

THIS UPSET WORLD

By W. E. Hill


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Discontent is rampant among the boys just graduated from high school. Their nearest and dearest are busy hunting jobs for them. But they want to be glamour boys.




This is one of those unsettling after-dinner conversations. The man in the center has it on the very best authority that Europe will explode in a month—just as soon as the spaghetti harvest is over in Italy. The girl on the right is a newspaper woman and has it on an even better authority that the most gruesome things are going on among Nazi and Communist factions right here at home, and it's only a matter of days, etc., etc. (The elderly lady will look under her bed for a dictator tonight and won't sleep a wink.)




Storm and stress in the art world. This is the new mural in the Kidney Center post office, and it's a great success artistically. It depicts the laying of the Atlantic cable and is so strong and virile that it gives the Kidney Centerites twinges of inferiority. The WPA is getting complaints about it.



"Hey, Buddy, they've given you the wrong set-up for the jobless demonstration! That goes with another picket group." Labor has its own worries and plenty of them.



Crises in Europe, ditto in the Far East, labor and New Deal troubles in the headlines. But unless there's a good blood-thirsty murder on page one, this reader will remark, "There's absolutely nothing in the paper today."



Youth and Age are trying to understand each other and are getting nowhere, as usual. (Sonny Boy is saying, "Oh, MOTHER, you're SO old fashioned, about thirty years behind the times!")



The escapists. Showing how the male (right) and the female (left) of the species get away from it all at times. One at a beauty parlor, the other at a cocktail bar.

Revolution In Spain!

Franco Gets Source of Supplies

● This is the second of a series of articles revealing the true, complete story of the Spanish revolution. Last week the author told of the background and outbreak.

By SAM BREWER

(Chicago Tribune Press Service.)

Hendaye, France.
FROM THE beginning of the Spanish war the nationalists held valuable but scattered areas. In the first six months they joined those into a single block stretching the whole length of the country, won control of two of the main outlets to France and Portugal, and settled into their two-year siege of Madrid.

By July 21, 1936, when the republican government first realized it had a war on its hands and not an abortive revolt, it already had lost all Spanish Morocco and two important parts of the mainland. One was a C-shaped strip in the south taking in the important towns of Algeciras, Cadiz, Seville, and Cordoba (the first three having seaports). The other took in all the north of Spain except Catalonia in the east and the coast provinces along the Bay of Biscay in the north. Two arms stretched south from it, one along the western border as far as Caceres, the other on the east of Madrid, reaching south as far as Teruel.

Majorca, largest of the Balearic Islands (in the Mediterranean), had gone over to the rebels and later proved a vitally important base for bombing planes and patrol vessels. The other two main islands of the group, Minorca and Ibiza, remained republican. An effort by a force from Barcelona to take Majorca ended disastrously and the nationalists remained in possession.

The nationalists' most pressing problems were to unite the northern and southern armies and as far as possible to shut off supply routes to the republicans and open them for themselves. Republicans held the only two important gates into France, at Port Bou on the Mediterranean side and Irun on the Atlantic side.

That prevented supplies reaching Franco from France, and, what was more serious, it allowed them to reach his foes.

The republicans also controlled the main road into Portugal, through Badajoz, and the chief ports in the north except Vigo. The nationalists could get supplies only through Vigo (and to some extent Coruna and El Ferrol) in the north, through the inadequate highway from Porto to Vigo, and through the southern ports of Cadiz, Seville, and Algeciras.

In theory the republican fleet should have had command of the seas, as it had three-fourths of the warships, but through the loss of their officers, most of whom were slain when they tried to join the movement, the ships were hopelessly inefficient.

Franco established headquarters in Seville at the beginning of August, left Gen. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano there in command of the southern army, and prepared to fight his way through to open the Badajoz road into Portugal and then join forces with Gen. Emilio Mola's army, coming down from the north.

As Portugal already had shown its friendliness to his cause, reopening the Badajoz road would open the way to a stream of food and munitions from Germany and Italy as well as Portugal.

Mola had started his march on Madrid July 21, with three columns converging from Valladolid, Burgos, and Saragossa, but all were making slow progress against stubborn defense by the republicans. Though they were not turned back, they could not make impressive gains. By Aug. 6 they held the main passes over the Guadarrama mountains, unable to advance farther.



Topical map of Spain during second period of the revolution.

Franco struck for Badajoz, took it by storm on Aug. 15, and drove ahead through Merida, Trujillo, and Oropesa toward Madrid. The going was comparatively easy, as opposition was slight, though that section of the country was not very friendly. His army covered more than 180 miles in two weeks after leaving Badajoz on Aug. 20.

It met the northern nationalist army for the first time Sept. 10, after nearly two months of war, when it took Las Arenas de San Pedro (a village about seventy miles west of Madrid in the Gredos mountains).

Meanwhile Mola had taken Irun by storm on Sept. 4, opening a way to the French border and cutting off a major entrance for republican supplies. Whole streets were dynamited and burned by the retreating Basques, but the nationalists had achieved one of their first major aims. Mola pushed on

not leave them to perish—they had been promised rescue and were entitled to it. Well organized and equipped modern troops could almost certainly have taken the Alcazar, and it was a question whether it could hold out much longer even against the republicans. From a purely military point of view, Franco was giving up his best chance to seize the capital and break republican morale. In any case he did turn aside.

The troops reached Toledo on Sept. 26 and the next day the survivors were rescued from the Alcazar. In the seventy-three-day siege they had lost eighty dead, and 500 were sick or wounded.

Franco four days later became supreme head of Spain by decision of the generals' committee in Burgos. Though the youngest general in the army, only 43, he had a reputation for great strategic ability as well as courage.



Madrid residents flee one of the early air raids. Bombings were discontinued after they proved inconclusive.

toward San Sebastian, Spain's summer capital, which fell on the 13th.

Only forty-five miles from Madrid on Sept. 20, after beating back the first serious resistance and taking Talavera de la Reina, Franco turned aside and gave the capital a breathing spell. Madrid was within his grasp if he had pushed on then. While he had only about 15,000 men, Madrid's defenses were sketchy and the defenders hopelessly disorganized. It was considered a walkover.

But some twenty-five miles southwest lay Toledo, where 2,000 cadets, officers, and their families had held out against a republican siege since the beginning of the war.

In the Alcazar (Moorish for "fortress") they had carried on their daily life, fighting off attack after attack by planes, guns, and dynamite squads. They had eaten mules and horses; they had buried their dead and tended their wounded, cared for mothers in childbirth, and even found time to put out a daily newspaper. Women and children had faced every form of bombardment and attack with their menfolk.

Most military observers think Franco could have walked into Madrid by the end of September if he had not turned aside to save the defenders of the Alcazar.

The nationalists say he could

General Sanjurjo had been picked originally by his fellow conspirators to head the rising. He had longer experience than Franco and was one of the moving spirits of the revolt. (He had also attempted an earlier rising against the republic in August, 1932, and, although it failed, has escaped with his life to continue the work.)

But Sanjurjo was killed at Lisbon in an air crash July 20 as he took off for Spain.

The venerable Gen. Miguel Cabanellas served as temporary head of the state until Franco was chosen to replace him, then stepped out of the picture.

Franco had the great advantage of youth. He was more vigorous; he had distinguished himself in actual fighting against the Rif in Morocco, winning the rank of brigadier general when he was only 34; and he had won a reputation as a strategist. (He founded the Saragossa war college for advanced study by officers.)

Franco also had the advantage of having been in hot water with the republic. His post as military governor of the Canary Islands at the outbreak of the war was supposed to have been given him by the republic as a handy means of pigeonholing him.

With Toledo taken and the entire country under his command, Franco resumed the march on Madrid. But it was

painfully slower than before. There had been time to organize defenses, and his troops took more than a month to cover the forty-five miles to Madrid.

On Nov. 7 men of the column under Colonel (later General) Yague, commander of the Moroccan division, hammered their way up to the Manzanares river, bordering Madrid on the west. They captured the western park, the Casa de Campo area, and the fringe of the university city, a model group of new university buildings and dormitories on the northwest corner of Madrid.

The government had moved hastily to Valencia (on the Mediterranean coast) the previous day.

There were sporadic efforts during the next few days to move on into the city, but there was no mass attack. On Nov. 16 a handful of troops got as far as the Plaza de España (well inside the western part of the city and near the royal palace) and managed to fight their way back when unable to hold it. A few overenthusiastic war correspondents announced the capture of the city, but the Plaza de España was the furthest point reached by the nationalists until the city surrendered last March.

It was the international brigades that saved Madrid. Militiamen and militia girls were picturesque. They made good material for newspaper stories, but their fatal lack of discipline and training made them of little use against real troops. The girls simply added to the confusion and indiscipline. Much later in the war the republican army improved both in discipline and knowledge, and it never lacked courage.

But in November, 1936, it was the international brigades, rushed to the Madrid front after brief training at Albacete (in the southeast), who saved the day. Many of them had World War experience behind them. Most of them had had some form of military training in their own countries, and they all understood the need of organization and discipline.

Moroccan forces and part of the foreign legion had been drafted to the north to help take Madrid. Against them the international brigades were the only hope.

At that point in the war international aid had begun to flow in to both sides on a big scale.

Portugal, whose aid got least attention of all from other powers, was the first to give important help to Franco. From the beginning of the war the Portuguese were sympathetic. Afraid of communism in the neighbor state, hostile to the republic for the disorder it had allowed to prevail, they did vital work for the nationalists.

Battery after battery of field guns was lent, and men of the Portuguese legion poured into

(Continued on page eight.)