This is Vietnam, where Americans in growing numbers fight and die to honor a pledge. Vietcong guerrillas move along its jungle trails and even into the metropolis of Saigon, capital of South Vietnam. Seat of the Communist government of North Vietnam is Hanoi. The divided country's neighbors are Laos, Cambodia — and China. Smaller notes refer to physical characteristics and to key positions on the far eastern chess board.

Map by Sentinel Artist James Luedeke
BOOKMARKS

Book examines issues of today

By DAVID GILBERT

New American Review No. 2
New American Library

Available At Paramount News

The second annual edition of the New American Review is out. As a sort of sophisticated Red Cedar Review, it can really claim only belatedly a share in the John Barth, Henry Miller, Nat Hentoff, Stanley Kauffmann and a deliberate orientation to, as the blurb puts it, "the issues and experiences here and now."

Frankly, I was not overly impressed by the volume. It seems that Barth's four stories, which was in his typical End Of The Road style, self-consciously self-conscious. In a harking back to Vollme, John Barth's four page with perception, but not too much concern. His final statement is that segregation is the point that expresses man's need to establish some kind of rationality but because of her own irrationality. She wishes, irrationally, to live within society's constructs, and she has no more justification for her choice than does the actress for choosing to live in silence. Kauffman accuses Bannie and Clyde of being "a superior example of an inferior breed: the film of make-believe meaning," that is, those films with a veneer of honesty and criticism: They are close-ups that are meant to seem unconventionally truthful but that dare nothing and say nothing.

Lester's How I Won The War is hailed by Kauffmann as an example of the Age of the Put-on, "an age of pragmatism, cynical but adventurous." The film's most devastating comment is not that war is hell, but that what is hellish is that "fundamentally men love it."

Robert Coover's short story The Sleeper is a terrifying allegorical journey through the soul of a Policeman and a police state. With crisp clear sentences reminiscent of Stephen Crane, Coover creates an incredible effect. As the cop interrogates an apparent vagrant who refuses to speak, the reader finds himself agreeing more and more with the cup until it seems inevitable and right that the old man be shot. There is in each of us an element of the Policeman that functions with pencil and reports, pomp and ceremony: and if the Policeman is very strong within us, we find it necessary to eliminate anything that refuses to conform to our concept of how things should be.

Out of the dozen or so poems, there are two very good ones. David Farrelly's Border Inc- dew is a memorable poem about the effect of an enemy soldier's death on a "de-personalized" soldier:

That took A completely by surprise,
It's maggots out his mouth and in his eyes,
And if he goes home to his child and wife
It's death, perhaps, will last him his life
Or never even get until he dies.

And Shirley Kaufmann's Room should be read aloud ten or fifteen times. It is quietly lyric, and probes the love moment from the outside in as well as from the inside out. The imagery of trees used is particularly effective, as is the suggestiveness of the water images.

There is more in New American Review, all of it competent, but little that is exciting or new. The Review No. 2 is on the contemporaneous scene, but seems curiously removed from it: one gets the impression of America as seen at second sight, once removed from the actuality. Most of the contributors know that they are good, and this, perhaps, is what detracts from the impact of the Review: its writers come across as uninvoluted.

THE 10 BEST-SELLING PAPERBACKS

1. Valley of the Dolls
2. The Man with Green Eyes
3. The Sleeping Prophet
4. The Adventures of the Invisible Man
5. The Best of the Beatles
6. Valley of the Dolls
7. The Best of the Beatles
8. The Adventures of the Invisible Man
9. The Best of the Beatles
10. The Adventures of the Invisible Man

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Nichols—success as director

By FRED SHERWOOD

Aside from boosting two new young talents (Katherine Ross and Dustin Hoffman) into the realm of stardom, the motion picture hit The Graduate serves as further proof of the directorial gift of one-time comedian Mike Nichols. Previously having put his energies into comic skits which panned everything from mothers to morticians, Nichols in The Graduate has now employed another medium to attack that which is typical in the affluent American society. The comic effects bear his mark, and the overall tone of the movie has the ring of the Nichols humor.

Any analysis of that humor must inevitably include something about his female counterpart and partner for seven years, Elaine May. The two were the dynamic duo of The Group at the University of Chicago. Before Chicago, Nichols enrolled in New York University, but not finding it to his liking he tried his hand at being an assistant costume jeweler. His job was to glue stones into their settings. The stones usually fell out, and he moved on to the University of Chicago where he appeared in amateur productions in his spare time.

Following that, Nichols studied the Stanislavsky Method at Actors Studio in New York under Lee Strasberg. He led the life of the stereotyped “struggling, starving” artist. Once he ate a jar of mustard for his dinner. He did not seem well suited for conventional jobs such as the one he lost at a Howard Johnson restaurant by telling a customer the only flavor ice cream they had was “chicken.”

Nichols began his career with Elaine May in 1955, earning $5 a week at the Compass, an improvisational theater in Chicago that also spawned such talents as Shelley Berman and Barbara Harris.

When it folded, Nichols and May went on to appearances in New York at the Village Vanguard and Blue Angel night clubs, bits on television and eventual national fame. In 1960 they opened on Broadway with An Evening with Mike Nichols and Elaine May, which won considerable acclaim. In a review of An Evening a critic described the Nichols-May satirical style as “Horrors rather than Jevunalia.”

“They take their revenge on society by reproducing it instead of whipping it with rods and scourges,” he said. “They locate the cliches of conventional middle-class life and strip them down to their essential absurdity.”

The Nichols-May satire was a different kind of commentary on modern life. Their comedy departed from the traditional one-liners about Eisenhower’s golf game or Marilyn Monroe’s bustline. They presented sketches painfully close to reality with enough artful inflection and style to create satire by reproducing banality. They dealt with everyday subjects: a mother calling her missile scientist son at Cape Canaveral, the insensitive nurse at a hospital, the little man with only one dime at the mercy of a telephone operator.

“It’s recognition that makes people laugh,” said Nichols. “People don’t laugh unless they have already recognized the truth—that whatever you’re doing on stage is true to life—and also funny or pretentious or just ridiculous.”

The Nichols-May routines threw barbs at everyone and everything from phony intellectuals and name-droppers (“Bert Russell is not pushy . . . personally, I think a pushy philosophy is a drag.”) to classics such as Sophocles’ Oedipus (“Look Jocasta, sweetheart, you’re my mother.”)

One of the more famous Nichols-May sketches was the fumbles of two young adolescents trying to both smoke and make out at once in the back seat of a parked car and receiving little more than cigarette burns and bruised egos.

For fun they did 10 second radio spots for a regional brewer that went something like this:

Elaine: I have something to tell you, darling.
Mike: Fine, darling, can I have a glass of beer please?
Elaine: Of course, darling, here is a glass of cold, extra dry, sparkling Java.
Mike: Thank you.
Elaine: You’re welcome. Phyllis shaved the dog today.

“We weren’t really a comedy team,” said Nichols, looking back after they went their separate ways. “We did little scenes, that’s all. We were actors, and we were writers, and directors all at once. We didn’t tell jokes. We’d think up a situation and then play it just like it would be in real life. If either of us broke up laughing, we knew we’d hit something true, so we’d keep it.”

After Evening finished its run in 1961, the two broke up to pursue individual careers. Nichols directed his first Broadway play.

(continued on page 11)
By LAWRENCE H. BATTISTINI

By 1962 perhaps 60 to 70 per cent of the rural population sympathized with the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV) and a very substantial proportion gave direct assistance to it. The plan's effective control had in effect extended over so much of the countryside that President Kennedy decided to step up military assistance by increasing the number of American military advisers to some 23,000, a step that accelerated the fatalistic plunge of the United States into the Vietnam morass. Actually this step had been prescribed in December 1961, when the State Department issued a two-volume white paper which unconvincingly tried to establish that North Vietnam was threatening the peace by trying to "conquer South Vietnam."

Without a declaration of war from Congress, President Kennedy authorized those American military advisers to participate in combat operations. Actually, however, these "advisers" had been engaging in combat operations before President Kennedy increased their number to 23,000. By 1963 Americans were operating more than 50,000 advisors and scores of reconnaissance planes, and perhaps more than half of the American soldiers in action. Strategic missions of the Saigon regime's air force were being carried out with Americans serving as pilots. Although American boys were being wounded and killed, Washing- on persisted in sustaining the fiction that American military men in South Vietnam were there only as "advisers."

By the end of the adventure in dollars was rising sharply for the American taxpayer. It was unofficially estimated that from mid-1960 to 1962 alone, the United States had poured into South Vietnam about $2 billion in military and economic aid.

Washington now took the position that the "American" war was a 100-per-cent Communist organization, directed and controlled by North Vietnam. In Vietnam, in 1962, Ngo Dinh Diem, a highly respected specialist on contemporary Vietnam, wrote: "The insurrection existed before the Communists decided to take part in it. And even among the original insurrectionist initiative, the cool heads at Hanoi, from the grass roots, where the people were literally driven by the white man's domination in the form of the Diem regime, had no idea of what they were fighting for or how the cause they were serving benefited either their own or their families' interests. Most of them were actually fighting because they were forced into the army and were compelled to fight. The fighting men of the NLFSV, on the other hand, consisted of large numbers of volunteers, and in almost every case they were fighting to free their villages, their homes, and to have discarded their sympathies and loyalties. The NLFSV was a failure, as practically none of the guerrillas came out of the jungles of South Vietnam could be won by the end of 1965. The administration's actual position that the war in Vietnam was America's war and that it could be won only by the United States. For public consumption, however, the position of the Defense Department was that the war in Vietnam was America's war and that "the survival of an independent government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of Southeast Asia and the free world that I can conceive no alternative other than to take all necessary measures with our capability to prevent a Communist victory." On Jan. 30, 1964, another military coup led by General Nguyen Khanh had overthrown the junta headed by General Minh. This junta was subsequently also overthrown by a coup, which in turn was followed by several other coups. Notwith-
Juggling Lives, Nations

(continued from page 4)

erly it must be allusions to "freedom" and "democracy." American policy hardened more and more in the direction of a purely military approach. The evacuation of the war and a willingness to run the risks of significant armed intervention by the South by North Vietnamese forces and increased material assistance by the Soviet Union and China.

On March 26, 1964, McNamara crystallized the various factors assuming the U.S. military involvement as follows. First, as he put it, South Vietnam was under attack from its neighbors. The United States had been asked to give assistance, and the United States was giving this assistance. Secondly, Southeast Asia has great strategic significance in the forward defense of the United States. Thirdly, "Southeast Asia is a test case for the new Communist strategy for fighting wars of "national liberation" being fought in South Vietnam and elsewhere."Any moves had to be made in the United States, that is to say, it would demonstrate that through the employment of all necessary military power such a war could not succeed.

Throughout the first half of 1964 the war in South Vietnam seemed to be going along in a routine way-continuing successful guerrilla attacks by the NLF/SV and the bombing of villages and forests with napalm, in the hope of killing as many Vietnamese as possible and inhibiting the villagers from assisting in any way the NLF/SV. On August 2, however, the Tonkin Bay incident occurred, which the Johnson Administration was able to exploit in its large-scale scheme to enhance military victory. On that day, according to the Administration, the American destroyer Maddox had been attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats 30 miles off the North Vietnamese coast. Two days later the Administration announced that the same Maddox and another destroyer, the Turner Joy, had again been attacked, this time 65 miles off the North Vietnamese coast. The Administration asked Congress and the American people to believe that these warships had been illegally attacked, wittingly provocation, while on "routine patrol." Both the Congress, with few exceptions, and the public were more than likely to believe the Administration. This was because the "credibility gap" had become a commonly recognized characteristic of the Administration's official statements. The day after the second attack, President Johnson asked Congress for its support in taking "all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty." At the same time, he assured Congress that the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. An argued Congress, which almost to a man accepted in its entirety the Administration's version of the incident. That August 20 passed the now celebrated Tonkin resolution which supported the President in taking all necessary action to protect U.S. forces and to defend nations protected by the SEATO Treaty. President Johnson apparently interpreted the resolution to mean that he had been virtually given a blank check to widen the war as he saw fit.

Ho Chi Minh claimed that the Johnson version of the Tonkin incident was a pure fabrication to cover up its own aggressive activities and intentions against North Vietnam. Even at the time, it appeared in many objective foreign observers that the action of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin was "calculated" and "directly associated with" naval attacks made by vessels of the Saigon regime's navy within North Vietnamese territorial waters. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has recently probed into the facts of the Tonkin incident and has come around to the cautious view that the Administration's original version was only part of the truth, and most of its members now have serious doubts about the "innocence" of the American destroyers' missions.

With the presidential election coming up, however, President Johnson was temporarily content to retaliate simply with a naval bombardment of the North Vietnamese coast. Nevertheless, the incident had served its purpose as far as the "war hawk" advisers of the President were concerned. Congress seemed to have given the President a free hand and the national temperament was sufficiently inflamed and prepared for a dramatic escalation when the presidential election was over. So President Johnson and the warhawk advisers apparently believed. Actually for many weeks after the election, President Johnson seemed almost to have forgotten Vietnam as he talked tenderly about his "Great Society" and of the progress to make it a reality. Meanwhile, however, grim military preparations were being made.

At the same time, the shooting war in South Vietnam was still going on, and the military position of the Saigon forces continued to deteriorate. In the closing months of 1964 the NLF/SV forces won a series of smashing and demoralizing victories over the Saigon military forces. Actually they were on the verge of winning on the field of battle the long and bitter struggle against the Saigon regime's U.S.-supported military establishment. The war might very well have ended within a few more months but for the major escalation of the U.S. military establishment beginning in early February 1965.

In January 1965 talk of the war was being virtually lost became increasingly prevalent among knowledgeable American journalists. Even the conservatively oriented Wall Street Journal raised strong editorial doubts about the possibility of a military victory and recommended that the U.S. government, that is what they should be called," had been unable to win the support of the people or even the government. "To say that we might lose in Vietnam is not defeatism but political realism," it declared.

However, the Johnson warhawks, while willing to admit that the war was not going well, were unwilling to concede that it could not be won. Their faith in the superiority of weapons and massive Soviet military power over man was boundless. They recognized, of course, that if the war was to be won, it would have to be won by U.S. military forces taking on the major, if not entire, burden. They also believed it was necessary to carry the war to North Vietnam, which they erroneously but stubbornly believed to be responsible for the war. They were convinced that the North Vietnamese, who practically had no air force, were the war could be speedily ended. President Johnson confidently accepted this assessment.

In February 1965, the Johnson Administration made what it thought would be the decisive move that would break the will of the North Vietnamese. On Feb. 7, 8, and 11, American warplanes bombed selected targets in North Vietnam slightly above the seventeenth parallel. Such an action needed a pretext. The pretext was that NLF/SV forces had attacked U.S. military installations in Pleiku, located in the northern part of South Vietnam, which had resulted in the death of eight Americans and the wounding of 109 others.

McNamara, in commenting on the guerrilla attacks against U.S. military installations, described them as a "test of the will, a clear challenge of the political purpose of both the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments." The air raids on North Vietnam, however, were not really simply retaliatory measures for the attack on Pleiku. Senator Wayne Morse, who at the time was one of the few senators critical of the entire Vietnam adventure, had as a matter of fact alerted the American people nearly a year previously, on May 21, 1964, when he declared: "I wish to warn the
The Christmas Truce

His entreats strangled, this soldier can't appreciate the truce. Lying in their tents, his buddies talk of getting drunk and making love.

But this soldier's death among the hole of the twisted bayonet in the enemy's breast, in the rec room where a plastic-cased radio relays the Pope's plea for peace.

By JEFF JUSTIN
'Our boys' in never-never land of war

By LEE ELBRINGER
Saigon, Dec. 12, 1967

The key word in Saigon is corruption but, fellow citizens, do not be alarmed. It is not the outrageous, wild-eyed corruption that at first comes to mind where sneaky, unscrupulous devils steal rice from the bowls of starving children. Oh no. It is unconscious corruption—a softness of the frontal lobes, if you know what I mean. Some call it waste, others call it inefficiency. Nobody seems put off by it. The average American soldier has not changed, one might say, and one might be correct. But the average American war has changed, and so much the worse for those who are unfortunate enough to get caught in its path or its draft.

The idealism with which wars are generally fought inspires no great acts of heroism in Vietnam: dollar signs dangle before the eyes of professional soldiers here. As one man told me in Nha-Trang he was doing heat in the Press Club—fighting Charlie in his own small way: "You can have the Far East. All the girls here have blazed eyes and no hair on their you-know-whats." (Before you get shocked, remember this is War, and War brings out what is elemental in Man.)

There are a few more things to get shocked about if you consider the war in Vietnam. One thing is the length of this war, the frustration, lack of progress, the staggering cost, and the loss of American lives. Another is the increasing bitterness of the Vietnamese people, the terror and brutality on both sides (please consider for a minute what it means to be strung up by the thumbs and methodically beaten to death: this is the sort of activity that goes on here). But one of the most surprising activities in Vietnam (and one of the most potentially dangerous) is the establishment and entrenchment of a vast military welfare state. Such a condition means nothing to Vietnam: Vietnam is remarkable for its ability to remain the same no matter what happens. But the 'police action' in Vietnam can mean a vast deal to America, which stands an extremely good and frightening chance of going the way of Nazi Germany.

The observer in Saigon sees the American presence in Vietnam divided into two categories: military and civilian. And these two categories can be further broken down into "good" and "bad." It is possible to wander through the never-neverland of Saigon—from the press centers (where history is being written) to Tu Do Street (where bars and bar-girls flourish) to the outdoor cafes near the Continental Cafe in Saigon. The many-headed hydra that traditionally symbolizes the country of Vietnam.

The military

First and foremost, there is the military. The good old American khaki-green give-em-hell bang-hang-you-re-dead military. The military can be found in one of two places: out in the field fighting desperately to stay alive or on top of the Rex Hotel in Saigon, drinking whisky, playing the slot machines, and swimming in an outdoor pool. If the military is found in the field, chances are it is a kid, between 18 and 24, from some place like Indiana or South Dakota who got drafted because he didn't get around to filling out his college application or he is incredibly unlucky. These kids are green, likable, scared, unsure of themselves, but fast becoming worldling. Most of them have never been so far away from home before and are well prepared to kill Vietnamese people but poorly equipped to deal with them. So the kids stick to themselves, count the number of days they have left in the service, and seek to do as little as possible. They rarely discuss (or even think about) the war and politics; the only subject that really interests them is girls. The discussions of our troops in Vietnam must be like discussions among troops at all times and in all places: they are coarse, rude, brusque, lacking in information or depth, but necessary to establish camaraderie and a semblance of normality. We must ask ourselves if discussions in college dormitories are significantly different.

The soldier is treated by the Army as a number, and it does not take long before he begins to adopt the same attitude toward himself. Friendships seem to be forced here. Barracks are filled with all sorts of men from different backgrounds and places and they are compelled by circumstances to mingle and live together. The experience is a valuable one in terms of introducing Americans to one another, but the effect it has on the Vietnamese is not particularly positive. Americans have a tendency to remain Americans when they travel in foreign countries, so rather than adapt to Vietnamese customs and culture, South Vietnam is being transformed into a little American State. Needless to say, the Vietnamese are not happy about this development.

Life in Saigon is significantly different from life in the countryside. Saigon has traditionally been a country within a country, "The Paris of the Orient" as the French liked to say, and this separatism has not diminished today. The life of the Vietnamese peasant is centered around the hamlet, not the city, so one sees a more realistic picture of Vietnam from the countryside rather than from the Continental Cafe in Saigon. This fact is borne out by soldiers who work in the countryside (and, incidentally, a more realistic view of the average soldier can be found in the "boonies" also).

The soldiers/kids (the phrase "our boys in Vietnam" is quite descriptive of the situation) have evolved an entire lingo, manner, and (non-)way of looking at life to cope with the situation in which they find themselves. Liquor and marijuana play an important part in numbing the minds of "our boys" to the brutality, violence, and injustice of duty in Vietnam. Marijuana is a new development for the army, and officials are baffled as to how to handle it. Soldiers are reluctant to talk about it (understandably so, because the penalty for getting caught is a maximum 25 years in the brig), but it is no secret that pot is cheap, available, good, and in use. Consequently, records like "St. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band" are banned in Vietnam. Some of the soldiers talk bravely about "getting Charlie" and "zapping the Cong," but most are scared and quite willing to admit it. A television programmer in Nha-Trang said that the favorite TV program in Vietnam is "Combat" (called "the other war" by the soldiers) because "Combat" is about a war where idealism is the motivating force and the good guys never get killed. This programmer described a surrealistic scene: surrealistic scenes are common in Vietnam:

he recalls watching the VC mortar a Special Forces camp in Nha-Trang while "Combat" blared away on the television set. The men at his station watched both performances with rapt attention. Another favorite of the soldiers and, I fear, soon to be re-cruited in the U.S. is the old Blondie and Dagmar movies (don't feel bad: I've never heard of them either) from the 30's. These movies are ultra-camp and represent an unreal return to reality. One supposes that the popularity of Blondie and Dagmar is due to the fact that they offer yet another chance to avoid thinking about the dangers and fears of the "real" world.

(continued on page 11)
The decision to carry the war to North Vietnam was allegedly "based on a soul-searching decision by President Johnson and his advisers." It was apparently assured President Johnson that the North Vietnamese "could not withstand sustained air attacks and that they would "chicken out" and make an "honest effort" to disengage from operations in the South. Military and diplomatic in-ascertainment of whether the United States was supposed to have convinced President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Defense Secretary McNamara that the North Vietnamese dominated the thinking of the North Vietnamese and that they would not permit Chinese troops to come to their aid. In view of the subsequent escalations that have followed the initial bombings of North Vietnam, what Edsson E. Laphay of the Knight newspapers wrote at the time seems starkly prophetic: "If we launch an air strike in North Vietnam proves wrong, a humiliated military and diplomatic community might find its lives in military graves in a couple of years. And their parents will have little illusions saying that their own died in the defense of freedom."

At the time of the Tonkin resolution, the Vietnamese were using the phrase: "We seek no wider war." It was repeated with monotonous regularity in subsequent months, with each major escalation at the same time, step by step further escalated the war by in-\( ^{\text{continued on page 5}} \)

Michigan State News, East Lansing, Michigan

America: An imperial power

Saigon regime supported by the United States — it is still a civil war, for the Vietnamese are one nation. From the standpoint of the NLF/SV and the government of North Vietnam, and also from the viewpoint of a substantial part of world opinion, it is also a kind of colonial war — a war also being fought to expel a foreign invader, the United States, from the soil of an Asian country with a long history of national identity and independence. And this is not withstanding the Johnson-Rusk sophistries about North Vietnam not leaving its neighbor alone, the shadow of China and a host of other wars-out cliches. By aggression, which has been committed from the outside, it has not been "aggression from the North" but aggression from the West. By the U.S. represented by the U.S. unilateral projection of its political, financial, and military power into the internal affairs of the Vietnamese people, its role as an accomplice in preventing the crucial parts of the Geneva accords from being carried out, and its self-given right to exclude Communism as an option for the people of South Vietnam. Not a single regime which has existed in Saigon since 1946 could have been established or could have maintained itself in power without U.S. approval and support. No Saigon regime since 1946 has been representative of, or supported by, as much as a fourth of the total population of South Vietnam.

As the distinguished authority on international law, Quinley Wright, has made it quite clear: "Neither the Charter of the United Nations nor customary international law recognizes any right to intervene in civil strife at the request of either the recognized government or a rebel group. The right of self-determination and independence gives the privilege of shaping their system of government or economy, even by violent revolution, without outside interference, as we asserted, it's the inherent right of the people of a country to determine their own future. The rebellion in South Vietnam had actually been underway for many years before the North Vietnamese committed itself to assistance. The so-called Vietcong insurgency is still, despite the increased military assistance of the North Vietnamese, essentially a South Vietnamese coalition against the Saigon regime and the U.S. presence. South Viet-namese Communists now perhaps play a decisive role in leadership, strategy and tactics, and in liaison with North Vietnam. But this was not so before the United States substantially escaped the military involvement. But even if South Vietnamese Communists did play a decisive role from the beginning, the argument that the rebellion in South Vietnam was indigenous remains valid, for South Viet-namese Communists are, after all, South Vietnam-ese.

President Johnson has in the past spoken about South Vietnam as "participating in at-tacks on their own Government," as though this were criminal behavior. A government which is alienated from the people it governs deserves to be attacked, and even overthrown by force if there is no other way. This is the sacred right of people to revolution, enshrined in our own Declaration of Independence. Since 1946 the civil-war nature of the conflict in Vietnam has been almost completely eclipsed by its international characteristics — brought on by the richest and most powerful nation in the world, made up of more than 200 million people, committing a little Asian people. It is doubtful if the North Vietnamese, without an air force, without a navy, without armor, without sophisticated offensive weapons, could go on resisting with the support received from the Soviet Union, China, and a few other countries.

However, the Johnson Administration does not include fighting men, but only food and materiel — to the extend of about $1 billion worth in a year. This contrasts with more than $25 billion which the United States is now spending in one year to prop up the Saigon regime, dispirited and ineffective as it may be, and also equipped with nuclear weapons. Most of the world sees this as an unequal contest between a mighty colossus and a pigny, and easily revulsion at the courage and dedication of the pigny.

3 We were mistaken in the first place and seriously damaged our national image in Asia and elsewhere when we assisted the imperialist French in their military effort to retain Viet-\( n\)am. We were mistaken again when we deci-\(ded\) to fill the power vacuum created by France's withdrawal and to attempt the im-
position of our will on the people of South Vietnam. Ten years of inglorious camouflage and platitudes about "freedom," "de-
mocracy," and other hollow phrases, a primary objective has been clear for some time. We did not become militarily involved because we "love people" and are seeking to "assist." It was we ourselves who created and made possible the first regime in Saigon, Diem regime, even though it alone it, it could be a kind of Frankenstein and had to be destroyed eventually. Since then, to this day, the pigny about it, has been a client regime, entirely dependent upon U.S. power and money for survival.

Although the cliches and slogans of the past are still being parroted by the apologists of the Johnson Administration, they were long ago discarded by the franker spokesmen. Our primary aim, unmistakably to be a kind of Frankenstein and had to be destroyed eventually. Since then, to this day, the pigny about it, has been a client regime, entirely dependent upon U.S. power and money for survival.

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(continued on page 19)
Max Hoffman (center) discusses his project in Washington D.C., with Harold Johnson (left), his supervising professor, and Elliot Ravenholt, on assistant to Vice President Hubert Humphery.

The most important part of my stay in Washington is not what I've done but the contacts I've made," Miss Neal said.

She has attended a number of OAS meetings, and has been involved in work related to the pan-American Union. She feels that the organization is efficient, and there is political favoritism. The real problem is that many of the questions come down to differences in the larger nations opposing those of the smaller ones.

After the field study program, Miss Neal said, "I have gotten as much out of this program as I have from attending all my classes at MSU to date."

Another Spanish major, Cathy Owen, a junior from Wayzata, is also working in the Pan-American Union. She is doing research in Spanish and is writing the Social Affairs Dept. report for Peru for the annual Alliance for Progress Report.

Miller is conducting a series of interviews relating to the Amicus Curiae Brief (Friend of the Court) for the Congressional Hearing Room. When not doing research reading, he interviews pressure groups such as the NAACP who have had cause to utilize the Amicus Curiae Brief.

Unlike most of the other JMC students in Washington, Miller is not tied down to a particular position. "I didn't particularly want to be in my congressman's office all of the time," he said. "I have more free time."

Miller replied "statements of his fellow students in Washington concerning the opportunities this program offers."

"In a 30-minute conversation with someone here, I can learn more than in a whole term of a political science course," Miller said. "These people have to be responsible for what they say; a poli sci prof doesn't."

Miller said that he is particularly impressed by how hard congressmen and other government figures work. He said that both radical and conservative groups complain about the lack of work being done in Washington.

"It isn't just fun on the Hill," Miller said.

Miller feels that the JMC program is worthwhile, but says that the individual student must assert himself to reap the benefits available.

"Simply because you are here, you are learning about your government and about the world," Miller said. "But we are on our own. We could drink beer all day if we wanted to. JMC must be careful of the kind of people they select."

Both McElroy and Johnson are pleased with the Washington project. They hope that the field study experience will aid the individual (continued on page 18)
Alienation at home, abroad

(continued from page 8)

The tragic war in Vietnam has much more than the use of power as a part of man­kind from us. It has also torn and split the American people as they have never been since the years preceding the American civil war. One of the cruel paradoxes of the present war is the inability of our military in Vietnam to destroy and to make freedom possible in that land, while in our own country there are millions, whites as well as colored peoples, who have never really known the meaning of freedom, dignity or opportunity. Instead of utilising our resources and talents, which are by no means limitless, to fulfill the American dream for our own millions of disadvantaged and alienated people, we are in effect squandering them and sacrificing the lives of our youth in an all­advised venture ten thousand miles away which in reality has no bearing whatsoever on the "common defense" and the 'general welfare" of the American people.

The "dirty war" in Vietnam, as it is called by many of our friends in Europe and Asia, is unmistakably brutalising a increasing num­ber of Americans. It is not irrelevant to note that the recently increased dissatisfaction of the public is evident in Vietnam. Killing policies seem to stem not from the resulting violence against the injustices and humanities of the war and the sufferings of the Vietnamese people, but from his failure to apply more resources to stopping the number of disadvantaged and alienated people, we are in effect squandering them and sacrificing the lives of our youth in an all­advised venture ten thousand miles away which in reality has no bearing whatsoever on the "common defense" and the "general welfare" of the American people.

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Nichols’ success

(continued from page 7)

Robert Frost in the Park written by Neil Simon. When he hit, he reportedly sold 600,000 copies. When it was a hit, he received over 400 scripts from Broadway, television, and movie writers seeking his direction and talents. He directed three more plays, which opened on Broadway, three more on television, and one more for the screen. The only comment from Nichols during its filming was: “We’re making it from a play into a movie.”

Arthur Schlesinger Jr., perhaps spreading himself thin when he moved from historian and biographer of presidents to film critic, said, “No one can be afraid of this Virginia Woolf.” Nonetheless, Nichols was congratulated for the “spectacular victory” of the performance he was to direct the second time. He had his actors stay up all night shooting some of the late night scenes in “Virginia Woolf” to see what would happen.

He had his production and costume designer, with财税, working on the film, which is supposedly similar to the setting of the play to gain first-hand reactions. The costumier, Virginia Woolf.

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(continued from page 7)

For the troops in the field of Vietnam, it is difficult to feel anything but high regard and compassion. Their confusion, their awkwardness, their doubts are an ineluctable part of the history of man and cannot be summed up in that (bogus) body counts and euphemistic jargon. These kids are young and trapped: they did not choose to come here, they did not choose to be killed, and they would never leave tomorrow if they could. As one soldier said to me, “Sure I kill. Sure I pull the trigger. But I don’t understand why. None of us do.” Others speak vaguely about “stopping communism”, and when asked about the possibility of a war with China, say, “The whole world is going to be blown up anyway, so it doesn’t matter what we do.” A striking aspect of these soldiers is their concern with masculinity: what does it mean to be a man? Are you a man enough bar-girls to boast about it in the near future? Each conscripted soldier seems to be carving his individual answers out of the poor material provided by the army, and some of them are doing a fine job of it.

Not so the enlisted soldiers, the professionals, the officers and career soldiers. These men seem to be a different breed: the losers, the men who could not make it in civilian life, men who thrirve on force, authority, and dominance, men with twisted concepts of self-worth. They are not interested in what the camera and photographic techniques to add depth to the story. Faces crowded together in closeup shots convey the tight, close feeling of a roomful of obnoxious people where the intruder, the hero appears to be running without getting anywhere as he is racing desperately against time to rescue his girl from the jaws of madness. At a highly emotional point in the story, the scene changes, though the action is continued through a veil of tears.

The use of the camera as a subjective viewing device rather than an impartial observer heightens the audience’s involvement. The scenes are drawn into the story by its visual effects. Nichols also does this in a montage of shots which cuts rapidly between scenes of his main character Ben Bradock listlessly passing time at home and conducting an equally listless affair with Mrs. Robinson, the wife of his father’s business partner. A shot of Ben lounging in his room about to drink from a can of beer cuts to a shot of him drinking from another can in a hotel room. The related subject matter of the alternating shots draws an analogy to the similarity of mood betwecn the two situations. The listless mood is furthered by setting the shots to the plaintive music of Simon and Garfunkel. 

Nichols’ presence in The Graduate is best felt, however, in the comic characterizations. Nichols might have been taken right out of a Nichols-May routine. There is absurdity, but there are no “jokes” or tired situations. Nobody falls down stairs or hides under a bed from an irate husband. The characterizations are drawn from Nichols’ past, and are humorous because they are ridiculously true and really, really ridiculous.

The Graduate is another manifestation of the original Nichols humor. There are the same three elements: the themes of domestic America from boisterous parents to bouncy future. The comic, Nichols, does it, a series of “little scenes” that builds a big comic picture.

The play was won him an Academy Award nomination, so small accomplishment for a first production, but Nichols views it in his usual candid angle:

“If I won it was Oscar! I would say I had done it all by myself and probably be stoned to death.”

Thursday, March 7, 1968 II

Realizing

Everything is dying.

Below my bedroom

Where I have tossed my desire out,

An old deaf woman rents from us.

Her bow-legged walk is skillful.

When friends take her for a drive,

In a strange passage, so I pass,

She sits reading newspapers and sentimental verse

With a magnifying glass.

She sits in a cobweb of hung white

Curtain and curtain and her white head,

But at dark when her light shines silver,

She is death’s spider web.

Every moment now

Her sorrow at its center,

At the thirty second point,

And so I want to how joy

At the beginning of the moment and at the end,

When life is prized, this how.

By JEFF JUSTIN

Never-never-land

(continued from page 7)
Never never and corrupted

(continued from page 11)

age is arrived at by tabulating deaths, wounded, and missing announcements in home newspapers. From this little bit of data, we can gauge something of the human cost. McChord's question, 'the young, inexperienced conscripted men, can you imagine this war?' is one professional men sit behind the desks, consume PX commodities, lead the good life of officer life here. ii. Pay and taxes, and profit greatly from the waste and tragedy of this war.

To suggest that all officers operate in this manner would be greatly dishonest, but it is actually quite accurate. This is the philosophy that dominates the Saigon scene and is the context in which I find myself. The Vietnamese people and the American cause in Vietnam is lost somewhere between the officers' clubs and the government contracts that are awarded on the basis of friendship and 'connections.' There is no way of extracting the American people and the American dollar from this mess, because the highjinks and freeloaders are built into the best obsolete systems that have been allowed to proliferate in and strangle this country. A mere switch in personnel would be useless and not just from a government point of view. If such activities were warranted.

As the military melts into a continuum of corruption, people become dedicated (but I do not know to what). frustration comedy. The government workers, the civilian workers, are parallel: the old. crass militaristic efficiency, is bureaucratic, harassed, confused, brainwashed. The future of medicine here is not always sane, let alone logical or successful. We are about to experience the greatest wealth in a short time that can only be described as sit-com. The American people are (or, at least, what we perceive) a fortunate people, with these people than we are. Consequently, we fail to learn from our 'enemy' (except about baseball and apple pie and yes) even Mother and real work with the people in this underdeveloped country who want a revolution. The American people are (or, at least, were) a relatively peaceful people and make mistakes, they get mad, get nervous, get discouraged. Their motives might even be less than pure (the few I have met have a holier-than-thou attitude which may or may not be unconscious). But then there is Benet who drove slowly in order to avoid splashing the people, represent an intelligent, enlightened approach to the problem in which we find ourselves. One wishes that the army would forget about the VC for a while and forget about baseball and apple pie and yes even Mother and really work with the people in this underdeveloped country who want a revolution. The American people are (or, at least, were) a relatively peaceful people and make mistakes, they get mad, get nervous, get discouraged. Their motives might even be less than pure (the few I have met have a holier-than-thou attitude which may or may not be unconscious). But then there is Benet who drove slowly in order to avoid splashing the people who are walking down the road.