AN APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY
A Case On America's Conscience

On Nov. 17, 1952, the Supreme Court of the United States, with Mr. Justice Hugo Black dissenting, refused to review the convictions and death sentences of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg on charges of “conspiracy to commit” espionage for the Soviet Union. The atmosphere in which their trial was conducted and the methods employed to obtain their convictions have raised grave doubts in the minds of people all over the world as to their guilt.

Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg have maintained their complete innocence from the start, and have until now discouraged pleas for clemency in the hope of vindication through the courts.

The Circuit Court of Appeals, in denying their first plea for a reversal, expressed the view that a higher court might consider altering the unprecedented death sentence. However, in its final denial of a review, the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter stated that it did not have this power.

These tormented young American parents therefore have but one hope of living for the day of their vindication and a future of freedom with their two children. That final hope is executive clemency through commutation of their death sentences by the President of the United States.

To help win the broadest support for executive clemency, this examination of the trial record by one of the outstanding figures in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is herewith reprinted. The reader is urged to consider his arguments carefully and urge others to consider them; and to add your voice to the millions now appealing to the White House in Washington for executive clemency for Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.
DENIS NOWELL PRITT, author of this brilliant analysis of the Rosenberg trial, is one of the veteran senior members of the English Bar: a Queen’s (King’s) Counsel since 1927. For many years a Labour MP and chairman of the Howard League for Penal Reform and the Bentham Committee for Poor Litigants, he presided in Sept., 1933, over the Reichstag Fire inquiry in London. The inquiry—unlike the Berlin trial—considered the evidence soberly, indicted Goering whom the world now knows to have been the real incendiary.

In presenting his analysis, Mr. Pritt writes: “I must state my qualifications for this work. In my 43 years as an English barrister I have had considerable experience both in trial and in Appellate work. In the latter, I have had to study in detail many hundreds of Records of cases from all parts of the British Empire and Commonwealth, including India, in all of which countries the procedure is very similar to that of the U.S.A.; and I have studied also a certain number of Records from the U.S.A. itself. To form an estimate of the value which the evidence given in the Rosenberg case should possess in the eyes of impartial lawyers trained in Anglo-Saxon legal traditions, is thus work of the sort to which I have devoted a large part of my time as a barrister.

“I have studied the Record carefully, putting aside as far as humanly possible anything I had previously learned about the case, and have reached certain conclusions about both the conviction and the sentence, which I will state fully, with my reasons for these conclusions.”

THE indictment on which Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were tried was returned on Jan. 31, 1951, against five defendants in all—the two Rosenbergs, one Morton Sobell, one Yakovlev, and one David Greenglass. Greenglass pleaded guilty. The two Rosen-
berg and Sobell pleaded not guilty and were tried together, the case of Yakovlev being severed.

The charge was that the five defendants named, together with one Harry Gold, one Ruth Greenglass, "and other persons unknown," had conspired over a period of six years, from June 6, 1944 to June 16, 1950,

... the U.S.A. being there and then at war, with intent and reason to believe that it would be used to the advantage of a foreign nation, to wit the U.S.S.R., to communicate, deliver and transmit to a foreign government, to wit the U.S.S.R., and representatives and agents thereof, directly and indirectly documents, writings, sketches, notes and information relating to the National Defense of the U.S.A.

It is well to explain at the outset what is the essence of the crime of conspiracy and why a charge of conspiracy to commit some crime or other is so frequently made, in lieu of a charge that the crime was actually committed. "Conspiracy" can be defined, sufficiently for present purposes, as an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime; it is itself a crime, and the crime of conspiracy is complete as soon as two or more persons have agreed in any way whatsoever, whether formally or informally, by words or by conduct, to commit some crime; it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove the commission of the ultimate crime nor even of acts amounting to an attempt to commit it.

It is thus in general easier to secure a conviction for conspiracy than for any other offense, for less has actually to be proved against the defendants; and prejudice or excitement may lead a jury to convict parties on a mere allegation that they agreed or arranged together to do something, under circumstances where, if it were necessary to prove some positive criminal act, the jury would have to acquit because there would be no evidence at all of any such acts.

To secure a conviction is moreover made easier still by the operation of a peculiar rule of evidence. In all normal cases no evidence can be given against any defendant in a criminal case except evidence of acts which he himself did or words which he himself spoke; but in a conspiracy case, so long as some evidence—however tenuous—is given from which an agreement between the alleged conspirators might be inferred, the acts and words of any of them, asserted to be done or spoken in pursuance of the conspiracy, are admissible evidence against all the others, on the footing that they are all agents of one another, and so responsible for each other's words and actions.
The Rosenbergs' 12 'overt acts'

It is little wonder, in the circumstances, that in all periods of tension, in all countries, charges of conspiracy have been frequently made, and many defendants have been found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment, although little has been proved against them and no other crime could plausibly even be charged. The dangers, inherent in conspiracy charges, of convictions being reached on inadequate evidence are indeed so well recognized that the rule has been firmly established in most Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, including that of the Federal Courts of the U.S.A., that "overt acts" demonstrating the conspiracy should be alleged in the indictment and proved.

Such overt acts are normally alleged pretty specifically, so that the defendants can really know what case they have to meet—and indeed, also, that the public may know the nature and weight of the case. I turn accordingly to study the twelve overt acts mentioned in the indictment in this case. They are in substance as follows:

- That Julius Rosenberg visited a building in Washington, D.C., on or about June 6, 1944.
- That on or about Nov. 15, 1944, Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Rosenberg talked with Ruth Greenglass.
- That, five days later, Julius Rosenberg gave Ruth Greenglass some money in New York.
- That on the same day, Ruth Greenglass took a train from New York to Mexico.
- That, three weeks later, Julius Rosenberg went to a building in New York.
- That on the same day Julius Rosenberg received from Ruth Greenglass a paper containing written information.
- That on or about Jan. 5, 1945, in New York, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg talked with David and Ruth Greenglass.
- That, on the same day, Julius Rosenberg gave Ruth Greenglass a portion of the side of a torn cardboard "Jello" box.
- That five days later Julius Rosenberg introduced David Greenglass to a man in New York.
- That two days thereafter Julius Rosenberg talked with David Greenglass.
- That on the same day Julius Rosenberg received from David Greenglass a paper containing sketches of experiments conducted at the Los Alamos Project.
That, two days after that, David Greenglass took a train from New York to New Mexico.

It will be noticed that the not very informative "overt acts" of this six years' conspiracy are spread over, or rather confined to, a period of only seven months, and that the only persons named as taking part in them are the two Rosenbergs and David and Ruth Greenglass; the defendants Sobell and Yakovlev are not mentioned. It is not surprising that applications were made to the Court on behalf of Sobell for some enlightenment as to what was alleged against him; and it was finally alleged that he had joined the conspiracy on or about June 15, 1944, and five overt acts were alleged against him, namely that at some time in five separate months of 1946, 1947 and 1948, he had conversations with Julius Rosenberg!

The witnesses: who, what, why?

The trial took place before Judge Irving R. Kaufman on 14 days in March, 1951. The prosecution put in a list of 112 witnesses, but in fact called only 22 of them, and one other.

The strength and weakness of the case depends, of course, on these witnesses, on their characters, on what they said, who they were, and what motives or interest they had; and it is thus of the greatest importance to know clearly all these points and to see exactly:

(1) What sort of a reliable case all witnesses between them were able to build up to establish that the Rosenbergs were guilty at all, and

(2) How serious anything was that the Rosenbergs were alleged to have done—and, above all, of course, whether what they had done merited the death penalty.

I turn at once to the evidence, adding only that, as I am dealing with the cases of the Rosenbergs, I will pay little attention to evidence which implicated only other persons, including Sobell, the only other person actually on trial with them.

Greenglass: 'terrible incentive for lying'

The principal witness against the Rosenbergs was David Greenglass. There were an unusually large number of reasons for mistrusting his evidence. To begin with, he had pleaded guilty to the conspiracy for which the Rosenbergs were being tried, but had not yet been brought up for sentence; thus, he might hope, and he expressly said that he did hope, to obtain some
advantage for himself as a result of giving evidence against the Rosenbergs; for the Court might ultimately give him a light sentence, and even if it gave him a substantial one, the Government might well remit much or all of it. He thus had a strong motive to "pile it on." In addition, he was, of course, fully established by his plea of guilty, by his evidence, and by surrounding circumstances (such as his possession of substantial sums of money which could only be explained on the basis that he was telling the truth when he said that he was selling military secrets for money), to have been a party to a conspiracy which both he himself and the prosecution described as a most serious one.

He thus fell into the class of "accomplice" witnesses, those who, in the old English phrase, "turn Queen's evidence." Such witnesses are universally regarded as highly unreliable, not merely because they are self-confessed criminals, and are betraying their associates, but far more because it is dangerously easy for them to implicate falsely, for some benefit to themselves, or to pay off some "score," or for any other reason, one who in fact took no part in the crime.

They are in a position to tell a story that is in the main true, and thus much easier to tell without being exposed as a liar in cross-examination; but at the same time to insert into that story one limited but serious falsity, namely, the assertion that some accused person took part in it when in fact he had nothing to do with it; and, if anything could make this easier, it would be that the accused was related to the accomplice so that it would be natural for them to meet from time to time.

Accomplices, moreover, as I have mentioned shortly above, have in many cases a very direct motive for implicating the accused persons as deeply as possible, for they hope to receive as a reward of their betrayal of their associates, and for their help in proving an alleged offense which could not be otherwise proved at all, either a lighter sentence from the Court, or some remission by the Government of whatever sentence is passed on them, or both. This provides so terrible an incentive for lying, and so great a danger of convictions on untrustworthy evidence, that in practically all of the many hundreds of cases of "accomplice evidence" which I have had to investigate in my practice the danger has been minimized either by giving the accomplice a free pardon before he gives evidence, or by sentencing him before he does so; and even then the need for corroboration of his evidence by independent witnesses, free from the taint of complicity, is always emphasized.
As an accomplice witness, David Greenglass was in the worst possible position; he had been neither pardoned nor sentenced, and he knew that so soon as the cases of the Rosenbergs and of Sobell had been disposed of he would come up for sentence. When he did come up, his Counsel made an eloquent and business-like plea to the effect that, unless people in his position could have some confidence that they would be dealt with leniently, they would not betray their associates, and the Government would therefore not secure convictions. If the Government wanted help it should give help. It should give Greenglass "a pat on the back"; he should be praised, not punished, said his Counsel. Greenglass was, however, given a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment and his only chance of not serving this fully lies in the hope of leniency from a grateful government.

'To save his own skin'

The peculiarities of David Greenglass as a witness in this case do not end with this already formidable circumstance. For it has to be added that Ethel Rosenberg, whom he was thus pushing towards a sentence of death, was his own elder sister who had always befriended and helped him; and Julius Rosenberg, whom he was treating in the same way, was her husband and thus his brother-in-law. To save his own skin he was quite willing to give evidence against his sister and his brother-in-law. (It was also clear, if not perhaps very important, that there had been long disagreements between him and Julius Rosenberg over a business in which they were partners after his demobilization from the army, which eventuated in his instructing his lawyer to bring civil proceedings against Julius.)

Nor was that quite all; for Ruth Greenglass, named in the indictment as a party to the conspiracy, for some unstated reason not actually indicted, but standing in peril of being indicted at some subsequent time, was David's wife, and he professed to love her dearly. Nevertheless, in the course of the many interviews he had with the FBI, in which he told bit by bit, as he remembered it, the whole of his story, he betrayed in the very first interview the full tale of his own wife's participation in the conspiracy in which he himself, at any rate, was taking part. With such an equipment, David Greenglass might be regarded as a man on whose evidence it would not be safe to convict anyone, but his evidence must of course be examined.

His version of how he came to take part in the conspiracy
was that his wife went down from New York to the neighborhood of Los Alamos, where he was working as a machinist, to take him a message—as she alleged—from Julius Rosenberg, inviting him to take part in espionage, and that by the morning of the following day he had decided to do so! And, at a later stage, when according to him Julius Rosenberg warned him that he was in danger of arrest and ought to leave the country, he accepted from Rosenberg sums amounting to $5,000 in cash to enable him to do so; he stated on oath that he never had any intention of leaving, and that he concealed his intention from Rosenberg but nevertheless accepted and retained the money. He had, he added, such a distaste for the money that he wanted to flush it down the lavatory, but changed his mind and used it to hire Mr. O. John Rogge as his lawyer instead.

'No sort or kind of corroboration'

The nature of his evidence against the Rosenbergs lent itself to no sort or kind of corroboration. It consisted of accounts of conversation with them, at which no third party was present, and of occasions on which he said that he furnished to the Rosenbergs sketches and written descriptions of processes and material objects such as lenses.

None of the alleged sketches or descriptions was produced, but Greenglass prepared—four or five years after the alleged incidents, from his own unaided memory—what he said were reproductions of the material, and these were put before the jury. Whether his limited education made it possible for him to do anything of this sort accurately is a matter for scientists rather than lawyers; but from the point of view of a lawyer it can be said that such reproductions, from even the most reliable of witnesses, would add little or nothing to their evidence and could not in any way constitute corroboration.

I pass over a number of minor points in his evidence which were designed to implicate one or both of the Rosenbergs, because examination of all of them shows that there is nothing in them to constitute any corroboration of his story; and it remains true that not one word of his story against them was corroborated by anybody but his wife, nor by any circumstance or material object.

It is my considered professional opinion that a conviction based upon such evidence from such sources, without independent corroboration, cannot be regarded as reliable and should not be
sustained. That not merely a conviction but a sentence of death
should be based upon such evidence runs counter, in my opinion,
to all normal standards of criminal procedure and of the admin-
istration of justice. I have myself appeared in many "accomplice"
cases where convictions on evidence much less objectionable than
this were set aside by appellate courts on the grounds that the
accomplice evidence should not be accepted.

**Importance of 'secrets' never shown**

I SHOULD add that, even if the evidence were regarded as pro-
viding a reliable basis for conviction, there would still be lack-
ing, in my humble opinion, any good reason for imposing or
upholding a death sentence. Such a sentence could surely only be
justified if it were clear that the secret information involved
was of the utmost importance.

Scientists may be able to express expert views on the value
or absence of value of what the witness, David Greenglass, alleges
that he communicated to the Rosenbergs, and, in particular, to
tell us whether the information was old or new; whether it re-
vealed or conveyed what is called "the secret of the atom bomb";
whether it was of such a nature that a foreign country which
could not have developed the atom bomb without it was thereby
enabled to do so; and, finally, whether David Greenglass was
sufficiently educated technically to be able to understand, re-
member and communicate it; all that a lawyer can say upon it
is that there is no real evidence in the Record to show that it
was of very great value. In general, in charges of espionage, there
is expert evidence to show exactly why the information is im-
portant; but in the present case only two scientific witnesses
gave evidence on this topic, and they said little. The evidence
of the first of them, a Dr. Koski, read as a whole, constitutes no
proof at all that there was any particular importance in what
David Greenglass learnt; it shows merely that the information
was secret and that an expert, seeing what Greenglass alleges
he had taken, "would know what was going on at Los Alamos." The
other witness, a Mr. Derry, stated that the description and
the sketch given by Greenglass "related to the atom bomb which
was in the course of development in 1945," and "demonstrated
substantially and with sufficient accuracy the principle involved
in the operation of the 1945 atomic bomb"; and, further, that
an expert could perceive from this information, to a substantial
degree, what the actual construction of the bomb was. He added
that the information was classified as "top secret"; but he said
nothing as to how many people already knew as much, or how
easy or how difficult it would be for other people to find it out
by their own researches; he said, indeed, nothing more specific
than that, so far as he knew, no foreign government other than
those of Britain and Canada knew as much in 1945 about the
development and structure of the atomic bomb as the American
scientists knew. (Another witness, a Mr. John Lansdale, Jr. was
also asked “to establish the authenticity of the information that
Greenglass gave”—i.e., said he gave—“to Rosenberg,” but after
a discussion between Counsel and the judge the question was
abandoned.)

Accordingly, while scientists can plainly make more effective
comment than I can on this part of the evidence, I can assert
as a lawyer that there was nothing in it to show that the infor-
mation which David Greenglass claimed to have communicated
to Julius Rosenberg was of any especial value or danger, such as
to justify on any view the death penalty.

David Greenglass’s wife, Ruth, whose position has already
been explained, also gave evidence, which followed pretty closely
that of her husband, and is equally devoid of any corroboration.
It does not call for separate study; her hopes and fears for herself
and her husband, her readiness to confess to crime and to impli-
cate relatives in that crime, do not differ from her husband’s. In
a sense she can be said to corroborate her husband, but this could
not be regarded as independent corroboration.

Witness who was 'scared to death'

The evidence of the two Greenglasses was almost the only
evidence against the Rosenbergs; but it is necessary just to
examine what other evidence there was. I begin with Max
Elitcher, a man who had worked in the Bureau of Ordnance of
the Navy Dept. He was mainly a witness against the other de-
defendant, Sobell, but he did say that on three occasions Julius
Rosenberg asked him to obtain confidential information for him
for Soviet purposes. He said, however, that he had not done so;
and it is noticeable that none of the “overt acts” alleged against
the Rosenbergs in the indictment covered the interview related
by Elitcher; he said, moreover, in cross-examination, that two of
his three meetings with Rosenberg were merely social.

Elitcher made it quite plain that he himself was an accom-
pliee. As he said, “I was part of it.” He admitted, too, that he had
told lies under oath, and that, being “scared to death,” he had
told the FBI "everything he knew"—although he had lied to them too—in the hope that he might "come out the best way" and that "nothing would happen to him." For some unexplained reason, he was neither indicted nor even mentioned in the indictment as a co-conspirator. It is obvious that his evidence can add practically nothing to that of the Greenglasses; it is of little volume and of almost equally poor quality.

Of the remaining 17 prosecution witnesses, only four gave evidence of anything the Rosenbergs were alleged to have said or done. Dorothy Abel, the sister of Ruth Greenglass, gave evidence that she had once been asked to leave the room whilst her sister talked with Julius Rosenberg and that the latter had once in her presence praised the Soviet system and described the U.S.A. as "capitalistic"! Dr. Bernhardt, Julius Rosenberg's physician, proved that Rosenberg asked him in 1950 what inoculations were needed for anyone entering Mexico. Two other witnesses, a Mrs. Cox and a Mr. Schneider, gave evidence "in rebuttal," after the close of the defendants' case, about the Rosenbergs on points that may fairly be left unmentioned as trivial. The remaining 13 witnesses either gave no evidence at all that bore on the Rosenbergs, or merely mentioned their name as hearsay.

Thus, the prosecution case against the Rosenbergs rested on the evidence of three persons, two of them husband and wife, and all of them unreliable as accomplices and for other reasons too. There was no corroboration of their story by any independent witness; no detective or other police official, let alone any member of the general public, was called to say that either of the Rosenbergs had ever said or done anything in their presence or hearing. Notwithstanding police searches of their home, no line of writing of any kind that they had ever written, received, or even seen, was adduced. There was nothing of any kind in evidence against them except what the two Greenglasses and Elitcher had said. I am unable to believe that, if the case had not involved political topics or had not been heard at a period when hysteria and prejudice played so strong a role, evidence so weak would have been put forward by the prosecution in any country in the world which followed the Anglo-Saxon traditions and procedure. I think that under those conditions any Court would almost certainly have withdrawn the case from the jury. But this case was allowed to go to the jury and the Rosenbergs were not only convicted but were sentenced to death.

The Rosenbergs, who at every stage asserted their innocence,
gave evidence and called two other witnesses; these latter dealt with points which can fairly be registered as unimportant. In a study designed to examine the strength or weakness of the prosecution case which the jury accepted, what the Rosenbergs themselves said is not of quite such importance as what the prosecution did or did not prove; but it remains true that they did give evidence, being of course submitted to cross-examination and answering fully and consistently everything that was alleged against them. Nothing was established against their character, unless it be that they had talked of the Soviet economic system, had thought that the Soviet Union was at one stage bearing the brunt of the Second World War, and had had in their possession a collecting box for Spanish refugee children.

**Judge's 'very shocking' comments**

I must say a little about the conduct of the trial. The prosecution, both in the opening statement of the prosecuting attorney and throughout the evidence, repeatedly made play with the alleged Communist connections of the Rosenbergs; the usual "warning" was given that of course communism is not evidence of conspiracy or of espionage, and was immediately nullified by the assertion—wholly unproved—that Communists are more likely to commit espionage than other people. The atmosphere of the case, as one can see from the observations in the Record alone, was indeed such that the mere suspicion of communist affiliation was almost enough of itself to make conviction certain. (Much the same comment must be made about questions and assertions on the point that the information was alleged to have been obtained on behalf of the Soviet Union, and indeed on any suggestion of any kind in favor of that country or of anything in it. I get from the Record the impression that both communism and the U.S.S.R. were such "red rags to a bull" that the bare mention of them, whether justifiable as relevant to the charges or not, of itself made it extremely difficult to secure a fair and judicial consideration of the evidence, or of the case generally.)

From a purely English point of view, it is noticeable that the trial judge at times treated the defense counsel with considerable abruptness and discourtesy, and at almost all stages of the cross-examination of the main prosecution witnesses, was harrying them to cut short their cross-examination.

The last and perhaps the most serious comment I have to make concerns the observations of the judge when passing sen-
tence. Having regard to what little evidence of any kind had been given against the Rosenbergs, it is very shocking to a lawyer brought up under the Anglo-Saxon system, in which judges should deal with what is proved in evidence and nothing else (apart from the very narrow field in which judges may take “judicial notice” of indisputable facts, like the days of the week and the seasons of the year), to read some of the statements made by the judge when passing sentence, presumably by way of expressing his reasons for deciding to impose the death sentence instead of sentence of imprisonment.

To begin with, it should be noticed, although it is far from being the most seriously objectionable of his remarks, that he made somewhat extravagant comments on “Russian terrorism” and on the administration of justice in the U.S.S.R.; he said, in short, the sort of things that one is accustomed to read in the more irresponsible newspapers, things which some of the less thoughtful readers may be led to believe. One might have hoped that persons holding high judicial office would have been less gullible; but in any case, these observations, made by the judge of an important court when passing sentence of death, were not merely inaccurate; they were unsupported by any evidence and were wholly irrelevant. That the judge behaved in this way may indicate that anti-communist and anti-Soviet hysteria has gained such ground for the moment in the U.S.A. that it is difficult if not impossible to secure a fair and dispassionate trial of a political case involving either communism or the U.S.S.R.

Duty rests on world public opinion

But these remarks by the judge are, alas, not the worst part of the matter. He went on to treat the case as if the information which the Rosenbergs were said to have communicated to the U.S.S.R.—of the value of which, as I have already mentioned, there was no real evidence—had been established to be of the most fundamental importance. He began, for example, with the assertion that what the Rosenbergs had done “has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggression in Korea” (about which, of course, there was once again no evidence.) He went even further and based his determination on sentence on the wholly unproved assumption that the Rosenbergs had obtained from David Greenglass and given to the U.S.S.R. just the vital information that enabled that country to develop the atom bomb, which it could not have achieved without that information. The Rosenbergs had thus, as he put it, “altered
the history of the world" to the injury of the U.S.A. (Incidentally, although it could have been alleged in the indictment that the conspirators had acted with intent to injure the U.S.A., no such allegation was pleaded.)

I am forced to the conclusion that, even if the conviction of the Rosenbergs had rested on reliable evidence that they had conspired to obtain some information, any sentence expressed by the judge to be based on such inaccurate and unproved assertions as to the importance of the information would have to be set aside on appeal under any procedure which provided for a free review of the sentence by an Appellate Court.

Unfortunately, the procedure applicable to this case does not provide for such a review, any more than it provides for a consideration of the credibility of the witnesses or the reliability of the evidence. Were the procedure different, it may well be that the whole matter would have been disposed of already. But there is, in effect, no appeal at all to any court from either of the two main defects of this trial, namely, the unreliability of the evidence and the gravely excessive sentence.

The duty of securing a review on these points thus rests on public opinion throughout the world. After full study, for the reasons which I have expressed above, I must express the view, from a purely professional standpoint, that it would offend against all Anglo-Saxon standards of justice that the convictions, let alone the sentence, of the Rosenbergs should be allowed to stand.
YOU have read Mr. Pritt's learned and dispassionate analysis of the trial and the evidence as a result of which Julius and Ethel Rosenberg face execution.

Will you take these steps:

1. Write or wire the President at the White House in Washington, asking him to use his powers of executive clemency to spare the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg.

2. Pass this pamphlet on to a friend or to the editor of your newspaper, with the suggestion that it be excerpted as a news story and commented on editorially.

3. Write the address below for additional copies of this document to distribute to others who may add their voices to yours in the plea for clemency. They are available at 20 for $1, $3 per 100, $25 per thousand, postpaid.

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