Afr.j. polil. sci. (1999), Vol. 4 No. 1, 21-39 
From "eco-pessimism" to 
"eco-optimism" — ECOMOG and The 
West African Integration Process 
Emmanuel Kwesl Aning* 
Introduction 
Enduring international cooperation is increasingly becoming crucial in tackling 
many transnational crises, not least security-related issues.1 The concept of 
security and putting it into operation with respect to Africa has been in flux, most 
especially in the post-cold war period. Under the previous bi-polar system, 
Africa's security dilemmas and predicaments and their resolution were closely 
linked to the nature of the international system. As a result, "local" security issues 
and conflicts were usually projected onto the international scene. However, since 
1990 perceptible changes have occurred with the marginalisation of the African 
continent. In spite of this, the constraints which hitherto hindered African 
organisations from defining and resolving regional security problems have to a 
large extent been removed and a renewed sense of dynamism is being experienced. 
A typical case is the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)2 
intervention in Liberia in 1989 and the resolution of its crisis in 1997. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse what I see as the transformation of 
ECOWAS from an economic integration scheme to include a security dimension; 
as a change from the debilitating effects of "eco-pessimism" to one of "ecooptimism". 
This analysis will be undertaken within the context of ECOWAS's 
intervention in and resolution of the Liberian crisis. To do this, the paper uses the 
following five fold holistic and integrated approach (i) conceptual clarification of 
security regimes; (ii) ECOWAS's security regime and its institutional design; (iii) 
regime response to and regulatory mechanisms in Liberia; (iv) the determinants of 
regime action effectiveness; and finally (v) the constraints and prospects for 
ECOWAS's security regime for the integration process. 
1027-035.1 0 IW9 African Association of Political Science
22 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
Security Regimes: Concepts and Clarification 
There are doctrinal squabbles concerning the effectiveness of international institutions 
in resolving security dilemmas.3 Neo-realism, for example has challenged 
the importance of international institutions or regimes in restraining state conduct. 
According to neo-realists, multilateral institutions are either paper tigers, or 
"scraps of paper"4 or symbolic epiphenomena of the activities of a hegemonic 
state/ that it is not able to extend beyond the alliance system dictated by the 
"anarchy" of the international system. However, in this paper, I apply a modified 
neo-liberal institutionalist approach to demonstrate that institutions do matter. The 
assertion is that ECOWAS's security regime should be seen as institutionalist 
because of the role played by transnational actors. Its common institutions are 
indispensable and the core body of experts at its secretariat are important players. 
Finally, it seeks the promotion of collective action to engender welfare.*1 
A regime is a set of "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actor interests converge in a given issue area".7 Principles and norms 
impart an expectation of reciprocity and are the defining features of regimes. Such 
rules and procedures may alter over time as conditions change, but they must 
remain consistent with the norms underpinning the regime. While retaining the 
Krasnerian notion as the basic conceptual framework, I argue that there is the need 
to reduce the spectre of fuzziness to which regime analysis is vulnerable. In 
becoming narrowed to tackle specific issue areas, regimes become differentiated 
from other international structures in the sense that they become "social institutions 
governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities".8 
Uncertainties abound concerning the extent to which regime theory is applicable 
to security. This controversy arose primarily because of its earlier narrow 
application to the "Concert of Europe" that became a paradigm for security 
regimes." However, I argue that the theory can be fruitfully applied to security if 
restricted to sub-areas of security policy where significant potential forcooperative 
behaviour is present. For instance, Miiller has recently applied regimes to several 
sub-areas of the security issue where systems of principles, norms, rules, and 
procedures regulate certain aspects of security relationships between states.'" 
The determining factors for identifying the existence of regimes are the 
presence of all four elements. The incentives inherent in the establishment of 
security regimes and the obstacles involved in so doing are particularly enhanced 
in the security discussion because of the security dilemma. These occur when 
states, in seeking power and security for themselves, threaten the power and 
security aspirations of others. Although effective security regimes arc difficult to 
attain, their value lies in their ability to regulate individual state action by limiting 
the cost of hostilities and the degree of suspicion. These arise from the pure realist 
state-centric world in which expansionist states will seek to gain resources through 
opportunistic behaviour at the expense of their neighbours. Under security
From "eco-pessiniism" to "eco-optimism" 23 
regimes, such individualistic state actions are not only dangerous but also costly. 
They can however be curtailed through improved bindingness}' This will normally 
be associated with a reduction in sovereignty in exchange for greater 
institutionalisation since it would be dangerous and costly in credibility and 
security for cheaters and deserters to find a substitute for a structurally advanced 
security mechanism.12 
Other difficulties of achieving a functional security regime can be explained 
within the context of the in-built fears and suspicions in the state system. That one 
state can or will violate the common understanding is a potent motivator for each 
state to undertake individualistic policies although each would otherwise prefer 
regime action. Thus, what is critical here is the extent to which state compliance 
with regime requirements can be reconciled; that is how mechanisms that secure 
compliance are instituted. It is important that in discussing such issues, one looks 
for situations in which states would have behaved differently had they not been part 
of regimes. It can be argued that it is only when compliance is considered 
inconvenient - that is when regime rules either conflict with or are incompatible 
with states' perceptions of what their self-interest would be were there no such 
institutions — that the impact of a regime is tested. During instances of such 
inconvenient commitments one would expect that, if regimes were unimportant 
their rules would be violated, and that in so far as rules are complied with it is then 
possible to deduce that regimes have had an impact. Analysing ECOWAS's 
security regime involves examining the processes of decision making and the 
effect of regime principles, norms, and rules on the manner in which decisionmakers 
frame regime action. As a prerequisite to examining cases of state 
compliance with security regime decisions, there had to be controversy about 
whether regime compliance was in the best interest of individual states. 
Two sets of questions should be asked to distinguish between (i) security regime 
formation in West Africa, and (ii) the characterisation of regime strength in terms 
of compliance. First, what conditions are conducive to the formation and maintenance 
of ECOWAS's security regime? To what extent can one argue that it is when 
major actors prefer status quo maintenance it can be deduced that a condition for 
the formation and maintenance of a security regime is present? Secondly, what 
processes and procedures are established to elicit compliance? In relating these 
questions to the empirical study, the extent to which status quo advancement was 
the primary reason for the establishment of this regime is not clear. Some 
importance must however, be placed on the role played by individual state 
perception of security against that identified by the regime as its prevalent security 
problem. It is the divergent perception of regime interest compared with individual 
state perception of what its interests and security would be that created the 
"controversy" about state compliance with ECOWAS's Liberia policies. Controversies 
concerning state compliance with regime policy are important, since
24 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
eliciting such compliance become a real test for regime effectiveness and strength. 
In contrast to its "post-Concert of Europe" application by Jervis, and Miiller' s more 
recent Eurocentric application, this article applies security regimes, not only to an 
African context, but also to one with special challenges: namely responding to the 
challenge posed by sub-state level factions or groups. 
Establishing ECOWAS's Security Regime 
Of relevance to this paper are the key questions why, when and how are security 
regimes established?11 What factors contribute to security regime formation? Is it 
the relations and patterns of military and economic power among states that 
determine security regime formation? For the purposes of this paper, ECOWAS's 
security framework is a regime with agreed upon principles, norms, procedures 
and programmes that regulate activities and mould the expectations of actors in a 
specific issue area. This has evolved within a framework in which the use of force 
by individual member states is constrained by a balance of power or mutual 
deterrence. 
At ECOWAS's establishment, the representatives of 15 member states affirmed 
their commitment to '"create a homogenous society, leading to the unity of the 
countries of West Africa".'" The Authority, theoretically controls decision making, 
but in reality decides in concert with experts and consultants at the secretariat 
whose decisions, reports and recommendations on technical issues constitute 
important inputs into decision making. According to Okolo, these "enjoy significant 
latitude ... and above all, serves as the engine room of the community".15 
Under this treaty no precise security arrangements were provided for. Despite these 
deficiencies, subsequent ECOWAS summits increasingly focused on security 
issues and the need for evolving a collective defence strategy. At the third summit 
in Lagos, Nigeria in 1978. a Protocol on Non-Aggression was adopted. This sought 
to create "an atmosphere, free of any fear of attack or aggression of one state by 
another".16 Julius Okolo, interpreted this protocol as "representing] a valuable 
statement of intent and a demonstration of the good will that exists among the 
national leaders of the West African region ... [and] signifies the will ingness and 
commitment by member states to restrict their sovereignty in a new era".17 
Innovative as the non-aggression treaty was, the signatory states overlooked 
two important security issues that were relevant to West Africa, namely: (i) the 
incidence of external aggression, and (ii) externally subsidized domestic insurrection 
and revolt within the community. Due to worsening politico-military situations, 
two independent unsolicited proposals were presented by Togo and Senegal 
in 1979. '* These proposals requested the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and 
the Executive Secretary to "convene a meeting of the technical commission of 
ministers to consider the said documents and submit a harmonized draft defence 
pact to the next summit.'" Subsequently, an eight-nation ministerial committee was
From "eco-pessimism" to "eco-optimism" 25 
established to examine and present a revised version of this document in May 1980. 
The Council failed to reach a unanimous consensus whereupon the matter was 
referred to the Authority at its meeting in Lome\ Togo. Here, Senegal argued 
against the exclusion of those countries which did not wish to join a defence pact. 
Togo argued that a mutual defence protocol was a "logical follow-up to the signing 
of the non-aggression protocol".2" In 1981, therefore, the omissions from the 1978 
protocol were presumably dealt with by the ratification of the Protocol Relating to 
Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD). This protocol, which took effect in 1986, 
merely sketched the outlines for tackling "internal armed conflict within any 
member state engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger 
the security and peace in the entire community".21 Radio Nigeria evaluated the 
PMAD " as a first step towards an attempt for a collective defence system for the 
West African sub-region".22 
A combination of these two protocols and their constitutive principles sought to 
establish a security framework and to provide specific blueprints and limitations 
for state action. The main hypothesis for applying security and regime concepts to 
ECOWAS is that ECOWAS forms a subsystem with a tacit aim of ensuring and 
securing sub-regional stability. It comprises a regime with rules, norms and 
principles that member slates should adhere to. Non-compliance with regime rules, 
norms and principles or perceived threats to accepted rules, norms and principles 
by either member states or other external forces can lead to either coercive or 
diplomatic response by other regime members. The regime's constitutive principles 
and rules are encompassed in the Protocols of 1978 and 1981 and the revised 
Treaty of 1993.2' ECOWAS provides the formal organisational framework through 
which its security regime finds institutional expression. The rules and decisionmaking 
procedures consist of the bi-annual intergovernmental meetings introduced 
since September 1997. In certain instances, extraordinary and ad hoc 
meetings can be summoned. At these meetings, the secretariat's administration and 
the regime's leadership attempts to strategise and enforce legislation are reviewed. 
This paper's focus, therefore, is not only on ECOWAS's institutionalizalion of 
collective defence promotion and the implicit indication to signatory states of 
support in periods of crisis, but also on the factual extension of such expected 
support. The argument is that the Defence Protocols represent a subsystem with a 
view to enhancing sub-regional stability. They constitute a regime with rules, 
norms, principles and decision-making processes which member states and their 
leaders should adhere to. Although it is distinct in its functional scope, geographical 
domain, membership and organisational structure, ECOWAS's security regime 
provides a framework of cooperation among its member states in order to 
accomplish a distinctive set of policy goals governed by African norms and values. 
Non-compliance with regime rules or perceived threats to conventional precepts 
often lead to coercive or diplomatic responses by the regime or individual regime
26 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
members24 as a clear demonstration of change from one of "eco-pessimissm" to 
"eco-optimism". Apart from providing rules and procedures for state behaviour, 
ECOWAS's security regime seeks to: 
• distinguish and concentrate on specific problems; 
• engender and advance reliable exchange of information and knowledge; 
• intensify confidence and security building measures and understanding among 
states; 
• facilitate negotiation and issue linkage among states; and 
• enforce, monitor and verify rules and guidelines underpinning cooperative 
ventures. 
Despite the generally perceived hegemonic tendencies exhibited by Nigeria, the 
security regime in West Africa has not been imposed from above.25 This paper 
argues that ECOWAS's security regime exists because of a convergence of 
interests shared by most ECOWAS member states in pursuing common interests 
and in avoiding certain common outcomes relative to ECOWAS's specific security 
preoccupations. 
Institutional Design and Decision-making Processes. 
Diverse institutional mechanisms and administrative arrangements were established 
to become operative in times of crisis. Under the PMAD, divisions from the 
armies of ECOWAS member states constitute an Allied Armed Force of the 
Community [AAFC] under a Community commander. Ministers of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs of member states constitute a Defence Council under the current 
Chairmanship of the Authority and the Chiefs of Staff of member states form the 
Defence Commission. Provision was also made for a Deputy Executive Secretary 
to be responsible for Military Affairs.2'1 
Procedures were established that dealt with (i) how an assaulted state should 
contact the defence structure; and (ii) what types of conflict were envisaged by the 
two Protocols as warranting community intervention. Three types of antagonistic 
military gesture were broadly agreed upon: (i) aggression from non-member states; 
(ii) conflict between member states and finally (iii) internal conflict in a member 
state. Attached to these three relatively well-defined areas were procedural and 
administrative arrangements for communication with the Secretariat for subsequent 
decision by the Authority. Under point one, upon receiving a request for 
assistance from a member state, the Authority meets to decide the expediency of 
military action and entrust subsequent enforcement to the force commander.27 
With the second point, the Authority would meet urgently to act accordingly for 
mediation in the form of deploying the AAFC as a peacekeeping force.28 Finally, 
point three states that when a conflict is actively maintained and sustained from 
outside, the Authority will take action as with point one. Significantly however, in 
situations where the conflict remained purely internal, there would be no commu-
From "eco-pessimism " to "eco-optimism " 27 
nity action.29 The PM AD provided for the establishment of aDefence Council30 and 
a Defence Commission.31 The Defence Council, Commission, and Authority 
would assist the force commander during interventions.32 The Authority, Defence 
Ministers and Chiefs of Staff formed a triumvirate that would decide whether to 
intervene or not. It also provided for a Deputy Executive Secretary for Defence.33 
Based on these points, it can be argued that the procedural aspects of the PMAD 
were overlooked which undermined the institutional capacity of ECOWAS to 
function optimally. 
How did these institutions react in times of real crisis? What ad hoc new 
institutions, if any, were established during an actual conflict situation? If so, what 
was the nature of coordination between the old and new institutional structures? 
For analytical purposes several issues arise. First, by August 1990 none of these 
institutions were in existence. Since they were designed as integral parts of the 
PMAD's decision-making structure dealing with questions of intervention in any 
security situation, the Council and Authority could not have taken any decision. 
Secondly, the PMAD does not make for an alternative institutional set-up for the 
independent performance of the Defence Commission if the Defence Council (i) 
is not functional or (ii) has not been established. Thirdly, the decision to intervene 
undermines the principle of unanimity that governs decision-making in the 
ECOWAS. The PMAD never established voting procedures for the working of the 
Authority that was expected to reach decisions concerning the community either 
through a consensus or outright majority. This last point was resolved at the 
Bamako extraordinary summit held in November 1990, and ensured consensus on 
the Authority forECOWAS's Peace Plan.34 The situation in Liberia, both before 
and after, the intervention reflected the performance of ad hoc institutions (see 
Figure 1 on p 151). It resulted not only in a certain level of disjointed action, but 
also in dysfunctional parallelism about the decision making processes. 
My basic argument is that for an effective security regime to exist, cooperation 
must take place according to the rules and principles that have been formally 
accepted by the parties concerned. Agreed mechanisms are required for maintaining 
the behaviour of parties and their compliance with agreements. In ECOWAS's 
case, several factors accounted for the non-establishment of the PMAD's institutional 
framework. First, this related to the latent distrust and doubts about Nigeria's 
intentions among its community partners, and the sub-regional hegemon's own 
domestic and international difficulties. Second, the institutional and financial 
weakness of the Executive Secretariat prevented it from performing beyond the 
narrow confines within which its formal structure defined its existence and 
performance until 1988. Thus, by the time of ECOWAS's intervention, the PMAD 
was nothing more than an instrument of declaratory policy.35
28 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
Regime Response to State Collapse 
This section deals with the response of the ECOWAS security regime to the 
Liberi an crisis, and discusses the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements set 
up by ECOWAS. The Liberian crisis started with an uprising by Charles Taylor's 
forces - National Patriotic Front of Liberia [NPFL] - on 24 December 1989. By 
April 1990 the NPFL claimed to effectively control over 90% of Liberian territory 
with the exception of Monrovia and its environs. Charles Taylor's expectation of 
support from Nimba county did not materialise, leading to serious setbacks for the 
NPFL.36 This opinion contrasts sharply with Max Sesay's assertion of "popular 
euphoria" for Taylor's invasion of Liberia from neighbouring countries in 1989.37 
However, thischanged when Liberia's incumbent President, Samuel Doe, mounted 
a massive but ineffective counter-insurgency campaign supported by US and 
Israeli counter-insurgency officers.3* Rather quickly, the insurgency degenerated 
intoethnic killings and aggravated an already severe insecurity situation.79 By May 
1990, the tidal waves of refugees forced across Liberia's contiguous borders into 
Cote d'lvoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone40 had reached crisis proportions. Through 
continuing internal disturbances, gross human rights abuses and demands for 
democratization, the "situation in Liberia ha[d] gone beyond the boundaries of the 
country and cease[d] to be an exclusive Liberian question".41 Liberia was totally 
incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community and its 
collapse not only imperilled its own citizens but threatened sub-regional stability. 
Liberia by mid-1990 was a "risky" and failed state.42 
It is against this background that ECOWAS's Thirteenth Summit of the Heads 
of State and Government meeting in Banjul. The Gambia in May 1990 discussed 
the Liberian crisis.43 Nigeria's Ibrahim Babangida argued for the establishment of 
a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to "intervene in timely fashion, whenever 
... disputes arise".44 In agreeing to establish a parallel institutional framework, the 
Authority affirmed that regional security and stability, as well as peace and 
concord, were necessary conditions for effective sub-regional cooperation and 
integration.45 
Comprising five member states, The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo, 
SMC membership was to be reviewed every three years. Structurally, a state under 
attack had to inform the Executive Secretary in writing of its intention to refer the 
matter to the SMC for settlement. Based on the procedural and organizational 
measures instituted under the SMC, Samuel Doe addressed a letter to the SMC. 
Here, Doe requested "assistance] in finding a constitutional and reasonable 
resolution" to the crisis engulfing Liberia. Crucially, Doe advanced his own 
proposals for resolving the conflict. The Liberian leader argued that, "it would 
seem most expedient at this time to introduce an ECOWAS Peace-keeping force 
into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension".46 The contents of Doe's 
letter contradict Ofuatey-Kodjoe's assertion that "Doc made an appeal to
From "eco-pessimism" to "eco-optimism" 29 
Nigeria and Togo for help to quell the insurrection. This led to the ECOWAS 
intervention".47 
Political and Military Agenda 
ECOWAS intervened on four major grounds, namely: (i) military-humanitarian 
considerations; (ii) the provisions under the two Defence Protocols; (iii) the peace 
and security of the region; and (v) that it was responding to the invitation of the "de 
jure" government in Liberia. The SMC's first strategy consisted of a set of 
interrelated policies based on mediation and negotiation that sought to find a 
political solution to the engulfing crisis.4" This resulted in an appeal for a cease-fire 
in Liberia, a proposal for the establishment of an interim government and 
establishment of an ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring group [ECOMOG].49 From 
May to mid-August 1990, the SMC supported by the Executive Secretary of 
ECOWAS, Abbas Bundu, presented diverse diplomatic strategies for finding a 
political conclusion to Liberia's crisis.50 NPFL intransigence led to the breakdown 
of the diplomatic process which otherwise had the support of remnants of the 
Armed Forces of Liberia [AFL], and Prince Yeduo Johnson's Independent 
National Liberation Front of Liberia [INPFL]. A complex convergence of related 
incidents internal to Liberia, the region and internationally, however, made the 
SMC change tactic. It now implemented a multi-track scheme characterized by the 
simultaneous pursuance of peace through diplomacy and the initiation of its 
historic "Operation Liberty" peace-keeping process by sending in ECOMOG 
troops. Without obtaining consent from the major faction, and with no peace to 
keep, the supposed peace-keeping activities were hurriedly suspended. 
Within weeks of launching "Operation Liberty", the strategy was modified to 
enforcement measures as a response to severe NPFL resistance. Under the new 
twin trajectories of diplomacy and enforcement measures, a series of peace accords 
and agreements were signed.51 These agreements encompassed most of the various 
initiatives towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict by ECOWAS. The first 
tactic involved negotiations followed by mediation efforts which became the basis 
for the peace plan of November 1990. Strategics for eliciting compliance from 
faction groups consisted of (i) a Peace Plan; (ii) encampment and disarmament of 
warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG; and (iii) the 
establishment of transitional institutions to conduct elections. To facilitate the 
achievement of these objectives, a general embargo was placed on all weapons and 
military equipment entering Liberia except those intended for ECOMOG forces.52 
Irrespective of the intentions behind the diverse components of these Accords. 
ECOMOG was unable to see to their implementation.53 
To attain peace in Liberia, ECOWAS's peace agreements emphasized a 
continuum of action from cease-fire through disarmament and demobilization to 
the holding of elections. Components of these agreements could be divided into
30 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
two: political and military. At the militarily level, the agreements provided for a 
cease-fire and outlined steps for the encampment, disarmament and demobilization 
of military units. To prevent violations of the cease-fire agreements a Joint 
Cease-Fire Monitoring Committee [JCMC]54 was established, and a United Nations 
Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to monitor and verify the progress 
of the demilitarisation components of the agreements, which had no precedent in 
peacekeeping history, was deployed.55 Politically, there was agreement on the 
establishment of a Liberian Transitional National Government (LNTG),56 and on 
the modalities for presidential and general elections to be supervised by a reconstituted 
Electoral Commission. Based on the Cotonou Agreement of 1993 and, 
in consultation with ECOMOG, ten e icampment sites were identified and proportionally 
distributed among the factions, two for the AFL, four for the NPFL/ 
NPRAG and four fora new group, the United Liberation Movement for Democracy 
in Liberia [ULIMO]. The parties agn-ed to the simultaneous disarmament of their 
forces, and the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. 
Although different accords were signed, aimed at restoring peace and security 
in Liberia, I have chosen to emphasise the special features of the Abuja II Accord 
for several reasons." First, Abuja II suceeded in improving the adversarial 
relationship between Charles Taylor and Nigeria. Secondly, it widened and 
deepened consensus among West African states on Liberia. Finally, it introduced 
the direct involvement of factional leaders in implementing the accord. This 
agreement also marked a major departure from previous strategies on the disarmament 
question. After seven years of non-compliance, Abuja II strategically shifted 
responsibility for the success of the disarmament process entirely to the faction 
leaders. For the first time, faction leaders, were personally held responsible for the 
non-compliance of their combatants. Abuja II also stipulated deadlines and 
imposed penalties for non-compliance. Finally, introducing this pro-active 
approach signalled to the factional leaders the introduction of a more interventionist 
and robust role for ECOMOG and UNOMIL in guaranteeing the disarmament 
component of Abuja II. 
Abuja II also changed implementation delays by introducing a stringent 
sanctions regime, and regulatory mechanisms. These included: travel and residence 
restrictions; freezing of business activities and assets of leading faction 
leaders in ECOWAS states; exclusion from participation in the electoral process; 
restrictions on the use of ECOWAS airspace and territorial waters; expulsion of 
faction leaders and members of their families from ECOWAS states; request to the 
United Nations Security Council to impose visa and import restrictions and finally 
invoking the OAU summit resolution, which calls for the establishment of a war 
crimes tribunal to judge all human rights offences.5" According to T.M. Shelpedi, 
Abuja II contributed in a "large extent (to] successful [disarmament] in the 
Liberian peace process".™
From "eco-pessimism " to "eco-optimism " 31 
Determinants of Effectiveness 
How does one determine security regime action effectiveness? Effectiveness is a 
contested nation. Variations in potential definitions and evaluation of regime 
effectiveness rely on the nature of the standard used. In this paper, I am interested 
in the notion of effectiveness in terms of whether ECOWAS resolved the security 
problems it was devised to address. In discussing regime actions in Liberia, an 
essential question is: how does ECOWAS's regime advance compliance and 
behaviourial changes in line with its rules, regulations and norms? There are two 
clusters of issues here. The first is the matter of state compliance with regime 
norms; and the second is with respect to compliance by Liberia's armed factions. 
As I have argued elsewhere,'10 even though the Liberian crisis involved a coterie of 
external actors, all discussion of compliance and behaviourial change should 
encompass the two groups above. To assess security regime action effectiveness, 
the analytical framework proposed by Noaini Weinberger61 will be adopted. This 
encompasses five variables which are divided into Contextual and Operational 
factors. Contextual variables comprise two components: (i) consent of parties; (ii) 
and degree of progress in peace-making. Operational factors, on the other hand, 
encompass: (i) mandate definition; (ii) coordination; and finally (iii) capabilities.62 
Since the prospects for achieving behaviourial change which regimes seek to 
promote, depend substantially on factors that are external to the international 
institution itself they will depend partly on the concerns of the actors involved. The 
nature of the issue area is also important. The complexity of the Liberian crisis 
which ECOWAS/ECOMOG succeeded in resolving arose from the number and 
diversity of the actors involved. Furthermore, international distress to "do something 
about the problem" can be intensified by a worsening situation [escalation of 
violence, increased outflow of refugees, worsening economic situation, contagion 
effects of crisis]. 
Closely related to institutional design and effectiveness are the concepts of 
monitorability and verification. By these I mean the ability to supervise and 
authenticate cither the functioning of dominant actors [i.e. factional groups] or 
mechanisms [referring to political/military aspects of the peace process, i.e. ceasefire, 
encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration] or the fulfilment 
of latent obligations. The ability to achieve stated strategies is based on several 
factors. Among them are monitoring and data collection infrastructures, and not 
least the political characteristics of the societies, states or factional groups 
involved. Perceptions of regime ability to verify agreements are crucial in influencing 
the consent of actors either to bargain, sign agreements or most decisively to 
fulfil agreements. Thus, to succeed, a regime must make a difference. Its institutions, 
rules and procedures must transform processes either directly or indirectly 
through their effects on the patterns of power, interest or influence. The key issue, 
therefore, is to examine institutional plans or external factors not in isolation, but
32 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
rather in the context of how they interact. Some of the factors which are critical to 
ascertaining the effectiveness of ECOWAS's security regime are: 
a) character and frame of rules; 
b) manner in which political and legally binding provisions are combined; 
c) the mechanisms by which rules are revised; 
d) the structure and role of secretariat; and 
e) processes for resource relocation among participants which can decisively 
influence patterns of interests and capacity. 
Thus, the effectiveness of a regime hinges on the extent to which a combination 
of these institutional attributes and mechanisms are developed in such a manner as 
to motivate and associate actors in a way that encourages preferred modification 
in conduct. 
The implementing processes for the regime's commitments were based on three 
interrelated factors: (i) degree of concern about the problem; (ii) the formation and 
support of commitments; and (iii) the ability to execute obligations. An effective 
regime is one whose institutions, and not least rules and procedures adjust to 
external determinants and processes in order that the conduct of pertinent actors is 
altered in line with its objectives. The argument here is that these factors were 
specific both to the situation in question and to the issue area implicated. A key 
characteristic of ECOWAS's effectiveness was its flexibility and the capacity to 
adapt its institutions, rules and procedures in a timely manner in the light of its 
experience with implementation and as patterns of power, interest, influence, 
knowledge, capacity and concern changed. The developmental process which 
ECOWAS has undergone from the initial discussions concerning the inclusion of 
security related protocols, to the eventual ratification of the PMAD, has in a manner 
demonstrated not only ECOWAS's flexibility, but a realistic awareness of the real 
sources of regional insecurity. 
Conclusions 
What has the application of regime theory to ECOWAS's security policies 
revealed? The major conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that securityrelated 
problems in the ECOWAS might continue, but multilateral efforts and the 
strengthening of institutional frameworks will be significant elements in tackling 
such problems. This warrants confidence building measures, and more effective 
verification systems. Also, cooperation among states within security regimes may 
continue to intensify by sustaining the norm of stability and making the rules and 
decision making procedures more transparent and effective. There is a critical need 
to enhance the present verification system by initiating a wide range of confidence 
building measures. This might lessen the security dilemma and advance less subregional 
tensions. So far, the general characteristics defining ECOWAS's security 
regime are:
From "eco-pessimism" to "eco-optimism" 33 
(i) restraint in state behaviour in the hope of reciprocity; 
(ii) ambitious arms procurement and contingency planning usually might 
continue; 
(iii) absence of war may be due to short term determinants and reflections; 
(iv) increasing shared conception of actor acceptance of the benefits of mutual 
security and cooperation; and that 
(v) realization that individual pursuit of security and war are costly, and that 
hostility in the military sector can easily spill over into other sectors. 
The regime and its secretariat lack the requisite structural and institutional 
capability to deal with a crisis of the magnitude of Liberia's. For a start, while under 
the defence protocols, arrangements for communication, administration and 
decision-making were supposed to have been established, the reality of the 
situation was different. Thus, at the height of the crisis, several ad hoc by-products, 
or committees on the decision to intervene (SMC, ECOMOG) were established 
which had neither definite nor precise roles; neither did they have the competence 
nor administrative structures to facilitate decision making and implementation. 
These diverse structures did not have a single body which administered or 
coordinated their operations. The end result of this explicit flaw in well established 
processes and institutional structures both stymied and succeeded in hampering the 
peace process. 
Despite the establishment of these diverse ad hoc committees, there were no 
bureaucrats at the political level to administer the peace process and keep the 
momentum. This can be explained by the shortage of qualified staff at the 
ECOWAS secretariat,w which weakened the political component of the peace 
process. Attempts at implementing the cease-fire, encampment and demobilization 
strategies have been compounded by financial constraints despite the imprimatur 
of regional and international legitimization. 
Part of the success of regime activities in Liberia has been the introduction of 
new actors who managed to influence national behaviour and contributed to the 
development, sustainability and convergence of policy making in ECOWAS. How 
then can ECOWAS/ECOMOG design strategies, probably in concert with other 
more experienced international organizations for improving its monitoring, data 
collection and information exchange mechanisms, data analysis and the supervision 
and implementation of regulations, and generally building the capacity of 
ECOMOG now and in the future to manage crises and to ensure against violation? 
Despite the limited success of ECOWAS actions in Liberia, it is obvious that 
international cooperation and institutionalisation have been central elements in 
containing and limiting crises. 
Notes 
* Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen, Denmark. An earlier version
34 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
of this paper was presented at the IX CODESRIA General Assembly on "Social 
Science and Globalization in Africa", Dakar, Senegal 14-18 December, 1998. 
I. It must be emphasised that (i) states cooperate on their free-will, (ii) that the 
attainment of specified common goals guide their actions, and (iii) cooperation 
usually involve long-term engagement. 
Economic Community of West African States. 
For adetailed synthesis of the major debates in regime theory, see Hansenclever, 
Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. 1996. "Interests, Power, Knowledge: 
The Study of International Regimes", Mershon International Studies 
Review, Vol. 40, supplement 2, October, pp. 177 - 228. 
Mersheimer, J.J. 1994. "The False promise of International Institutions", 
International Security, 19.3. Keohane, R. O. et al 1995. After the Cold War: 
InternationalInstitutions andState Strategies in Europe 1989-199V.Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, pp. 2-7. 
Gilpin, R. 1989. "The Theory of Hegemonic War" in RI Rothberg and T.K. 
Robb, eds., The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
6. For a more detailed exposition of these ideas, see Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi. 
1998. Security in the West African sub-region: An Analysis of ECOWAS's 
Policies in Liberia, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Institute of Political 
Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, especially pp. 32-53 and 
212-224. 
Krasner, S. 1983. "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes and 
intervening variables" in Krasner, S. (ed.), International Regimes, London: 
CUP. p. 185 
Young, O.R. 1980 "International Regimes: Problems of Concept and Formation", 
World Politics, 32. p. 332. These ideas are emphasised in a latter article 
where it is emphasised that regimes should be understood as social structures. 
Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", World 
Politics, January, No. 2, and "Security Regimes", International Organisation, 
36, 2, spring. 
10. Miiller, Harald. 1997. "The Internationalisation of Principles, Norms and 
Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes", in V. Rittberger and 
P. Mayer, (eds.) Regime Theory andlntemational Relations. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, p. 361, my emphasis). 
I1. Bindingness as I have used it here refers to the scale of structural commitment 
allies agree to make under a security regime. A better appreciation of the 
dynamics of bindingness under any security regime will, however, require an 
analysis of the distinctive institutional features of security arrangements. This 
will permit an evaluation of how such allies are bound to reducing their 
discretionary powers.
From "eco-pessiinism " to "eco-optimism " 35 
12. According to Ghana's Foreign Minister, Obed Asamoah, "ultimately, ECOWAS 
is going to be a supranational organization, and one must begin to see this kind 
of action [the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia] in those terms. It is laying the 
foundation for common ECOWAS action over and above petty national 
interests... [I]t will lead to greater cohesion ... (T)his (is) a pioneering role with 
very wide implications for the efficacy of ECOWAS", (my emphasis) Asamoah, 
Obed. 1991 "The Making of Ghanaian Foreign Po\\cy",LECIA Bulletin, 1, (1), 
pp. 34-36; Novicki, Margaret. 1990. "Obed Asamoah: A New Role for 
ECOWAS", Africa Report, November-December, pp. 17-20; West Africa, 
10-16 January 1994:37-38. 
13. Diverse explanations can be presented to explain embedded cooperation 
among states. The three most influential explanations are (i) hegemonic 
stability, (ii) institutionalism and (iii) knowledge and learning. 
14. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, Art. 2 (hereafter 
ECOWAS Treaty). 
15. Okolo, op cit. For the role of epistemic communities during negotiations, see 
Haas, P.M. 1989. "Do Regimes matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean 
Pollution Control", International OrganizationA3, pp. 377-404. 
16. West Africa, 3 November 1986, p. 2333. A necessity for the establishment of 
such a regime can be better appreciated when an analysis of the sources of subregional 
conflict are tabulated. The most prevalent ones are border disputes 
involving state/citizen clashes, support for coup plotters, refugees and 
environmental crises. 
17. Okolo, op cit. 
18. Probably, an understanding of the Togolese/Senegalese presentation of the 
security proposals can be appreciated by the fact that these states were members 
of the exclusively Francophone group which had appended a security protocol 
to their economic endeavours. 
19. See ECOWAS Document ECW/HSG/11.7 Rev. 1 in Journal of ECOWAS, 1 
(1979) p. 13. 
20. African Research Bulletin, 17 February, 1980, p. 5664. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Okolo, Julius Emeka 1983. "Securing West Africa: The 
ECOWAS Defence Pact", The World Today, May, Volume 39, Number 5, 
pp. 180-181. 
21. Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD). A/SP3/5/81, 
Chapter 11 Art. 4(b). 
22. African Research Bulletin, June 1-30, 1981, p. 6072. 
23. see Article 58 of the revised Treaty. 
24. Sesay, A. 1985. "The OAU and Regime Recognition: Politics of Discord and 
Collaboration in Africa", Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives, 
No. 3, pp. 26-28. Agyeman-Duah, Baffour & Olatunde B.J. Ojo. 1991 "Interstate
36 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
Conflicts in West Africa: The Reference Group Theory Perspective", 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, October, pp. 304-306. 
25. Interview with Ike Nwachukwu, Nigeria's former Foreign Minister, Lagos, 18 
August 1997. 
26. The functions included devising plans for troop movements and logistics, 
launching collective military manoeuvres, formulating and administering the 
military budget of the secretariat, and reviewing and recommending proposals 
to the Executive Secretary, about issues relating to personnel and equipment 
PMAD. 
27.PMAD, 1981 Articles 6(3) & 16. 
28./6K/.,PMADArticle 17. 
29. Ibid., PMAD Article 19. 
30.Ibid., PMAD Article 7(i). 
31. Ibid, PMAD Article 11 (i). 
32. Ibid, PMAD Article 9. 
33. Ibid., PMAD Article 12( 1). 
34. Interview with Abbas Bundu, former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS in 
London, 9 January 1998). 
35. Yoroms, Gani Yoses & Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 1997. "From Economic to 
Political Integration: Towards An Analysis of ECOWAS's Transformation", 
Africa Peace Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 40. 
36. See African Research Bulletin, [ARB] 15 February, 1990, p. 9557. According 
to ARB, "the rebels had apparently assumed that the people of Nimba... would 
rally to their side. But when Charles Taylor,..., proclaimed himself leader of 
the NPFL, whatever local support the rebels enjoyed largely evaporated". 
37. See Sesay, Max A. 1996 "Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia", 
Review of African Political Economy, No. 67, p. 37. H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Jr 
1993. "Liberia: Struggle for Democracy", West Africa, 22-28 March, 
pp. 462-463. 
38. The material on this section is extensive. See among others "Views from 
Abidjan", West Africa, 22-28 January, 1990, p. 93; "US Military Advisers", 
West Africa, 12-18 February 1990, p. 246; "Call for US withdrawal "West 
Africa, 19-25 February, 1990, p. 294; "Gadafi Pledges Peace", West 
Africa, 3-9 December 1990, p. 2964. 
39. Job, Brian L. ed., "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State 
Securities in the Third World" in The Insecurity Dilemma, Boulder: Lynne 
Reinner. pp. 17-19. 
40. For an analysis of the influence of refugees on international politics, see 
Loescher, Gil 1989. "Refugee Issues in International Relations", pp. 2-3 in G. 
Loeschler and Laila Monhan, ed., 1989 Refugees and International 
Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. "Liberia: The Cycle of Abuse -
From "eco-pessimism " to "eco-optimism " 37 
Human Rights Violations since the November Cease-fire", Africa Watch, 
1991, p. 13. 
41.Erskine, Emmanuel. 1991. "Peacekeeping", Africa Forum, 1,1, p. 26. 
42. Helman, G. B. and Steven R. Ratner. 1992/93 "Saving Failed States", Foreign 
Policy, No. 89, Winter, p. 5. Ayoob, M. 1995. The Third World Security 
Predicament: State-making, Regional Conflict and the International System 
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner) pp. 81, 86, 173. Schneider, G. and Patricia A. 
Weitsman. 1995. "Eliciting Cooperation from "Risky States": The Limits of 
Conventional Multilateralism in Security Affairs". Paper presented at the 2nd 
Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Paris, September 13-16, 
p. 3. 
43. There is controversy about this point. Abbas Bundu asserts that it was his 
pressure on both Blaise Compaore and Dawda Jawara that made Liberia an 
agenda issue. Interview, London, 11 January 1998. 
44. Quoted in Akabogu, Chike, 1992. "ECOWAS Takes The Initiative", p. 79 in 
Margaret Vogt, ed.,The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt At 
Regional Peace Keeping Lagos: Gabumo Pub. Co. Ltd. 
45. ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Decision A/Dec.9/5/ 
90, Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee, 
Banjul, Gambia, 30 May 1990. 
46. Letter addressed by President Samuel K. Doe to the Chairman and Members of 
the Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, 14 
July 1990. See also Weller, M. (ed.), 1994. Regional Peace-Keeping and 
International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 60-61. 
47. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. 1994. "Regional Organisations and the Resolution of 
Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia", International Peacekeeping, 
Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn, p. 262. 
48. See Decision A/Dec. 1/8/90, Decision A/ Dec.2/8/90, Decision A/Dec.3/8/90, 
Decision A/Dec.4/8/90, also Weller. op cit., pp. 67-72. 
49. The character and strategy of ECOMOG was mandated as, maintaining, 
enforcing and monitoring the cease-fire, protecting life and property, maintaining 
essential services, providing security to the LNTG, observe elections, 
conduct policing duties, see Vogt, "The Problems and Challenges of Peacemaking: 
From Peace-keeping to Peace Enforcement", p. 159, in Vogt, op cit., 
50. ECOWAS: A Stable and Peaceful Environment- Pre-requisite for accelerated 
ECOWAS Development and Integration. Interim Report of the Executive Secretary 
to the 28th Session of the Council of Ministers. Abuja, 12-14 October 1990. 
51. These are the Yamoussoukoro IV Accords of October 1991, Cotonou Accords 
of 1993, Accra/Akosombo Agreements of September/December 1994 and 
finally the Abuja Agreement of August 1995/6. The controversies among
38 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
community partners were solved by shifting emphasis from the SMC to the 
Committee of Five, at a critical stage during the peace process (Burkina Faso, 
C6te d'lvoire, Guinea, Senegal and Togo). Subsequently, the Committee of 
Five and the SMC were merged to form the Committee of Nine (Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo) to 
create a monitoring group with the aim of maintaining strict implementation of 
the cease-fire agreements. Final Communique of the 1st Joint Summit of the 
ECOWAS SMC and the Committee of Five, see also ECOWAS, First Meeting 
of the Committee of Nine on the Liberian Crisis, Final Communique, Abuja, 
Nigeria, 7 November 1992. See Weller, op cit., pp. 230-232. 
52. ECOWAS: Decision A/DEC.8/7/92 Relating to Sanctions Against Taylor and 
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, see also ECOWAS: Decision HSGC9- 
2/8/96 Relating to the Implementation of Arms Embargo in Liberia. 
53. These agreements have been discussed in detail in a forthcoming paper, "From 
War to Peace: The Dilemmas of Multilateral Agency Interventions in Civil 
Wars", 1998. 
54. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) is the first United 
Nations peace-keeping mission undertaken in co-operation with a peacekeeping 
operation already set up by another organisation. Established in 
September 1993, UNOMIL's mandate under Security Council resolution 866 
(1993) includes in addition to military aspects, assistance in the co-ordination 
of humanitarian activities, observation and verification of elections, and to 
monitor the implementation procedures in order to verify their impartial 
application. UNOMIL and ECOMOG have separate chains of command, but 
the missions consult formally through the established committees, as well as 
informally on matters affecting them both. UNOMIL strength is 345 military 
observers, 20 military medical personnel and 45 military engineers. 
55. ECOWAS: Resolution A/RES.6/7/95 calling on the United Nations to Maintain 
its Presence and support to Liberia. 
56. This point is particularly important as it represented a major concession from 
Charles Taylor's NPFL which had established a quasi-state. Greater Liberia, 
under a National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government [NPRAG] 
based at Gbarnga. 
57. See especially ECOWAS: Final report of the Thirty-Ninth session of the 
Council of Ministers, Abuja, 22-25 July 1996, ECW/CM/XXXIX/18/ 
Rev. 1 and ECOWAS: Final communique of the Nineteenth session of the 
Authority of Heads of State and Governments, Abuja, 26-27 July 1996, ECW/ 
HSG/XIX. 
58. ECOWAS: Final report Thirty-Eight meeting of Council of Ministers, 22-25 
July 1996: 26; New Nigerian, 19 August, 1997:12, ECOWAS: Fourth session 
of Heads of State and Government of the Committee of Nine on Liberia,
From "eco-pessimism" to "eco-optimism" 39 
Decision HSGC9-1/8/96 Relating to Sanctions Against Persons who Violate 
the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia, Abuja 17 August 1996. 
59. Shelpedi.T.M. 1998. "Transition from Warto Peace: Consolidation of Achievement", 
paper presented at ECOWAS Forum on Conflict Management and 
Resolution at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 7-11 July 1998. p. 9. 
60. Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi 1996 "Ghana, ECOWAS and ECOMOG: An Analysis 
of Ghana's Role in Liberia", Liberian Studies Journal, Vol. XXI, No. 2 
December 1996, 
61. For a more detailed analysis, see Wienberger, Naomr 1995. "How Peace 
Keeping Becomes Intervention: Lessons from the Lebanese Experience" 
pp. 154-170 in Esman, Milton J. and Shibley Telhami eds., International 
Organisations and Ethnic Conflict, Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press. 
62. These variables have been tested in a comparative analysis in the paper Aning, 
E.K. 1997. Multilateral Organisation Responses to State Collapse in Africa: 
Lessons from the Liberia and Somali Experiences", Revised version of paper 
presented at a conference on "The Perspectives on ECOMOG in the Future 
of African Regional Security", at The University of Abuja, Nigeria, between 
3-7 March 1997. 
63. Tarr, Byron 1993. "The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective", 
ISSUE: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. XXVI -2, p. 79. Jonah, was confident of the 
competence of the Executive Secretary": a political rather than an economic 
expert [with] long experience as a member of the commonwealth secretariat, 
[it was] inevitable that he would give a political thrust to ECOWAS,... [T]here 
is no doubt that the forceful personality, political acumen and wide-ranging 
experience ... helped galvanise action by ECOWAS in dealing with the 
Liberian crises" see Jonah, J. 1993 "ECOMOG: A Successful Example of 
Peace-keeping by a Regional Organisation in the Third World", in W. Kiihne, 
(ed.), Internationales Umfeld Sicherheitsinteressen und Nationale Planning 
der Bundesrepublik: Stifung Wissenschaft und Politik, p. 197.
Afr.j. polil. sci. (1999), Vol. 4 No. 1, 21-39 
From "eco-pessimism" to 
"eco-optimism" — ECOMOG and The 
West African Integration Process 
Emmanuel Kwesl Aning* 
Introduction 
Enduring international cooperation is increasingly becoming crucial in tackling 
many transnational crises, not least security-related issues.1 The concept of 
security and putting it into operation with respect to Africa has been in flux, most 
especially in the post-cold war period. Under the previous bi-polar system, 
Africa's security dilemmas and predicaments and their resolution were closely 
linked to the nature of the international system. As a result, "local" security issues 
and conflicts were usually projected onto the international scene. However, since 
1990 perceptible changes have occurred with the marginalisation of the African 
continent. In spite of this, the constraints which hitherto hindered African 
organisations from defining and resolving regional security problems have to a 
large extent been removed and a renewed sense of dynamism is being experienced. 
A typical case is the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)2 
intervention in Liberia in 1989 and the resolution of its crisis in 1997. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse what I see as the transformation of 
ECOWAS from an economic integration scheme to include a security dimension; 
as a change from the debilitating effects of "eco-pessimism" to one of "ecooptimism". 
This analysis will be undertaken within the context of ECOWAS's 
intervention in and resolution of the Liberian crisis. To do this, the paper uses the 
following five fold holistic and integrated approach (i) conceptual clarification of 
security regimes; (ii) ECOWAS's security regime and its institutional design; (iii) 
regime response to and regulatory mechanisms in Liberia; (iv) the determinants of 
regime action effectiveness; and finally (v) the constraints and prospects for 
ECOWAS's security regime for the integration process. 
1027-035.1 0 IW9 African Association of Political Science
22 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
Security Regimes: Concepts and Clarification 
There are doctrinal squabbles concerning the effectiveness of international institutions 
in resolving security dilemmas.3 Neo-realism, for example has challenged 
the importance of international institutions or regimes in restraining state conduct. 
According to neo-realists, multilateral institutions are either paper tigers, or 
"scraps of paper"4 or symbolic epiphenomena of the activities of a hegemonic 
state/ that it is not able to extend beyond the alliance system dictated by the 
"anarchy" of the international system. However, in this paper, I apply a modified 
neo-liberal institutionalist approach to demonstrate that institutions do matter. The 
assertion is that ECOWAS's security regime should be seen as institutionalist 
because of the role played by transnational actors. Its common institutions are 
indispensable and the core body of experts at its secretariat are important players. 
Finally, it seeks the promotion of collective action to engender welfare.*1 
A regime is a set of "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actor interests converge in a given issue area".7 Principles and norms 
impart an expectation of reciprocity and are the defining features of regimes. Such 
rules and procedures may alter over time as conditions change, but they must 
remain consistent with the norms underpinning the regime. While retaining the 
Krasnerian notion as the basic conceptual framework, I argue that there is the need 
to reduce the spectre of fuzziness to which regime analysis is vulnerable. In 
becoming narrowed to tackle specific issue areas, regimes become differentiated 
from other international structures in the sense that they become "social institutions 
governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities".8 
Uncertainties abound concerning the extent to which regime theory is applicable 
to security. This controversy arose primarily because of its earlier narrow 
application to the "Concert of Europe" that became a paradigm for security 
regimes." However, I argue that the theory can be fruitfully applied to security if 
restricted to sub-areas of security policy where significant potential forcooperative 
behaviour is present. For instance, Miiller has recently applied regimes to several 
sub-areas of the security issue where systems of principles, norms, rules, and 
procedures regulate certain aspects of security relationships between states.'" 
The determining factors for identifying the existence of regimes are the 
presence of all four elements. The incentives inherent in the establishment of 
security regimes and the obstacles involved in so doing are particularly enhanced 
in the security discussion because of the security dilemma. These occur when 
states, in seeking power and security for themselves, threaten the power and 
security aspirations of others. Although effective security regimes arc difficult to 
attain, their value lies in their ability to regulate individual state action by limiting 
the cost of hostilities and the degree of suspicion. These arise from the pure realist 
state-centric world in which expansionist states will seek to gain resources through 
opportunistic behaviour at the expense of their neighbours. Under security
From "eco-pessiniism" to "eco-optimism" 23 
regimes, such individualistic state actions are not only dangerous but also costly. 
They can however be curtailed through improved bindingness}' This will normally 
be associated with a reduction in sovereignty in exchange for greater 
institutionalisation since it would be dangerous and costly in credibility and 
security for cheaters and deserters to find a substitute for a structurally advanced 
security mechanism.12 
Other difficulties of achieving a functional security regime can be explained 
within the context of the in-built fears and suspicions in the state system. That one 
state can or will violate the common understanding is a potent motivator for each 
state to undertake individualistic policies although each would otherwise prefer 
regime action. Thus, what is critical here is the extent to which state compliance 
with regime requirements can be reconciled; that is how mechanisms that secure 
compliance are instituted. It is important that in discussing such issues, one looks 
for situations in which states would have behaved differently had they not been part 
of regimes. It can be argued that it is only when compliance is considered 
inconvenient - that is when regime rules either conflict with or are incompatible 
with states' perceptions of what their self-interest would be were there no such 
institutions — that the impact of a regime is tested. During instances of such 
inconvenient commitments one would expect that, if regimes were unimportant 
their rules would be violated, and that in so far as rules are complied with it is then 
possible to deduce that regimes have had an impact. Analysing ECOWAS's 
security regime involves examining the processes of decision making and the 
effect of regime principles, norms, and rules on the manner in which decisionmakers 
frame regime action. As a prerequisite to examining cases of state 
compliance with security regime decisions, there had to be controversy about 
whether regime compliance was in the best interest of individual states. 
Two sets of questions should be asked to distinguish between (i) security regime 
formation in West Africa, and (ii) the characterisation of regime strength in terms 
of compliance. First, what conditions are conducive to the formation and maintenance 
of ECOWAS's security regime? To what extent can one argue that it is when 
major actors prefer status quo maintenance it can be deduced that a condition for 
the formation and maintenance of a security regime is present? Secondly, what 
processes and procedures are established to elicit compliance? In relating these 
questions to the empirical study, the extent to which status quo advancement was 
the primary reason for the establishment of this regime is not clear. Some 
importance must however, be placed on the role played by individual state 
perception of security against that identified by the regime as its prevalent security 
problem. It is the divergent perception of regime interest compared with individual 
state perception of what its interests and security would be that created the 
"controversy" about state compliance with ECOWAS's Liberia policies. Controversies 
concerning state compliance with regime policy are important, since
24 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
eliciting such compliance become a real test for regime effectiveness and strength. 
In contrast to its "post-Concert of Europe" application by Jervis, and Miiller' s more 
recent Eurocentric application, this article applies security regimes, not only to an 
African context, but also to one with special challenges: namely responding to the 
challenge posed by sub-state level factions or groups. 
Establishing ECOWAS's Security Regime 
Of relevance to this paper are the key questions why, when and how are security 
regimes established?11 What factors contribute to security regime formation? Is it 
the relations and patterns of military and economic power among states that 
determine security regime formation? For the purposes of this paper, ECOWAS's 
security framework is a regime with agreed upon principles, norms, procedures 
and programmes that regulate activities and mould the expectations of actors in a 
specific issue area. This has evolved within a framework in which the use of force 
by individual member states is constrained by a balance of power or mutual 
deterrence. 
At ECOWAS's establishment, the representatives of 15 member states affirmed 
their commitment to '"create a homogenous society, leading to the unity of the 
countries of West Africa".'" The Authority, theoretically controls decision making, 
but in reality decides in concert with experts and consultants at the secretariat 
whose decisions, reports and recommendations on technical issues constitute 
important inputs into decision making. According to Okolo, these "enjoy significant 
latitude ... and above all, serves as the engine room of the community".15 
Under this treaty no precise security arrangements were provided for. Despite these 
deficiencies, subsequent ECOWAS summits increasingly focused on security 
issues and the need for evolving a collective defence strategy. At the third summit 
in Lagos, Nigeria in 1978. a Protocol on Non-Aggression was adopted. This sought 
to create "an atmosphere, free of any fear of attack or aggression of one state by 
another".16 Julius Okolo, interpreted this protocol as "representing] a valuable 
statement of intent and a demonstration of the good will that exists among the 
national leaders of the West African region ... [and] signifies the will ingness and 
commitment by member states to restrict their sovereignty in a new era".17 
Innovative as the non-aggression treaty was, the signatory states overlooked 
two important security issues that were relevant to West Africa, namely: (i) the 
incidence of external aggression, and (ii) externally subsidized domestic insurrection 
and revolt within the community. Due to worsening politico-military situations, 
two independent unsolicited proposals were presented by Togo and Senegal 
in 1979. '* These proposals requested the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and 
the Executive Secretary to "convene a meeting of the technical commission of 
ministers to consider the said documents and submit a harmonized draft defence 
pact to the next summit.'" Subsequently, an eight-nation ministerial committee was
From "eco-pessimism" to "eco-optimism" 25 
established to examine and present a revised version of this document in May 1980. 
The Council failed to reach a unanimous consensus whereupon the matter was 
referred to the Authority at its meeting in Lome\ Togo. Here, Senegal argued 
against the exclusion of those countries which did not wish to join a defence pact. 
Togo argued that a mutual defence protocol was a "logical follow-up to the signing 
of the non-aggression protocol".2" In 1981, therefore, the omissions from the 1978 
protocol were presumably dealt with by the ratification of the Protocol Relating to 
Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD). This protocol, which took effect in 1986, 
merely sketched the outlines for tackling "internal armed conflict within any 
member state engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger 
the security and peace in the entire community".21 Radio Nigeria evaluated the 
PMAD " as a first step towards an attempt for a collective defence system for the 
West African sub-region".22 
A combination of these two protocols and their constitutive principles sought to 
establish a security framework and to provide specific blueprints and limitations 
for state action. The main hypothesis for applying security and regime concepts to 
ECOWAS is that ECOWAS forms a subsystem with a tacit aim of ensuring and 
securing sub-regional stability. It comprises a regime with rules, norms and 
principles that member slates should adhere to. Non-compliance with regime rules, 
norms and principles or perceived threats to accepted rules, norms and principles 
by either member states or other external forces can lead to either coercive or 
diplomatic response by other regime members. The regime's constitutive principles 
and rules are encompassed in the Protocols of 1978 and 1981 and the revised 
Treaty of 1993.2' ECOWAS provides the formal organisational framework through 
which its security regime finds institutional expression. The rules and decisionmaking 
procedures consist of the bi-annual intergovernmental meetings introduced 
since September 1997. In certain instances, extraordinary and ad hoc 
meetings can be summoned. At these meetings, the secretariat's administration and 
the regime's leadership attempts to strategise and enforce legislation are reviewed. 
This paper's focus, therefore, is not only on ECOWAS's institutionalizalion of 
collective defence promotion and the implicit indication to signatory states of 
support in periods of crisis, but also on the factual extension of such expected 
support. The argument is that the Defence Protocols represent a subsystem with a 
view to enhancing sub-regional stability. They constitute a regime with rules, 
norms, principles and decision-making processes which member states and their 
leaders should adhere to. Although it is distinct in its functional scope, geographical 
domain, membership and organisational structure, ECOWAS's security regime 
provides a framework of cooperation among its member states in order to 
accomplish a distinctive set of policy goals governed by African norms and values. 
Non-compliance with regime rules or perceived threats to conventional precepts 
often lead to coercive or diplomatic responses by the regime or individual regime
26 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
members24 as a clear demonstration of change from one of "eco-pessimissm" to 
"eco-optimism". Apart from providing rules and procedures for state behaviour, 
ECOWAS's security regime seeks to: 
• distinguish and concentrate on specific problems; 
• engender and advance reliable exchange of information and knowledge; 
• intensify confidence and security building measures and understanding among 
states; 
• facilitate negotiation and issue linkage among states; and 
• enforce, monitor and verify rules and guidelines underpinning cooperative 
ventures. 
Despite the generally perceived hegemonic tendencies exhibited by Nigeria, the 
security regime in West Africa has not been imposed from above.25 This paper 
argues that ECOWAS's security regime exists because of a convergence of 
interests shared by most ECOWAS member states in pursuing common interests 
and in avoiding certain common outcomes relative to ECOWAS's specific security 
preoccupations. 
Institutional Design and Decision-making Processes. 
Diverse institutional mechanisms and administrative arrangements were established 
to become operative in times of crisis. Under the PMAD, divisions from the 
armies of ECOWAS member states constitute an Allied Armed Force of the 
Community [AAFC] under a Community commander. Ministers of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs of member states constitute a Defence Council under the current 
Chairmanship of the Authority and the Chiefs of Staff of member states form the 
Defence Commission. Provision was also made for a Deputy Executive Secretary 
to be responsible for Military Affairs.2'1 
Procedures were established that dealt with (i) how an assaulted state should 
contact the defence structure; and (ii) what types of conflict were envisaged by the 
two Protocols as warranting community intervention. Three types of antagonistic 
military gesture were broadly agreed upon: (i) aggression from non-member states; 
(ii) conflict between member states and finally (iii) internal conflict in a member 
state. Attached to these three relatively well-defined areas were procedural and 
administrative arrangements for communication with the Secretariat for subsequent 
decision by the Authority. Under point one, upon receiving a request for 
assistance from a member state, the Authority meets to decide the expediency of 
military action and entrust subsequent enforcement to the force commander.27 
With the second point, the Authority would meet urgently to act accordingly for 
mediation in the form of deploying the AAFC as a peacekeeping force.28 Finally, 
point three states that when a conflict is actively maintained and sustained from 
outside, the Authority will take action as with point one. Significantly however, in 
situations where the conflict remained purely internal, there would be no commu-
From "eco-pessimism " to "eco-optimism " 27 
nity action.29 The PM AD provided for the establishment of aDefence Council30 and 
a Defence Commission.31 The Defence Council, Commission, and Authority 
would assist the force commander during interventions.32 The Authority, Defence 
Ministers and Chiefs of Staff formed a triumvirate that would decide whether to 
intervene or not. It also provided for a Deputy Executive Secretary for Defence.33 
Based on these points, it can be argued that the procedural aspects of the PMAD 
were overlooked which undermined the institutional capacity of ECOWAS to 
function optimally. 
How did these institutions react in times of real crisis? What ad hoc new 
institutions, if any, were established during an actual conflict situation? If so, what 
was the nature of coordination between the old and new institutional structures? 
For analytical purposes several issues arise. First, by August 1990 none of these 
institutions were in existence. Since they were designed as integral parts of the 
PMAD's decision-making structure dealing with questions of intervention in any 
security situation, the Council and Authority could not have taken any decision. 
Secondly, the PMAD does not make for an alternative institutional set-up for the 
independent performance of the Defence Commission if the Defence Council (i) 
is not functional or (ii) has not been established. Thirdly, the decision to intervene 
undermines the principle of unanimity that governs decision-making in the 
ECOWAS. The PMAD never established voting procedures for the working of the 
Authority that was expected to reach decisions concerning the community either 
through a consensus or outright majority. This last point was resolved at the 
Bamako extraordinary summit held in November 1990, and ensured consensus on 
the Authority forECOWAS's Peace Plan.34 The situation in Liberia, both before 
and after, the intervention reflected the performance of ad hoc institutions (see 
Figure 1 on p 151). It resulted not only in a certain level of disjointed action, but 
also in dysfunctional parallelism about the decision making processes. 
My basic argument is that for an effective security regime to exist, cooperation 
must take place according to the rules and principles that have been formally 
accepted by the parties concerned. Agreed mechanisms are required for maintaining 
the behaviour of parties and their compliance with agreements. In ECOWAS's 
case, several factors accounted for the non-establishment of the PMAD's institutional 
framework. First, this related to the latent distrust and doubts about Nigeria's 
intentions among its community partners, and the sub-regional hegemon's own 
domestic and international difficulties. Second, the institutional and financial 
weakness of the Executive Secretariat prevented it from performing beyond the 
narrow confines within which its formal structure defined its existence and 
performance until 1988. Thus, by the time of ECOWAS's intervention, the PMAD 
was nothing more than an instrument of declaratory policy.35
28 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
Regime Response to State Collapse 
This section deals with the response of the ECOWAS security regime to the 
Liberi an crisis, and discusses the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements set 
up by ECOWAS. The Liberian crisis started with an uprising by Charles Taylor's 
forces - National Patriotic Front of Liberia [NPFL] - on 24 December 1989. By 
April 1990 the NPFL claimed to effectively control over 90% of Liberian territory 
with the exception of Monrovia and its environs. Charles Taylor's expectation of 
support from Nimba county did not materialise, leading to serious setbacks for the 
NPFL.36 This opinion contrasts sharply with Max Sesay's assertion of "popular 
euphoria" for Taylor's invasion of Liberia from neighbouring countries in 1989.37 
However, thischanged when Liberia's incumbent President, Samuel Doe, mounted 
a massive but ineffective counter-insurgency campaign supported by US and 
Israeli counter-insurgency officers.3* Rather quickly, the insurgency degenerated 
intoethnic killings and aggravated an already severe insecurity situation.79 By May 
1990, the tidal waves of refugees forced across Liberia's contiguous borders into 
Cote d'lvoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone40 had reached crisis proportions. Through 
continuing internal disturbances, gross human rights abuses and demands for 
democratization, the "situation in Liberia ha[d] gone beyond the boundaries of the 
country and cease[d] to be an exclusive Liberian question".41 Liberia was totally 
incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community and its 
collapse not only imperilled its own citizens but threatened sub-regional stability. 
Liberia by mid-1990 was a "risky" and failed state.42 
It is against this background that ECOWAS's Thirteenth Summit of the Heads 
of State and Government meeting in Banjul. The Gambia in May 1990 discussed 
the Liberian crisis.43 Nigeria's Ibrahim Babangida argued for the establishment of 
a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to "intervene in timely fashion, whenever 
... disputes arise".44 In agreeing to establish a parallel institutional framework, the 
Authority affirmed that regional security and stability, as well as peace and 
concord, were necessary conditions for effective sub-regional cooperation and 
integration.45 
Comprising five member states, The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo, 
SMC membership was to be reviewed every three years. Structurally, a state under 
attack had to inform the Executive Secretary in writing of its intention to refer the 
matter to the SMC for settlement. Based on the procedural and organizational 
measures instituted under the SMC, Samuel Doe addressed a letter to the SMC. 
Here, Doe requested "assistance] in finding a constitutional and reasonable 
resolution" to the crisis engulfing Liberia. Crucially, Doe advanced his own 
proposals for resolving the conflict. The Liberian leader argued that, "it would 
seem most expedient at this time to introduce an ECOWAS Peace-keeping force 
into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension".46 The contents of Doe's 
letter contradict Ofuatey-Kodjoe's assertion that "Doc made an appeal to
From "eco-pessimism" to "eco-optimism" 29 
Nigeria and Togo for help to quell the insurrection. This led to the ECOWAS 
intervention".47 
Political and Military Agenda 
ECOWAS intervened on four major grounds, namely: (i) military-humanitarian 
considerations; (ii) the provisions under the two Defence Protocols; (iii) the peace 
and security of the region; and (v) that it was responding to the invitation of the "de 
jure" government in Liberia. The SMC's first strategy consisted of a set of 
interrelated policies based on mediation and negotiation that sought to find a 
political solution to the engulfing crisis.4" This resulted in an appeal for a cease-fire 
in Liberia, a proposal for the establishment of an interim government and 
establishment of an ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring group [ECOMOG].49 From 
May to mid-August 1990, the SMC supported by the Executive Secretary of 
ECOWAS, Abbas Bundu, presented diverse diplomatic strategies for finding a 
political conclusion to Liberia's crisis.50 NPFL intransigence led to the breakdown 
of the diplomatic process which otherwise had the support of remnants of the 
Armed Forces of Liberia [AFL], and Prince Yeduo Johnson's Independent 
National Liberation Front of Liberia [INPFL]. A complex convergence of related 
incidents internal to Liberia, the region and internationally, however, made the 
SMC change tactic. It now implemented a multi-track scheme characterized by the 
simultaneous pursuance of peace through diplomacy and the initiation of its 
historic "Operation Liberty" peace-keeping process by sending in ECOMOG 
troops. Without obtaining consent from the major faction, and with no peace to 
keep, the supposed peace-keeping activities were hurriedly suspended. 
Within weeks of launching "Operation Liberty", the strategy was modified to 
enforcement measures as a response to severe NPFL resistance. Under the new 
twin trajectories of diplomacy and enforcement measures, a series of peace accords 
and agreements were signed.51 These agreements encompassed most of the various 
initiatives towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict by ECOWAS. The first 
tactic involved negotiations followed by mediation efforts which became the basis 
for the peace plan of November 1990. Strategics for eliciting compliance from 
faction groups consisted of (i) a Peace Plan; (ii) encampment and disarmament of 
warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG; and (iii) the 
establishment of transitional institutions to conduct elections. To facilitate the 
achievement of these objectives, a general embargo was placed on all weapons and 
military equipment entering Liberia except those intended for ECOMOG forces.52 
Irrespective of the intentions behind the diverse components of these Accords. 
ECOMOG was unable to see to their implementation.53 
To attain peace in Liberia, ECOWAS's peace agreements emphasized a 
continuum of action from cease-fire through disarmament and demobilization to 
the holding of elections. Components of these agreements could be divided into
30 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
two: political and military. At the militarily level, the agreements provided for a 
cease-fire and outlined steps for the encampment, disarmament and demobilization 
of military units. To prevent violations of the cease-fire agreements a Joint 
Cease-Fire Monitoring Committee [JCMC]54 was established, and a United Nations 
Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to monitor and verify the progress 
of the demilitarisation components of the agreements, which had no precedent in 
peacekeeping history, was deployed.55 Politically, there was agreement on the 
establishment of a Liberian Transitional National Government (LNTG),56 and on 
the modalities for presidential and general elections to be supervised by a reconstituted 
Electoral Commission. Based on the Cotonou Agreement of 1993 and, 
in consultation with ECOMOG, ten e icampment sites were identified and proportionally 
distributed among the factions, two for the AFL, four for the NPFL/ 
NPRAG and four fora new group, the United Liberation Movement for Democracy 
in Liberia [ULIMO]. The parties agn-ed to the simultaneous disarmament of their 
forces, and the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. 
Although different accords were signed, aimed at restoring peace and security 
in Liberia, I have chosen to emphasise the special features of the Abuja II Accord 
for several reasons." First, Abuja II suceeded in improving the adversarial 
relationship between Charles Taylor and Nigeria. Secondly, it widened and 
deepened consensus among West African states on Liberia. Finally, it introduced 
the direct involvement of factional leaders in implementing the accord. This 
agreement also marked a major departure from previous strategies on the disarmament 
question. After seven years of non-compliance, Abuja II strategically shifted 
responsibility for the success of the disarmament process entirely to the faction 
leaders. For the first time, faction leaders, were personally held responsible for the 
non-compliance of their combatants. Abuja II also stipulated deadlines and 
imposed penalties for non-compliance. Finally, introducing this pro-active 
approach signalled to the factional leaders the introduction of a more interventionist 
and robust role for ECOMOG and UNOMIL in guaranteeing the disarmament 
component of Abuja II. 
Abuja II also changed implementation delays by introducing a stringent 
sanctions regime, and regulatory mechanisms. These included: travel and residence 
restrictions; freezing of business activities and assets of leading faction 
leaders in ECOWAS states; exclusion from participation in the electoral process; 
restrictions on the use of ECOWAS airspace and territorial waters; expulsion of 
faction leaders and members of their families from ECOWAS states; request to the 
United Nations Security Council to impose visa and import restrictions and finally 
invoking the OAU summit resolution, which calls for the establishment of a war 
crimes tribunal to judge all human rights offences.5" According to T.M. Shelpedi, 
Abuja II contributed in a "large extent (to] successful [disarmament] in the 
Liberian peace process".™
From "eco-pessimism " to "eco-optimism " 31 
Determinants of Effectiveness 
How does one determine security regime action effectiveness? Effectiveness is a 
contested nation. Variations in potential definitions and evaluation of regime 
effectiveness rely on the nature of the standard used. In this paper, I am interested 
in the notion of effectiveness in terms of whether ECOWAS resolved the security 
problems it was devised to address. In discussing regime actions in Liberia, an 
essential question is: how does ECOWAS's regime advance compliance and 
behaviourial changes in line with its rules, regulations and norms? There are two 
clusters of issues here. The first is the matter of state compliance with regime 
norms; and the second is with respect to compliance by Liberia's armed factions. 
As I have argued elsewhere,'10 even though the Liberian crisis involved a coterie of 
external actors, all discussion of compliance and behaviourial change should 
encompass the two groups above. To assess security regime action effectiveness, 
the analytical framework proposed by Noaini Weinberger61 will be adopted. This 
encompasses five variables which are divided into Contextual and Operational 
factors. Contextual variables comprise two components: (i) consent of parties; (ii) 
and degree of progress in peace-making. Operational factors, on the other hand, 
encompass: (i) mandate definition; (ii) coordination; and finally (iii) capabilities.62 
Since the prospects for achieving behaviourial change which regimes seek to 
promote, depend substantially on factors that are external to the international 
institution itself they will depend partly on the concerns of the actors involved. The 
nature of the issue area is also important. The complexity of the Liberian crisis 
which ECOWAS/ECOMOG succeeded in resolving arose from the number and 
diversity of the actors involved. Furthermore, international distress to "do something 
about the problem" can be intensified by a worsening situation [escalation of 
violence, increased outflow of refugees, worsening economic situation, contagion 
effects of crisis]. 
Closely related to institutional design and effectiveness are the concepts of 
monitorability and verification. By these I mean the ability to supervise and 
authenticate cither the functioning of dominant actors [i.e. factional groups] or 
mechanisms [referring to political/military aspects of the peace process, i.e. ceasefire, 
encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration] or the fulfilment 
of latent obligations. The ability to achieve stated strategies is based on several 
factors. Among them are monitoring and data collection infrastructures, and not 
least the political characteristics of the societies, states or factional groups 
involved. Perceptions of regime ability to verify agreements are crucial in influencing 
the consent of actors either to bargain, sign agreements or most decisively to 
fulfil agreements. Thus, to succeed, a regime must make a difference. Its institutions, 
rules and procedures must transform processes either directly or indirectly 
through their effects on the patterns of power, interest or influence. The key issue, 
therefore, is to examine institutional plans or external factors not in isolation, but
32 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
rather in the context of how they interact. Some of the factors which are critical to 
ascertaining the effectiveness of ECOWAS's security regime are: 
a) character and frame of rules; 
b) manner in which political and legally binding provisions are combined; 
c) the mechanisms by which rules are revised; 
d) the structure and role of secretariat; and 
e) processes for resource relocation among participants which can decisively 
influence patterns of interests and capacity. 
Thus, the effectiveness of a regime hinges on the extent to which a combination 
of these institutional attributes and mechanisms are developed in such a manner as 
to motivate and associate actors in a way that encourages preferred modification 
in conduct. 
The implementing processes for the regime's commitments were based on three 
interrelated factors: (i) degree of concern about the problem; (ii) the formation and 
support of commitments; and (iii) the ability to execute obligations. An effective 
regime is one whose institutions, and not least rules and procedures adjust to 
external determinants and processes in order that the conduct of pertinent actors is 
altered in line with its objectives. The argument here is that these factors were 
specific both to the situation in question and to the issue area implicated. A key 
characteristic of ECOWAS's effectiveness was its flexibility and the capacity to 
adapt its institutions, rules and procedures in a timely manner in the light of its 
experience with implementation and as patterns of power, interest, influence, 
knowledge, capacity and concern changed. The developmental process which 
ECOWAS has undergone from the initial discussions concerning the inclusion of 
security related protocols, to the eventual ratification of the PMAD, has in a manner 
demonstrated not only ECOWAS's flexibility, but a realistic awareness of the real 
sources of regional insecurity. 
Conclusions 
What has the application of regime theory to ECOWAS's security policies 
revealed? The major conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that securityrelated 
problems in the ECOWAS might continue, but multilateral efforts and the 
strengthening of institutional frameworks will be significant elements in tackling 
such problems. This warrants confidence building measures, and more effective 
verification systems. Also, cooperation among states within security regimes may 
continue to intensify by sustaining the norm of stability and making the rules and 
decision making procedures more transparent and effective. There is a critical need 
to enhance the present verification system by initiating a wide range of confidence 
building measures. This might lessen the security dilemma and advance less subregional 
tensions. So far, the general characteristics defining ECOWAS's security 
regime are:
From "eco-pessimism" to "eco-optimism" 33 
(i) restraint in state behaviour in the hope of reciprocity; 
(ii) ambitious arms procurement and contingency planning usually might 
continue; 
(iii) absence of war may be due to short term determinants and reflections; 
(iv) increasing shared conception of actor acceptance of the benefits of mutual 
security and cooperation; and that 
(v) realization that individual pursuit of security and war are costly, and that 
hostility in the military sector can easily spill over into other sectors. 
The regime and its secretariat lack the requisite structural and institutional 
capability to deal with a crisis of the magnitude of Liberia's. For a start, while under 
the defence protocols, arrangements for communication, administration and 
decision-making were supposed to have been established, the reality of the 
situation was different. Thus, at the height of the crisis, several ad hoc by-products, 
or committees on the decision to intervene (SMC, ECOMOG) were established 
which had neither definite nor precise roles; neither did they have the competence 
nor administrative structures to facilitate decision making and implementation. 
These diverse structures did not have a single body which administered or 
coordinated their operations. The end result of this explicit flaw in well established 
processes and institutional structures both stymied and succeeded in hampering the 
peace process. 
Despite the establishment of these diverse ad hoc committees, there were no 
bureaucrats at the political level to administer the peace process and keep the 
momentum. This can be explained by the shortage of qualified staff at the 
ECOWAS secretariat,w which weakened the political component of the peace 
process. Attempts at implementing the cease-fire, encampment and demobilization 
strategies have been compounded by financial constraints despite the imprimatur 
of regional and international legitimization. 
Part of the success of regime activities in Liberia has been the introduction of 
new actors who managed to influence national behaviour and contributed to the 
development, sustainability and convergence of policy making in ECOWAS. How 
then can ECOWAS/ECOMOG design strategies, probably in concert with other 
more experienced international organizations for improving its monitoring, data 
collection and information exchange mechanisms, data analysis and the supervision 
and implementation of regulations, and generally building the capacity of 
ECOMOG now and in the future to manage crises and to ensure against violation? 
Despite the limited success of ECOWAS actions in Liberia, it is obvious that 
international cooperation and institutionalisation have been central elements in 
containing and limiting crises. 
Notes 
* Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen, Denmark. An earlier version
34 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
of this paper was presented at the IX CODESRIA General Assembly on "Social 
Science and Globalization in Africa", Dakar, Senegal 14-18 December, 1998. 
I. It must be emphasised that (i) states cooperate on their free-will, (ii) that the 
attainment of specified common goals guide their actions, and (iii) cooperation 
usually involve long-term engagement. 
Economic Community of West African States. 
For adetailed synthesis of the major debates in regime theory, see Hansenclever, 
Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. 1996. "Interests, Power, Knowledge: 
The Study of International Regimes", Mershon International Studies 
Review, Vol. 40, supplement 2, October, pp. 177 - 228. 
Mersheimer, J.J. 1994. "The False promise of International Institutions", 
International Security, 19.3. Keohane, R. O. et al 1995. After the Cold War: 
InternationalInstitutions andState Strategies in Europe 1989-199V.Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, pp. 2-7. 
Gilpin, R. 1989. "The Theory of Hegemonic War" in RI Rothberg and T.K. 
Robb, eds., The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
6. For a more detailed exposition of these ideas, see Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi. 
1998. Security in the West African sub-region: An Analysis of ECOWAS's 
Policies in Liberia, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Institute of Political 
Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, especially pp. 32-53 and 
212-224. 
Krasner, S. 1983. "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes and 
intervening variables" in Krasner, S. (ed.), International Regimes, London: 
CUP. p. 185 
Young, O.R. 1980 "International Regimes: Problems of Concept and Formation", 
World Politics, 32. p. 332. These ideas are emphasised in a latter article 
where it is emphasised that regimes should be understood as social structures. 
Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", World 
Politics, January, No. 2, and "Security Regimes", International Organisation, 
36, 2, spring. 
10. Miiller, Harald. 1997. "The Internationalisation of Principles, Norms and 
Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes", in V. Rittberger and 
P. Mayer, (eds.) Regime Theory andlntemational Relations. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, p. 361, my emphasis). 
I1. Bindingness as I have used it here refers to the scale of structural commitment 
allies agree to make under a security regime. A better appreciation of the 
dynamics of bindingness under any security regime will, however, require an 
analysis of the distinctive institutional features of security arrangements. This 
will permit an evaluation of how such allies are bound to reducing their 
discretionary powers.
From "eco-pessiinism " to "eco-optimism " 35 
12. According to Ghana's Foreign Minister, Obed Asamoah, "ultimately, ECOWAS 
is going to be a supranational organization, and one must begin to see this kind 
of action [the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia] in those terms. It is laying the 
foundation for common ECOWAS action over and above petty national 
interests... [I]t will lead to greater cohesion ... (T)his (is) a pioneering role with 
very wide implications for the efficacy of ECOWAS", (my emphasis) Asamoah, 
Obed. 1991 "The Making of Ghanaian Foreign Po\\cy",LECIA Bulletin, 1, (1), 
pp. 34-36; Novicki, Margaret. 1990. "Obed Asamoah: A New Role for 
ECOWAS", Africa Report, November-December, pp. 17-20; West Africa, 
10-16 January 1994:37-38. 
13. Diverse explanations can be presented to explain embedded cooperation 
among states. The three most influential explanations are (i) hegemonic 
stability, (ii) institutionalism and (iii) knowledge and learning. 
14. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, Art. 2 (hereafter 
ECOWAS Treaty). 
15. Okolo, op cit. For the role of epistemic communities during negotiations, see 
Haas, P.M. 1989. "Do Regimes matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean 
Pollution Control", International OrganizationA3, pp. 377-404. 
16. West Africa, 3 November 1986, p. 2333. A necessity for the establishment of 
such a regime can be better appreciated when an analysis of the sources of subregional 
conflict are tabulated. The most prevalent ones are border disputes 
involving state/citizen clashes, support for coup plotters, refugees and 
environmental crises. 
17. Okolo, op cit. 
18. Probably, an understanding of the Togolese/Senegalese presentation of the 
security proposals can be appreciated by the fact that these states were members 
of the exclusively Francophone group which had appended a security protocol 
to their economic endeavours. 
19. See ECOWAS Document ECW/HSG/11.7 Rev. 1 in Journal of ECOWAS, 1 
(1979) p. 13. 
20. African Research Bulletin, 17 February, 1980, p. 5664. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Okolo, Julius Emeka 1983. "Securing West Africa: The 
ECOWAS Defence Pact", The World Today, May, Volume 39, Number 5, 
pp. 180-181. 
21. Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD). A/SP3/5/81, 
Chapter 11 Art. 4(b). 
22. African Research Bulletin, June 1-30, 1981, p. 6072. 
23. see Article 58 of the revised Treaty. 
24. Sesay, A. 1985. "The OAU and Regime Recognition: Politics of Discord and 
Collaboration in Africa", Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives, 
No. 3, pp. 26-28. Agyeman-Duah, Baffour & Olatunde B.J. Ojo. 1991 "Interstate
36 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
Conflicts in West Africa: The Reference Group Theory Perspective", 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, October, pp. 304-306. 
25. Interview with Ike Nwachukwu, Nigeria's former Foreign Minister, Lagos, 18 
August 1997. 
26. The functions included devising plans for troop movements and logistics, 
launching collective military manoeuvres, formulating and administering the 
military budget of the secretariat, and reviewing and recommending proposals 
to the Executive Secretary, about issues relating to personnel and equipment 
PMAD. 
27.PMAD, 1981 Articles 6(3) & 16. 
28./6K/.,PMADArticle 17. 
29. Ibid., PMAD Article 19. 
30.Ibid., PMAD Article 7(i). 
31. Ibid, PMAD Article 11 (i). 
32. Ibid, PMAD Article 9. 
33. Ibid., PMAD Article 12( 1). 
34. Interview with Abbas Bundu, former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS in 
London, 9 January 1998). 
35. Yoroms, Gani Yoses & Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 1997. "From Economic to 
Political Integration: Towards An Analysis of ECOWAS's Transformation", 
Africa Peace Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 40. 
36. See African Research Bulletin, [ARB] 15 February, 1990, p. 9557. According 
to ARB, "the rebels had apparently assumed that the people of Nimba... would 
rally to their side. But when Charles Taylor,..., proclaimed himself leader of 
the NPFL, whatever local support the rebels enjoyed largely evaporated". 
37. See Sesay, Max A. 1996 "Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia", 
Review of African Political Economy, No. 67, p. 37. H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Jr 
1993. "Liberia: Struggle for Democracy", West Africa, 22-28 March, 
pp. 462-463. 
38. The material on this section is extensive. See among others "Views from 
Abidjan", West Africa, 22-28 January, 1990, p. 93; "US Military Advisers", 
West Africa, 12-18 February 1990, p. 246; "Call for US withdrawal "West 
Africa, 19-25 February, 1990, p. 294; "Gadafi Pledges Peace", West 
Africa, 3-9 December 1990, p. 2964. 
39. Job, Brian L. ed., "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State 
Securities in the Third World" in The Insecurity Dilemma, Boulder: Lynne 
Reinner. pp. 17-19. 
40. For an analysis of the influence of refugees on international politics, see 
Loescher, Gil 1989. "Refugee Issues in International Relations", pp. 2-3 in G. 
Loeschler and Laila Monhan, ed., 1989 Refugees and International 
Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. "Liberia: The Cycle of Abuse -
From "eco-pessimism " to "eco-optimism " 37 
Human Rights Violations since the November Cease-fire", Africa Watch, 
1991, p. 13. 
41.Erskine, Emmanuel. 1991. "Peacekeeping", Africa Forum, 1,1, p. 26. 
42. Helman, G. B. and Steven R. Ratner. 1992/93 "Saving Failed States", Foreign 
Policy, No. 89, Winter, p. 5. Ayoob, M. 1995. The Third World Security 
Predicament: State-making, Regional Conflict and the International System 
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner) pp. 81, 86, 173. Schneider, G. and Patricia A. 
Weitsman. 1995. "Eliciting Cooperation from "Risky States": The Limits of 
Conventional Multilateralism in Security Affairs". Paper presented at the 2nd 
Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Paris, September 13-16, 
p. 3. 
43. There is controversy about this point. Abbas Bundu asserts that it was his 
pressure on both Blaise Compaore and Dawda Jawara that made Liberia an 
agenda issue. Interview, London, 11 January 1998. 
44. Quoted in Akabogu, Chike, 1992. "ECOWAS Takes The Initiative", p. 79 in 
Margaret Vogt, ed.,The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt At 
Regional Peace Keeping Lagos: Gabumo Pub. Co. Ltd. 
45. ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Decision A/Dec.9/5/ 
90, Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee, 
Banjul, Gambia, 30 May 1990. 
46. Letter addressed by President Samuel K. Doe to the Chairman and Members of 
the Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, 14 
July 1990. See also Weller, M. (ed.), 1994. Regional Peace-Keeping and 
International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 60-61. 
47. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. 1994. "Regional Organisations and the Resolution of 
Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia", International Peacekeeping, 
Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn, p. 262. 
48. See Decision A/Dec. 1/8/90, Decision A/ Dec.2/8/90, Decision A/Dec.3/8/90, 
Decision A/Dec.4/8/90, also Weller. op cit., pp. 67-72. 
49. The character and strategy of ECOMOG was mandated as, maintaining, 
enforcing and monitoring the cease-fire, protecting life and property, maintaining 
essential services, providing security to the LNTG, observe elections, 
conduct policing duties, see Vogt, "The Problems and Challenges of Peacemaking: 
From Peace-keeping to Peace Enforcement", p. 159, in Vogt, op cit., 
50. ECOWAS: A Stable and Peaceful Environment- Pre-requisite for accelerated 
ECOWAS Development and Integration. Interim Report of the Executive Secretary 
to the 28th Session of the Council of Ministers. Abuja, 12-14 October 1990. 
51. These are the Yamoussoukoro IV Accords of October 1991, Cotonou Accords 
of 1993, Accra/Akosombo Agreements of September/December 1994 and 
finally the Abuja Agreement of August 1995/6. The controversies among
38 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning 
community partners were solved by shifting emphasis from the SMC to the 
Committee of Five, at a critical stage during the peace process (Burkina Faso, 
C6te d'lvoire, Guinea, Senegal and Togo). Subsequently, the Committee of 
Five and the SMC were merged to form the Committee of Nine (Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo) to 
create a monitoring group with the aim of maintaining strict implementation of 
the cease-fire agreements. Final Communique of the 1st Joint Summit of the 
ECOWAS SMC and the Committee of Five, see also ECOWAS, First Meeting 
of the Committee of Nine on the Liberian Crisis, Final Communique, Abuja, 
Nigeria, 7 November 1992. See Weller, op cit., pp. 230-232. 
52. ECOWAS: Decision A/DEC.8/7/92 Relating to Sanctions Against Taylor and 
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, see also ECOWAS: Decision HSGC9- 
2/8/96 Relating to the Implementation of Arms Embargo in Liberia. 
53. These agreements have been discussed in detail in a forthcoming paper, "From 
War to Peace: The Dilemmas of Multilateral Agency Interventions in Civil 
Wars", 1998. 
54. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) is the first United 
Nations peace-keeping mission undertaken in co-operation with a peacekeeping 
operation already set up by another organisation. Established in 
September 1993, UNOMIL's mandate under Security Council resolution 866 
(1993) includes in addition to military aspects, assistance in the co-ordination 
of humanitarian activities, observation and verification of elections, and to 
monitor the implementation procedures in order to verify their impartial 
application. UNOMIL and ECOMOG have separate chains of command, but 
the missions consult formally through the established committees, as well as 
informally on matters affecting them both. UNOMIL strength is 345 military 
observers, 20 military medical personnel and 45 military engineers. 
55. ECOWAS: Resolution A/RES.6/7/95 calling on the United Nations to Maintain 
its Presence and support to Liberia. 
56. This point is particularly important as it represented a major concession from 
Charles Taylor's NPFL which had established a quasi-state. Greater Liberia, 
under a National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government [NPRAG] 
based at Gbarnga. 
57. See especially ECOWAS: Final report of the Thirty-Ninth session of the 
Council of Ministers, Abuja, 22-25 July 1996, ECW/CM/XXXIX/18/ 
Rev. 1 and ECOWAS: Final communique of the Nineteenth session of the 
Authority of Heads of State and Governments, Abuja, 26-27 July 1996, ECW/ 
HSG/XIX. 
58. ECOWAS: Final report Thirty-Eight meeting of Council of Ministers, 22-25 
July 1996: 26; New Nigerian, 19 August, 1997:12, ECOWAS: Fourth session 
of Heads of State and Government of the Committee of Nine on Liberia,
From "eco-pessimism" to "eco-optimism" 39 
Decision HSGC9-1/8/96 Relating to Sanctions Against Persons who Violate 
the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia, Abuja 17 August 1996. 
59. Shelpedi.T.M. 1998. "Transition from Warto Peace: Consolidation of Achievement", 
paper presented at ECOWAS Forum on Conflict Management and 
Resolution at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 7-11 July 1998. p. 9. 
60. Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi 1996 "Ghana, ECOWAS and ECOMOG: An Analysis 
of Ghana's Role in Liberia", Liberian Studies Journal, Vol. XXI, No. 2 
December 1996, 
61. For a more detailed analysis, see Wienberger, Naomr 1995. "How Peace 
Keeping Becomes Intervention: Lessons from the Lebanese Experience" 
pp. 154-170 in Esman, Milton J. and Shibley Telhami eds., International 
Organisations and Ethnic Conflict, Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press. 
62. These variables have been tested in a comparative analysis in the paper Aning, 
E.K. 1997. Multilateral Organisation Responses to State Collapse in Africa: 
Lessons from the Liberia and Somali Experiences", Revised version of paper 
presented at a conference on "The Perspectives on ECOMOG in the Future 
of African Regional Security", at The University of Abuja, Nigeria, between 
3-7 March 1997. 
63. Tarr, Byron 1993. "The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective", 
ISSUE: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. XXVI -2, p. 79. Jonah, was confident of the 
competence of the Executive Secretary": a political rather than an economic 
expert [with] long experience as a member of the commonwealth secretariat, 
[it was] inevitable that he would give a political thrust to ECOWAS,... [T]here 
is no doubt that the forceful personality, political acumen and wide-ranging 
experience ... helped galvanise action by ECOWAS in dealing with the 
Liberian crises" see Jonah, J. 1993 "ECOMOG: A Successful Example of 
Peace-keeping by a Regional Organisation in the Third World", in W. Kiihne, 
(ed.), Internationales Umfeld Sicherheitsinteressen und Nationale Planning 
der Bundesrepublik: Stifung Wissenschaft und Politik, p. 197.