renaissance outlined above, provide a strong nexus between African Renaissance 
and human rights. If nothing at all, the emphasis on democracy or 
democratic governance necessarily invokes, in tandem, the idea of human rights. 
Even though democracy is as popular as human rights, it has not always been 
welcome; in the past, it had been actively resisted by classes that felt threatened 
by it. Among such classes were feudal orders, rule-by-divine-right advocates, as 
well as aristocratic and absolutist monarchies. In recent history, Nazi and other 
fascist regimes have derided and denounced democracy as nothing short of 
"anarchy", "democrazy" or "massocracy" (Gitonga, 1988: 5). Today, African 
countries, like their counterparts in other parts of the south are experiencing the 
third wave of democratic rebirth. 
The current popularity of democracy does not in any way translate into a 
universal agreement as to what democracy means. There is, however, a general 
perception that democracy is rooted in the principle of popular sovereignty by 
which the citizenry is the ultimate repository of all state authority. Hence, the 
exercise of any such authority, whether executive, legislative or judicial, is 
considered to be democratic only if it is derived from the free will of the citizenry. 
The human rights dimension of democracy emanates from article 21(3) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, which stipulates: 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; 
this will shall be expressed in periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures. 
Clearly, elections constitute a major mechanism by which popular sovereignty 
is secured. But elections are meaningful only if certain basic human rights are 
guaranteed. These include the right to vote; the right to take part in the 
government of one's country directly or through freely chosen representatives; 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association; the right to freedom of thought and
112 Kenneth Asamoa Acheampong 
conscience; the right to freedom of movement; and the right to liberty and 
security of person. 
Another aspect of democracy which underscores the link between human 
rights and democracy is developmental democracy which embodies participatory 
democracy. The latter is underpinned by popular participation. Developmental 
democracy posits that citizens should be allowed to formulate their own 
developmental goals and adopt plans by which they can realize such goals with 
the co-operation, but not the overwhelming and oppressive control, of the state. 
In 1990, the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphasized the mutually 
inclusive nature of developmental democracy and human rights when he stated: 
The concept of people's participation in their own development is 
enshrined in the principal documents of the United Nations. The Charter 
itself not only begins with the words "We the people of the United 
Nations", but also declares that they, the people, are determined among 
other things, "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women..." 
and "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom" (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1990: 6). 
The human rights instrument which stresses most the linkage between human 
rights, democracy and development is the Declaration on the Right to Development 
adopted by the United Nations' General Assembly in 1986. In article 1(1), 
this Declaration states the essence of the right to development as follows: 
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which 
every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute 
to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in 
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. 
Article 2(1) provides justification for this; namely, that "the human person is 
the central subject of development and should be the active participant and 
beneficiary of the right to development." The adverse effects of developmental 
dictatorship, which is the antithesis of developmental democracy, also bear out, 
though from a negative point of view, the symbiotic relationship between human 
rights and democracy. As noted by Gregor (1979: 96), "The hardships of 
developmental dictatorship are well known: liberty is suppressed; labour is 
regimented and exploited; freedom of movement is curtailed; personal choice is 
severely restricted". 
In his address to the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, 
Austria, in June 1993, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, then Secretary-General of the
Teaching Human Rights in the Context of the African Renaissance 113 
United Nations, opined that "the imperative of democracy" was what was truly 
at stake as the world neared the end of the century. After emphasizing that 
individual rights and collective rights could be reconciled only through democracy, 
he expatiated on "the imperative of democratization" as follows: 
The imperative of democratization is the last- and surely the most 
important - rule of conduct which should guide our work. There is a 
growing awareness of this imperative within the international community. 
The process of democratization cannot be separated, in my view, 
from the protection of human rights. More precisely, democracy is the 
political framework in which human rights can best be safeguarded. 
This is not merely a statement of principle, far less a concession to a 
fashion of the moment, but the realization that democracy is the political 
system which best allows for the free exercise of individual rights. It is not 
possible to separate the United Nations promotion of human rights from 
the establishment of democratic systems within the international community 
(United Nations, 1995: 446). 
A democratic system is an imperative also for the emancipation of the African 
woman from patriarchy, which we consider as an aspect of the African Renaissance. 
Generally, patriarchy in Africa is inimical to women's enjoyment of the 
benefits of the principles of human rights. It encourages the unfettered display 
of male chauvinism under the guise of customary protection. Consider, for 
example, the fact that a woman, subject to customary law in Lesotho's patriarchal 
society (and the overwhelming majority of women are) is a legal minor with no 
locus standi injudicio. She, therefore, has to be under the guardianship of one 
male or another in her life. As observed by an International Labour Organization's 
multidisciplinary mission to Lesotho: 
Under customary law, a woman is a perpetual minor usually under the 
guardianship of her father or oldest member of her family, her husband 
upon marriage and under her eldest son or a male customary heir upon the 
death of her husband ... The status of a single woman above twenty-one 
years may be redeemed if she can satisfy the "life-style test," indicating 
that she has adopted a modern way of life and is therefore emancipated. 
For the majority of women, however, particularly those in the rural areas, 
they are usually not emancipated and are therefore perpetual minors 
(International Labour Organization, 1994:45, 46). 
Women under such patriarchical system, virtually cease to be bearers of
114 Kenneth Asamoa Acheampong 
human rights. They have no legal capacity to contract unless assisted by a 
husband or guardian. This becomes evident when the customary law woman 
needs bank credit, or wants to acquire property.9 Male protection or guardianship 
is also a sine qua non when this woman wants to enter into employment contracts. 
The 1993 Constitution of Lesotho, underpins this state of affairs by stipulating, 
in section 18(4)(c), that no law is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect if 
it makes provision for the application of customary law with respect to any matter 
in the case of persons who, under law, are subject to that law. This constitutional 
provision offends both the letter and spirit of the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, which 
Lesotho ratified on 22 August 1995 (Acheampong, 1993:79-105). The Convention 
mandates, in article 15(1), that "States Parties shall accord to women 
equality before the law". It stipulates further, in article 15(2), that "States Parties 
shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men 
and the same opportunities to to exerecise that capacity". In the latter Article the 
Convention enjoins States Parties to "give women equal rights to conclude 
contracts and to administer property". This injunction is undergirded by the 
provision in Article 15(3) of the Convention that"... all contracts and all other 
private instruments of any kind with a legal efect which is directed at restricting 
the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void". 
The African Renaissance is yoked to respect for human rights. No awakening 
of the African spirit can dispense with the demands it makes. It affirms the need 
to uphold democracy and respect for the fundamental rights of the citizen. Vale 
and Maseko sum it up as the 
... more creative ideas that have also filled, as it were, the empty policy 
vessel represented by the African Renaissance. South Africa's government 
is committed to the development of democracy in Africa; indeed, 
Mbeki's statements on the "African Renaissance" have insistd that "the 
people must govern" and Mandela has been vocal on the need to protect 
hman rights on the continent (Vale and Maseko, 1998: 277). 
An African Concept of Human Rights 
Philosophical discourse on human rights is dominated by Western conceptions 
of human rights. This, more than anything else, makes the analyses of the concept 
of human rights in the African context imperative and such analysis should take 
account of western philosophy. 
Natural law and natural rights theories and legal positivism have had a lot to 
do with western discourses on human rights. To the natural law school of 
thought, human rights emanate from natural law, or the laws of nature, which 
spring from divine will or metaphysical absolutes and confer certain rights upon
Teaching Human Rights in the Context of the African Renaissance 115 
individual human beings by virtue of their nature as humans. According to this 
school, any positive law, whether municipal or international, must be subordinated 
to natural law, which is characterised as everlasting, universal in its 
application and constant or unchanging. "Legal positivism has nothing complimentary 
to say about this conception of law and rights. To positivists, the 
discourse on rights is meaningful only if what is deemed to be a right is 
positivised, i.e., set down or enshrined in a legal system, and is enforceable. 
Thus, the only rights one can talk of are positive rights and not natural rights 
which, the positivists contend, exist only in positive morality. The most derisive 
description of natural law and natural rights is generally ascribed to the staunch 
legal positivist Jeremy Bentham. After decrying as "terrorist language" the 
natural law school's characterisation of natural rights as imprescriptible or 
inalienable, he disparaged natural law and natural rights as follows: 
Right is the child of law; from real laws come real rights, but from 
imaginary laws, from 'laws of nature' come imaginary rights... Natural 
rights is simple nonsense, natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical 
nonsense (Bentham 1970: 32). 
Marxist-Leninist conceptions of human rights have, likewise, not been kind to 
natural law and natural rights. According to Kartashkin: 
The Marxist-Leninist theory deduces human rights not from the 'nature' 
of man but from the position of an individual in the society and, above all, 
in the process of public production (Kartashkin 1982: 631). 
Proceeding from its firm belief that rights are not inherent in the nature of man 
and do not constitute some sort of natural attributes, Marxism-Leninism argues 
that human rights, like all other rights of human beings, emanate from the 
material conditions of life, and not from any universal and metaphysical law. 
In spite of such persuasive criticisms, natural law theory has continued to 
enjoy some appeal in human rights discourse. This is principally the result of the 
deficiencies of positivism and Marxism, the two main detractors of the natural 
law theory and the natural rights doctrine. As Shaw contends, 
Positivism as a theory emphasized the authority of the State and as such 
left little place for rights in the legal system other than specific rights 
emanating from the constitutional structure of that system, while the 
Marxist doctrine, although based upon the existence of certain immutable 
historical laws governing the development of society, nevertheless denied 
the existence of rights outside the framework of the legal order 
(1986: 172-173).
116 Kenneth Asamoa Acheampong 
What this means in human rights terms is that formal rules of a legal system 
do not, necessarily guarantee human dignity as was the case in apartheid South 
Africa and Nazi Germany. Equally relevant, in this context, is the infamous 
American case Dred Scott v Sanford11 in which the American Supreme Court 
upheld the traditional legal concepts which did not recognize Americans of 
African origin as bearers of rights, and determined that such a view "was fixed 
and universal".12 The same Court in its so called separate-but-equal doctrine in 
the case of Plessy v Ferguson," 
also sanctified racial segregation and Jim Crow laws which did not treat 
African-Americans with the same concern and respect as white Americans. 
After this judgment, it took African-Americans almost seventy 
years of struggle for civil rights before the Civil Rights Act, 1964, which 
recognised their civil rights, was passed by the American Congress and 
signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson. 
This analysis dovetails into what we consider to be the major context of human 
rights discourse in Africa, i.e., the historical context which bears out the struggles 
of Africans to be free from the tentacles of colonialism, imperialism, apartheid 
and dictatorship. The right to self-determination, by virtue of which all peoples 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development is crucial in this regard. This is what Shivji (1989: 58) 
calls "the central right" for Africans. But when European powers met at the 
Berlin Conference of 1884/5 to partition the African continent among themselves, 
they obviously did not, consider Africans as deserving of such a right. 
Nonetheless, the right to self-determination has been the primary force driving 
the struggles to emancipate the continent from colonialism, imperialism, apartheid 
and dictatorship. The right to self-dedermination is central to human rights 
struggles in Africa and therefore requires elaboration. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, 
the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, stressed this historical 
context of human rights when, at the opening of the World Conference on Human 
Rights held in Vienna in 1993, he declared: 
Human rights should be viewed not only as the absolute yardstick which 
they are, but also as a synthesis resulting from a long historical process. 
As an absolute yardstick, human rights constitute the common language 
of humanity. Adopting this language allows all peoples to understand 
others and to be the authors of their own history. Human rights, by 
definition, are the ultimate norms of all politics. 
As an historical synthesis, human rights are, in their essence, in constant
Teaching Human Rights in the Context of the African Renaissance 117 
movement. By that I mean that human rights have a dual nature. They 
should express absolute, timeless injunctions, yet simultaneously reflect 
a moment in the development of history. Human rights are both absolute 
and historically defined (United Nations, 1995: 442). 
The idea of peoples' rights advanced by the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, 1981 defines an African concept of human rights. The recognition 
given to peoples' rights in the African Charter not only distinguishes this 
Charter from other regional human rights treaties, but also highlights the 
historical struggles of African peoples to resist domination and exploitation and 
achieve political emancipation as well as economic and social justice. This is 
summarised in the preamble to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, which declares that "freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential 
objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African 
peoples." It also undergirds the reaffirmation made in the preamble of the same 
Charter of "the pledge they (i.e., States Parties to the Charter) solemnly made in 
article 2 of the said Charter (the Charter of the Organization of African Unity) 
to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify 
their efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa ..." Hence, in its 
Article 19, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights stipulates that 
"All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the 
same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of apeople by another." Article 
20 expatiates this in its sub-Article (1) by asserting: "All peoples shall have the 
right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to 
self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall 
pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have 
freely chosen." The teaching of human rights should be situated in this history 
and vision which are embodied in the African Renaissance. 
The Teaching of Human Rights in Africa 
The teaching of human rights in Africa should take into account the recognition 
given by States Parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
"that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings, which 
justifies their national and international protection and ... that the reality and 
respect of peoples' rights should necessarily guarantee human rights" (1981: 
Preamble). As discussed earlier, the idea of peoples' rights gives an African 
content to human rights: it brings to the fore the struggles of African peoples to 
liberate themselves from foreign domination and political, economic, social and 
cultural exploitation. This affirmation that human rights stem from the attributes 
of human beings should also assist us to properly focus the teaching of human 
rights in the context of the African Renaissance. As noted by the United Nations:
118 Kenneth Asamoa Acheampong 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms allow us to fully develop and use 
our human qualities, our intelligence, our talents and our conscience and to 
satisfy our spiritual and other needs. They are based on mankind's increasing 
demand for a life in which the inherent dignity and worth of each human 
being will receive respect and protection (1987: 4). 
The preamble to the 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights also 
affirm that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world". Furthermore, "these rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person". Denying any person his or her basic rights will, 
thus be tantamount to the loss of human dignity, which is the common denominator 
underpinning a person's rights; viz., respect, power, enlightenment, health, 
well-being, skill, affection and rectitude (Shaw, 1986: 173). Admittedly in 
certain limited circumstances human rights may be limited or suspended to 
secure due recognition of the rights of others and to meet the just requirements 
of the welfare of the community at large. But in recognition of the need to 
safeguard human diginity, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966), makes provision for non-defeasible rights such as the right to life 
(Article 6), the right to freedom from torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (Article 7), the right to freedom from slavery and 
servitude (Article 8) and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(Article 18). 
Rights are meaningful only if the supposed bearers are aware that they possess 
such rights. That is why the teaching of human rights in Africa should stress the 
duty imposed by the said Charter upon States "to promote and ensure, through 
teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms 
contained in the... Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well 
as corresponding duties are understood" (1981: article 25). Equally important is 
the stress of the African Charter that States Parties "have the duty to guarantee 
the independence of the Courts" and "allow the establishment and improvement 
of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection 
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ... Charter" (1981: Article 26). If 
human rights is to be more than mere rhetoric and the legal maxim ubijus ibi 
remedium1* is to bear any meaning, then governments and citizens must appreciate 
it arfd uphold the independence of the juidiciary and national human rights 
institutions such as the Ombudsman for the effective protection of human rights 
and the maintenance of the democratic environment. On the premise that African 
traditions do not perceive the individual as isolated from community, the 
teaching of human rights in the context of the African Renaissance should also 
focus on the African Charter's mandate that the individual shall have duties
Teaching Human Rights in the Context of the African Renaissance 119 
towards his family and society. In this respect, it is worth noting that it is not only 
Africans who assert that groups have human rights and that in certain situations, 
e.g. when genocide is being perpetrated, the individual's rights - including the 
right to life, the fulcrum of all other rights - become meaningful only when the 
rights of the group of which he is a member are protected.15 Briefly stated, the 
teaching of human rights in the context of the African Renaissance should focus 
on the individual. But the rights of the group should remain an integral part of the 
rights of the individual. 
Conclusion 
Through the idea of African Renaissance, which is steadily growing in popularity, 
Africa is seeking to awaken itself to meet the challenges posed by its 
developmental needs as the 21st century and the new millennium unfold. 
Africa's renaissance would reach fruition only if it is situated in the protection 
and enrichment of the rights of the people. The teaching of human rights in 
Africa's educational institutions should also take account of the imperative of the 
continent's renaisance. It should also aim at casting aside the cloak of national 
sovereignty behind which governments have committed serious crimes against 
their people. International peace and security demands respect for human rights. 
In the light of the genocide in Rwanda and wanton human rights abuses occuring 
elsewhere on the continent, the OAU must provide examplary leadership in 
finally burying the principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of 
States", which was enshrined in the OAU Charter (1963 Article III.2). It is under 
the cover of this principle that many atrocities have been committed. 
Notes 
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, National University of Lesotho, Roma, 
Lesotho. 
1. Moyo further contends that "To ignore this reality and pretend that the 
African Renaissance started in 1994 (when apartheid formally ended) 
would amount to dishonest and dangerous wishful thinking" (1998: 10). 
2. To back this, Moyo gives an example of a tour of Asia by Mbeki in the 
course of which "His speeches there were underlined by platitudinous 
statements about the African renaissance, all of which were about South 
African commerce and industry, two pivotal areas that continue to be 
dominated by whites. But, even if whites did not dominate these areas, 
South Africa is not Africa and Africa is not South Africa" (1998: 10). 
3. Vide Debates of the Constitutional Assembly (South Africa), No. 1, 29 
March - 8 May 1996, cols. 422-427. 
4. The "Freedom Front" is a political party in South Africa. Constand Viljoen, 
a former General in the South African army, is its leader.
120 Kenneth Asamoa Acheampong 
5. Quoted in The Associated Press (1998), "Countries with poor human rights 
records defend themselves at UN", The Associated Press, December 11. 
6. For specific references to these expressions in the UN Charter, see the 
following provisions ofthe Charter: preamble; article l(3);article 13(l)(b); 
article 55; article 62; article 68 and article 76. 
7. To appreciate this controversy, vide, e.g.: (i) Cranston, M. (1967), "Human 
Rights, Real and Supposed," in D.D. Raphael, (ed.), Political Theory and 
the Rights of Man (London: MacMillan); A. Gewirth, (1984), "The Epistemology 
of Human Rights", in P. Frankel, et. al. (eds.), Human Rights 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell); and T. Campbell, et. al. (eds.) (1986), Human 
Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality (New York: Blackwell). 
8. The fundamental human rights principle of equality and non-discrimination 
does not mandate sameness of treatment of all persons at all times. It 
provides for both formal, absolute, or mathematical equality (i.e., sameness 
of treatment) and relative equality (i.e., differential treatment). Vide 
Warwick, M. (1983), Equality and Discrimination Under International 
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press); and The dissenting judgment of Judge 
Tanaka in the South-West Africa Cases (2nd Phase), 1966, International 
Court of Justice. 
9. The ILO mission did, however, note an exception to this legal limitation in 
"a 1977 Order which allows a married woman to open a bank account at 
Lesotho Bank in terms of Lesotho National Development and Savings 
Order of 1971 (which created Lesotho Bank). It expressly states that a 
married woman whether under marital power or not, may be a depositor in 
the savings bank and may without assistance execute all necessary documents 
and give all necessary acquittance and be liable to all obligations 
attached to depositors. Credit, however, is still restricted." (International 
Labour Organization, 1994:46). 
10. Vide, generally, Castberg, F. (1968), "Natural Law and Human Rights: An 
Idea-Historical Survey", in Eide, A. and Schou, A. (eds.), International 
Protection of Human Rights (Nobel Symposium, 7th Oslo, 1967) (New 
York: Interscience Publishers). 
11. 60 US 393 (1857). 
12. Ibid., at 407. 
13. 163 US 537 (1896). 
14. The expression literally means where there is a right, there is a remedy. 
15. According to article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948: 
... genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
Teaching Human Rights in the Context of the African Renaissance 121 
group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group." (italics added). 
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