Afr.j. polit. sci. (1998), Vol. 3 No. 1, 82-103 
The Future of Demilitarisation and Civil 
Military Relations in West Africa: 
Challenges and Prospects for 
Democratic Consolidation* 
J 'Kayode Fayemi** 
Abstract 
This paper examines the state of civil-military relations and the prospects for 
demilitarisation anddemocratisation in contemporary West Africa. Its underlying 
thesis is that West Africa poses one of the greatest dilemmas to the prospects for 
demilitarisation in Africa. At the same time, it offers a potentially useful mechanism 
for regional peace and security with implications for (de)militarisation in 
Africa. While the paper recognises the historico-structural dimensions of 
militarisation as well as the behavioural obstacles to demilitarisation, it captures 
the challenges and prospects in terms of the complexity of state-civil society 
relations and suggests a holistic understanding of the concept of security. This, it 
does with a view to de-emphasising force as the key mechanism for conflict 
resolution, and promoting an inclusive institutionalframework for demilitarisation 
and development. 
Introduction 
Militarisation is a multi-dimensional process containing phenomena such 
as rearmament, the growth of armed forces, an increasing role for the 
military in decision making process, an increasing role for force in conflict 
resolution and the spread of " militaristic" values. In general,... militarisation 
is a process whereby the "civilian" sphere is increasingly militarised 
towards a state of excess, usually referred to as "militarism" (Hettne, 
1988,18). 
1027-0353 © I99S African Association of Political Science
Future of Demilitarisation and Civil-Military Relations in West Africa 83 
The West Africa region presents Africa with some of its greatest challenges to 
demilitarisation today. If one takes the incidence of conflicts in the region, the 
increased flow of arms, the activity of private armies, the prime place occupied by 
force in conflict resolution and the continued influence of the military in the 
political decision-making process as the militarisation index. West Africa is one 
region that ought to worry observers deeply. In reviewing the current security 
situation in Africa and, exploring the relationship between militarisation, armed 
conflict and underdevelopment, an understanding of the security challenges of 
demilitarisation in the region should help illuminate our assessment of the 
prospects for solutions. 
In this paper, demilitarisation is understood in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms. The central premise of the paper is that although demilitarisation in all its 
dimensions constitutes an essential requirement for establishing stable civilmilitary 
relations, economic development and therefore democratic consolidation, 
there can be distorting consequences especially when it is reduced to a beancounting 
exercise. The academic and policy implications of this can be negative, 
especially when the actual results do not fit the expected outcomes. A good 
example of this is the trade-off hypothesis that is popular in studies on disarmament 
and development, even when there is evidence that a decrease in defence expenditure 
does not necessarily translate into an increase in social spending.1 In West 
Africa where political leaders have been known to pursue "guns" and "butter" 
objectives, military spending does develop a life of its own and becomes autonomous 
of overall national spending. Often times, reduction in military spending 
leads to non-consumer defence spending, not increased expenditure on the 
productive aspect of the civil sector nor on long-term social welfare spending like 
education or health.2 Demilitarisation should therefore be seen not as a set of 
technical and administrative arrangements that automatically flow from post 
conflict reconstruction efforts, but as part of complex political processes which 
must address the root causes of conflict.3 
In ourrecognition of the need for a holistic approach to the problems of security, 
democratisation and development, this paper looks at the material base of 
militarisation as well as its behavioural and socio-cultural dimensions. To enable 
us to synthesise the structural and the symptomatic issues relevant to the 
militarisation-demilitarisation debate, conflict is examined at the political and 
psychological levels. Since the issues involved cannot be captured simply through 
a theorisation of historical experiences premised upon the separation of the 
"domestic" and the "international", the "economic" and the "political", the 
demilitarisation dilemma is also seen in terms of its global, regional, national and 
sub-national complexities. Primacy is however given in our analysis to state-civil 
society relations in West Africa; and to how state powerrelates to the key economic 
and social forces in affected societies. This way, militarisation would be properly
84 J 'Kayode Fayemi 
put into context and solving the problems and achieving the prospects of 
demilitarisation in Africa would not be reduced to a number crunching exercises. 
The Paradox of Democratisation and Demilitarisation in 
West Africa 
The record of African countries in democratic transition, a decade after the postcold 
war "third wave", underlines the enormity of the task of demilitarising 
politics and ensuring stable civil-military relations in a democracy. Although 
African countries are democratising in the formal sense, and significant strides 
have been made in the areas of civil-military relations and reduced military 
expenditure, it may be misleading to speak of democratic governments if by this 
it is understood that the formal end of authoritarian structures also marks a 
definitive break with authoritarian practices - abuse of human rights, stateengineered 
conflicts and the militarisation of decision-making processes. Of the 
several countries that democratised during the past decade, none can as yet boast 
of a serious movement beyond the formal processes of legitimation through "free" 
and "fair" elections. Hence, General Eyademacould openly rig elections and usurp 
the powers of the Electoral Commission in the belief that the essential defining 
feature of the electoral process is his being declared the winner. The international 
community has most often supported these fundamentally flawed processes in the 
name of political stability. In view of the authoritarian character of the 
democratisation process in these countries, several scholars like Diamond & 
Planner (1997), Mkandiware and Olukoshi (1995) have criticised these so-called 
new democracies as electoral democracies, illiberal democracies, or pro-forma 
democracies. 
West Africa, which appeared to have led the democratic reform process in the 
immediate post- cold war era, seems to typify this obsession with elections as 
representing democracy. In the past five years, the region has regressed to one of 
"home-grown" </e/nocra*/Hras,quasi-dictatorships, personalised autocracies, pacted 
democracies, stolen elections and endless transitions leaving in its trail nominally 
civilianised.4 military rulers/warlords in Burkina-Faso, Ghana, the Gambia, 
Niger, Togo, Benin, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Chad and Liberia; "debilitating 
democracies" in Cote d'lvoire, Senegal, Cameroon and Mauritania; and a full 
blown military dictatorship in the region' s largest country - Nigeria. Even in Mali, 
originally seen as a strong beacon of hope for democratic consolidation, things are 
now beginning to look uncertain. 
An essential feature of peace-building and conflict management is often the 
degree to which consensus can be achieved among parties in conflict. But in 
situations where elections have become a "legitimate" means of consolidating 
political exclusion and authoritarianism, the opposition has often resorted to 
violence as the only means of challenging these practices; and this could become
Future of Demilitarisation and Civil-Military Relations in West Africa 85 
a potential source of domestic instability, especially in countries where the 
nationality question is yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of all players. In a sense 
this is the paradox of the democratisation-demilitarisation process. On the one 
hand, asking authoritarian governments with few or no answers to their countries' 
economic and social problems to demilitarise could only be seen by incumbents as 
political suicide. On the other hand, advising those excluded from the political 
process to put their faith in "electoral democracy", when they know everywhere 
that the deck is stacked against them, can only engender conflict. The militarist 
option now prevalent in the West Africa region must be seen, in part, as the 
inevitable consequence of the acute nature of internal contradictions and the almost 
total absence of any credible mechanisms for mediating conflict and seeking 
enduring resolutions. There are however other challenges that must be taken into 
account in assessing the future of demilitarisation on the continent. These challenges 
are discussed below. 
The Challenge of the Military Psyche 
In spite of the rather pessimistic picture painted above, military disengagement 
from politics is still the most important first step towards democratic reform, even 
if it does not equate with civilian, democratic control. Indeed, from the evidence 
available, demilitarisation of politics has widened the space within which genuine 
democratic reform is possible and sustainable. Even so, purging politics of its 
current militarism, especially in a body politic that has become atomised and, in 
which the symbols, values, and ethos of the military are reproduced in large 
sections of civil-society, still appears difficult to attain.5 Given the prevailing 
political culture bred by three decades of militarisation and authoritarian control, 
perhaps the greatest challenge lies in dealing with the psychology of militarism and 
the aura of invincibility that this has created. As argued by Hothne (op cit), it is 
quite possible to have militarism without having the military in power. This is why, 
"in some African countries, political transition has involved a reconfiguration of 
political, economic and military elites, rather than an opening up of the political 
system and broadening of participation".6 Indeed, this is more likely to be the case 
if the "new democrats" come from a military background as the situation is in West 
Africa where what we have are "shadow military states" (ECA/GCA 1998), rather 
than democratic countries. This also explains the phenomenon of child soldiers 
who have exchanged their school pens and pencils for rifles and grenades, and 
university graduates who have dropped their diplomas for military commissions. 
Traumatised by violence and long years of existence under military and authoritarian 
structures, they have mostly tendered to glorify a regime in which traditional 
norms and the rule of law have 1 ittle or no meaning. A critical task in consolidating 
democracies and rebuilding stable civil-military relations therefore lies in reclaiming 
the militarised mind.
86 J 'Kayode Fayemi 
The Legacy of Colonialism 
Tied to the challenge of the military psyche has been the military' s colonial legacy, 
therefore an understanding of the colonial character of the military is a crucial 
factor in the determination of the praetorian instincts of several West African 
armies. The history of many of these armies can be traced from the small mercenary 
forces that had been used to establish British and French rule in West Africa.7 On 
the one hand, nationalist leaders saw the army as a reactionary force having been 
used to legitimise colonial rule. They were convinced that it could not be trusted 
in the task of nation-building. Since many of these nationalist leaders went on to 
become the leading figures in the post-colonial states, there was always a deep 
seated suspicion among them and the people they governed that the military was 
an institution to be wary of if co-optation failed. In addition to this was the 
perception of the military establishment as the place for drop-outs. On the other 
hand, Africans in colonial armies had developed an attitude that disposed them 
towards direct involvement in political affairs. As Michael Crowder argued: 
Africans had fought alongside white men, killed white men, seen brave 
Africans and white cowards, slept with white women, met white soldiers 
who treated them as equals, or who were like themselves, hardly educated 
... Above all, having fought in the defence of freedom, they considered it 
their right that they should share in the government of the land [my 
emphasis].* 
This orientation was later encouraged and exploited by civilian groups who felt 
excluded from power. The result was the rampant coups d'etat that characterised 
the politics of the region in the 1960s and 70s. Having discovered its own 
indispensability to political society, the military enhanced its place in civil society 
much to the detriment of civilian regimes.9 This was compounded by the fact that 
the ruling elites in political and civil society, were ignorant of the military. 
The Challenge of an Ignorant Civilian Political Elite 
The deep resentment against the military by the civilian political elite because of 
the former's colonial past as well as its post-independence involvement in politics 
resulted in a civilian elite that remained on the one hand, dependent on the military 
for survival when in power, and on the other hand, ignorant about the military as 
an institution. Even when civilians are in charge of the military establishment, 
knowledge of the military is often sketchy or at worst, virtually non-existent. Any 
close study of civilian governments' defence policies and practices in West Africa 
would immediately reveal the reluctance to develop independent knowledge 
about the psychological and sociological underpinnings of the military institution. 
The inability of the civilian political elite to challenge military judgment on
Future of Demilitarisation and Civil-Military Relations in West Africa 87 
operational as well as security issues aided the military in the struggle for political 
power. 
In Nigeria, for instance, the military has always preyed on this ignorance which 
has in turn precluded the development of a civilian, strategic understanding of the 
operational requirement for accountable armed forces. In effect, since the military 
has been responsible for both operational and policy control over defence and 
political matters, there was no alternative, countervailing system to scrutinise its 
decisions, hold it accountable, and submit it to ultimate civil control. This lack of 
effective oversight is perhaps the single most important factor responsible for the 
demise of the few civilian, democratic governments and the rise of military 
"democrats" under various guises in West Africa. The military profession, like any 
other, findsitdifficult to respect aCommander-in-ChieforaDefence Minister who 
lacks a basic understanding of the institution, yet this is more often than not the 
situation in most West African democracies. The experienced Defence Minister in 
Ghana, Alhaji Mahama Idrissu recently referred to the difficulty of penetrating the 
cordon of secrecy that continued to surround the Armed Forces in Ghana, after 13 
years as head of the Defence Ministry.l0 In Nigeria, during the second republic, the 
Minister of Defence was generally clueless about the decisions made by the 
military, and had no independent means of assessing military judgments placed 
before him. In short, the military has maintained virtual control over the military 
decision-making process." 
The need to invest the defence ministry with considerable political power, and 
the administrative and political leadership with institutional knowledge is crucial 
to earning the respect and confidence of the armed forces. The challenge remains 
one of overcoming the historical reluctance of the civilian political elite to become 
the source of countervailing power capable of subjecting military policy to critical 
scrutiny and control. For in any situation where the civilian elites do hot take the 
task of controlling the formulation of military policy seriously, the vacuum is often 
occupied by the military which ends up dictating to the civilian political leadership 
with impunity. At the level of the executive, parliament and the civilian bureaucracy, 
the conscious will to direct policy must be regained and sustained in the same 
way this has happened in countries like Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, to mention 
a few, that have moved from prolonged military rule to democracy. 
The Challenge of a Mission: Redefining the Military Role 
in Society 
In addition to lacking effective oversight from the civilian political elite and the 
general populace, a clear and identifiable military mission tied closely to its 
traditional duties and professional training is absent. The threat of a military 
without a well defined mission therefore becomes real in countries where the 
military is preoccupied with dual responsibility for political and defence matters.
88 J 'Kayode Fayemi 
Ideally, military missions are determined largely by the objective security needs of 
a country, which must of necessity be subject to periodic review. By extending the 
military's responsibilities beyond defence, or extending its defence duties to 
include others like nation-building and internal security, the professionalism of the 
military is inevitably undermined. The political uses of military talents, for 
instance, has been shown to be counter-productive in areas where the military is 
needed to function like a fighting force.l2 Although some countries in West Africa 
have armies with a fine reputation for international peacekeeping duties, their 
soldiers have been found wanting when called upon to undertake such missions 
largely because of the disorientation that arises from bad military leadership. Yet, 
international peacekeeping seems to offer a solution to the challenge posed by the 
lack of mission for a military that is out of government since this is one role that 
is not far removed from its primary duty of defence of territorial integrity and state 
sovereignty. 
Since no country in West Africa faces any severe external threat, one would 
expect the military to redefine its role and mission to accommodate the changing 
geopolitical realities. However, for a military that is in search of an ideological 
legitimation for its place in the body politic, its own security in politics has become 
synonymous with national security. That is the "ideas of the ruling regime have 
become the ruling ideas" defined as national security, with the military concentrating 
on the best way to enhance the security of successive military governments. 
This aberration from the traditional military mission has opened to military 
professionals a wide range of rent-seeking opportunities through their direct 
involvement in the running of bureaucracies, special task forces, internal security, 
humanitarian and disaster management as well as social welfare projects. Some 
military regimes like the one headed by Rawlings, exploited this distorted mission 
to create populist support through organs such as the Committees for the Defence 
of the Revolution (CDRs) which later formed the template for his (Rawlings') 
return to power as a civilian president. 
While it may be superficially correct, as some scholars have argued that 
providing rent-seeking opportunities for the military in a civilian democracy may 
help curb the military's interest in direct governance, and so consolidate democracy," 
there are serious implications in at least two broad areas for sustainable 
civil-military relations in a democracy. First, because the ruling military elite has 
now acquired extensive experience in running all kinds of civilian based projects 
with good opportunities for rent-seeking, the experience and clout gained from 
mere participation in such activities have undermined the notion that the military 
is unfit for civilian administration. Second, as Louis Goodman argues, "a real 
danger exists that involvement of the military in alternate missions may lead the 
military to neglect its core mission by failing to maintain combat readiness".14 A 
third caution may be added. There is the temptation to encourage military
Future of Demilitarisation and Civil-Military Relations in West Africa 89 
involvement in developmental roles in civil society, as has been the case in 
countries like Tanzania and Senegal - and these countries seem to enjoy fairly 
stable civil-military relations. It is however, my contention that this notion poses 
enormous danger to the objective of demilitarising political society. At the root of 
it, all is the danger posed by the authoritarian enclaves left behind by ex-military 
rulers especially where these enclaves are determined to frustrate the consolidation 
of democracy in societies that have just emerged from prolonged military cum 
authoritarian rule. 
The Challenge of Ethno-nationalism and Globalisation 
The nation-state in Africa is now caught between the paradox of ethno-nationalism 
and globalisation both of which reduce the prospects for demilitarisation and 
democratisation in West Africa. During the cold war era, traditional super-power 
politics ensured minimum integrity and primacy of the nation-state, and the state's 
monopoly of the instruments of violence was taken for granted. The end of the cold 
war has already changed all this. The integrity of the nation-state is now under 
threat; and the military has become both a pawn and player in the contest arising 
from this situation. In the event, weapons accumulation is no longer the preserve 
of the state; therefore any demilitarisation project now, would have sub-national 
actors to contend with. In addition, the military has become an instrument of the 
ethnic struggle for power in many West African states leading to the perception that 
West African armies are the conclaves of certain ethnic groups associated with the 
ruling elite, civilian or military. In its recent assessment of civil-military relations 
in Africa, the US-based National Democratic Institute reported that ethnic tensions 
are more prevalent within African militaries or in relations between the military 
and civilian leadership." According to the study, of particular concern is the 
"politicisation of ethnicity within African armies" which creates "an imbalance of 
membership of the armed forces as a whole and/or in the composition of special 
units." In Togo, for example, approximately 90 per cent of the members of the 
armed forces come from the same ethnic group. Of the 13,000 strong Togolese 
Armed Forces (FAT), only 3,000 are from the southern part; of the 10,000 from the 
North, 7,000 come from the Kabre ethnic stock of President Eyadema; and none 
of the 26 units in the command structure is headed by a southerner.16 
In other countries where the ethnic cleavages do not appear as striking, there is 
still the perception that the military is not an equal opportunity profession. The 
Christian Association of Nigeria recently raised alarm about what it perceived as 
the lopsided recruitment of more Moslems into the Nigerian army. This perception 
was reinforced by the creation of the Special Bodyguard Service-a countervailing 
power-centre set up by the late by General Abacha and virtually dominated by 
recruits from General Abacha's ethnic group. The domination of the Krahn 
elements in Liberia under President Doe, which contributed to the loss of
90 J 'Kayode Fayemi 
confidence in the objective control of that army, has become an issue in postconflict 
Liberia. In spite of the provisions of the Abuja Accords that ECOMOG 
should supervise disarmament and restructure the Liberian Army, the current 
government has asserted its right to carry out the restructuring. All the armed 
factions have opposed this as it is suspected that this might be an attempt to ensure 
that the restructured army is essentially President Taylor's ethnic army. Even in 
countries where the army appears to be ethnically balanced, there is a strong 
perception of ethnic bias in special units set up primarily for regime security. In 
Ghana for example, there exists the apprehension that Ewes, President Rawling's 
ethnic group, dominate special units like the 64th Commando unit. 
The collapse of communism and the movement for market reform encouraged 
the notion that proxy wars propped up by the superpowers will fade away, if not 
totally disappear in Africa. Such optimism may not be unfounded since it is true 
that global military expenditure has plummeted, and indeed Africa's share of it has 
declined on an average by 1.3% during the last ten years. However, the relationship 
between arms reduction and political stability, demilitarisation and development, 
and arms control and the cold war is not inevitable. There is need for a more 
rigorous assessment of the relationship between arms procurement and authoritarian 
regimes; weapons accumulation in Africa and capital accumulation in the 
industrial world; structural adjustment programmes and arms procurement, 
militarisation, militarism and arms reduction; as well as the tortuous democratic 
experiments in Africa, and their impact on the future of the arms race in the next 
millennium.17 
The economic aspect of globalisation'" has compounded the problem of insecurity, 
violence and militarisation especially as the economic problems of the new 
democracies deepened and the nation-state was threatened by ethno-jingoism. 
Poverty remains the greatest threat to democratic consolidation in Africa today; 
and the overwhelming majority of the African populace is consequently marginal 
to the democratisation process. At the same time, there is little indication that their 
lot will be improved as economic and political reforms proceed. As the economic 
crisis worsens and social tensions increase, the new democratic regimes are 
compelled to resort to the same repressive means of government to safeguard 
regime security and capitalist development. The politics of repression under 
structural adjustment programmes undertaken by virtually every state in the region 
is the best example of this trend, especially as expressed through policies such as 
devaluation, de-subsidisation, de-nationalisation and deregulation, all of which are 
possible only where citizens' rights are suppressed. These, coupled with the 
exclusionary politics, have fueled local armed conflict, and the further militarisation 
of society, and all this with direct or indirect external collaboration. There is 
therefore a sense in which the current wave of militarisation in West Africa could 
be seen as a function of a dominant elite cartel comprising of arms manufacturers,
Future of Demilitarisation and Civil-Military Relations in West Africa 91 
mineral exploiters, corporate mercenaries and Africa's authoritarian as well as new 
democratic governments and warlords as junior partners. 
The clearest example of this external connection is the upsurge in the activities 
of private peacekeepers (private armies like Executive Outcomes), light weapons 
proliferation and the linkage to mineral exploitation in troubled West African 
states. In exploring the causes and potential cures of conflict in Africa, the United 
Nation's Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan referred to "interests external to 
Africa", who "in the competition for oil and other precious resources in Africa 
continue to play a large and, sometimes decisive role, both in suppressing conflict 
and sustaining it".19 The Secretary-General also referred to "the role of international 
arms merchants in African conflicts", and "how access to resources by 
warring parties ... has highlighted the impact that international business interests 
can have on the success or failure of peace efforts".20 These trends have wider 
implications for the demilitarisation process and democratic consolidation in West 
Africa. For in a globalised world where public interest in international peacekeeping 
has waned considerably,21 the security vacuum created is now being effectively 
occupied by unregulated private armies often linked to international business 
interests that are intent on maximising profit and on resource exploitation in 
countries in conflict. 
This increasing use of mercenaries by established governments and multilateral 
institutions, has come under a sharp focus by the recent revelation in the British 
media about the link between Sandline International - a British private military 
organisation, the British Foreign Office and Kaba's regime in Sierra Leonewhich 
had then been ousted by a rebel group in conjunction with renegade soldiers from 
the Sierra Leonean army. Interestingly, Sandline shares its London premises with 
Diamond Works-a Canadian owned diamond prospecting corporation with major 
concessions in Sierra Leone, and one of Diamond Works' Directors, Tony 
Buckingham is the founder of Sandline International. These complex international 
linkages are replicated in several instances in other parts of Africa, especially in 
Angolaand Mozambique." In spite of the motives of private security organisations, 
opinion remains divided on their destabilising influence, and some analysts still 
view them as a positive factor in conflict management and peace building"rather 
than as mercenaries. 
The incidence of light weapons and small arms proliferation is closely linked to 
the private security firms operating in Africa; and it also poses a serious challenge 
to the demilitarisation process in West Africa. This has been the subject of debate 
in multilateral circles in recent times. For example, a Panel of Government Experts 
appointed by the UN's Secretary-General identified uncontrolled availability of 
small arms and light weapons as both a causal and exacerbating factor in Africa's 
conflicts. According to the panel, the weapons contribute to "fuelling conflicts but 
also exacerbating violence and criminality".24
92 J 'Kayode Fayemi 
For the long term stability of any country coming out of prolonged military/ 
authoritarian rule, changes in military, security and defence structures are crucial 
and they must be approached bearing in mind the challenges posed by the various 
factors that impinge on the state's capacity to manage its security concerns in this 
era of globalisation. In policy specific terms, solutions to the proliferation of 
mercenaries on the continent must be sought through the revamping of the relevant 
legislation both at OAU, and UN levels concerning international mercenaries and 
arms transfer whilst ECOWAS is encouraged to legislate against the involvement 
of private armies in conflict situations. As a first step, there is the need to critically 
assess the implications of the activities of private armies for African security.25 
The Nigeria factor in the Demilitarisation and 
Democratisation Agenda in West Africa 
Beyond the challenges to a successful demilitarisation programme already identified, 
one challenge that is particularly unique to West Africa is the position of 
Nigeria in all of these. The demonstration effect of continued military rule in a 
strategic country such as Nigeria impinges significantly on the future of 
demilitarisation and democratisation in the region. With a quarter of the entire 
African population - a population roughly equal to the combined total of its fifteen 
west African neighbours, a military that is by far the largest and best equipped in 
the region, and oil wealth unmatched by that of any of the neighbouring countries 
- Nigeria has been the source of envy and pride for most African countries. In its 
good days, its resources provided, and in some cases - still provide the source of 
the common good in the region. Put in the simplest of terms, if Nigeria disintegrates, 
so will regional security suffer. 
As the military regime in Nigeria tightens its grip on civil society, it is bound to 
give more confidence to other praetorians in the region waiting in the wings to upset 
the fledgling democratic culture. This can happen in a number of way s, but the most 
worrying source is the contagion of its coup culture, already widespread in the 
region. Or if Nigeria should descend into anarchy it would trigger a widespread 
refugee crisis in the region. Just as apartheid South Africa affected the security and 
stability of the entire Southern African region, there is little hope of consolidated 
democracy or a leadership focus on demilitarisation in West Africa without a 
democratic and demilitarised Nigeria. Already, Nigeria's cycle of crisis is having 
a wider impact in West Africa in particular, and Africa in general. For instance, 
although there is no conclusive evidence of Nigeria's involvement in the 1994 
military coup in Gambia, it is hard to dispute that inspiration for it was drawn from 
the presence of a military regime in Nigeria. And in particular, the transformation 
of the two military rulers - Yaya Jammeh and Barre Mainasara - into civilian 
presidents seems to have received more explicit support from the Nigerian rulers. 
Furthermore, it is arguable that the "election" of General Kerekou in Benin in 1996,
Future of Demilitarisation and Civil-Military Relations in West Africa 93 
the re-election of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings as president of Ghana in 
December 1996, and the "re-election" of Eyadema as president of Togo in 1998 
benefited, in part, from the example of military rule in the most important country 
in the region. Therefore, however commendable Nigeria's efforts in restoring 
democratic government in Sierra Leone and Liberia might appear, the precarious 
fate of democracy in its own internal political processes seriously threatens 
regional stability. 
There are othernegative security implications for Nigeria's neighbours. Already, 
asaresult of the porous international borders in the region, financial fraud, money 
laundering, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling now constitute major security 
problems.26And it is apparent that the Nigerian contingent, which formed the bulk 
of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force in Liberia is now seen as an army of 
occupation, rather than a peacekeeping force, because of the militarisation of its 
internal politics.27 
Designing a Holistic Security Agenda for Demilitarisation and 
Democratic Development 
Rethinking Regional Security Mechanism for Peace-building 
Caught between theextremes of supra-nationalism as represented by globalisation, 
and the reactionary sub-nationalism that has been exacerbated by the politicisation 
of ethnicity, regionalism offers the best panacea for the weakened nation-state in 
West Africa. Indeed, it would appear that any prospect for demilitarisation and 
democratisation in West Africa must build on the fabric of regionalism if it is to 
have any chance of success. Given the declining external security threats and the 
need to curb the rising tide of internal strife, the promotion of a professional peacebuilding 
mechanism within the global framework of preventive diplomacy would 
seem critical in the region. The last decade in West Africa has witnessed the 
strengthening of regional autonomy, especially in its conflict management capacity 
Although seen in several circles as a standard feature of Nigeria's subimperialist 
agenda, there is a strong perception of ECOMOG as a potential 
mechanism for an effective conflict management model in Africa.28 Yet, regional 
autonomy can be influenced by national and sub-national factors. It is also 
susceptible to super-power influence and control, which may be opposed to the 
goals of demilitarisation and democratic consolidation, especially if the latter does 
not offer the required stability for capitalist development. 
Inrethinkingregionalism, we must go beyond the pro-forma creation of apeacekeeping 
force that remains technical in form and content only. For regionalism to 
tie an effective antidote to globalisation and ethnicisation it must permeate the 
nation-state in a more deeply rooted manner. Otherwise, if the current non-state 
challenges to the nation state in West Africa are a measure of what to expect in the
94 J 'Kayode Fayemi 
future, the prospects for demilitarisation are bleak. It is for this reason that a 
recognition of the necessity for a multi-dimensional understanding of security, 
without a redefinition of existing notions of state sovereignty, would undermine 
the search for a holistic security agenda. In arguing for a redefinition of the concept 
of sovereignty in the sub-region which de-emphasises colonial artificial boundaries, 
the motive is not territorial revisionism. Instead, we are revisiting the 
territorial state where the artificial boundaries have formed the legitimising force 
for arrested development in several states that are just juridical entities in name 
only. If we could translate this into a sustainable security agenda, we would 
propose a West-Central Africa security and development mechanism, but one that 
is properly structured, rather than a victim of an ad hoc arrangement like ECOMOG. 
If a properly structured security mechanism were available for deployment at a 
moment's notice, it should be possible to convince small states like Sierra Leone 
and the Gambia that the protection of their territorial integrity does not necessarily 
depend on a standing army. 
A systemic change of the type that we are suggesting requires extensive work. 
A good place to start might be to review the ECOWAS Defence Protocols to 
incorporate lessons derived from similar instruments operating in other parts of the 
world; develop a peacekeeping model with an accountable command, control and 
information system; develop the necessary linkages between security, democracy 
and development in the regional integration process; and, finally, conceptualise an 
architecture of conflict management for 21st Century Africa in which militarism 
and militarisation are less significant.29 
Redefining the Mission of the Military 
If militarism is to become less significant in the politics of the region, the military 
needs to redefine its mission which is at present confined to the nation-state. To the 
extent that West Africa's militaries have penetrated all aspects of civic and 
economic life makes military demobilisation a dangerous proposition, and would 
require considerable skill to implement. It could be achieved by first assuaging the 
fears of the rank and file of the military about their future in a demobilisation era; 
finding an appropriate role and mission for those left behind in the institution and 
guaranteeing their professional autonomy. Equally important will be the need to 
develop a civilian, democratic defence policy expertise and create the necessary 
opportunities for networking and dialogue between military representatives and 
civil society. As much as possible, the military must be restricted to its traditional 
external combat role as a means of strengthening civil-military relations. If it must 
get involved in any internal security operations, proper criteria must be established 
for evaluating their involvement. At all times, the unifying theme in all of the 
political elite negotiations should be the determination to assert democratic civilian 
control and oversight and the subordination of the military to civilian authority.
Future of Demilitarisation and Civil-Military Relations in West Africa 95 
The region could gain from the contrasting experience of other countries: e.g. 
smaller countries coming from long years of military rule to civilian democratic 
politics - like Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti, where they succeeded in getting rid 
of their standing armies; bigger countries with some regional influence - like 
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, South Korea and Bangladesh where, 
the military retains a significant influence in national politics; others in both Latin 
America and Russia where the military is still actively involved in politics; and a 
country like Poland where the armed forces have moved from completely "satrapic" 
orientation into stable, conventional roles. 
In all of these cases, there are outstanding problems associated with creating 
stable civil-military relations in which roles are clearly defined and mission fully 
worked out. But the fact that the mission has been refocused, especially in countries 
like South Africa, Argentina and Poland gives real cause for hope that the obstacles 
to sustainable civil-military relations are not insurmountable. South Korea, for 
example, seems to have succeeded where others have failed by seeking reconciliation 
via accountability for past human rights abuses which occurred under 
military rule. Two former heads of state were sentenced to life imprisonment for 
their role in the massacre of student demonstrators in the early 1980s. The recent 
election of a candidate perceived as a threat to the military establishment may have 
stemmed from a successful demystification carried out by the previous regime, 
even though the deteriorating economy ultimately contributed to the success of the 
left-wing president, Kim Dae Jung, who eventually released the convicted former 
Heads of State as a gesture of reconciliation. So far, what the South Korean 
example seems to show is that Faustian bargains with some progressive elements 
within the military may be inevitable in order to deal with the challenges of 
demilitarisation and/or the quest to consolidate democracy. However, such pacts 
should be dependent on whether they guarantee the complete subordination of the 
armed forces to the democratic civilian authority. Nor should pacts be engineered 
for the consolidation of personal autocracies in exchange for military privileges, 
which precludes the military from being accountable to democratic institutions. 
Notwithstanding the positive developments in the countries mentioned above, 
the experience of West African countries where the military has become so 
entrenched in the body politic gives much cause for worry about how successful 
the agenda for restructuring existing civil-military relations.30 This is especially so 
when one confronts the inevitable issue of amnesty or accountability for human 
rights and other abuses committed by successive military authorities, especially in 
Nigeria, but also in Sierra Leone, the Gambia, Ghana and Liberia. The example of 
Argentina and Chile, can only make us cautiously optimistic about the future for 
democratic consolidation. After seven years of democratic restoration in Chile, 
General Pinochet, with his grip on the military, has blocked every effort to punish 
human rights abuses of his seventeen years rule as Chilean Head of State. Through
96 J 'Kayode Fayemi 
his hard core right-wing supporters, some of whom describe him as the greatest 
"visionary" Chile has ever known, the elected Chilean government headed by 
President Frei has not been able to exorcise the terrible ghosts of those repressive 
years. This represents a benchmark of failure for those who fought for democratic 
reform, although some argue that there is wisdom in exercising some patience for 
General Pinochet to leave the scene. But for all practical purposes, he remains the 
undemocratic spirit guiding Chilean democracy; although he has now stepped 
down as Commander-in-Chief, a position he retained in 1990 after giving way to 
the democrats, his influence still runs deep within the civilian, political structure 
of the country; not just because he remains a Senator for Life, but also as a result 
of the "authoritarian enclaves" he established over the years. For example, there are 
still ten non-elected seats he unilaterally allocated to himself and his subordinate 
generals in the Chilean Senate. With this power base, he has managed to sabotage 
any attempt to try the army for past misdeeds." 
The Chilean scenario definitely raises a number of questions about the future of 
democracy in West Africa sub-region, given the fact that some states in the region 
are already adopting similar measures. Senegal's democracy is, to all intents and 
purposes, a replica of this, if one considers the place of the military in that 
dispensation. Also, given the evidence in Nigeria that efforts for the eventual 
transformation of military rulers into "elected" civilian rulers are continuing apace, 
the threat of the military's authoritarian enclaves must worry observers of the 
transition politics. 
Ensuring Civilian Oversight and Military Autonomy on 
Professional Military Matters 
Provided the overall case for regionalisation is acceptable to the affected states, the 
other issue for consideration at nation-state level is the separation of operational 
and policy control over broad defence matters such as size, shape, organisation, 
equipment, weapon acquisition and pay/conditions in the services on the one hand, 
and on the other hand administrative control over the services. The point has been 
made earlier about how the lack of any expertise on the part of elected civilian 
authorities has prevented effective oversight of the various arms of the armed 
forces. Any redirection of the defence policy process will inevitably require a 
different kind of expertise, which must be applied by a mixture of civilians and 
military professionals. To sustain this, there is a need for a significant thawing 
process through changes in relationships between the military and civilian political 
elite, and a significant increase in contacts between opinion moulders and the 
outside world. The process of agreeing an appropriate role for the military can only 
be successfully achieved in a climate of mutual confidence and dialogue between 
the civil and military elites. 
In introducing civilian expertise however, care must be taken not to substitute
Future of Demilitarisation and Civil-Military Relations in West Africa 97 
military incompetence with technocrats who are not wholly accountable to the 
electorate. If civilian control is to be democratic, it must empower elected officials 
to lead the confidence building exercise. This is not to suggest however that 
professional civilian expertise is unnecessary in these countries. In fact, a possibility 
worth exploring is the creation of a Strategic Cell that may serve in an advisory 
capacity between a civilian president and the military professionals. At all times, 
the military should not be left to conduct its affairs without "interference", at least 
not in terms of broad policy formulation; but the political elite should leave the 
military to design wholly operational matters especially where broad policy issues 
have been settled. In ensuring civilian supremacy and a democratic pattern of civilmilitary 
relations, the civilian leadership must help the military with the definition 
of the role it must play in a clear and precise manner. As much as possible, this must 
be confined to its traditional external combat role as a means of strengthening civil 
over military authority. 
Resolving the Challenge of Ethno-Nationalism in Recruitment 
The resolution of the highly volatile question of recruitment is only possible to the 
extent that the nationality question is resolved in individual countries. Three 
central questions should be addressed here, (i) Should recruitment into the armed 
forces in a democratic dispensation be based on equal opportunity? (ii) Should the 
military be a combat effective, battle ready force recruited from the most able in 
the most rigorous and competitive manner? (iii) Should the manner of recruitment 
matter - if the training is standardised and geared towards bringing out the best in 
every recruit?32 These are not necessarily the most important when issues of 
structure and process are the ones receiving the most attention. 
If good personnel is at the core of any effective military organisation, the 
concern about representation is a legitimate one. especially in ethnically diverse 
societies where the armed forces are seen as key instruments of national integration. 
Getting recruitment wrong from the outset has implications for discipline, 
attrition rate and the organisation's institutional cohesion in the long run, all of 
which must be situated within the context of the perceptions and misperceptions 
bred by inter-ethnic suspicions. Therefore, attempts at demilitarisation and 
stable military relations must ensure a balance between merit and equal opportunity. 
This can only be done in a situation where the military is seen not as the fastest 
route to political power, but as a professional institution serving the interests of all 
citizens. 
What is of utmost importance within this context is what the military mission 
is, what objective threats face the nation? What are the necessary force numbers, 
rather than the manpower necessary for the accomplishments of its mission? Is the 
personnel suitable for the mission that the military may be called upon to 
accomplish? Are manpower numbers cost-effective; and does the recruitment
98 J 'Kayode Fayemi 
process attract individuals that are wholly dedicated to military service in a 
democracy? 
Another way this issue has been addressed is through compulsory military 
service. In countries like Tanzania and Senegal that have experienced long years 
of stable civil-military relations, compulsory military service is an integral part of 
their armed forces recruitment policy. This can be used to complement a policy of 
demilitarisation and demobilisation. A much reduced, but highly mobile deployment 
force within a rationalised recruitment process can still be effective while it 
addresses the huge problem of ethnic imbalance through compulsory military 
service. 
Resolution of Human Rights Issues as a Key Plank in the 
Demilitarisation Process 
The desperate need to negotiate a process of reconciliation (Argentina/South 
Africa) or restitution (South Korea) between the military and civil society that 
safeguards human rights and fundamental freedoms remains an issue in countries 
emerging from prolonged authoritarian rule. In several countries in West Africa 
where the military has had a long and chequered history of political intervention 
and human right abuse, citizens are insisting on a reconciliation or restitution 
mechanism for dealing with the past. The idea of assuaging the fears of the military 
by a declaration of amnesty poses a serious challenge to the strengthening of stable 
civil-military relations. Equally, the approach in some countries of literally hauling 
everyone connected to a military regime to jail without adequate investigation of 
their role is fraught with danger for genuine reconciliation. Ultimately, the 
question must be asked, as others must have asked themselves in Chile, Argentina 
and Philippines. While restitution may be a necessary, even cathartic exercise, in 
terms of sustainable, civil-military relations, it could exacerbate rather than 
attenuate tensions in conflict ridden societies. Indeed, some will argue that one key 
reason why ex-military rulers turned-civilian presidents are reluctant to vacate the 
seat of government is this fear of the unknown if "enemies" take charge of 
government. This is one of the areas where the right balance must be struck 
between the search for immediate justice and the need for long term stability. It is 
difficult to see a situation where abuses can be wished away if democracy is to be 
sustainable, in the long term. Therefore, countries emerging from a prolonged 
authoritarian dispensation must examine mechanisms for dealing with this major 
problem area in seeking long-term demilitarisation strategies." 
Conclusion and Policy Considerations 
We have tried in this paper to integrate the broad issues with the specific concerns 
that relate to the subject of demilitarisation and democratisation in the context of 
a weakening nation-state. In suggesting the structural mechanisms for de-
Future of Demilitarisation and Civil-Military Relations in West Africa 99 
emphasising force in conflict resolution, the paper recognises the futility of violent 
challenge to ethno-nationalistic responses to domination. Equally, the nationstate 
must re-examine the process of regionalisation, especially given West 
Africa's recent experience with ECOMOG without necessarily losing the 
symbolism of state sovereignty. The quality of political leadership will ultimately 
make a difference in straddling these difficult issues. It is common knowledge 
that some civilian political leaders have in the past either participated actively in, 
or encouraged the military to stage coups against their opponents. This not only 
undermines the fragile political system, but also destroys military professionalism. 
That is why the clarity and quality of the post-military leadership in the 
new democracies will necessarily determine how these complex issues are 
resolved. 
Notes 
* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the international conference 
by the Africa Leadership Forum and The Arias Foundation on the theme 
"LeadershipChallenges of Demilitarisation in Africa" held in Arusha, Tanzania, 
July 22-24, 1998. 
** Executive Director, Centre for Democracy & Development, a public policy 
research and training institution with offices in London, England and Accra, 
Ghana. 
1 See United Nations, Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and 
Development: Report of the Secretary-General New York: United Nations, 
1981, for a good example of this positive correlation argument. 
2 For an expansion of this argument, see J 'Kayode Fayemi, Threats, Military 
Expenditure and National Security: Analysis of Trends in Nigeria's Defence 
Planning, 1970-1990, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of London, 
1994. 
3 See Mats R Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars: 
Armed soldiers and the termination of armed conflicts", Adelphi Paper 303 
Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1996. 
4 See Nicolas Van de Walle, "Reversal, Survival or Consolidation? The 
Prospects for Democracy in Africa", Paper presented at the 38th Annual 
Meetings of the African Studies Association, Orlando, Florida, November 3- 
6,1995 and Richard Joseph, "Africa, 1990-1997: From Abertura to Closure", 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 2, April 1998. For a less pessimistic 
viewpoint, see E. Gyimah-Boadi, "The Rebirth of Liberalism", Journal of 
Democracy, Ibid. 
5 Robin Luckham, "Democracy and the Military: An Epitaph for Frankenstein's 
Monster?" Democratisation, Vol. 3, No. 2. Summer 1996, pp. 1-16. 
6 Economic Community of Africa & Global Coalition for Africa, The Role of the
100 J 'Kayode Fayemi 
African Military in Political Transition and Economic Development: Co- 
Chairpersons' Summary, Addis-Ababa, May 8-9, 1998, p. 1. 
7 See Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of 
Authority and Revolt 1960-1967. Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 
1971 and Simon Baynham, The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana, 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. 
8 Michael Crowder, West Africa under Colonial Rule, London: Hutchinson, 
1970, p. 505 
9 For a good background on the nature of civil-military relations in West Africa, 
see Eboe Hutchful & Abdoulaye Bathily (eds). The Military and Militarism in 
Africa, (Dakar: Codesria, 1998); For good country studies, see J 'Bayo 
Adekanye, Nigeria: In Search of a Stable Civil-Military Relations, Boulder, 
Colo: Westview Press, 1981. Also, see his "Military Occupation and Social 
Stratification, (Ibadan: University of Ibadan, 1993), Eboe Hutchful, "Military 
Policy and Reform in Ghana", JournalofModern African Studies, 35,2 (1997), 
pp. 251-278 and Baffour Agyeman-Duah, "Liberia: The Search for a Stable 
Civil-Military Relations", Paper presented at the Workshopon "State Rebuilding 
after State Collapse in Liberia", organised by the Centre for Democracy and 
Development, London, June 19, 1998. 
10 See Eboe Hutchful, "Military Policy and Reform in Ghana," JMAS, Ibid. 
11 General Ibrahim Babangida who was the Director of Army Plans and Staff 
Duties during the Shagari regime once told a Conference on national security 
that "the amount of power vested in the civilian headed Ministry of Defence 
could be a source of concern to the armed forces because the ministry consists 
mainly of civilians who have little or no knowledge of the military profession 
..." See National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies Proceedings of 
Conference on National Security, Kuru, Jos: NIPSS, 1981 p. 130. 
12 This has been the major criticism of the peacekeeping activities of ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group - ECOMOG in West Africa. See Funmi Olonisakin, 
Bridging the Conceptual Gap in Peace-keeping: Peace Creation in Liberia, 
Centre for Democracy & Development Occasional Paper 2, London: CDD, 
forthcoming. 
13 See David Goldsworthy, "Civilian Control and the Military in Black Africa", 
African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 8, 1987, pp. 49-74. 
14 Louis W. Goodman, "Military Roles: Past and Present", in Larry Diamond and 
Marc Plattner (eds.) Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 39. 
15 Report of the Civil-Military Relations Assessment Mission: West and Central 
Africa. Washington, D.C.: NDI, April 1997. 
16 Lida Koussi Moise, "National Armies and Ethnicity in Africa," The Role of the 
African Armed Forces in the Democratic Process Africa, Proceedings of the
Future of Demilitarisation and Civil-Military Relations in West Africa 101 
Regional Seminar held in Ouagadougou, 2-4 July, 1997 cited in Agyeman- 
Duah, op-cit. 
17 See KayodeFayemi, "Africa's Disarmament INusions", Africa Events, February 
1993, pp. 23-26. 
18 See Nicolas van de Walle, "Globalisation and African Democracy" in Richard 
Joseph (ed.) State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa Boulder, Colo: Lynne 
Rienner, forthcoming. 
19 UN Secretary-General explores potential causes, cures of conflict in Africa, 
(UN-IRIN West Africa News), SG/2045 - AFR/50, SC/6501. 16 April 1998. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See a recent book co-authored by the UN Co-ordinator of the Peacekeeping 
Operations in Somalia, Robert Oakley. In it, the authors conceded the inability 
of the UN to cope with the burden of peacekeeping operations due to the lack 
of interests from member-nations. See Robert Oakley, Michael J. Dziedic, and 
Eliot M. Goldberg, Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and 
Public Security, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1998. 
22 See Africa Confidential, Vol. 39, No. 9, May 29, 1998. 
23 David Shearer and Herbert Howe have been positive in their analyses of 
mercenary activities in West Africa, both concluding that what is needed to 
even out the rough edges of current practise is regulation. See Herbert Howe, 
"Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes", 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 36, 2, 1998 and David 
Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, IISS Adelphi Paper, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press for IISS, 1997. 
24 "Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms", New York: 
United Nations, July 1997, p. 25 cited in Abdel-Fatau Musah, Africa: The 
Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peacekeeping Operations, 
BASIC PAPERS, No. 23, December 1997. 
25 See J 'Kayode Fayemi & Abdel-Fatau Musah (eds.), Mercenaries and African 
Conflicts, London: Pluto Books, forthcoming. 
26 For the reach ofNigeria's drug barons, see Philip Van Niekerk, "South Africa's 
Drug Explosion", The London Observer, 28 January, 1996. 
27 This was a major issue at the recent National Conference in Liberia. 
28 Countries like Senegal and others within the French axis, hitherto reluctant of 
the need for ECOMOG, now actively campaign for its involvement in the 
recent crisis in Guinea-Bissau. Egypt has officially requested that ECOMOG 
be adopted as a continental model in Africa. 
29 This is the subject of a much larger research work at the Centre for Democracy 
and Development. 
30 In General Abacha's recently aborted transition programme in Nigeria, at least 
athird of the Senators elected into the National Assembly came from a military
102 J 'Kayode Fayemi 
background. Indeed, the entrenchment has probably shut down the notion of a 
level playing field in politics for some time to come in the assessment of some 
observers. 
31 Young parliamentarians in the Chilean Assembly recently sought an injunction 
in the Court to block an automatic seat for General Pinochet in the country's 
Senate. Ironically, President Frei and several senior politicians are not in the 
frontline of this challenge to the military. 
32 See Kayode Fayemi, "The Politics of Military Recruitment in Nigeria: A 
Critical Appraisal", Tempo Magazine (Lagos), 28 August 1997, pp. 4-5 for an 
extensive analysis of the Nigerian Armed Forces' recruitment politics under 
General Abacha. 
33 Sec Sonny Onyegbula, "Seeking Truth and Justice in West Africa: Lessons 
from South African experience", Centre for Democracy & Development's 
Monograph Series (London: CDD, 1998). 
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