Afr.j. polit. sci. (2000), Vol. 5 No. 1, 1-13 
The Globalisation of Political Science: 
An African Perspective* 
Presidential Address, June 22,1999 
L. Adele Jinadu" 
Abstract 
Globalised political science, including its professionalisation, is part of the 
cultural superstructure facilitating Western hegemony. It functions under the 
guise of universal science, with serious implications for knowledge production in 
and about Africa, especially African politics. During this period of liberal 
triumphalism, it has undergone a paradigmatic shift in its application to African 
politics, emphasising institutional reform as a pre-requisitefor democratic transition, 
thereby exposing its limitations. It conflates the problem of democracy with 
institutional reform; it is unable to account for the role of various social forces in 
securing the current transition to democracy; and it is unable to relate the problem 
of democracy to the problem of underdevelopment in Africa. 
The end of the cold war, as well as profound changes in the world economy and in 
inter-state relations brought about by the technological and informatics revolution 
of the post World War II period, have given rise to a new interest in globalisation 
as a process which, by definition, creates relationships and networks that necessarily 
cut across national boundaries. Globalisation as a contemporary process that 
has created, or is creating, the so-called new world order might be regarded in 
positive or negative terms. It can be viewed positively from a neo-classical or neoliberal 
perspective as the triumph of political liberalism and the unfettered play of 
market forces. Further it may be regarded as likely to strengthen the economic and 
socio-cultural basis for the unity of mankind by offering fresh possibilities for 
1027-0353 © 2000 African Association of Political Science
2 L Adele Jinadu 
"new partnerships" in the new world order. But it can also be viewed negatively 
from a Marxist perspective. On such a view, it is a new form of imperialism, 
heralding a New Age of Imperialism in which national, regional and global 
asymmetries, characterised by social injustice and unequal exchange are much 
more pronounced and pernicious than was the case before. 
Whichever way one views it, the character of previous as well as contemporary 
processes of globalisation, almost by definition, involves the diffusion or 
"transnationalisation" of capital and of the dominant ideas of social and cultural 
organisation that undergird and propel it to other societies from the "most 
advancing society" (Lewis Peuer, 1986: 3). 
II 
I am interested in this chapter to explore one contemporary aspect of this 
diffusionist theory of globalisation in its neo-classical or neo-liberal formulation. 
I focus on the globalisation of political science, including its professionalisation, 
as a knowledge-based activity since the end of the second world war. More 
specifically, I want to speculate about the consequences or implications of the 
application or diffusion or export of this globalised political science to Africa. 
My concern includes the following. How, given the economic and social or 
cultural context of contemporary globalisation and the neo-liberal claims about 
emerging "new partnerships" in the world order, can globalised political science 
advance our knowledge and understanding of African politics? How well has it 
done this, or how better can it or should it do this? 
ni 
But first, there is need to develop the notion of a globalised political science and 
the concept of "new partnerships". I begin from the assumption that concretely the 
reference to globalised political science, including the primary source of its 
specific diffusion to Africa and indeed, to other parts of the world, including 
Canada and Europe, is mainstream political science as it has evolved and developed 
in the United States of America. On this point, Erkki Berndtson [1991: 40] 
has argued that, 
partly due to the early institutionalisation, and partly because of the global 
hegemony of the United States after World War II, American political 
science has influenced the institutionalisation of political science around 
the world. 
Confirming this, Dag Anckar [ 1991: 189] has observed of the development of
The Globalisation of Political Science: An African Perspective 3 
political science in Western Europe and particularly in the Nordic countries that, 
although 
[the] scientific climate has become more pluralistic in terms of influences 
and dependencies ... the reliance on American traditions and conceptions 
still dominates the picture. 
To elaborate the notion of "mainstream political science," including the various 
trajectories of its evolution and development in the US, and of its export abroad, 
is beyond the scope of my concern here. Suffice it to say that the term "mainstream 
political science", as used here, refers to the dominant paradigms and trends in the 
study of the discipline in the United States. Globalised mainstream political 
science refers to the export or diffusion of this mainstream US political science to 
other parts of the world. The character of this globalised mainstream US political 
science has been well described, analysed and discussed by others, and need not 
be detailed here [see Crick, 1959; Easton, 1985; Finifter, 1983; Lepawsky, 1964; 
Ricci, 1984]. For my purpose here, however one feature of this globalised 
mainstream political science is the link as well as the antinomies between its 
scientific pretensions and its ideologised preference for and attachment to American 
liberal democracy [Gunnell, 1991: 24]. This globalised mainstream political 
science is a critical dimension of the cultural superstructure utilised as part of the 
wider strategic extension of the power of the US in the world. As Ake [ 1979:100] 
has argued, with respect to the theory of political development, typically, 
Western scholarship on Third World countries ... is an important tool for 
controlling Third World perceptions of their world and eventually Third 
World behaviour. 
Globalised mainstream political science necessarily serves this function under 
the guise of developing a universal, cross-cultural, cross-national, value-free 
"positivistic" political science. As Hyden [1989: 14] has pointed out, 
following the natural-science model, the principal preoccupation of social 
science research became the testing of rigorously formulated hypotheses as 
instrument of confirming lawlike generalizations about social behaviour 
and social processes... The globalization of American political science was 
the outcome of this process within the social sciences. The belief at the time 
was that with growing precision of language, cross-cultural explanatory 
generalizations were possible. 
However, it is in the sense of its structurally determined role in the consolidation
4 L. Adele Jinadu 
and extension of the extension of US power in the world that the post Second World 
War II interest of mainstream US political science with development theory, 
(variously subsumed under such subdisciplinary fields as political change, comparative 
public administration, political development or political modernisation) 
assumes significance as a form of cultural imperialism. 
IV 
The agencies and sources of this diffusion or intellectual dominance have included 
US-based or US-trained political scientists and other academics, US universities 
and research institutions, exchange programmes, professional networks of political 
scientists and other social scientists, and the philanthropic foundations like the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation.[see Stifel et al, 1982: 57-82]. 
What Dag Anckar [1991:189]has observed of Western Europe i s even much more 
true of Africa: 
The emergence of various exchange programmes, offering study scholarships 
in the US, was an important mechanism for conveying American 
influences to Europe and served to impress major theoretical and methodological 
innovations on a rising generation of European political scientists. 
Before I explore the implications of contemporary globalisation and the "new 
partnerships" expected to emerge from it for the study of African politics, let me 
set out two assumptions that have informed my approach to the problem. 
First, as it has generally been pointed out [Ake: 1979; Leys, 1997], development 
theory, with its focus on world capitalist-industrial development and its replication 
in "follower societies", provided the dominant paradigm used by mainstream US 
political science to study African politics in the immediate post-independence 
years in the 1960s. The assumptions about African politics which underlay 
development theory in the 1960's are still reflected in mainstream US political 
science in its current application to Africa. My second assumption is that globalised 
mainstream political science, based on a reconfigured concept of "new partnerships" 
in the context of contemporary globalisation, now needs to begin to look at 
African politics from theoretical perspectives other than those that have provided 
it with its paradigmatic liberal or neo-liberal theoretical or ideological foundations. 
"New partnerships" refers in a generalised sense to the opportunities for 
realignments in the nascent character or in the reconfiguration of global power 
relations and in the world system itself as a result of the end of the cold war and
The Globalisation of Political Science: An African Perspective 5 
structural changes in the world economy brought about by globalisation. These 
structural changes include the emergence of transnational corporations as major 
catalytic actors in the emergent world order, protected by and acting in most cases 
as surrogates for their home governments, and the extensive, virtually unhindered 
movement of monopoly capital across national boundaries. 
The ideological foundations for this contemporary phase of globalisation is neoliberalism 
in its emphasis on economic and political liberalisation and in its 
consequential rejection of social democracy and Keynesian state interventionism. 
This regnant neo-liberalism is at bottom a theory of world capitalist development. 
On the basis of this it has sought to define the parameters under which and within 
whose frameworks the new partnerships in the world are to be pursued. In this 
sense, therefore, the new globalisation, emerging out of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the cold war, both of which events or developments it 
presaged or facilitated, is a metaphor or euphemism for the triumphalist dominance 
of finance capital, under the leadership of the United States. 
It needs to be added here, parathentically, that in spite, of all the talk about the 
"end of history" [Fukuyama, 1992], the realignments arising from the new 
globalisation, for example, the hegemonic emergence of the United States, the 
expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the new European Union, the 
unification of Germany, projected reforms of the United Nations and the Bretton 
Woods institutions, the break up of the Soviet Union and the command economies 
of Eastern Europe, have all highlighted and made problematic the contradictions 
thrown up by this new process of globalisation. The undercurrents of these 
contradictions are much more structurally fundamental, reflecting the basic 
contradiction between capital and labour, than the effort to characterise them 
according to [Huntington, 1996] as arising out of the clash of civilisations and 
cultures, would suggest. 
VI 
How has globalised mainstream political science approached African politics in 
the wake of this triumphant neo-liberalism? To answer this question, it is necessary 
to return to the origins of development theory and of development or area studies 
in what has been described as Keynesian economics (Leys, 1996) and the post 
world war II "butskellist" consensus on the managed economy in Europe. Globalised 
mainstream political science drew substantially on and reflected the ideological 
concerns of the statist developmentalist model implicit in Keynesianism and the 
managed economy when it turned its searchlight to Africa in the period immediately 
before and after African independence in the 1960s. In doing this, globalised 
mainstream political science was understandably eclectic. As is shown in its 
application of development or modernisation theory to Africa, globalised political
6 L. Adele Jinadu 
science, during the high tide of the behavioural revolution in political science, 
"borrowed" concepts and insights from social and political anthropology, sociology, 
psychology and history and, much later from economics. [Leys, 1969; Ake, 
1979] 
VII 
In spite of its pretensions to develop a universal theory of political science, for 
which Africa and the "new nations" were to provide data, globalised mainstream 
political science was constrained by its liberal ideological foundations. It defined 
the African development agenda as an imitative or replicating one, characterised 
by the transfer and institutionalisation of the salient substructural and superstructural 
features of the developmental trajectories already charted by the west to 
Africa. These features were enlightened state capitalism, of a basically statewelfarist 
or pseudo social democratic or Keynesian nature, liberal constitutionalism, 
competitive party politics and parliamentariamsm. Two aspects of this 
ideologised application of globalised mainstream political science to Africa must 
be noted. First, there was a "missionary" dimension to it. This was what unwittingly 
provided asymbiotic link between mainstream political scientists andpolicy 
makers in the west. As Ake [1979: 103] so well puts it, 
"the works of these writers invariably reflects their role within the cultural 
apparatus of capitalist/imperialist states." 
It was in this objective sense that this political science became an important 
cultural aspect, and indeed a strategic agent of the hegemonic thrust of finance 
capital under the incipient globalisation processes of the post-1945 period. Second, 
the focus of mainstream political science on nation building as a developmental 
project in Africa, in so far as it was instrumentalist and problem-solving, highlighted 
the political and sociocultural requisites for development. These were noneconomic 
factors that development economists had tended to ignore. Invariably, 
however, such non-economic factors were in the final analysis abstractions from 
the development experience of the west. 
VIII 
The basic epistemic and theoretical assumptions and the various methodological 
approaches that informed globalised mainstream political science in its application 
to the study of African politics have been highlighted and critiqued by others (e.g. 
Ake, 1979, Leys, 1969; Leys, 1996), and need not be repeated here. The response 
of globalised mainstream political science to such critique has been a paradigmatic
The Globalisation of Political Science: An African Perspective 7 
shift taking the form of neo-liberalism as the regnant global ideological movement. 
Applied to Africa, regnant neo-liberalism subsumes a theory of the African state 
as weak, over-extended and ill-equipped in its present form to undertake the task 
of economic and political development. In place of the state, the market is 
advocated as the most rational and efficient allocators of economic resources. 
There should be political reforms leading to competitive electoral party politics. 
The ultimate goal of the reforms is the the minimalist state. 
This paradigmatic shift is also reflected in the World Bank's advocacy of "good 
governance" as the panacea for Africa's problems of economic and political 
development. Jettisoning its earlier support of state capitalism as the engine for 
sustainable economic growth and political development, the World Bank now 
requires African countries to implement a package of policy reforms as a condition 
for loans. The reform package mainly includes structural adjustment, economic 
liberalisation, democratisation and civil service reform. In short, neo-liberalism 
now defines the parameters of the "new partnerships" under contemporary 
globalisation. African countries, as "follower-societies" are now expected to 
subscribe to the institutional imperatives of neo-liberalism. 
IX 
What has been the impact of neo-liberalism on the study of African politics by 
globalised mainstream political science? The impact is to be seen partly in a change 
in neo-liberalism as aglobal ideology has led to aparadigmatic shift in the approach 
to African politics and partly in its critique of modernisation theory as applied to 
Africa. In the latter case, much like the dependency and neo-marxist critiques of 
development theory, neo-liberalism's theoretical baggage has enabled globalised 
western political science to refocus on the causes of institutional failures and 
therefore on contradictions and conditions which it had earlier ignored or which 
the then regnant theoretical-analytical tools were ill-equipped to discern. [Leys, 
1996 ch. 4] 
The emphasis on institutional reforms in the political marketplace and good 
governance, specifically its concern with competitive (electoral) party politics, has 
also spawned, within globalised mainstream political science, a new interest in the 
liberal democratisation project, including democratic elections. This is consistent 
with the need to make the market (economic and political) work better - in other 
words, give so-called market forces unfettered freedom. Underlying this concern 
is a set of assumptions. These are the teleological assumption that the design or 
restructuring of economic and political institutions, and constitutional engineering 
to enable citizens maximise their utilities, will in the long run advance the public 
good and thereby enhance the prospects for liberal democracy.
8 L. Adele Jinadu 
Let me now return to the questions I posed in Section II above. How, in the context 
of the emerging "new partnerships" made possible by the new world order, can 
globalised mainstream political science advance our understanding of African 
politics? 
I have indicated in Section V that the structural dynamics of contemporary 
globalisation have created new asymmetries between the western world and Africa 
which may be described as a new form of imperialism. Neo-liberalism's emphasis 
on the minimalist state and on economic liberalisation, which in effect means that 
the market and not the state should be "the allocator of social surplus' [Leys, 
1996:89], has aided the "transnationalisation" or dominance of finance capital. 
This has placed African and other developing countries in a weak position to 
protect themselves against unfair competition. 
Globalised mainstream political science has now, as before, taken the nature of 
the world order and the asymmetrical partnerships deriving from it as given. It 
continues to take what can be described as a "conformist" view of Africa as a 
"follower-society," with no choice but to continue to imitate the west, to import its 
economic and political institutions and to adapt itself to contemporary globalisation. 
The study of African politics should therefore be carried out from the 
perspective of the dominant actors in the contemporary world system. In both 
theoretical and practical terms, this has generally meant the economic and political 
foundations of western industrial societies. 
XII 
An important theoretical and indeed policy-oriented dimension of globalised 
mainstream political science in its application to African politics is to be found in 
what has been described as the "new political economy," or "new institutionalism." 
This is because 
... a kind of partial hegemony of rational choice idea has undoubtedly been 
occurring in U.S political science, and not least in the field of development. 
[Leys, 1996:81] 
As I have already argued in Section IX above, one important advantage which 
neo-liberalism has over modernisation theory is in highlighting institutional 
failures and weaknesses as the cause of the poor performance of the African state. 
Situating the reasons for these institutional failures or weaknesses of the African 
state in the pre-eminence accorded social needs [politics] over citizens' economic 
interests, rational choice theory tries to provide a basis for overcoming such
The Globalisation of Political Science: An African Perspective 9 
failures and weaknesses. It hypothesizes that the policy processes must accord 
primacy to the autonomy of market relations as the engine and guarantor of 
development. 
How does this advance our knowledge of African politics? Leys [1996:80-103] 
has offered an analysis of the strengths and limitations of rational choice theory as 
applied to Africa. He argues [Leys, 1996: 82] that, 
its [i.e. rational choice theory's] main achievements have been in throwing 
light on relatively micro-level institutional problems; attempts to present it 
as a new general theory of politics have been singularly unsuccessful, (Leys 
1996: 82). 
He goes on to conclude, with respect to Bates' application of rational choice to 
African politics, that, 
... it is not politics that "impair" market efficiency, but market forces that 
conflict with social goals; and in reality what is at stake in Africa is precisely 
a conflict between the principles of "market society" and alternative 
conceptions-some traditional, some modern-of collective welfare. The 
assumption, then, that in dealing with "economic matters" rational people 
act primarily for material advantage is by no means a "natural" starting 
point...; it is a highly political one, which takes as "natural" what is in fact 
at stake in the struggle for Africa's future [Leys, 1996: 95]. 
XIII 
Another important theoretical and policy-oriented dimension of the application of 
globalised mainstream political science to African politics is liberal democratic 
theory. The focus on democratisation has emerged in the wake of what has been 
characterised as "global democratic transitions," beginning with the transitions in 
Southern Europe (Spain and Portugal) and Latin America. 
Its paternity in neo-liberalism and, therefore, its theoretical affinity with rational 
choice theory or the new political economy arises from the thesis that one-party 
rule and other forms of authoritarian rule, like military rule, create market 
distortions and imperfections by denying and stifling individual choices and 
options in the political marketplace. It is this institutional failure or weakness, 
which results in the vicious cycle of political instability and lack of accountability 
in postcolonial Africa. The solution is to base politics on individualism and self 
interest; in other words, on "exchanges among rational self-interested citizens" 
[March and Olson, 1995: 6]. 
By far the greater part of globalised mainstream political science literature on
10 L. Adele Jinadu 
African transitions [see Luckham and White, 1996; March and Olsen, 1995; 
Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot, 1995, among others] is preoccupied with these as a 
transition to liberal democracy. This is defined as limited or constitutional 
government, based on the Schumpeterian competitive multiparty electoral model, 
on the condition that the results of such competition, i.e. of elections, are "uncertain 
[and] indeterminate ex ante." [Przeworski, 1991:10; see also Luckham and White, 
1996: 2-3] 
The wide acceptance of this dominant view of democratic transitions as 
transitions to liberal democracy across ideological lines has been expressed by 
Luckham and White [1996: 283-4] in the following words: 
The acceptance of liberal democracy has extended to include the radical 
Left, partly because the Leninist alternative has collapsed and never 
delivered much in the way of democracy in any case. Socialists of course 
seek to extend the notion of democracy beyond the political into the social 
and economic system, but now more than previously they are willing to 
recognise the inherent virtues of the standard model of liberal democracy. 
But in its application to Africa, the focus of globalised mainstream political 
science on democratic transition as transition to liberal democracy has been, 
among other preoccupations, on the relationship between democracy and development, 
between democracy and demilitarisation, between democratic consolidation 
and the roles of non political elites, like businessmen and soldiers on the role of 
donor communities in the democratisation process, and on democracy as a 
procedure. [Luckham and White, 1996: 4-10, 274-289] 
How much has this approach contributed to our understanding of African 
politics? At least, it has been useful in improving our understanding of the 
processes and limitations of democratic transitions in Africa. In this respect, the 
notion of transitions as a design problem, over which various (endogenous and 
exogenous) conjunctural social forces are in contention, requiring special political 
"invention" to solve, is useful. This is more so with the location of the problem and 
processes of democratic transitions in structural rather than in psycho-cultural and 
institutional causes. Also useful is the typologisation of transitions for purposes of 
comparative analysis. 
These notwithstanding, some shortcomings of the focus of globalised mainstream 
social science on liberal democracy still remain. First, it tends to conflate 
the problem of democracy in Africa with the adoption of liberal democracy and its 
institutional artifacts. This is problematic in that it fails to address the problem of 
ethnic pluralism in Africa where, to use Georges Balandier's apt phrase, "the 
societies are ethnically split," and where, as a result, the simple majoritarian 
principle of liberal democracy may have to be tempered with consociational
The Globalisation of Political Science: An African Perspective 11 
principles, [cf. Ake, 1996] In short, the problem of whether and how group rights 
can be accommodated with individual rights in liberal democratic theory is hardly 
addressed. The question, from this perspective, turns on whether some other 
democratic theory is better suited to Africa than liberal democratic theory. Related 
to this is the little attention given to the relationship between culture and democracy, 
a lacuna arising out of the tendency to assume that (liberal) democracy is an 
objective, culture-neutral phenomenon. 
Second, it has shown little interest in studying grassroots-based social movements 
and their impact in initiating and sustaining democratic transitions in Africa. 
This itself may reflect a carry over from earlier studies on African nationalism 
which were informed by what Thomas Hodgkin once called "the clever elite-dumb 
masses" thesis. By this, the contribution of western educated elites to African 
nationalism was exaggerated over the contribution of the African peasantry and 
other declasse groups. 
Third, it does not adequately relate the problem of democratic transitions to the 
structural problem of underdevelopment as arising from the structural inequalities 
and unequal exchanges created by the imperialist logic of contemporary globalisation. 
Put differently, the literature on democratic transitions in Africa has not 
really addressed the implications of the African economic crisis and underdevelopment 
for democratic consolidation in Africa [Robinson, 1996; and Hansen, 
1987]. The sum total of all these shortcomings is to raise serious questions about 
the usefulness of neo-liberalism as a conceptual tool for explaining the problems 
of democracy and development in Africa. 
XIV 
What is the way forward, if the globalisation of mainstream western political 
science is to be built on the basis of promoting and forging "new partnerships"? The 
answer is that the "new partnership" must be based on reciprocity. This means that 
Africa must be viewed less as a "laboratory" for testing western-derived concepts. 
Nor must its development problems be defined and analysed in the context of 
western political institutions and processes. Two implications of this for the 
application of globalised mainstream political science to Africa should be pointed 
out. First, Africa must be studied in terms of the conditions and possibilities for its 
own self-centered development, and the adaptation of its own indigenous institutions 
to the problems of governance. Globalised mainstream political science must 
readjust its intellectual lenses in looking at Africa. To do this requires going back 
to historical and micropolitical studies, in the tradition of political and social 
anthropologists, like Evans Pritchard, Peter Llyod and Georges Balandier. 
Second, globalised mainstream political science should begin to explore how 
data collected in and about Africa can illuminate aspects of politics in the west. In
12 L. Adele Jinadu 
other words, the west should itself become a "laboratory" for testing data and 
hypotheses derived from Africa. Here again, much can be learnt about the 
dialectics of race and ethnic relations in the west from the work of those political 
and social anthropologists who studied ethnic and race relations in Africa. In the 
same vein, data gathered from work on patronalism, prebendalism and "bellypolitics" 
in Africa might provide interesting insights into the nature of similar 
problems in the west. This is what reciprocity demands; and this is what globalised 
mainstream political science should begin to address. It needs to begin to pursue 
the question, "what can we learn from and about African politics to help our 
understanding of our own politics and in developing a general theory of politics?" 
This is what the idea of "new partnerships," applied to the globalisation of political 
science, should be about. 
Notes 
* Originally presented at an IPSA/CPSA Roundtable in Quebec, Canada, 
February 1998. 
** Professor of Political Science and Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department 
of Political Science, Lagos State University, Lagos, Nigeria and 
President, African Association of Political Science (AAPS), 1997-1999. 
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