Afr. j . poll!, sci. (1999), Vol. 4 No. 2, 126-142 
Contested Regionalism: Southern 
and Central Africa in the 
Post-Apartheid Era1 
Tandeka C. Nkiwane ' 
Introduction: Southern Africa and Central Africa 
The politics that are reshaping the African continent need to be captured from an 
historical perspective, integrated with an understanding of the contemporary 
realities which provide the "push" and "pull" factors tugging at the African social 
fabric. Regional politics clearly are a manifestation of both the old and the new, 
with a particular salience in Southern and Central Africa. An intriguing aspect of 
regionalization is that regional blocs are formed often as an attempt to create a 
political framework for a variety of forms of economic activity. 
Regionalization has both an external and an internal logic. First, a region in 
international relations can be a phenomenon imposed from the outside. Regions 
have formed, for example, in the Cold War context shaped by military or economic 
alliances. In Africa the external imposition and composition of regions is a 
phenomenon shaped by the colonial experience, but reinforced during the postcolonial 
period. The notion of a region usually implies some form of territorial 
contiguity, although regions in Africa have also been delineated along linguistic 
lines. This arbitrary definition of regions generally has Africa divided into five: 
East, West, North, South, and Central. Of course the boundaries of these regions 
do overlap, and it is the troubling and growing spectre of conflict in Central and 
Southern Africa with which this paper is concerned. The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) as a political and economic project will be 
examined in this context, as well as the evolving notions of security in Southern 
Africa. The contested boundary between Central and Southern Africa is of 
particular concern in this paper, focussing on the military intervention of Angola, 
1027-0353 © 1999 African Association of Political Science
Contested Regionalism 127 
Namibia and Zimbabwe in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), the newest member of the SADC. 
Notions of Security in Southern Africa 
The political and foreign policy landscape in Southern Africa has changed 
dramatically in the past half decade. A geo-strategic focus on military security and 
destabilisation pitted apartheid South Africa against the Frontline States of 
Southern Africa, in a politico-military confrontation which had enveloped the 
foreign policy debates from the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s. Freed from the 
main obstacle to building cooperative regional mechanisms, namely apartheid 
South Africa, new and expansive agendas have dominated the discourses in the 
region bringing to the fore a complex set of competing interests and actors, not 
necessarily of the politico-military sphere. Following the demise of white minority 
rule and the holding of democratic elections of April 26-29,1994, South Africa has 
been integrated into the African whole, with a variety of inferences in the foreign 
policy realm. Two contending perspectives have emerged with respect to the 
broader foreign policy questions related to security. One perspective has argued 
that the removal of the security threat posed to the region by apartheid South Africa 
would launch a new degree of regional cooperation in the sphere of peace and 
security. This perspective, which certainly has dominated the discourse in recent 
Southern African scholarship advocates the creation of new avenues of political 
cooperation to replace the Frontline States.2 This position is reflected in the 1992 
Treaty on the Establishment of a Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). The counter-perspective, often associated with those from a realist 
persuasion, has argued that while a black majority government may reign in South 
Africa, the South African state remains dominant in the region, and will persist in 
its external relations as a regional leader.3 In this scenario, therefore, there would 
be no impetus for South Africa to suddenly change its foreign policy dictates given 
its geo-strategic position. 
Outside the realm of security, a number of intriguing foreign policy concerns 
have emerged. Questions related to economic integration and trade, shared water 
resources, constitutionalism and democracy, border disputes, and the recognition 
and involvement of non-state actors in the foreign policy decision-making process, 
have surfaced, representing new challenges to the nation-states of Southern Africa. 
Increasingly, non-military threats have come to represent major foreign policy 
concerns, widening the area of cooperation and conflict. The foreign policies of a 
variety of states are in the process of evolution, reflecting a change in political 
leadership and changing political elites. The retirement of President Ketumile 
Masire of Botswana on March 31,1998 and of President Nelson Mandela of South 
Africa in 1999 represent the withdrawal of powerful regional figures associated 
with the foreign policies of their respective countries. In the multi-party "wave" of
128 Tandeka C. Nkiwane 
the early 1990s, new presidents were installed in Zambia, Lesotho, Tanzania, and 
Malawi, with the leadership of Swaziland currently under constitutional debate. Of 
the post-independence generation of leaders, Presidents Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, 
Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola 
and Sam Nujoma of Namibia remain; but a number of these have shuffled their 
foreign ministers in recent years. 
Elites in the Foreign Policy Process 
Foreign policy making is dominated by political elites. But it is equally true that, 
"however strategic and self-interested they may be, elites are not socially disembodied; 
virtually by definition they represent and draw upon collective groups 
...".4 In this regard, Gabriel Almond notes four distinct groups in relation to the 
broad foreign policy process. These are the general public, the attentive public, the 
policy and opinion elites, and the legal and official policy leadership.5 This analysis 
is applicable to the Southern African context, where the political elites have 
traditionally represented social movements, liberation movements, trade unions, 
classes, ethnic groups, and a host of others. Furthermore, it is significant that the 
political and military elites of the liberation movements in Southern Africa later 
assumed key leadership positions in their respective countries while maintaining 
old networks of co-operation in the region. Similarly, political elites who were in 
conflict during the early period have either persisted in their mutual hostility, or 
struck new alliances. 
Almond's categorisation is useful in the discussion of the foreign policy processes 
in Southern Africa. Although dominated by what he would describe as the legal and 
official policy leadership, increasingly other groups play a prominent role in the 
process of foreign policy making. The political elites who are involved in this 
process, usually comprising the president, his key ministers and top civil servants in 
the ministries of foreign affairs, defence and security, rely increasingly on input from 
a wide range of groups outside such official circles. Non-governmental organizations, 
academics, representatives of regional think tanks, and representatives of the 
private sector generally represent such groups. The general and the attentive public 
are also concerned with issues of foreign policy, questioning the formulation, 
application, and rationale of decisions, which directly affect them. This is particularly 
true in the larger cities, and the border areas of Southern African states. 
Another pertinent distinction that Almond makes is between the political elites 
on the one hand, and the administrative and bureaucratic elites, on the other.6 This 
delineation is however less stark in a number of Southern African states; but it 
certainly raises interesting questions with respect to South Africa. This is particularly 
so regarding several foreign policy disputes within South Africa, and between 
South Africa and its neighbours where the competing agendas of a stratum of the 
bureaucracy associated with, and often carried over from, the apartheid regime and
Contested Regionalism 129 
the new political elites have become evident. While there may be cooperation at the 
highest political levels, "sabotage" has been alleged at the bureaucratic levels of 
foreign affairs and defence departments in the South African state, posing an 
intriguing question about where the power lies with respect to both foreign policy 
decision making and implementation. 
Throughout the 1970s South Africa systematically used force or the threat of 
force as well as economic sanctions as foreign policy instruments in the Southern 
African region. In 1975 the South African Prime Minister Johannes Vorster 
proposed the establishment of a Constellation of African States. He later elaborated 
this foreign policy strategy to include both military and economic measures. P.W. 
Botha, who took over from Vorster in 1977, expanded upon this agenda for security 
in the sub-region to mean a policy of "Total Strategy". The concept of 'total 
strategy' was based on South Africa's claim of a "right to intervene" in any African 
state south of the equator. This, of course, was part of apartheid South Africa's 
flagrant policy of destabilisation and refusals to comply with treaties and norms of 
international law. In pursuit of this policy of aggression against its neighbours, the 
allocations for defence rose dramatically from 692 million rands to 4.27 billion 
rands bewteen 1975 and 1985 during which military incursions and destabilisation 
of its neighbours, including Lesotho, Mozambique, Angola, and Botswana and 
Zimbabwe also increased. 
As a political response to apartheid South Africa as well as colonial rule in 
Southern Africa, the Frontline States were formed in 1974. It was spearheaded by 
Tanzania and Zambia, and included Congo-Brazzaville, Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa) 
and Botswana. The fall in 1975 of the Portuguese colonial regime drastically 
altered the regional balance of forces, leading to the withdrawal of Zaire and 
Congo-Brazzaville from the Front-line States grouping, and an increased effort by 
South Africa to block the efforts of the sub-region to free itself from political and 
economic dominance. One of South Africa's first foreign policy acts in 1994 after 
Nelson Mandela's democratic government came into office was to join the 
Frontline States. Until 1995, this organization comprised eight member-states; 
namely, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe (excluding Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi).7 
Admittedly, states may face severe threats of a non-military nature. Economic 
and political threats are often as severe as military threats. When economic or 
political threats occur, self-seeking behaviour on the part of a neighbouring state 
can be profoundly destabilizing just as unilateral actions may weaken an already 
unstable economic, political or military order. In order to combat threats of 
destabilisation, states are often willing to give up some freedom of action to a 
consultative process, that could later become institutionalised. This appears to be 
the only realistic means of combating non-military threats when existing strategies 
prove ineffective. In the Southern Africa region, non-military threats transcend
130 Tandeka C. Nkiwane 
borders. Economic instability, environmental problems and social movements cut 
across boundaries, and as such often demand a regional or sub-regional response. 
Equally important, many of the political crises occurring in the region in recent 
years have had potentially serious repercussion for the entire region, and have, 
consequently, demanded a regional response. The rest of this paper is devoted to 
exploring some of such peace and security imperatives that have confronted the 
region. 
The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was in 
essence the economic offshoot of the Frontline States. It was formed in April, 1980 
following the Lusaka Declaration entitled Southern Africa: Towards Economic 
Liberation. A key objective of SADCC was to harmonise development among the 
countries of Southern Africa (excluding South Africa and Namibia), and to reduce 
economic dependence on South Africa. The Declaration and Treaty establishing 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was signed in Windhoek, 
Namibia in August 1992 with a more comprehensive mandate to promote the 
integration of the sub- region. The new mandate included the political integration 
of the sub-region. The mandate also called for the development of a common 
foreign policy in the region. SADC comprised Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe at 
its formation. In 1994 SADC admitted South Africa following democratic multiracial 
elections; in 1995 Mauritius was admitted following a year of controversy 
about its candidature; and in 1997 Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) were admitted. When the Southern African Development Community 
was formed in August of 1992, it was committed to the formation of, "a 
framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for 
mutual peace and security".8 This signified broadening of the objective of the 
former Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in the 
light of a number of positive changes in international arena as well as the subregion. 
This culminated in a workshop in Windhoek in July of 1994, which 
recommended SADC co-operation in political, human rights and security spheres. 
The deliberations at the Windhoek meeting formed the basis for the decision at the 
SADC Gaborone Summit in August 1994, to establish a formal SADC sector on 
"Political Co-operation, Democracy, Peace and Security." The new proposals, in 
particular the formation of a Human Rights Commission within SADC, were 
endorsed by the region's non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It was further 
agreed that the Frontline States would disband, and all its operations would be 
integrated into this SADC sector. As with all SADC sectors, one country would be 
responsible for co-ordinating its operations. 
Whereas the larger international community, or even the African community of
Contested Regionalism 131 
nations may be wary of getting involved in a particular crisis, a country cannot 
ignore the potential repercussions of a conflict in a neighbouring country. The 
potential for national conflicts to transform into regional conflicts is an everpresent 
threat, therefore governments are always keen to prevent conflicts in 
neighbouring countries. This is the logic of the behaviour of governments in the 
SADC region where countries continue to experience a huge flow of refugees 
across common borders, the fomenting of armed insurgencies inside their borders, 
and numerous security threats. It is such developments within the region that make 
co-operation in the sphere of politics and security not only a desirable option, but 
a pressing necessary. 
The logic behind the establishment of acommon framework stemmed from both 
a short-term commitment to co-operate and a long-term drive towards the development 
of a common defence policy. This commitment centred on both exogenous 
integration (or the process of military co-operation developed in the face of an 
explicit external or internal threat) and endogenous integration (or the process of 
eventually developing a political and economic union) imperatives. A common 
security framework was formed in anticipation of a number of potential advantages. 
First, SADC is an intergovernmental organisation and operates on this basis, 
therefore a more institutional approach towards co-operation is probably the most 
functional. Second, and more important, SADC was established to facilitate the 
creation of an economic and political community, which was regarded as a logical 
means to realise progress in the security sphere. 
The establishment of another framework was discussed. This is the proposed 
Association of Southern African States (ASAS) as a successor to the Frontline 
States. At a meeting held in Harare on March 3, 1995 to harmonise the two 
proposals, it was agreed that ASAS be established as the political arm of SADC, 
with conflict prevention, management, and resolution as the major area of focus. 
It was to be a new-look Frontline States, informal and flexible. It was further 
proposed that ASAS be supported by two committees, one on political matters and 
the other on defence and security matters. As with its predecessor. The Frontline 
States, the foreign ministry of the country that would chair it would assume the 
responsibility of servicing the ASAS. And most important of all, the Chairmanship 
of ASAS would rotate among member states every two years. The ASAS proposal 
was taken to the 1995 SADC Summit in Johannesburg and eventually the matter 
was deferred, the stated reason being that the ministers of foreign affairs needed 
more time to consult their ministers of defence and security.' 
Undoubtedly South Africa is the most powerful country in the sub-region. Its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is three times that of the other SADC countries 
combined. Its military establishment, comprises 137,900 regular troops, a part time 
reserve force of 475,000, commandos totalling 76,000 and an active citizen force 
reserve of 275,000. With an army, navy, air force, paramilitary force, and a now
132 Tandeka C. Nkiwane 
latent nuclear arsenal, South Africa unquestionably has the most sophisticated and 
most powerful military establishment in Sub-Saharan Africa.10 Therefore, postapartheid 
South Africa has in many ways become the most dominant political 
player in the sub-region. It is actively redefining its post-apartheid foreign policy. 
It has joined the SADC, OAU, and UN; and it has been keen to project itself as the 
primary advocate of democracy and reconciliation throughout the continent. In 
October 1995, during the UN 50th anniversary celebrations. South Africa indicated 
that it would lobby for a permanent seat on the Security Council should the 
UN reform process allocate one to Africa. 
On the other hand, Zimbabwe's foreign policy can be described as activist, with 
much of its effort being concentrated on African affairs. Like the foreign policies 
of small states, Zimbabwe's foreign policy encompasses a vision strongly associated 
with its leader, Mugabe. When the FLS was formed it was decided that the 
Chairmanship would rotate according to "seniority". Hence, it began with Nyerere 
who later passed on the baton to Kaunda. The next inline, according to the seniority 
principle, was Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, who because of the civil war in 
his country decided to pass the mantle on to Mugabe. Today, Mugabe considers 
himself the senior statesperson in Southern Africa. 
On January 18 1996, SADC Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defence, 
and SADC Affairs met in Gaborone to decide on the best option for the SADC 
region with respect to peace and security. The compromise position that emerged 
is what was termed a "SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security". The 
SADC organ, as proposed, would be an institutional structure of SADC, operating 
only at Summit (Heads of State and Government) level, on a troika (three-member) 
basis, and independent of other SADC structures. It was proposed that the 
Chairmanship of this organ would rotate annually, and that the powerful Inter-State 
Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) would become one of the arms of the 
organ. On June 28, 1996, at an extraordinary Summit in Gaborone, the SADC 
Heads of State formally established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and 
Security, with the objective of evolving common political institution among the 12 
member-states. It was also to fashion a common foreign policy in areas of mutual 
interest. SADC is expected to develop a protocol on peace, security, and conflict 
resolution, and also to develop a collective security capacity and a mutual defence 
pact for responding to external threat. It was further agreed that the development 
of a regional peacekeeping capacity was desirable and would be pursued for the 
benefit of the sub-region and for Africa as a whole. President Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe was elected the first Chairman of this SADC Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security. 
The decision to establish the organ had its strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps 
its greatest strength is the inclusion of ISDSC as an agency of the organ. The 
inclusion of the principle of the troika was also a major strength. But the rotation
Contested Regionalism 133 
of the Chair of the organ is still cause for concern. The extent to which nongovernmental 
actors in the region could get involved in SADC structures is also 
unclear. International NGOs, in particular Amnesty International, have criticised 
the formation of the SADC Organ, on the ground that it merely pays lip-service to 
their commitment to democracy and the promotion of human rights. No formal 
institutional arrangements have been established to implement the spirit and letter 
of the 1994 Windhoek Declaration. 
At the September 1997 SADC Summit, with President Mandela as Chairman of 
SADC, and President Mugabe as Chairman of the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defense and Security, things fell apart. In a startling revelation, the following was 
acknowledged. 
"Although the organ was established in May, 1996, its functions, structure, 
operating procedure, and relationship with other SADC institutions have not been 
discussed." " President Mandela, in a surprise announcement, threatened to quit 
as SADC Chairman unless the institutionalization of the SADC Organ was 
accomplished. President Mugabe equally maintained his position that the various 
components necessary for the maintenance of peace and security in the sub-region 
must not be over bureaucratized. The position of the organ in the overall SADC 
structure still remains unresolved, with subsequent summits (including the one 
held in Maputo on March of 1998) ending inconclusively, and the decision to form 
a ministerial working group on the matter being left in limbo. It appears that it will 
remain a critical foreign policy issue in the Southern Africa region for some time, 
reflecting not only struggles for power but also the scope of the formalised common 
foreign policy agenda. 
In the rest of this paper we discuss a number of security concerns that have 
forcefully brought the issue of regional security to the forefront of regional politics. 
Environmental and Border Disputes 
An issue that has gained prominence in the realm of foreign policy in Southern 
Africa has been the dispute between Botswana and Namibia over the Sidudu/ 
Kasikili Island. This is a dispute over the ownership of a small island in the Linyati/ 
Chobe river. This is also one of the few foreign policy disputes in which regional 
mediation has failed, and both countries subsequently submitted the case to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for resolution. What makes this dispute 
intriguing is that the 3 sq. km. island in question is not considered a "strategic" asset 
by either country, and does not possess any known resources. Namibian farmers 
have been using the island only for small-scale agricultural production. Botswana 
claims ownership; and has therefore deployed military personnel to evict the 
Namibian farmers. This action has prompted the allegation that Botswana was, in 
fact, preparing to pursue an aggressive expansionist policy in the region. In support 
of this view, its acquisition of sophisticate military hardware and the construction
134 Tandeka C. Nkiwane 
(by the United States) of an air force base in its territory have been cited. Following 
a failed effort at resolution by a bilateral commission and a failed attempt at 
mediation by President Robert Mugabe in 1995, both countries informed the ICJ 
on May 29, 1996 of their intention to submit the dispute for arbitration. 
An important, security issue that is emerging is the right over water resources 
in the region. Rivers traverse national boundaries. In a drought prone region such 
as Southern Africa, the struggle for control of such water resources is bound to be 
keen. In recent years such contestations have intensified making it a major foreign 
policy question. S ADC Heads of States and Government in 1995 signed a protocol 
on shared watercourse systems, and in 1997 a formal SADC sector responsible for 
water was established under the auspices of Lesotho. In Southern Africa there are 
11 shared water systems. The Zambezi river is the largest, and is shared by 8 
countries.12 The Zambezi river basin has two large hydroelectric dams, one at 
Kariba on the border between Zimbabwe and Zambia, which is currently a source 
of dispute. The other is at Cabora Bassa in Mozambique. Munyaradzi Chenje and 
Phyllis Johnson note that, "the mean annual renewable water resources for 
Southern Africa are about 1870 cu kms per year, of which 80 percent is available 
in the Congo basin. Much of this is outside the SADC region".13 When DRC was 
admitted as a member of SADC, that country's rich water resources became a 
central foreign policy concern despite the fact that the DRC is physically located 
outside the Southern African region as traditionally defined. 
Trade Concerns 
During a greater part of this decade the issue of trade has emerged as amajor foreign 
policy concern in the region, and is likely to remain on the foreign policy agenda 
into the next millennium. SADC has adopted a trade protocol in order, "to further 
liberalise intra-regional trade in goods and services on the basis of fair, mutually 
equitable and beneficial trade arrangements".14 The raison d'etre of SADC drives 
this trade protocol. This pertains to the establishment of a "fortress Southern 
Africa" with a common external tariff. Up to date, only two countries have ratified 
the trade protocol. In May 1995, South Africa was allocated the Trade and 
Investment portfolio of SADC, and made responsible for promoting both intraregional 
and external trade on behalf of the organisation. But very little progress 
has been made towards achieving the goal of the protocol. In recent times, a major 
foreign policy debate has centred on access to South Africa's market by its 
neighbours. Several states, notably Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mauritius, complain 
about the huge trade deficit they have with South Africa, alleging unfair trade 
practices by South African business in connivance with their government. Trade 
disputes are not limited to South Africa. In March of 1997 a "cement war" broke 
out between Zambia and Zimbabwe, after the latter unilaterally increased the,simport 
duty on cement from Zambia.
Contested Regionalism 135 
The extent to which trade has become a major foreign policy issue became 
clear in 1996, following the circulation of the SADC Annual Report for the 
annual consultative conference. The Zimbabwean government through its foreign 
minister, Stan Mudenge referred to the Finance and Investment Sector 
Annual Report as a, "conspiracy,"" designed to undermine both Zimbabwe and 
SADC. The report, among other matters, alleged that Zimbabwe's GDP in 1995 
had declined by 10%, an allegation which was angrily denounced by Mudenge. 
The representatives of Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Swaziland, Lesotho and 
Namibia all demanded an explanation, following which a forma! apology was 
delivered to the Zimbabwean government the next day by South African Foreign 
Minister Alfred Nzo, South African Finance Minister Chris Liebenberg and 
SADC Executive Secretary Kaire Mbuende. A formal inquiry into the report was 
subsequently instituted and followed by a further apology. Given such controversies, 
the issue of trade is bound to remain a central foreign policy concern for 
some time. 
Related to this issue is that of the overlapping organisations that have been 
formed to deal with trade issues. These include the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) comprising South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
The S ADC/COMES A overlap is one of particular concern to both government 
officials and many analysts. COMESA, formerly the Preferential Trade Area 
(PTA) was established in 1981 to promote integration among East and Southern 
African States, and envisages the establishment of a common market by the year 
2000. It comprises 20 member states, with its secretariat in Lusaka. Ten of the 
SADC states, with the exception of South Africa and Botswana, belong to 
COMESA. SADC also has a mandate to promote the establishment of a common 
market by the year 2000. With SADC accounting for 81% of Africa's Gross 
National Product, 81 % of total imports, and 80% of total exports, it is easy to see 
SADC as the most promising sub-regional organisation, with South Africa as the 
driving force. This is why South Africa was assigned the Finance and Investment 
portfolio soon after its admission to SADC membership. A joint SADC/ 
COMESA ministerial committee was appointed to examine the possibility of 
merging the two organisations in order to rationalise and harmonise trade and 
investment policies. The recommendations of the ministerial committee which 
had been endorsed by a majority of its members, was rejected in August 1996 
with a call on the ministerial committee to spell out "modalities of co-operation 
in specific areas between the two bodies".16 At the COMESA Summit of April 
1997, both Lesotho and Mozambique gave notice of their intention to leave 
COMESA in 1998, with Namibia also threatening to pull out of the organisation 
due to its overlap with SADC. These moves set the stage for a strengthened and 
more cohesive SADC.
136 Tandeka C. Nkiwane 
Evolving Norms, New Actors, and the DRC 
Realpolitik, couched in the discourse of constitutionalism and democracy, are part 
of the evolving foreign policy agendas of Southern African states. This was first 
demonstrated when in 1994 Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa intervened in 
the Lesotho crisis. Following a political and military crisis in Lesotho throughout 
1993 and 1994, King Letsie III suspended the constitution and fired Prime Minister 
Ntsu Mokhehlc in a "royal coup" which sent Shockwaves throughout Southern 
Africa. Determined not to allow a military coup in Southern Africa, the troika 
invoked the Commonwealth Harare Declaration of 1991 issued by the summit of 
Heads of State and Government as justification. The Harare Declaration had called for 
the, "protection and promotion of the fundamental political values of the Commonwealth; 
democracy, democratic processes, and institutions which reflect national 
circumstances, the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest 
government.".l7 Whether the issue of democracy and constitutionalism will be the basis 
of future political interventions in similar situations is open to question. But this 
intervention certainly placed onto the centre stage the issue of democratic rule as a norm 
in foreign policy considerations in the Southern Africa region."1 
A similar debate has emerged, couched in the discourse of "sovereignty" and the 
protection of legitimate government, with respect to the ongoing conflicts in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho in 1998. In May 1997, when the Allied 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire (AFDL) under the leadership of Laurent 
Kabila ousted Mobutu Sese Seko from power, it was with the overt military 
assistance not only of Rwanda and Uganda, but also of Angola and Zimbabwe 
which are members of SADC.19 The failed attempt by South Africa to mediate a 
negotiated exit from power by Mobutu in addition led to the reversal of a number 
of economically strategic pacts in Zaire, particularly by prominent South African 
multi-national corporations such as Anglo-American that are involved in the 
mining industry. South Africa's losses were Zimbabwe's gain, which facilitated 
the rapid movement of the latter's private and public sector companies into the 
DRC economy to forge bilateral economic arrangements. When Kabila's former 
allies Rwanda and Uganda, instigated a rebellion uprising in Eastern DRC in 
August 1998, the DRC, which was now amember of SADC, immediately appealed 
for help from the organisation. 
Announcing the decision to intervene militarily, Mugabe stated, 
"We have considered it our duty to respond to the call of appeal by one of 
us for assistance to be given so that peace and stability can be restored in the 
Congo and in our region ... the people of the DRC are as much our people 
who constitute our individual population." -° 
The contribution of military personnel by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in
Contested Regionalism 137 
support of President Laurent Kabila which effectively reversed the rebel21 advance 
on the capital Kinshasa prompted the South African government to take a public 
stance against the military intervention; a stance which was publicly altered at the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Durban in early September 1998. The 
decision taken in Harare on August 18 1998 by S ADC Defence Ministers under the 
auspices of ISDSC to intervene militarily in the DRC exposed apolitical fault line 
in SADC from which it will be difficult to recover. 
The prolonged political dispute between South Africa and Zimbabwe on the 
resolution of the conflict in the DRC, which has since expanded to include other 
state and non-state actors over the past eight months, has highlighted the larger and 
more complex issues of integration. In particular, the issues include the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of nation-states in the region, as well as those of 
democracy, human rights and regime legitimacy. It has also emphasised the fact 
that the inconclusive status of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
has left it open to manipulation, and has intensified jockeying to control it. In 
September 1998, after a seven-week political dispute overgeneral elections, which 
were deemed flawed by the SADC-appointed Langa Commission,22 Lesotho 
Prime Minister Mosisili requested the assistance of South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique and Botswana. South African's military intervention aided by 
Botswana, which occurred within 48 hours, also raised controversies that are 
similar to those that followed the intervention in the DRC. 
As stated earlier, there is a change in the political decision makers with respect 
to foreign policy decision-making in Southern Africa. The older generation of 
political elites, associated with the liberation struggle, is slowly retreating from the 
centre stage of politics in the region. However, it is the expansion of non-military 
security and foreign policy concerns that has significantly altered the structure of 
foreign policy making. The circle of actors has widened beyond the usual 
departments of state- home affairs, finance, development, social welfare, industry 
and commerce. In addition, new actors are on the scene such as research 
organisations, the university community, and several other interest groups that are 
directly or indirectly affected by foreign policy decisions of the states. The latter 
groups include those in the border and drought prone areas, private sector and 
informal trading groups, and groups in areas thai are subject to relocation for the 
good of "greater" Southern Africa. The upshot of all this is a growing trend towards 
the institutionalisation of the decision-making process in foreign policy. 
Currently, the populations of Southern Africa are increasingly becoming vocal 
with respect to foreign policy matters, and are demanding a place in the structures 
of foreign policy making and, at times, the implementation of key foreign policy 
measures. The 1994 Windhoek SADC workshop was the first time that non-state 
individuals and groups were asked to contribute to the foreign policy debates in 
Southern Africa on a substantial scale. Regional institutions are also increasingly
138 Tandeka C. Nkiwane 
demanding a place in the foreign policy decision-making process. The DRC and 
Lesotho interventions are partly responsible for these changes in the foreign 
policy-making environment in Southern Africa. 
Conclusion: Persistence and Change 
In this paper, I have tried to present a paradox of the persistence of an alliance - the 
SADC - when the historical and political circumstances, which gave rise to the 
grouping are changing rapidly. It would however seem, that the persistence of nonmilitary 
security concerns has become the primary driving force sustaining the 
alliance. Indeed, the litmus test for the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security will be in its ability to respond to this expanding array of foreign policy 
concerns in a comprehensive manner. The issues and actors may have evolved 
since the formation of the Frontline States, but the necessity for co-operation to 
address non-military concerns is now the key issue in the region. In other words, 
although the frontline no longer exists, the rationale for co-operation in the sphere 
of foreign policy remains. 
It appears that the non-military security threats, particularly those emanating 
from political or economic instability would continue to be the most prominent in 
this region's integration project. The millions of cross-border immigrants have 
caused severe tension both within South Africa, and between South Africa and her 
neighbours. Disputes over trade policies and practices, and deepening crises 
dominate the discourse on regional integration. Labour unrest in Zimbabwe, 
threats to political stability in Zambia, Lesotho and Swaziland, and the cycle of 
violence and political tensions in South Africa are the new generation of nonmilitary 
security issues that confront states of this region. The export of civil war 
from Angola (involving both UNITA and MPLA) to neighbouring states is a most 
disturbing development, as are the recent secessionist moves in Namibia. 
These notwithstanding, the biggest challenge that faces SADC is perhaps the 
management of the conflict in the DRC with such dexterity as to avoid any major 
political fallout. 
Norms and political elites evolve, and this evolution represents necessary 
change. For example, the involvement of non-state actors in the foreign policy 
process is a reflection of a new era in Southern African politics. It is no longer as 
essential for foreign policy decision making to remain the preserve of certain 
sectors of the state apparatus. Indeed, the justification for the closed-door modus 
operandi of foreign policy decision making in Southern Africa is giving way to a 
more consultative process in a variety of states. A vigilant public is increasingly 
holding foreign policy elites accountable for their decisions and actions. It would 
therefore appear that there is a growing trend to spread the burden of foreign policy 
making more widely. 
The role of South Africa in the Southern African region is an important question
Contested Regionalism 139 
on the agenda of SADC states. The foreign policy elites in South Africa are trying 
to balance the need to pursue an active foreign policy, with sensitivity to the fears 
of neighbouring states of what could be interpreted, and has in some instances been 
perceived, as unilateral and hegemonic behaviour. It is also in South Africa's 
interest that its foreign policy should be framed in the context of the region. As was 
demonstrated by the intervention in the 1994 Lesotho crisis, South Africa does not 
need to be always self-assertive in regional politics in order to achieve a desired 
foreign policy objective. The adverse reaction to its unilateral intervention in 
Lesotho's crisis of 1998 is a contrasting lesson. In this regard, it will be interesting 
to see the kind of foreign policy vision Thabo Mbeki, the successor to Nelson 
Mandela as President of South Africa, will construct. 
The change of political leadership throughout Southern Africa has affected the 
foreign policy decision-making domain in a discernible way. In the absence of 
direct historical linkages and preoccupations, the new elites are obliged to find new 
and innovative ways of understanding one another and addressing common foreign 
policy challenges. The final outcome of such changes may take the form of 
institutionalised processes of foreign policy making, a process that is already on the 
way. As dictated by the current historical moment, the foreign policy-making 
process will also require the involvement of a deeper and broader stratum of actors. 
Notes 
* Doctoral candidate. Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town. 
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented as "SADC Divided: Revisiting 
the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security," at the 9th General 
Assembly of CODESRIA on the theme—Globalization and Social Sciences 
in Africa, Dakar, Senegal, December 14-18, 1998. 
2. See Laurie Nathan and Joao Honwana. After the Storm: Common Security 
and Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa. (Cape Town: Centre for Conflict 
Resolution, February, 1995). 
3. See David Myers (ed.). Regional Hegemons: Threat, Perception, and Strategic 
Response. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. Also see Ibbo Mandaza {ed.). 
Peace and Security in Southern Africa. (Harare: SAPES Trust, 1996). 
4. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "The Political Economy of Democratic 
Transitions," in Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, April 1997, p. 278. 
5.. Gabriel A. Almond, "The Elites and Foreign Policy," in James N. Rosenau 
(ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, (New York: The Free Press 
of Glencoe Inc., 1961), p. 269. 
6. Ibid. 
7. For a more comprehensive discussion on the Frontline States see Ronald T. 
Libby, The Politics of Economic Power in Southern Africa, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987).
140 Tandeka C. Nkiwane 
8. See SADC's 1992 Windhoek Declaration, Towards a Southern African 
Development Community. 
9. See SADC Communique, Johannesburg, South Africa, August 28,1995, 
p. 3. 
10. The economic statistic was compiled prior to Mauritius joining SADC. The 
military statistics are from IISS The Military Balance 1996 -1997, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 264-265. 
11. See Government of South Africa document entitled: South Africa as Chair 
of SADC and Review of the SADC Programme of Action: Departmental 
workshop to discuss issues, 20 November 1996, p. 2. 
12. Munyaradzi Chenje and Phyllis Johnson (eds.). Water in Southern Africa, 
(Maseru/Harare: SADC/IUCN/SARDC, 1996), p. 166. 
13. Ibid., p. 189. 
14. See SADC Protocol on Trade. 
15. See SADC Annual Consultative Conference, Gallager Estate, Midrand, 
Report 4, p. I. 
16. See statement by COMESA Secretariat. August 6, 1996. 
17. Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Harare, 16-22 October 
1991, Harare Commonwealth Declaration. 
18. For a wider discussion of the 1994 Lesotho intervention see Tandeka C. 
Nkiwane. My Brother's Keeper: The Lesotho Crisis in Perspective. Harare: 
African Association of Political Science Occasional Paper Series, Volume I, 
No. 1, 1997. 
19. As well as Eritrea. 
20. The (Harare) Herald, August 18. 1998, p. I. 
21. The rebel advance was propelled by Uganda and Rwanda; their contribution 
to the war, whether as an "act of aggression" or supporting a legitimate 
internal political rebellion, is at the heart of the dispute between Zimbabwe 
and South Africa. 
22. The extent of electoral fraud was a matter (and still is) of dispute. It has been 
argued quite authoritatively that the Langa Commission report was watereddown 
at the SADC Summit in September 1998. 
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