Afr.j. polit. sci. (1999), Vol. 4 No. 2, 89-105 
Politics and Security in Central 
Africa 
Musifiky Mwanasali ' 
Central Africa: A Neglected Sub-Region? 
Central Africa comprises eleven republics, namely Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, 
the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe.' 
Lying over approximately one-third of the continent, Central Africa is adjacent to 
all of Africa's sub-regions. Chad links it with Libya and the Maghreb, and through 
Cameroon and Chad, the sub-region has links with West Africa. The Great Lakes 
region connects Central to East Africa, namely Uganda and Tanzania (and, now, 
Rwanda). Angola and the DRC constitute both the sub-region's southern borders 
as well as its links with Southern Africa. 
Central Africa is Africa's sub-region most endowed with natural resources. It 
holds the biggest expanse of tropical forests and in the Congo basin, the largest 
water reserves in the continent. In addition to the "geological scandal" dormant in 
the DRC, major exploited resources include precious minerals (gold, diamonds 
and some platinum), petroleum, bauxite and iron ore, as well as copper, cobalt, 
timber, hydroelectric power, uranium and natural gas. The region's economy is 
very dependent on extractive industry and foreign investments. The manufacturing 
base remains very narrow and, despite relatively good farming land, food production 
is still below the needs of the population. 
Demographically, the sub-region counts nearly 100 million people, spread 
unevenly across the region and, within each country, between the areas of high 
density (like Rwanda or Burundi), and those of low density like Sao Tome and 
Principe, Equatorial Guinea or even the DRC. On the whole, the population is 
predominantly young, with approximately half the population in the 0-14 age 
1027-0353© 1999 African Association of Political Science
90 Musifiky Mwanasali 
bracket. The median life expectancy hovers around 50 years and infant and 
maternal mortality remain very high. 
Several organizations have been established in the sub-region with the aim of 
achieving economic cooperation. This is notably the case with the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which was created in 1983 and 
became operational two years later.2 Six out of the eleven member States of the subregion 
share a common currency zone (the CFA Franc) and a monetary union 
known as CEMAC (Communaute economique et monetaire d'Afrique centrale). 
The others use their own, generally non-convertible, national currency.3 
Despite its vast natural reserves, the Central African sub-region is generally 
poor. Gabon, with an adjusted real GDP of USD 3,641 per capita, is the "richest" 
of all ECCAS members. Rwanda, by contrast, is ranked second among the poorest 
countries in the world, with only USD 352 adjusted GDP per capita.4 On the other 
hand, the sub-region's large population makes it potentially a large consumer 
market. Yet sub-regional cooperation arrangements have yet to unleash this full 
economic potential and move it towards economic integration. Goods produced in 
Central Africa do not circulate easily in the ECCAS community. And in contrast 
to their counterparts in West Africa, ECCAS nationals need an entry visa to other 
ECCAS countries, regardless of the duration of their stay. Occasionally, police and 
immigration services are more ruthless towards ECCAS travelers than foreign 
nationals from Europe or North America.5 
These restrictions impinge on the development of a market for consumer goods 
while stifling local entrepreneurship. Forced to fend for themselves, local producers 
have generally taken things into their own hands, even if this meant violating 
existing governmental regulations on regional trade. Smuggling, illicit exports and 
migration continue unabated between Cameroon and Gabon, Gabon and Congo, 
the DRC and the Central African Republic, across the Congo River, or in the Lunda 
area at the Congo-Angola border. Such activities testify to the fact that, were 
ECCAS Member States to make up their mind on the promotion of collective 
security and the free movement of goods and people, the sub-region could develop 
into a vast trade networks and consumer markets in Africa. Unfortunately, this has 
not been the case. 
The lack of a clear and sustained government commitment to promote subregional 
cooperation is not limited to economic issues. It is also evident in peace 
and security matters. According to the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee 
on Security Questions in Central Africa, recurrent political crises and military 
hostilities have kept the sub-region "continuously in the headlines for nearly 40 
years".* Calling Central Africa "a hotbed of tension," the UN Standing Advisory 
Committee asserts that "all evidence points to Central Africa as being one of the 
most affected areas, especially after the large scale massacres committed between 
April and July 1994 in Rwanda alone."7 Guns are still crackling in Five countries.
Politics and Security in Central Africa 91 
while political tensions and hostilities persist among at least one third of ECCAS 
members. 
Despite its vast economic resources and political troubles, the Central African 
sub-region does not usually receive the same kind of policy attention and treatment 
devoted to, say, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Over the years, there has 
been a lot of attention given to individual countries and troubled spots. However, 
in comparison to ECOWAS or SADC, and excluding the case of the UN Standing 
Advisory Committee, the sub-region as a whole has not been considered or treated 
as a major actor in conflict management in Africa. On account of the cynical 
remarks about the inability of the sub-region to handle its numerous problems, one 
is often led to believe that nothing important ever happens here in the area of 
conflict management. 
This cynicism is justified, particularly in the light of the proliferation of internal 
and inter-state violence in the sub-region. However, as this paper will show, 
political leaders in Central Africa have frequently showed their concern for 
political stability and security in the sub-region. Individually or collectively, they 
were engaged to end Chad's long civil war, the mutinies in the Central African 
Republic, or the 1996 rebellion against President Mobutu. During this decade 
alone, the Heads of State and Government of the Central African countries have 
committed themselves (on paper, at least) to developing and strengthening 
political and security cooperation in various domains. 
This paper will try to fill the gap created by the generally poor knowledge about 
efforts being made by Central Africa's leaders towards political and security 
cooperation. Its aim is to describe for the community of scholars and policy makers 
where Central Africa stands in terms of security cooperation, and what opportunities 
and constraints the sub-region continues to face in the enhancement of peace, 
security and political stability. First, I will provide a background of the major 
political events and security concerns that prevail in the sub-region, and lead its 
leaders to search for a common peace and security mechanism. I will then review 
the key political decisions and security instruments that aim to preserve or restore 
peace, security and political stability in Central Africa. Finally, I will explore some 
salient political, institutional and security issues that continue to impede the 
development of an effective security architecture in the sub-region. 
A Geo-Strategic Profile of Central African States 
Nearly sixty percent of the Central African countries are currently either in a state 
of war or under precarious political and security conditions. Only four countries 
can boast of relative peace (i.e. the absence of war) and political stability. But here 
too, political and ethno-regional tensions persist, while material conditions have 
not improved much for the majority of the population.
92 Musifiky Mwanasali 
In the Central African Republic, repeated armed mutinies and personal quarrels 
among the political elite appear to have subsided. French troops that were deployed 
in strategic parts of the country were replaced first by MISAB, the French acronym 
standing for the African force whose mission was to monitor the implementation 
of the Bangui political accord signed by Central African protagonists. Since April 
1998, the United Nations has deployed a mission known as Mission des Nations 
Unies en Republique Centrafricaine. The main objective of MINURCA, as the 
mission is known in UN parlance, is twofold: to continue the implementation of 
peace agreements between the authorities and the former mutineers, and to maintain 
a climate of security and political stability through the difficult task of restructuring 
the security forces. Legislative elections were held in November 1998, and although 
the country appeared poised for the presidential elections in October 1999, uncertainty 
still remained as to the long-term viability of the UN-led political transition, 
especially in the event of the UN withdrawal from the country. 
Another major security concern for the CAR remains the huge movement of 
refugees and fugitive government soldiers who are fleeing the war in the DRC. 
Reacting against the presence of nearly 10,000 Congolese government troops in 
the CAR, a rebel faction has recently threatened to invade the CAR if this country 
continues to accept Congolese soldiers on its territory. 
In Cameroon, ever since the last round of general elections there still prevails 
a modicum of political serenity. Despite wide (and often unsubstantiated) claims 
of electoral fraud President Paul Biya has twice kept his office, first in 1992 then 
five years later in 1997. His hold on power appears steady and unshaken by a 
fractious and at times, refractory political opposition. Cameroon's main security 
concerns are threefold, (a) The tension with Nigeria over the little island of 
Bakassa, to which it has begun to find some kind of resolution, (b) The proliferation 
of small arms and weapons of war. (c) The phenomenon of "coupeurs de routes" 
i.e. armed bandits operating along major trade routes, particularly along the 
borders with Chad. 
Gabon has just concluded its second round of general elections. At the helm of 
this oil-producing country of slightly over a million people for over a quarter of a 
century. President Omar Bongo has won another term in office through an electoral 
process he helped to initiate nearly a decade ago. Just as in neighbouring 
Cameroon, most of Gabon's political opposition appears incoherent and disunited. 
In both countries, the political incumbent and the opposition are still at odds over 
the nature of the emerging political order, the identity of its beneficiaries or the best 
modalities of power sharing. Meanwhile ethno-regional tensions continue to brew 
unattended; but they have not (yet?) led to tragedies and atrocities so characteristic 
of this sub-region. 
Of major concern to this small but "rich" country - Gabon - is the great 
movement of illegal immigrants as well as refugees and armed elements (fugitive
Politics and Security in Central Africa 93 
combatants and militiamen) in the southern part of the country, along the borders 
with the Republic of Congo. Gabon's social and economic structures are increasingly 
unable to absorb this surplus population, and fears are rising about the 
possibility that in the near future violence and political turmoil may be imported 
into this politically stable country. 
Chad is slowly emerging from a protracted civil war and a cycle of violence that 
gripped the country for three decades. Since the deployment of the United Nations 
Aouzou Strip Observer Group in mid-1994 peace has generally been achieved, 
more especially with the Libyan neighbour. However, the security of goods and 
people remains a daunting challenge for President Idriss Deby. Small-armed bands 
roam certain parts of the country and maintain rebellious centres against Mr. 
Deby's government. In 1991 a small contingent of French troops helped the present 
regime to escape a near fall to a military assault allegedly mounted by Mr. Hissein 
Habre, Mr. Deby's predecessor now in exile in Senegal. As in the Central-African 
Republic, Chad's political leadership appears determined to engage the political 
system in the direction of political pluralism. 
The economic performance of the countries that I have just profiled, including 
Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, remains generally far below the 
expectations of the majority of the population in as far as provision for a decent life 
is concerned. However, these are the only countries in the sub-region to enjoy a 
modicum of peace, security and political stability. Much as security in those 
countries is threatened by the new phenomenon of "coupeurs de routes,"* this, 
however, is nowhere close to the general insecurity and the state of war prevailing 
in the rest of the sub-region. 
Rwanda is the epicentre of many of the violent atrocities and communal 
hostilities whose impact now reverberates throughout Central Africa. With the 
exception of a short-lived peaceful transition following President Habyalimana's 
coup d'etat in 1973, the Banyarwanda have yet to see an end to their tragedy and 
to experience lasting peace. Ironically, in spite of its own political, economic and 
security ordeal at home Rwanda's already strained army has been spearheading a 
military insurrection aimed at overthrowing the government of one of its neighbours, 
the Demopcratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
Rwanda's tragedy is well known by neighbouring Burundi. Since independence 
in 1962, this former monarchy has lived through four coups, a cycle of communal 
violence and, of course, the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of 
a republic in November 1966. Unlike Rwanda, whose "contagion" it has always 
feared, Burundi initiated constitutional reform in 1992. Subsequently, free and fair 
general elections were held rather prematurely, considering the fact that society 
had not properly cleansed its deep wounds. Eventually, Melchior Ndadaye won 
and became in 1993 the first and so far, the only democratically elected Head of the 
Burundian State. President Ndadaye's tenure was to be short-lived. The feeling of
94 Musifiky Mwanasali 
hope that accompanied his victory soon turned into bitterness for the various 
extremist groups. Only three months after his triumphant election President 
Ndadaye was murdered, along with most members of his cabinet. In the aftermath 
of his assassination violence and atrocities resumed, and once again dashed the 
hopes of the majority of Burundians for a stable polity. Upon his return to power, 
President Buyoya engaged the country towards another effort at dialogue and 
national reconciliation. The internal dialogue among Burundians from all walks of 
life seems to be going smoothly, in contrast with the ongoing talks in Arusha 
Tanzania, between the government and only few members of the civilian and 
armed opposition. 
A similar situation occurred in the Republic of Congo. The 1992 elections 
resulted in the victory of Mr. Pascal Lissouba over the long-tenured rule of General 
Denis Sassou-Nguesso. However, the defeated President and his supporters did not 
take their defeat well. Three years later prompted by a series of political gaffes by 
the Lissouba government, General Sassou-Nguesso mounted a media offensive 
denouncing the undemocratic regime of his successor. A year later, militiamen 
loyal to the incumbent attacked the former president's residence in an attempt to 
capture him. A bloody confrontation ensued between the militias loyal to the two 
men, resulting in the victory of General Sassou-Nguesso. 
Since General Nguesso's return to power, and in spite of his repeated calls for 
national dialogue and reconciliation between his government and all political and 
military factions, insecurity still prevails in the country. The old militias are more 
than ever present and actively fighting in different parts of a country where 
unnecessary damage and senseless destruction have occurred. 
Across the Congo River, the former Zaire was re-christened the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) in May 1997. President Mobutu had just been driven 
out of office (and the country) by an incongruous alliance of obscure domestic 
forces, with the backing of a clandestine coalition of foreign countries and 
financial interests. The story of the odyssey that led to the demise of President 
Mobutu and the rise of the current autocrat began with the massacres in Rwanda 
in 1994. 
The subsequent flight of Rwandan Hutu refugees and their settlement in eastern 
Zaire posed a serious security threat to the Tutsi dominated regime of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front. Around the same time, obscure leaders of four unknown Congolese 
political parties met to form what came to be known as Alliance des Forces 
Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (AFDL). Thanks to the involvement 
of the Rwandan army, the tacit approval of the Zairean people and the implication, 
for various reasons, of a score of African and foreign interests, AFDL successfully 
routed Mobutu's army and toppled his regime in May 1997. 
Two years after its advent, the AFDL has virtually ceased to exist. There is no 
more mention of it in public speeches. Some of its prominent founders have been
Politics and Security in Central Africa 95 
either jailed or exiled. Accusing its former ally of harbouring dictatorial and 
genocidal impulses, a faction which became known as the Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Democratic (RCD), took up arms and, with the backing of Rwanda and 
Uganda, sought to topple the government of President Kabila. Ironically a year or 
so after its founding, the DRC has also broken into two factions, each ostensibly 
backed by a neighbouring country. Meanwhile, the forces loyal to President Kabila 
appear incapable offending off three new rebellions at once without the help of 
their African friends. 
The second Congo crisis has caused the Central African sub-region to be almost 
at war against itself. Neighbouring countries, including Rwanda, Uganda and, 
initially, Burundi ostensibly support three rebel armies intent on toppling an 
internationally-recognized government, itself backed by two other countries of the 
sub-region (i.e. Angola and Chad). A peace accord was recently signed in Lusaka 
Zambia, among the countries engaged in this phony war. After protracted negotiations, 
the rebels have also decided to sign the peace accord. Meanwhile, foreign 
troops are supposed to leave the country and be replaced by a multinational force 
under the aegis of the OAU and the UN. 
In Angola, lasting peace appears as elusive as elsewhere in this troubled subregion. 
Between 1989 and 1997, Angola received continuous assistance from the 
United Nations. Under the guise of the United Nations Verification Mission in 
Angola (UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II and UNAVEM III), the United Nations 
established a presence in Angola to monitor the implementation of peace accords 
signed between the government and the main armed opposition. The first round of 
general elections took place in 1992, and resulted in the (contested) victory of the 
ruling party. Hostilities resumed in 1992, but the fighting parties agreed to another 
peace accord in 1994. In June 1997, the United Nations terminated UNAVEM III 
and replaced it with United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The 
war broke out again in early 1999 and, in a controversial move, the government of 
Angola requested the United Nations to withdraw all MONUA staff. The civil war 
is still raging with claims and counter-claims against one another. 
Sub-Regional Initiatives at Conflict Management 
The security situation in Central Africa is at present bleak. To their credit, ECCAS 
political leaders have, individually or collectively, sought regularly to prevent, 
manage or resolve armed conflicts and prevent political differences from escalating 
into open hostilities. Some of these political and diplomatic initiatives have 
yielded relative success. The mediation conducted by several African countries, 
including Chad and Gabon, to end the mutinies and violence that crippled the 
Central African Republic in 1996 is a good example. Mediation by African 
countries led to the 1997 Bangui Agreement and the establishment of an inter- 
African peace force ("Mission Inter-Africaine de Verification des Accords de
96 Musifiky Mwanasali 
Bangui," or M1SAB). ECCAS members played a prominent role in this African 
initiative to end an African conflict. 
Most significant, however, is the decision by the Heads of State and Government 
to establish a legal and institutional framework to promote and strengthen 
peace and security in the sub-region. This historic decision was made at the 
Yaounde Summit on 25 February 1999." The Conseil Superieur de Paix et de 
Securite de I 'Afrique Cent rale (Article 1), or COPAX, as the security mechanism 
is called, has a dual mission. First, it aims to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts 
in Central Africa. Secondly, it will undertake all and any necessary action that can 
deal effectively with political conflicts and lead to the promotion, preservation and 
consolidation of peace and security in the sub-region (Article 2). 
The decision to establish COPAX was the culmination of intense deliberations 
that occurred in three stages, organized under the auspices of the UN Standing 
Advisory Committee for Security Questions in Central Africa. The first was by the 
Committee of Ambassadors to the United Nations of the Central African subregion. 
The second was a meeting by experts and government representatives of 
the sub-region. And finally, there was a meeting by the Council of Ministers of 
Defence and Foreign Affairs. At the 1999 Yaounde Summit, the Council of 
Ministers was also instructed by the Heads of State to prepare as quickly as possible 
a draft of the statute, protocols and administrative structure of COPAX. However, 
at the time of writing, COPAX is still not operational, owing to disagreements 
among government experts on technicalities. 
COPAX: Its Roots 
COPAX was established under the auspices of the UN Standing Advisory 
Committee for Security Questions in Central Africa. Grouping all the eleven 
member States of ECCAS, the Committee was instituted by the UN Secretary- 
General on 28 May 1992, pursuant to the resolution of the General Assembly 
(described below). Its mission is "to develop confidence-building measures and to 
encourage arms limitation and development". The Committee held its first meeting 
in Yaounde in 1992, and has since met twice a year at the level of government 
experts, the Council of Ministers of Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs, and 
Heads of State and Government. In addition to COPAX, the Committee assisted 
Central African states in the signing of a Pact of Non-Aggression in 1996 and the 
establishment, in the same year, of the Libreville-based early warning mechanism 
(mecanisme d'alerte rapide). It also commissioned a joint study by the former 
Zaire and the Republic of Congo on the feasibility of a Pact of Mutual Assistance, 
which should then be included in the COPAX. 
The need for inter-state security cooperation in Central Africa arose for the first 
time at the Yaounde Summit of 8 October 1996, when the Heads of State and 
Government of the sub-region decided to create and establish an Early Warning
Politics and Security in Central Africa 97 
Mechanism (EWM) for Central Africa in Libreville Gabon. At a meeting in 
Libreville on 8 May 1997 over the political crisis in Zaire, the political leaders 
agreed on the necessity of creating an inter-state security mechanism and cooperation 
for the prevention and management of conflicts in the sub-region. ECCAS 
Ministers of Defence and Interior deliberated on this idea during their meeting in 
Libreville, from 28 to 30 April 1998. Consensus emerged on the possibility of 
cooperating on defence and security matters at the sub-regional level. The 
Ministers unanimously agreed to form a supreme council whose task was to 
promote peace and to prevent, manage and resolve armed conflicts in Central 
Africa. They subsequently recommended the establishment of such a mechanism 
to the Heads of State and Government. 
A similar decision was reached at the conference on democratic institutions and 
peace in Central Africa, that was held in Bata, Equatorial Guinea from 18 to 20 May 
1998. Expressing concern over the persistence of political crises in the sub-region, 
the participants adopted a document entitled "Bata Declaration for the Promotion 
of Democracy, Peace and Sustainable Development in Central Africa". The 
document concurred with the recommendations of the ECCAS Ministers of 
Defence and Internal Affairs on the need to create a political mechanism whose 
sole aim would be to build confidence and to strengthen cooperation among the 
countries of the sub-region on peace, security and political stability. 
Finally, at ameeting in Yaounde" from 29 to 30 October 1998, ECCAS Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs also discussed the possibility of inter-state cooperation on 
security matters. The Ministers noted "with satisfaction" the progress made by the 
sub-region, notably towards the reduction of political tensions. Alarmed by 
increased insecurity and the illicit traffic of drugs and small arms across the region, 
they urged greater cooperation and dialogue among sub-regional security forces 
over these issues and the adoption of a common strategy to stave off such illegal 
and criminal activities. Above all, recognizing the institutional void on inter-state 
security cooperation, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs concurred with their 
colleagues in charge of Defence and Interior on the need for a legal framework 
aimed at preventing, managing and resolving armed conflicts in the sub-region. 
They, too, agreed to propose to the Heads of State and Government the establishment 
of a Conseil Superieur pour la promotion de lapaix, la prevention, la gestion 
et le reglement des crises politiques et des conflits armes en Afrique centrale. 
The UN General Assembly and Secretary-General have provided significant 
assistance and expertise to ECCAS member States in their search for effective 
inter-state cooperation in security matters. Prominent among UN initiatives for 
Central Africa is the General Assembly's Resolution 46/37, which was adopted 
at the forty-sixth session in December 1991. In it, the General Assembly "welcome[d] 
the initiative taken by ECCAS member States with a view to developing confidence-
building measures, disarmament and development in their sub-region, by.
98 Musifiky Mwanasali 
in particular, the creation, under the auspices of the UN, of a standing advisory 
committee on security questions in Central Africa". That resolution also requested 
"the UN Secretary-General to submit to the [forty-ninth session of the] General 
Assembly a report on the implementation of Resolution 46/37B".10 
Non-Aggression Pact 
Signed in Yaounde on 8 July 1996 by nine ECCAS members, the Non-Aggression 
Pact is one of the three major pillars of inter-state cooperation in Central Africa. 
Although the Pact is short in its wording (6 articles only), it could nonetheless have 
a significant impact on peace and security in the region once it is ratified by 
Member States. Reaffirming their commitment to inter-state cooperation on 
peace and security matters, ECCAS members took the responsibility to refrain in 
their mutual relations from the threat or use of force or aggression, either against 
the territorial integrity or independence of other member States, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or the 
treaty establishing the ECCAS" (Article I). 
Article II calls on member states "to refrain from committing, encouraging 
or supporting acts of hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or 
independence of other Member States". Article III encourages each Member 
State to "ensure that the acts referred to in Article 2 ... are not committed from 
its territory by resident or non-resident aliens against the sovereignty or 
territorial integrity of other Member States". And Article IV concludes the list 
of these bans by offering to Member States the "resort [to] peaceful means to 
settle any differences that may arise among them by having recourse to the 
various relevant mechanisms for resolving conflicts within the ECCAS, the 
OAU and the UN". 
I quoted these four articles in extenso because they show a strong political 
commitment by the leaders of a sub-region that is characterized by all the activities 
that the Non-Agression Pact prohibits. ECCAS Foreign Ministers did not miss this 
paradox when, at a meeting in Yaounde in 1998, they urged the States that are 
signatories to the Pact to ratify it, and those who have not signed it to do so. 
Government experts and the Council of Ministers reiterated a similar request at the 
preparatory meeting of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government in 
Yaounde in February 1999, and in Yaounde in July 1999. Finally, in his welcome 
speech at the Yaounde Summit in February 1999, President Paul Biya of Cameroon 
spoke extensively of the need for governments of the region to show the political 
will to make effective their declarations about inter-state cooperation on security 
matters. He argued that no security mechanism will work effectively to prevent, 
manage or settle political differences within and among ECCAS members if the 
political leaders do not show the political commitment to make it an effective 
instrument for peace in the sub-region.
Politics and Security in Central Africa 99 
Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) 
After several years of lethargy, the sub-region is now determined to effectively 
launch the Libreville-based EWM. A building has been allocated by the Government 
of Gabon and funds secured for its initial operation. The main questions 
currently under debate concern staff recruitment and assistance by the UN and the 
OAU in making it fully operational. The previous debate concerning the relationship 
between COPAX and the EWM was resolved at the Malabo Summit in July 
1999. It was once suggested that the EWM should be directly responsible to the 
Conference of the Heads of State and Government, but independent in its 
administrative and operational activities. Of late, consensus seems to have emerged 
over the need to consolidate existing cooperation arrangements and institutions in 
the sub-region. The argument ran as follows. None of the inter-state organizations 
created in Central Africa has operated effectively. It is unwise to keep on creating 
new institutions or mechanisms when the existing ones are not functioning 
properly. Central African countries should rather harmonize their economic and 
security initiatives and consolidate them into a single organization. However, in 
order for inter-state security cooperation to work effectively and efficiently, the 
organizations created for this task should be flexible and unhindered by a heavy 
bureaucratic structure. 
According to this reasoning, the EWM would become an integral part of 
ECCAS. However, in order to avoid the lethargy that has crippled ECCAS 
Secretariat over the decades, it has been suggested that the post of ECCAS Undersecretary 
General (USG) in charge of peace and security questions be created. The 
EWM would then be placed under the supervision of the USG, while maintaining 
a lean administrative structure and a line of command that will make it flexible and 
fully operational. 
The EWM would accomplish three missions. First, it would regularly monitor 
the political, socio-economic and security situation throughout the sub-region. 
Secondly, it would identify all sources of tensions and detect those that appear 
likely to degenerate into political conflicts. Thirdly, it would be expected to alert 
the political leaders about potential sources of conflict and assist in implementing 
preventive measures decided by the region's political leaders. The proposed 
administrative structure provides for three operational units which would be placed 
under a Technical Coordinator. The first unit would be in charge of policy analysis 
and conflict prevention. The second would deal with peacekeeping and logistics. 
The third would specialize in humanitarian and refugee assistance. Overall, the 
EWM is expected to be lean so as to ensure maximum flexibility, greater 
effectiveness and direct access to ECCAS Heads of State and Government. 
Several conditions ought to be fulfilled if such a structure is to be effective. The 
first concerns the quality of the staff that would perform these tasks. Despite the 
existence of a large pool of expertise in the sub-region on peace, security and
100 Musifiky Mwanasali 
economic matters, the political leaders have over the years chosen not to appoint 
the most qualified people to such highly sensitive positions. Yet the EWM needs 
a professional staff, highly qualified people who are familiar with the techniques 
of data collection and who possess the necessary analytical skills, to operate 
effectively. Secondly, even if the Libreville-based EWM is efficiently run by a 
professional team of the highest calibre, it would still not work properly without 
national and local observatories in different parts of the sub-region to facilitate the 
rapid circulation of early warning information. For example, it is impossible for the 
staff in Libreville to assess accurately and independently that a particular event in 
South Kivu or eastern Burundi, for example, signals potential conflict and 
should therefore be given prompt attention. To ensure effectiveness, it is 
equally important for the sub-region to mandate representatives of "civil society" 
and non-governmental organizations to gather early warning information for its 
use. This collaboration can easily be established at the level of national and local 
observatories. 
These options are nonetheless fraught with many complications. First of all, for 
the national or local observatories to work effectively, they should be independent 
from the security forces and intelligence services of the Member State where they 
are established. This, of course, is not always possible. Central Africa is replete 
with reports of governments denying the existence of a domestic problem (until it 
has got out of hand) or refusing offers of assistance in conflict management by other 
African governments. Moreover, because of their concern for "national security," 
Member States can at any time classify as "sensitive" any information of apolitical 
nature. In such cases, nobody but the appropriate national intelligence agency can 
freely gather or disseminate the relevant information. Examples abound in the subregion 
of representatives of the media or members of non-governmental organizations 
arrested for writing or disseminating so-called "sensitive" stories or 
information. 
The relationship between Governments and civil society is notably fraught with 
suspicion and animosity. On several occasions, sub-regional authorities have tried 
to silence, undermine or keep civil society organizations in check, only to provoke 
the wrath of the international community. 
Relationship Between the EWM, COPAX and ECCAS 
The debate over the nature of the relationship between the EWM and COPAX is 
closely associated with another debate surrounding the nature of COPAX in 
relation to ECCAS. Overall, the lack of consensus over these issues constituted the 
major stumbling block in the development of COPAX's draft statute and protocols. 
Two main conflicting interpretations divided government experts and Council of 
Ministers. The first group supported the institutional separation of COPAX and 
ECCAS, and proposed to turn the former into an independent agency with
Politics and Security in Central Africa 101 
headquarters somewhere other than Libreville, where ECCAS Secretariat is 
temporarily located. Proponents of this option argued that ECCAS was an 
organization that required a complete and time consuming restructuring if it is to 
overcome its weaknesses. Since the Heads of State and Government wanted 
COPAX to be fully established and operational as quickly as possible, they should 
not wait until the restructuring of ECCAS. Furthermore, the peace and security 
mission entrusted to COPAX required flexibility and direct access to the Heads of 
State and Government. Therefore, to make it an organic component of a cumbersome 
and inefficient bureaucratic structure such as ECCAS would render COPAX 
unnecessarily bureaucratic, which would adversely affect fulfillment of its mission. 
ECCAS members should therefore keep economic cooperation separate from 
their concern for peace and security, even if the possibility of collaboration 
between the two organizations on some common projects, such as providing 
assistance to refugees, were to remain open. COPAX should remain a platform for 
political leaders to hold dialogue and consult among themselves on security 
matters. The Summit of the Heads of State and Government would be the sole 
deliberative organ. It would be assisted in its deliberations by the Council of 
Ministers of Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs. A Committee of Ambassadors 
accredited to the UN and the OAU would advise the Council of Ministers and serve 
as its permanent liaison with international organizations and external donors. 
Not everyone agreed with the idea of COPAX becoming an independent 
organization. Two justifications were offered in support of this opposition. Some 
noted that the sub-region always seemed to rush into the decision to create new 
institutions when all the existing ones barely functioned. It was therefore argued 
that the sub-region should first strive to revitalize and restructure the organizations 
created so far before thinking about new ones. At the meeting of government 
experts and the Council of Ministers in Yaounde in February 1999, some delegates 
even sought to do away with the idea of COPAX on the ground that the sub-region 
did not need a security mechanism but did need a strong commitment to make the 
EWM fully operational. Furthermore, it was argued that the sub-region should 
seriously consider the financial difficulties confronting the existing organizations 
and resolve them prior to the creation of new agencies. Questions were raised as 
to why the Heads of State and Government of the sub-region would decide to 
establish COPAX as an independent institution when they lacked the financial 
autonomy to effectively run ECCAS, the EWM and other sub-regional organizations? 
Others argued that it was desirable for COPAX to keep its organizational and 
operational autonomy, the sub-regional mechanism should remain an integral part 
of ECCAS. The post of an Under Secretary-General of ECCAS should be instituted 
to oversee COPAX operations and liaise with the Council of Ministers and the 
Heads of State. COPAX should therefore remain what the name "Superieur 
Council" suggests, that is, a platform for the Heads of State and Government to
102 Musifiky Mwanasali 
deliberate and initiate policies on peace and security matters. In this connection, it 
was suggested that, rather than setting COPAX as another sub-regional organization 
with its own administrative structure, the Heads of State and Government 
should consider making the EWM the Technical Secretariat of COPAX. In 
conformity with its role of assisting political leaders in the management of peace 
and security in the sub-region, the EWM would then advise the Summit of the 
Heads of State. It would also implement and follow up on the Summit's decisions 
and keep the records of sub-regional deliberations and decisions on peace and 
security matters. 
This, in bold strokes, was the substance of the debate over the nature of COPAX 
and its relationship with the existing sub-regional organizations and institutional 
arrangements. As is often the case, when arguments and counter arguments are 
made, the technical issues were either ignored or marginalised; or considerations 
of purely "national interests" took precedence over them thereby stalling the entire 
decision-making process. During the drafting of the ECCAS security mechanism 
an impasse of this kind occurred because governments of the sub-region chose to 
rely primarily on their experts. In so doing, they allowed real and imagined national 
concerns to dominate and complicate the discussions and thereby obfuscate the 
technical demands of the mechanism. This was most evident in Yaounde last 
February during the meeting of government experts and the Council of Ministers. 
Happily, the Heads of State broke the impasse by integrating the COPAX into the 
ECCAS and establishing the post of USG in charge of security matters. They also 
promised to set funds aside for the revitalization of ECCAS. 
A Sub-Regional Parliament? 
While ECCAS and its organic units (COPAX and the EWS) are struggling to 
regain a new life and become fully operational, a different idea has quietly gained 
ground among the political leaders of the sub-region. It is the idea of a subregional 
parliament, which entered the discourse on peace and security in the 
sub-region for the first time at the conference on democratic institutions and 
peace in Central Africa." In his opening statement at that conference. President 
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea made an impassioned 
defense of the linkages between democracy, peace and social justice. He 
eloquently argued that peace and security could not be achieved "without giving 
[the people] the opportunity to participate in the political process of the State, in 
order to build their own future". President Nguema even suggested that "centres 
of tension in Central Africa [...] appear when the imperatives of social justice 
and participatory government are lacking".12 He concluded his speech by 
proposing the establishment of a "sub-regional parliamentary assembly responsible 
for protecting the interests of the people". Central Africa, President 
Nguema asserted, must find:
Politics and Security in Central Africa 103 
the necessary means of achieving good governance and rational management 
in order to promote the economic development, peace, security and 
well-being of our nations and to consolidate African solidarity, mutual 
governmental support and cooperation in national development.14 
As proposed by the Equatorial Guinea President, the sub-regional parliament 
will constitute the third pillar of inter-state security cooperation in Central Africa, 
alongside COPAX and the EWM. It is the political framework that would 
harmonize peace, security and economic cooperation and generate the political 
will to bring together the peoples of the Central African sub-region through their 
elected representatives. In this context, the proposed sub-regional parliament 
would be a pre-eminent platform for the promotion of democratic values and 
practices, as well as the creation and dissemination of a culture of tolerance and 
peace among the peoples of Central Africa. 
The idea of a sub-regional parliament rests on the fundamental democratic 
principle of popular sovereignty. While the Heads of State and Government have 
achieved significant progress towards the establishment of a sub-regional security 
mechanism and various instruments for securing peace, it behoves them to involve 
the people of the sub-region in the implementation of these peace and security 
arrangements. After all, the people are the primary victims of mounting instability 
and the proliferation of political tensions and armed conflicts across the region. 
Therefore, they have a sovereign stake in matters of peace and security there. 
If it ever becomes operational, the sub-regional parliament would achieve 
several objectives. Chief among them would be the harmonization of parliamentary 
procedures for the ratification of treaties and accords signed by the executive 
authority. Secondly, there exists at the moment no institutional oversight of the 
political and security agreements that the Heads of State usually sign but rarely care 
to implement. A sub-regional parliament would thus establish a system of 
accountability that would compel the Heads of State to live by their political 
engagements. A third objective concerns the development of common regulations 
on trade, migration and population movement across the sub-region. The protection 
of the rights of the people against state violence or brutality is another priority, 
as is the rendering of justice to those who have been victims of discrimination based 
on gender, religious, ethnic or regional identity. The sub-regional parliament may 
sponsor cultural and artistic exchanges among the people and fund activities ai med 
at promoting the culture of peace and tolerance in the sub-region. Finally, it would 
be in charge of budget authorization and the appropriation of funds for all subregional 
organizations. 
Conclusion 
Despite personal animosities, ideological differences and sharp disagreements
104 Musifiky Mwanasali 
over matters of mutual concern, the Heads of State and Government of the subregion 
have shown an inclination to agree on common issues, as well as take 
significant decisions to build political confidence, promote peace and security, and 
promote economic cooperation and integration in the sub-region. More progress 
needs to be made primarily towards the implementation of such decisions, and the 
encouragement of the peoples of the sub-region to participate in designing and 
implementing the political and security architecture that would guarantee them 
their basic life entitlements. 
Observers of the political and security situation in Central Africa agree that 
today's security environment is not qualitatively different from that which prevailed 
a decade ago. Political tensions, armed conflicts and general insecurity 
continue unabated. However, it should be noted that the political leaders in the subregion 
are now bolder than before in their determination to openly tackle the issues 
that they used to skirt around not long ago. By itself, this political courage is 
noteworthy. 
Still, political dissent is still ruthlessly suppressed, though modest gains have been 
made in other areas by the political opposition and civil society organizations among 
others. Gradually, non-governmental organizations have emboldened themselves by 
taking on abusive regimes throughout the sub-region. Some political space has been 
gained through this persistent struggle, which is equally remarkable. 
Economic conditions have not improved for the majority of the population of 
the sub-region, and there is no hope of changing these conditions soon, particularly 
when one takes into account the enormous cost of civil violence and strife 
throughout the sub-region. In this context, the idea of a sub-regional parliament is 
propitious, particularly if it would enable the people of Central Africa to pressure 
their leaders to accelerate the process of sub-regional economic integration and 
allow greater popular participation in the exploitation of the vast mineral resources 
and arable land which are being exploited for private gain. It is encouraging to see 
the Heads of State and Government commit themselves, as they now do; but this 
task is too important to be left solely to them. 
Notes 
* International Peace Academy, and Sarah Lawrence College, New York, 
USA. The opinions expressed in this article are mine. 
1. The DRC was recently admitted as a member of the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC). 
2. Notable among them is the Economic Community of Central African States, 
ECCAS, or, as it is known in French, Communaute Economique des Etats 
d'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC). Based in Brazzaville, the ECCAS is soon to 
be chaired by Equatorial Guinea. Another was the defunct CEPGL, 
Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs, grouping the former
Politics and Security in Central Africa 105 
Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi. All that remains of the CEPGL are a few identity 
cards, called CEPGL cards, still in use until the onset of the war in August 
1998, for border crossing between the DRC and Burundi. 
3. Gabon, Congo, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea 
and Chad use the CFA. Rwanda has the "Franc rwandais," Burundi the "Franc 
burundais," Sao Tome and Principe the "dobra," and Angola the "new 
kwanza." It is not unusual for many to concurrently use more than one 
currency. In the DRC, for example, there are three "national" currencies: the 
new "Franc Congolais" (Congolese franc), introduced with much fanfare in 
June 1998, the old "new zaire" inherited from the Mobutu era of high inflation 
and seniority, and the US dollar, the preferred currency since the early 1990s. 
4. UNDP. Human Development Report 1997. (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), pp. 146-148. 
5. Gabon, the country that is the most frequently associated with these practices, 
cites the great movement of refugees and armed elements from neighboring 
Congo, as well as the economic and social problems wrought by the presence 
of illegal immigrants from West Africa, as the major justification for its tough 
immigration policy. 
6. United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in 
Central Africa. United Nations Concern for Peace and Security in Central 
Africa. (New York: United Nations, 1997), p. I. 
7. Ibid., p. 1. 
8. These are small bands of armed robbers that cause much insecurity to traders 
and their produce mainly in Cameroon and Central Africa. They also operate, 
especially in the Central African Republic, as poachers, illegally hunting rare 
and protected species. The weapons used in the commission of these crimes 
come from two main supply channels that allegedly include demobilized 
fighters in Chad and army deserters in Central Africa. 
9. Eight Heads of State and Government and one Vice-President participated in 
the Summit and signed the decision establishing a security mechanism for 
Central Africa. Rwanda and Angola did not attend the Summit. 
10. For the reports of the UN Secretary-General dealing with the UN Standing 
Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and the most 
relevant resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council, see 
Notes 6 above. 
11. UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. 
Subregional Conference on Democratic Institutions and Peace in Central 
Africa. Conference Report. (New York: United Nations, 1999). The Conference 
was held in Bata, Equatorial Guinea, from 18 to 21 May 1998. 
14. Ibid., p. 17-18. 
15. Ibid., p. 18.