Afr. j . polil. sci. (1998), Vol. 3 No. 2, 1-14 
The Appropriated State: Political 
Structure and Cycles of Conflict in 
Nigeria, 1900 — 1993 
Ehimika A. Ifidon * 
Abstract 
Three times has post colonial Nigeria tried to operate a democratic constitution; 
three times have these attempts generated centrifugal conflict. Defective constitutions, 
inherently corrupt politicians and class struggle as explanations have 
limited causal logic. The recurrence of conflict only under particular conditions 
has tended to indicate the validity of the structural explanation, and the phased 
succession a cyclical interpretation. How valid is the discernment of cycles in 
Nigeria's political history? If the claim that "historical events are unique " is not 
demonstrated to follow from the nature of events, that "history repeats itself 
becomes an equally possible hypothesis. All history, therefore, is reasoned history. 
Yet, the phases of the Nigerian conflict cycle: Northern hegemony - Southern 
challenge (Crisis) - military rule, indicate a struggle to appropriate the state and 
reveal the existence of conflict units, the needs of which are usually sought and met 
in the same manner. Could these conflict cycles be said, therefore, to have 
immanent causes? 
Introduction 
An influential class of explanations attributes the visible non-sustenance of 
democratic government in Nigeria since independence in 1960 to defective 
political and constitutional structures (Oyovbaire 1987; Olagunju etal 1993: 33- 
34). The extent of official acceptance of such explanations is indicated by the 
otherwise ornarhental re-working of the basic independence constitution, finally 
effected in 1963, 1979 and 1991, and by modifications in the number and 
organisational structure of political parties. The outcomes have been changes in the 
relationship between the component territorial units and the central government,
2 Ehimika A. lfidon 
and from the Westminster parliamentary to variants of the American presidential 
arrangement. That Nigeria in 1993 still grappled with the problem of sustaining 
democratic government implies that these explanations have failed to explain the 
problem. Yet, conflict has generally followed any case of democratic breakdown. 
The conflict-generating capacity of pluralism, particularly within a democracy 
(Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) appears to have ample demonstration in Nigeria's 
political history (Post and Vickers 1973). The retort that ethnic differences are not 
"inherently conflictual", but "lead to strife only when they are politicised" (Ake 
1991: 34) ignores the fact of the conflict-generating competition for the resources 
of the state that is a feature of coexistence within the same state. Ethnicity is 
inherently political, hence conflictual. 
Closely associated with the failure of democratic continuity, conflict of the kind 
defined as national, i.e., motivated by the struggle primarily for exclusive hegemonic 
advantage, and that engenders suppressed clamours for ethnic or regional 
autonomy or separation, is rarely a feature of military rule. In fact, such national 
conflicts usually lead to, and justify civil-military regime change. That such 
conflict is not a regular feature of military rule only means that a militarydictatorial 
framework has a better capacity to withstand civil conflict. This quality 
also applies to one-party rule, and accounts for the generally low incidence of civil 
conflicts in one-party states or under authoritarian regimes compared to states with 
multi-party systems (Collier 1982:95-112; and Young 1994: 2). Nevertheless, the 
occurrence of coups in one-party states and the military-military coup are indications 
that this capacity has its limitations, and a test of the immunity of the military 
to factional political divisions. In Nigeria since 1960, there have been three such 
successful military-military coups- 1966, 1975 and 1985. 
If therefore the features of democratic practice and breakdown, and regime 
change are super-imposed on Nigeria's historical time-chart between 1900, when 
formal colonial rule began, and 1993, when another attempt at democratisation 
failed, the recurrence of a particular succession of events is discernible. Is it 
possible to construe this recurrence in terms of inexorable cycles of conflict? Could 
these cycles be argued to have their own logic of succession? Or is their occurrence 
merely a reflection of creative imagination? 
The Appropriated State and the Politics of Pluralism in Africa 
So much rationality, unreality, eurocentrism has characterised the analysis of the 
post-colonial state in Africa. Political analysis has been so blunted by the apparent 
theoretical possibilities in the prescriptive conception of the state that the problematic 
state in Africa is confusedly and inappropriately defined in terms of what the 
state should be rather than what it is. Running through statist approaches, as 
demonstrated by the classifications of Chabal (1992: 69-70) and Chazan et al 
(1992: 40), is the emphasis on formal prerequisites, and characterisation in terms
The Appropriated State 3 
of institutions, of their structures and functions. The implication is the conception 
of the state not only as a political actor, but as an autonomous and impersonal actor. 
For post colonial and culturally plural Africa, this is invalid. 
In spite of the Marxist instrumental theory of the state, the state in Euro- 
American theoretical and historical tradition has been presented as autonomous, 
impersonal and impartial (Simons 1997: 279). The pre-condition for such a state 
is that social relations are sufficiently pluralistic and diffused, guaranteeing liberty 
and objectifying the state. So the state is autonomous, since its acts are: 
(i) directed by "organisationally coherent collectivities of state officials, ... 
insulated from ties to currently dominant socioeconomic interests", and 
(ii) "not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, 
or society" (Skocpol 1985: 9; Zartman 1995: 5). 
Because it is autonomous, it is also impersonal (Held 1989: 180). 
Theorists of the post-colonial state in Africa have insisted on the historicity of 
the African state, linking its peculiarity particularly with its colonial origins' 
(Chabal 1992: 70,74; Dornbos 1990: 180). The consensual inference from historical 
analysis seems to be that the distinguishing feature of the state in Africa is its 
prominence, defined by Rothstein (1987: 143) as "the centrality of the state," and 
as the centralized state (in relation to local centres of power) by Wunsch and Olowu 
(1995: 4). The state in Africa may not be the minimal "arbiter" state of western 
political theory (Chabal 1986: 15), but its characterisation has not been incompatible 
with the autonomous-impersonal state. Thus, the state is said to act, intervene 
in society and to have its own agenda (see, for example, Lubeck 1987: 16). 
If the state does act, by whose agency and on whose behalf does it act? The 
autonomy/impersonality argument presupposes a state-society divide where the 
state acts to strengthen itself against society. But can the state be so conceived in 
Africa where the most visible feature of politics is cultural pluralism? 
Lasswell and Kaplan(1950: 184), following Laski's empiricist conception of the 
state, have argued that the acts of the state are "the concrete acts of certain persons 
and groups". The state is in fact a social institution, and reflects the tensions and 
conflicts among social groups. Indeed, it is instrumental in determining and 
sustaining outcomes, hence it is importantly an object of appropriation by 
competing groups; hence the state is a source of violence (against non-ruling social 
groups). 
Callaghy (1986:31) has defined the "model African state" as: 
an organisation of domination controlled with varying degrees of efficacy 
by a ruling group or class that competes for power, for sovereignty, with 
other political, economic, and social groups. 
Rothstein (1987: 144), describing the pathological state in Africa as a robber
4 Ehimika A. Ifidon 
state, has noted the de-autonomisation of the state by referring to its transformation 
as "the spoil of spoils for special interests". What these writers have not done is to 
link this process of state appropriation with the politics of pluralism, to the intergroup 
competition for access, domination and exclusion (Ifidon 1996). This is 
explicit in Kuper (1971: 33). 
In the plural society the state is the representative political organ of the 
ruling section organised as a concrete group, its exclusive and ultimate 
instrument for the internal domination and corporate control of the institutionally 
distinct subject populations ... 
The state in Africa is neither autonomous nor impersonal: it is not law that 
rules, but groups, their interests and members. True, it is centralised, but 
centralisation has been a condition for the emergence of the appropriated state, 
while further centralisation has been effected by the appropriated state to reproduce 
itself. The state does not have ideal attributes. The attributes of the state are 
the attributes of the appropriating group. Africa's regressing cycle of redemocratisation 
is traceable to the operation of the appropriated state. 
Political Structure and Cycles of Conflict in Nigeria, 
1900-1993 
Nigeria is an appropriated state: "The Nigerian state serves as a financial conduit 
for sectional political forces" (Whitaker 1991:269). The use of the concept of cycle 
to describe what has been referred to as "the recurrent crisis and conflict in the 
Nigerian political system" (Akinyemi 1976:135) is not novel. Ihonvbere and Shaw 
(1988:14) had explained the predictability of the 1983 democratic breakdown (and 
military coup) by reference to the general fact that the "nature and direction of 
Nigerian politics in the 1980s did not appear to be fundamentally different from 
what it was in the 1950s and 1960s until 1984"; but specifically to the repetition 
of the "conditions which prompted civil unrest in the first republic and forced the 
military to intervene on behalf of the bourgeoisie". 
A political-economy rendition locates the conflicts in the "production, market, 
state and moral relations of Nigerian society". But neither military rule nor 
democratic government has shown "the will or capacity" to address these problems 
at source. Civil rule, therefore, is "likely to repeat the 'failure of polities', and hence 
to invite in its turn a fresh demonstration from the military of the 'failure of 
administration'" (Williams and Turner 1978: 172). 
A similar description sums up the crisis as that of under-development, and the 
failure of the dominant class (having both civilian and military factions) to 
overcome it. Military rule, in the first instance, owes its origin to the inability of the 
civilian faction to grapple with the crisis. The military also fails to "'correct' the
The Appropriated State 5 
Nigerian society" and relinquishes power either through its own judgement or 
through vociferous public demands. But the crisis is already worse, so civil rule 
again fails. "Thus, the circle of civilian misrule followed by military coups/military 
rule and again by further military disengagement repeats itself (Kieh, Jr. and 
Agbese 1993:410). 
In relation to the proposed cyclical model, three phases are identifiable, 
a. An authoritarian political phase that features non-representative rule. The 
rule is defined as authoritarian with regard to its nature and ultimate source. 
Thus, military rule is as authoritarian as colonial rule. 
Table 1: Regime Change and Cycles of Conflict in Nigeria, 1900-93 
Third Cycle 
1983-? 
Second Cycle 
1966-1983 
First Cycle 
1900-1966 Phase 
1983-1987 1966-1977 1900-1950 Authoritarian 
1987-1993 1977-1979 1950-1960 Transitional 
9 Civil 1979-1983 1960-1966 
A transitional political phase marked by the dual rule of authoritarian and b. 
representative elements (even at different levels of government), and with 
the objective of ultimate transition to full representative government. 
A civil political phase, which by virtue of being based on election, can be 
described as democratic. 
These phases form a recurring succession, hence their cyclical integration. As 
c. 
Table 1 shows, the first phase of the first cycle started with formal colonial rule by 
Britain in 1900 and ended in 1950, from which time is dated the transitional phase 
of Nigerian rule and colonial over-rule through quasi-representative institutions. 
The transitional phase ended with formal independence in October 1960, and 
initiated the civil political phase which featured adejure all-Nigerian government. 
The second cycle started with the military coup of January 1966 and the reinstatement 
of authoritarian rule. Three military governments ruled during this phase: J.T. 
Aguiyi-Ironsi (January - July 1966), Yakubu Gowon (August 1966-July 1975) 
and Murtala Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo (July 1975 - 1977). In 1977, 
with the local government election, the transitional phase began it featured 
military over-rule, but civil rule at the local level. This phase ended with the 
swearing in of Shehu Shagari as president in October 1979. The military again 
struck in December 1983 bringing the second cycle to a close.
6 Ehimika A. Ifidon 
The third cycle began in 1983, and its authoritarian phase ended in 1988 with 
the inauguration of the transitional phase in December 1987 with the local 
government election. Two military governments ruled during the authoritarian 
phase: MuhammaduBuhari (January 1984-August 1985) and Ibrahim Babangida 
(September 1985-1988). Between 1988 and 1993, the Babangida government 
shared power with elected local government chairmen, and later with elected state 
governors, senators and representatives till its exit in August 1993. Although there 
was a presidential election on June 12 to complete the process of transition, it was 
annulled by Babangida on June 23. On August 26, the civilian-headed Interim 
National Government was inaugurated, and on November 17, it fell to the new 
military dictatorship of Sani Abacha. The transitional phase was not completed, 
therefore no civil political phase followed. Why this breach? 
A logical or merely creative reading of the phases described would characterise 
the central tendency in Nigeria's political history as the "Triumph of Order", or the 
"Search for Stability". When authoritarian rule became too long or severe, it 
engendered contrary tendencies. The result was gradual disengagement represented 
by dual rule, and ultimately civil political government. The absence of a 
central ordering structure encouraged juvenile freedom in partisan politicians 
which resulted in strife and near-anarchy. To prevent the state from expiring, and 
in response to popular clamour for order, authoritarian rule was re-established. The 
June 12 presidential election seemed to have created conditions that could 
undermine Nigeria's integrity, hence the reversion to authoritarian rule. But there 
was no civil political phase for which authoritarian rule was the solution. The 
disorder was generated not by the election, but by its annulment. This scheme, for 
its inability to explain the breach, must be abandoned. 
Explaining the Breach in Transition 
Explaining the breach in transition must lead, not only to a reconstruction of the 
pattern of recurrence, but first to an explanation of the persistence of conflict, and 
therefore the very source of recurrence. There seems to be a limit to the applicability 
of the cultural pluralism model in its traditional formulation, or its conglomerate 
variant, to the explanation of conflict and its persistence in Nigeria. The unit 
of conflict for the above model is the plural section defined as the ethnic or cultural 
group. Using Otite's (1990: Appendix II) list of 374 ethnic groups, for example, 
the kind of conflict that should ensue is that of all against all. But from the first 
national conflict of 1953 to date, such conflicts have not been patternless or 
directionless, and the ethnic group has not been the unit of conflict, nor has 
ethnicity been the basis of alignment. 
Instead of the plain ethnic groups of the traditional cultural pluralism model, the 
units of conflict have been arrangements of these groups on geo-historical and 
clientele based principles. The starting point is the emergence of a tri-polar
The Appropriated State 7 
regional structure in 1939 and its politicisation with the introduction of broad 
based electoral politics. The extent of intra-regional socialisation has been understated. 
.To speak of the West or East is not a mere reference to the multi-cultural 
Yoruba or Igbo dominant centre. What has happened in the period between 1939 
and 1963, when Nigeria was given a four region structure with the creation of the 
Midwest Region (from the Western Region), and 1967, when Nigeria became a 
twelve state "military" federation, was a region-based elite integration and cultural 
inter-penetration. The ensuing bi-polar structure in the south prevented the 
emergence of a viable political South. 
It is possible to argue that the North existed before Nigeria. It largely existed in 
the Fulani ruled Sokoto Caliphate for about sixty years before it was incorporated 
into what is now called Nigeria. The British did not have to work on "building up 
the North as a separate entity" (Ekeh 1989: 23); a historical basis already existed. 
But the British did define the separateness of the North in relation to the South. The 
implication of this prior existence is that the structure of relations in the Caliphate 
has been carried along, unchanged, into Nigeria. 
Although the principle of state organisation in the Caliphate was religious, 
social organisation was based on a "horizontal stratification based on class and 
rank" (Sklar 1983: 350), a hierarchical patron-client system that integrated muslims 
and non-muslims, negroid and hamitic elements. With the emergence of a politically 
conscious North (largely as response to the aggressive politics of leaders of the 
West and East of the country), the distributive basis of the clientele based system 
was vastly expanded and functionally trans-ethnic. Yet, the dominant centre has 
remained the Fulani. It is an understatement to represent these regional formations 
as Yoruba, Igbo and Fulani (or less correctly, Hausa-Fulani). Certainly, there have 
been intra-regional difficulties,2 but in the context of a national conflict, sympathies, 
alignments, and especially mobilisation tend to be regional. These regions, 
in their different stages of integration or disintegration, are the units of conflicts. 
Before Nigerians themselves manned these conflict units, British colonial 
officers had fought among themselves on the basis of these units, purporting to do 
so on behalf of the respective Nigerian peoples. Frederick Lugard had thus 
complained of the "growing divergence of administrative methods" in Nigeria 
(Kirk-Greene 1968: 58-59). In consequence, he recommended amalgamation 
under one governor-general "so that there may be no jealousy or rivalry between 
the North and the South" (p. 27). 
Why would there bejealousy or rivalry between North and South? An indication 
of the objects of intra-colony competition over which conflicts have been recurrently 
generated in post-colonial Nigeria was given in an apologia for the colonial 
North by E.D. Morel (1968: 19): 
The position of Northern Nigeria is very anomalous. A vast protectorate
8 Ehimika A. Ifidon 
shut off from the seaboard by another less than four times its size; having 
no coastline, and the customs dues on whose trade are collected by the latter. 
Southern Nigerian enjoying a very large revenue; its officials decently 
housed and catered for; able to spend freely upon public works and to 
develop its natural resources. Northern Nigeria still poor, a pensioner upon 
the Treasury, in part upon Southern Nigeria; unable to stir a step in the 
direction of a methodical exploration of its vegetable riches; its officials 
housed in a manner which is generally indifferent and sometimes disgraceful, 
and now deprived even of their travelling allowance of five shillings a 
day. 
Such a dependent position arising from geographical location, while 
certainly better than outright separate existence, had political implications. A 
federal or confederal system, allowing for a measure of autonomy, would confirm 
such dependence; but a unitary structure would ensure state control of the 
benefits of coastal endowment. To control the benefits, the North must control the 
state. 
Although this was written in 1911, and about those sympathetic to the British 
North and those sympathetic to the South, the structure of needs has remained 
essentially the same, except that oil has become one of the resources possessed by 
the South (minorities), the revenue from which has become the object of sectional 
appropriation through control of the state. The principle of revenue allocation by 
derivation, supportive of a federal structure, would ensure northern dependence, 
or at least inadequate resource base. But other principles such as those based on 
need and population would have a contrary impact. 
The relationship between political domination of the Nigerian state and accessibility 
to all its resources, and infrastructural development of the region controlling 
power has been studied extensively (Bamishaiye 1976). From 1950, with the 
indigenisation of the competition for resources, the political insecurity of the 
"privileged classes of the North", as in 1953 and 1966, initially led to the threat to 
secede (Nnoli 1978: 162). But the outcome of the events of 1966 and the 
consequent civil war have demonstrated that unitarism is the solution to insecurity 
or fear of southern domination, and real federation the solution to the fear of 
northern domination. 
The only way the North could ensure access to, and control of the System of 
Rewards in the early 1960s was to "ensure a strong presence for itself in the Federal 
Government" (Post and Vickers 1973: 65); in later years it was to dominate it. In 
conflict terms, the realisation of this objective has meant the creation of the 
equilibrium. The crisis of the mid 60s has been attributed to Ahmadu Bello's 
determination to maintain this favourable equilibrium in the face of a strong 
southern challenge:
The Appropriated State 9 
... the Northern leader was not prepared to contemplate any change which 
might alter the balance precariously achieved at the end of 1959, which he 
regarded as favouring his own region and giving a preponderance in Nigeria 
to his own Hausa-Fulani people (ibid.: 73). 
The outcome was the disfigurement of the electoral system, riots and a coup 
d'etat. 
The same pattern recurred during the 1979-1983 civil government period. 
Dominated by the same conflict unit, in 1983 it faced another potent western 
led electoral challenge. Another mutilated general election followed. Between 
October, when the second term of Shagari as president started, and December, 
when a coup d'etat occurred, Nigeria groaned under total paralysis arising 
from the contested electoral victory of the northern controlled National Party of 
Nigeria. 
The June 12, 1993 election produced an aberration: Moshood Abiola, from the 
west, to all intents and purposes, won. As Ali Mazrui (1995: 32) has remarked, 
... he was the first southerner to be elected executive head of state in the 
country's post-colonial history. In previous elections Nigerians brought 
northern muslims into power. In June 1993, they still brought back a muslim 
victor — but this time he was a southerner. Did the military government of 
Ibrahim Babangida nullify the elections for those ethnic and regional 
reasons? 
The question should therefore be posed: Did the electoral victory of Abiola put 
the equilibrium in jeopardy ? Yes, it did because it meant the possibility of entry for 
another conflict unit with the implication of exclusion for the other two. Abdulkadir 
Balarabe Musa (see interview in African Guardian, 29.11.93), once the "radical" 
governor of the northern state of Kaduna, summarized the two reasons why the 
northern leadership was distressed by the result of the June 12 election and 
instigated its annulment. 
First, June 12 means a change from them calling the shots to someone else 
calling the shots. This change is something they cannot accept. 
Second, these people live on favours, privileges, appointments, contracts. 
Now, they fear that they may not be doing as well as they were doing and 
because of their quarrel with M.K.O. in the Second Republic and since 
M.K.O. is now being sponsored by another party, SDP, they are afraid they 
would be marginalised on award of contracts, board appointments, all these 
bureaucratic privileges.
10 Ehimika A. Ifidon 
In effect, the election was nullified for "ethnic and regional reasons". Musa 
further remarked, "if the winner had been a northerner, a Hausa-Fulani. They 
would have taken it as their own victory". This explains the breach in the earlier 
cyclical construct. Hence, Post and Vickers' interpretation of the 1993 episode in 
contrast with that of the early 1960s: 
An issue the Northern conservatives seem agreed upon is that under no 
circumstance must NIGERIA as it is known today mutate. The resolve is: 
Neither disintegration nor confederation. Even the Sultan had advised 
against disintegration ... (African Guardian 1993: 28). 
Hegemony Cycles 
The pattern of political change I have analysed above could be characterised as 
hegemony cycles. As shown in Table 2, the first independent government was 
dominated by the Northern Peoples Congress, a domination challenged by an 
alliance of the major southern parties (and some northern opposition parties) in the 
1964 election. It was inconclusive. The outcome was a period of crisis that 
culminated in the coup of 15 January 1966. Military rule justified as a response to 
political disorder ended in 1979. This is the first cycle. 
Table 2: Political Conflict and Hegemony Cycles in Nigeria, 1960-93 
Phase 
First Cycle 
1960-1979 
1960-1964 Northern 
Hegemony 
Southern 
Challenge 
(Crisis) 1964-1966 
Military Rule 1966-1979 
The second cycle began with the inauguration of Shagari in 1979 It was 
essennallyaNorthern rule, particularly after the North-Easterns (the NPN-NPP 
accord) broke down, just as the North-East coalition (NPC-NCNC) of the 1960 
We6!") ^ TH ^f^ f « • ^ng SouTheS (pa^cu^ 
Western) challenge. The fear of losing grip and the urge to win power led to 
man.pu.at.ons of the electoral process. The outcome w£ the contend results 
Second Cycle 
1979-1993 
Third 
Cycle 
1979-1983 June 12,1993 
election annulled, 
western 
hegemony 
aborted. 
Oct.-Dec. 1983 
1984-1993
The Appropriated State 11 
Between October and December 1983, Nigeria simply drifted in an expectant 
crisis. Again the military struck apparently in response to political disorder. 
Military rule was to last till 1993, ending the second cycle, but the "wrong" conflict 
unit won the June 12, 1993 presidential election. As before, it was either victory or 
crisis. That the equilibrium may not be destroyed, the election was nullified and 
military rule continued. 
The modified cyclical regime, rather than an expression of reasoned history or 
transcendental explanation, seems to have followed from the nature of the 
conflicting units and the objects and mode of competition. Lasswell and Kaplan 
(1950: 246), explaining the mechanism of cyclical occurrence, have insisted that 
a pattern is "cyclical only if similar needs continually recur and are continually 
dealt with in virtually the same ways". It is in this sense only that these hegemony 
cycles have immanent causes. 
Notes 
* Lecturer in History, Department of History, University of Benin, Benin City, 
Nigeria; and doctoral candidate in History at the Obafemi Awolowo University, 
Ile-Ife, Nigeria. 
1. To describe the African state as "a borrowed institution" (Diop and Diouf 
1990:7) would seem to imply that the state is ahistorical, that the African state 
is not peculiar. The idea of the state may have been borrowed, but not the state 
itself. The state as a colonial bequest had no parallel in Europe (see O' Brien 
1993: 63). 
2. It is pertinent to note that none of the major ethnic groups has the currently most 
sought after good in the Nigerian competition circuit: oil; access to it has been 
through political control of the state. Minority groups in the west and east, with 
limited success and impact, had tried to mobilise on this basis. In the North, the 
middle belt communities, particularly the Tiv, have played an anti-hegemonic 
role. 
References 
Ake, C, 1991. "Rethinking African Democracy", Journal of Democracy, 
2(1), pp. 32-44. 
Akinyemi, A.R., 1976. "Ethnic Politics: A Non-Conformist View", pp. 135-145 in 
A.O. Sanda, (ed.) Ethnic Relations in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects. 
Ibadan: The Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan. 
Bamishaiye, A., 1976. "Ethnic Politics as an Instrument of Unequal Socio- 
Economic Development in Nigeria's Frist Republic", pp. 71-91 in A.O. Sanda, 
(ed.) Ethnic Relations in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects. Ibadan: The 
Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan.
12 Ehimika A. Ifidon 
Callaghy, T., 1986. "Politics and Vision in Africa: The Interplay of Domination, 
Equality and Liberty", pp. 30-51 in P. Chabal, (ed.) Political Domination in 
Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Chabal, P., 1986. "Thinking about Politics in Africa", pp. 1-16 in idem, (ed.) 
Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power. Cambridge: 
Chabal P., 1992 Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation .London and 
Cambridge University Press. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
in Contemporary Africa. 2nd edition. Boulder, Col. Lynne Rienner. 
1945-1975. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Chazan, N.R., Mortimer J., Ravenhill and D. Rothchild, 1992 Politics and Society 
Collier, R.B., 1982 Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 
Collingwood, R.G., 1961 The Idea of History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Diop, M.C. and M. Diouf, 1990 Statutory Political Successions: Mechanisms of 
Power Transfer in Africa. CODESRIA Working Paper 1/90. 
Doornbos, M., 1990 "The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and 
Prospect", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 28(2), pp. 179-188. 
Ekeh, P.P., 1989 "The Structure and Meaning of Federal Character in the Nigerian 
Political System", pp. 19-44 in P.P. Ekeh and E.E. Osaghae, (ed.) Federal 
Character and Federation in Nigeria. Ibadan: HEB. 
Held, D., 1989 "Citizenship and Autonomy", pp. 162-184 in D. Held and J.B. 
Thompson, (ed.) Social Theory of Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and his 
Critics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ifidon, E.A., 1996 "Citizenship, Statehood and the Problem of Democratisation in 
Nigeria", Africa Development, xxi (4), pp. 93-107. 
Ihonvbere, J.O. and T.M. Shaw, 1988 Towards a Political Economic of Nigeria: 
Petroleum and Politics at the (Semi-) Periphery. Aldershot: Avebury. 
Kieh, G.K., Jr. and P.O. Agbese, 1993 "From Politics back to the Barracks in 
Nigeria: A Theoretical Exploration", Journal of Peace Research, 30(4). 
Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., (ed.) 1968 Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria: A 
ed.) Pluraiism in Africa_ Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
pp. 409-426. 
Documentary Record. London: Frank Cass. 
Kuper, L., 1971 "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems", pp. 7-26 in L. 
Kuper and M.G. Smith, ( 
University of California Press. 
Lasswell.H.D.andA. Kaplan, \950PowerandSociety:A FrameworkforPolitical 
S ' M To?a»en and London: YaIe U n i v e r s i tyP r e s s - 
A , "• ,','l~J. The African Bourgeoisie: Debates, Methods, and Units of 
Ana ys.s 3-26 in .dem, (ed.) The African Bourgeoisie: Capitalist Development 
m Ntgena, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast. Boulder, Col. Lynne Rienner.
The Appropriated State 13 
Mazrui, A., 1995 "Ethnicity in Bondage: Is its Liberation Premature?", in Ethnic 
Violence: Conflict Resolution and Cultural Pluralism. Report of the UNRISD/ 
UNDP International Seminar on Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies, August 
1994, New York. Geneva: UNRISD. 
Morel, E.D., 1968 Nigeria: Its Peoples and its Problems. 3rd Edition. London: 
Frank Cass. 
Nnoli, O., 1978 Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension. 
O'Brien, J., 1993 "Ethnicity, National Identity and Social conflict", pp. 60-82 in 
A. Hurskainen and M. Salih, (ed.) Social Science and Conflict Analysis. 
Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
Olagunju, T., A. Jinadu and S. Oyovbaire, 1993 Transition to Democracy in 
Nigeria, 1985-1993. Ibadan: Spectrum. 
Otite, O., 1990 Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria. Ibadan: Shaneson. 
Oyovbaire, S.E., 1987 "The Context of Democracy in Nigeria", pp. 1-19 in idem 
(ed.) Democratic Experiment in Nigeria: Interpretive Essays. Benin: Omega. 
Post, K. and M. Vickers, 1973. Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, 1960-1966. 
Rabushka, A. and K.A. Shepsle, 1972 Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of 
London: HEB. 
Democratic Instability. Columbus, Oh.: Charles E. Merrill. 
Rothstein, R.L., 1987 "National Security, Domestic Resource Constraints and 
Elite Choices in the Third World", pp. 140-158 in S. Deger and R. West, (ed.) 
Defence, Security and Development. London: Frances Pinter. 
Russell, B., 1966 Philosophical Essays. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Simons, A., 1997 "Democratisation and Ethnic Conflict: The Kin Connection", 
Nations and Nationalism, 3(2), pp. 273289. 
Sklar, R.L., 1983 Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African 
Nation. New York: NOK. 
Skocpol, T., 1985 "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research", pp. 3-37 in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol, (ed.) 
Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Whitaker, C.S., 1991 "The Unfinished State of Nigeria", pp. 265-273 in R.L. Sklar 
and C.S. Whitaker, African Politics and Problems in Development. Boulder, 
Col. Lynne Rienner. 
Williams, G. and T. Turner, 1978 "Nigeria", pp. 132-172 in J. Dunn, (ed.) West 
African States: Failure and Promise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wunsch, J.S. and D. Olowu, 1995 "The Failure of the Centralized African State", 
pp. 1-22 in idem, (ed.) The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and 
Self-Government in Africa. San Francisco, Ca.: Institute for Contemporary 
Studies. 
Young, C, 1994 Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: An Overview. Occasional 
Paper 8. Geneva: UNRISD.
14 Ehimika A. Ifidon 
Zartman, I.W., 1995 "Posing the Problem of State Collapse", pp. 1-11 in idem, 
(ed.) Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 
Authority. Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner.