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TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT THEORIES IN AFRICA

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Introductory Remarks

Three decades ago, the then British Prime Minister made the famous remark on the "wind of change" in Africa. It was echoed all over the world by politicians, planners, researchers, social scientists, etc. The "economic boom" of the 1950s and 1960s reinforced its impact in the minds of the African nationalists as independence seemingly promised miracles of social and economic growth. Apparently, Africa had all the potentials for leaping from the "traditional stage" to "pre-conditions for take-off", "take-off", "drive to maturity" and finally the "age of high mass-consumption" and catch-up with the West.¹ Values and norms from the West were to provide the conditions for "take-off" while "traditional" ones were to be supplanted by "modern" ones. This was to be possible through "modernizing agents" people with "achievement orientation" — particularly in the economic sphere (in terms of levels of innovation and entrepreneurship).²

This was during the heydays of the "modernization theories" era developed since the 1940 when development of the colonies began to occupy a special place in world literature. Development and/or growth then was viewed in terms of economic indicators: it was synonymous with *capital formation* and industrialization. The argument was, development of the third world countries could be possible through further intergration in the world-market, which in turn would lead to injection of capital, technology and values. This would then narrow the gap between the 'Laza-

rus” and the “Shylocks”, agrarian and industrial societies. “Traditional” economies of the third world countries could be transformed to “modern” ones; the barriers to this process being in the former. The state was to play the central role in this process of transformation, together with enlightened (civilized) individuals (such as entrepreneurs, politicians, modernizing agents, etc).

The post-World War II period witnessed, in Europe and USA, the emergence of studies dealing with “social change”, “patterns of development” and “development strategies” which promote economic prosperity. At the same time politicians and institutions such as the World Bank, International Labour Organization and major commercial banks became involved in promoting “economic growth” spending (and still spend) large amounts of money.

The socio-economic crisis which began early 1970s brought to light the fact that something had gone wrong in Africa. Haunting questions emerge: What has happened to Africa? How are African social formations to be conceptualized? In what way can they be transformed? Where are they heading to? etc.

Current theories of development and underdevelopment in Africa—which have reached an *impasse* — are an expression of the period of generalized crisis in which we live. Revealed by this situation is the fact that, the more than forty years of institutional development of social sciences has not yielded much in terms of their capability to furnish the necessary social capacity for the transformation of social process; social sciences being part and parcel of the ideological, philosophical, theoretical and political struggles *for* and *against* the transformation of the capitalist societies in Africa.

With the crisis, is a profound difficulty to conceptualize and act upon a conception of the possibility to construct a socialist *human community*. Socialist revolutions, national liberation triumphs and struggles for economic self-reliance, signifying the defeat of imperialism, have led and are leading imperialism to counter-attack with intense force. This aspect, led to the revival of ‘orthodox Marxism’ and classical liberal theories.

The revival of “orthodox Marxism” which started with the demise of the “Dependency school” was a response to the “much publicised ‘revival of Marxism’ . . . in the last two decades, . . . ’. The critics of ‘Dependency’ insisted on the necessity

to base analyses of processes on the sphere of production, some even rejecting the labour theory of value and the reduction of history to social struggles. Of paramount importance and a very powerful methodological "tool" in analyses of processes and social dynamics is the concept 'mode of production.'⁴ In other words, history is transformed into the processes of emergence of production and their displacement.

This mode of theorization has had its impact on the conceptualization of African social formations and the whole process of "development." Current theorization, taking into consideration the aspects of the socio-economic crisis, also questions Dependency and neo-Marxism as a divergence from classical Marxist theory. According to Bill Warren, who revived the notion of capitalism and imperialism as historically progressive⁵, "imperialism was the means through which techniques, culture, and institutions that had evolved in Western Europe over centuries . . . sowed their revolutionary seeds in the rest of the world."

Imperialism and capitalist development in the third-world countries led to industrialization; and if such developments did not take place the reasons had to be sought in the ideologies, strategies and policies pursued by the governments of the countries in question. Accordingly, prospects of industrialization in these countries are quite good, and all arguments about imperialism and dependency are "reactionary petty bourgeois outlooks of Proudhon" which reject "the progressive outlook of John Stuart Mill." Socialist ideologies are primitive, radical interventions which reject the progressive nature of capitalism to the detriment of development.⁶

Goran Hyden, on Africa, declared that for development to occur, the prerequisites are "very definite conditions of which the economic ones are the most decisive: the determining element in history is ultimately the production and reproduction in real life."⁷ This fundamental point in "Marxist" theory needs rediscovery in "relation to the specific materialist and social conditions prevailing in Africa."⁸ After all, Marxism Leninism "is only a more complex version of capitalism." To quote further:

No approach to development has proved feasible without the subordination of individuals to a cultural superstructure in which the rules of science and technology reign.

The debates about alternative life-styles that goes on in Western societies take place without the confines of such a superstructure . . . It is a debate among people for whom science and technology are part and parcel of daily existence.

Such conditions do not prevail in Africa, according to Hyden, Sandbrook and others. In Africa, productive forces are at a very low level of development: production and organization methods are still “largely pre-scientific, particularly so in the predominantly peasant agricultural sector.”¹⁰ Due to the dominance of the “peasant mode of production”, what prevails in Africa are “neo-patrimonial relations”. The African peasant who remains “uncaptured” by other social classes for development purposes, given the power of the “economy of affection”, uses “organic power” as opposed to “inorganic energy.” The peasants’ knowledge as a successful cultivator is “not systematized into a set of abstract hypotheses ready to be tested.” It is not “universalized” into separate theories; instead, it is harboured within individuals as practical directives. This “organic environment”, has “little understanding and tolerance of experimentation and has limited scope for problem-solving of the kind that we associate with an inorganic environment.”¹¹ Colonialism and modernization attempted to challenge these organic aspects. Despite the challenge, African agriculture has remained pre-scientific. The assumption that the prevalence of capitalism in Africa is a result of imperialist global functioning is false.¹²

Sandbrook, who partly shares the above argument views African states as not being capitalist in the same sense as the capitalist states are: they are simply “neo-patrimonialist” (based on personal rule) with a variety of “economic irrationalities”, which, due to instability, corruption and maladministration impede on productive economic activities causing the politico-economic decline. Underlying all this is the question of governance of an “unintegrated peasant society.”¹³ As opined by Hyden, it is, methodologically, the “economic element” which provides the “general structure and context within which progress must be analysed.” In this regard, Marx’s thesis still holds true: “Yet the last two decades in Africa have essentially been devoted to denying the validity of this fundamental point of any

political economy analysis.”¹⁴ Africa needs a “set of new paradigms that better incorporates the fact that Africa is still essentially pre-capitalist”. What is taking place in Africa “is the battle between forces defending these formations and those—still much weaker — trying to conquer them.”¹⁵ Colonialism and modernization failed to conquer these forces because there was no “hegemonic culture to defend the new system other than the one brought by the colonialists.”¹⁶ Of course, Africans had their own culture, but it was not “high” culture which would justify the position of the ruling class. Instead it had its roots in the economy of affection.”¹⁷

Africa would be confronting less alarming problems if her countries “had advanced capitalist forms of production in either agriculture or industry”. Africa’s crying need “a real bourgeoisie with roots in African society:”¹⁸ whose role is progressive because it eliminates the pre-capitalist structures and “paves the way for productivity gains and economic expansion”¹⁹. Those countries which made international capital their ally (“or at least a necessary evil”) have been able to develop national economies, than those which rejected it for fear of “neo-colonial threat” — those which attempted at self-reliance.²⁰

To alleviate the situation in Africa, it is necessary to re-orient the politics in such a way that it is possible to live with capitalism and learn how to deal with it constructively. There is no need to fear or pre-empt it; more scope should be given to managing it:

Greater reliance on the market forces, for instance, will produce growing social cleavages along class lines. Rather than assuming that some form of classless society is possible, the questions arising from the emergence of cleavages must be more effectively addressed.²¹

So much for the *profession de foi* of the current theoreticians of development. It is a prometheun task to deal with every aspect of the current material on development. Attention here will therefore focus on: can the current crisis be regarded as simply an economic crisis resulting from wrong choice of ideologies, policies, strategies of development? How plausible is it to conceptualize development or growth as *economic* expansion involving merely economic relations? Are the institutions — the state, the party,

and enlightened individuals the agency for the transformational processes? Different questions will be proposed in the process of dealing with these issues: how has it been possible for such a *tendenz* to occur? How are we to grasp development as an ideology? What circumstances resulted in its emergency? And, what is its social and political significance?

The Social Economic Crisis: A resume

“The plight of Africa” is currently harped in every international forum. In 1984, for example, it was reported that about 150 million people were facing “extreme hunger, malnutrition and, in a number of cases, with grave shortages of portable water.”²² Moreover, tension areas, civil war areas and border conflicts have been on the increase — Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, etc. . . . With the world capitalist crisis which began in the 1970s, African countries have been facing severe balance of payments deficits; worsening conditions of living of working people due to extensive poverty, income inequalities, inflation and shortage of consumer goods; decline in export of primary goods and agricultural products; underutilization of industrial capacities, etc.²³

The situation is seen by economists, planners, politicians and governments as having been caused by balance of payments deficit. The latter itself is seen as having been caused by the decline in exports due to the adverse functioning of the world market, escalating prices of fuel, and recurrent droughts.²⁴ Here, even the neo-classical economics’ wisdom which view crises in terms of disequilibrium/disproportionality between different sectors of the economy, for example, non-agricultural and agricultural, industrial and commercial, is thrown overboard, despite the lip-service paid to them in some of the theories. The solutions betray these underlying assumptions — that there is a need to strike a balance between the different sectors or structurally adjust the economy by, for example, increasing agricultural output. This view is broadly held by institutions such as the IMF.²⁵

Such explanations lack the force of history and social determination of processes. The process of *social production* itself is not taken into consideration. An examination of how social pro-

duction replaces that part of the product which satisfies the personal needs of the worker and the capitalists and that which is transformed into capital²⁶ shows that social production and the aggregate social product is divided into two departments: (a) Department I — the production of means of production (commodities which serve only for productive consumption). It is subdivided into production of means of production as means of production (Department I (i)) and production of raw materials (production of means of production as a means of consumption (Department I (ii))). And, (b) Department II — production of means of consumption (commodities which satisfy the personal needs of the working people and the capitalists). It is subdivided into production of necessities of life (department II (i)) and that of luxury goods (Department II (ii)).

Exchange has to take place between and within the two departments for the system to reproduce itself. Under capitalism, only a part of surplus value is consumed by the capitalists for their personal needs; the rest is consumed productively by being converted into productive capital. This means that the variable capital and surplus value of Department I must be greater than the constant capital of Department II so that a part of surplus value in Department I can be used for expansion of production. In other words, production of means of production becomes the most rapid expanding branch of the economy, followed by the production of means of production as means of consumption. Production of means of consumption grows at the slowest pace.

In so far as there is a demand of the goods produced by Department I, then there is a general expansion of the economy — a boom — signifying that there are investments taking place in both departments. But this expansion reaches a limit, beyond which Department I cannot realize its goods. Thus begins a crisis of the whole economy. In so far as regulation of production is through the law of value, disequilibrium is inevitable, and consequently, the limitless striving for accumulation and the fall in rates of profit in some branches.

Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) which was undertaken from the 1940s by the third world countries entailed massive importation of machinery and equipment produced by Department I (ii) from the advanced capitalist countries, paid through exports of raw materials produced by Department I (ii) of the third

world. The machinery were for the expansion of Department II. Expansion of Department II in third-world countries, innevitably, could be possible only if profits were higher than in the other branches of the economy, and specifically Department I (ii). The result of this was the shifting of capital from agriculture to non-agricultural branches of the economy, and, increasingly, the inability of those countries to pay for the imports. An attempt to resolve this problem in the 1960s was made through continued dishing of loans, grants, and financial aid so as to keep Department I in the advanced capitalist countries and Department II in the third world countries afloat, in the hope that the latter's economies would recover soon. This never came about. By 1974, the world was in a financial crisis due to the accumulated debts by third world countries.

Third world countries were already facing a balance of payments crisis; and Department I in the advanced capitalist countries was facing a problem of realization. This was exacerbated by the world commodity price boom, especially in 1974-75 as a result of the heightening contradictions among imperialist countries due to the *relative* decline of British and French imperialism, the emergence of Brazil as an industrial power, and the decline of absolute hegemony of USA (marked by the defeat in Vietnam, a war whose immense costs resulted in bank-borrowing by the government) to the profit of Germany and Japan (although she still remains the most powerful imperialist country). Due to these contradictions:

In an effort to stop the rise of its rivals, American imperialism has, for the past decade, used economic "weapons", notably the rise in prices of raw materials (oil) and the continuing devaluation of the dollar (substituted for gold as the form of money for international reserves); this, in 1974-75 precipitated the crisis whose conditions had long been germinating in the unequal development and contradictions of the international monetary system.²⁷

The above is an explanation of the world crisis beginning in 1970s in so far as it is taken as an expression of the contradictions in the social relations: an economy, like a big drama is lifeless without the *dramatic personae*.

It can be deduced, at this point that, periodic crises are part and parcel of the nature and process of accumulation (as a means to regulate the economy) — a process which entails competition between different forms of capital, also between capital and labour. Crises express the level of development in the process of subordination of labour to private appropriation, the contradictions in the relations of production appearing as a disproportionality between the different branches of the economy. The history of Africa, up to the present demonstrate such aspects, and development and modernization conceptions pointed out in the preceding section. are a flesh of the bones of that history. These are the aspects dealt with in the next section.

Systematization and Institutionalisation of Ideologies

The evolution, systematization and the belief in development and or growth demonstrated by economic indicators, and effected by the *state* and *enlightened individuals* through ideologies and strategies; its institutionalization after independence in Africa and, finally the crisis, is best grasped within the reality of the predatory destructive imperialist domination. This reality, as a despotic and totalitarian phenomenon, involved the economic, political, cultural, social and psychological subjugation of the dominated people and their struggles against it. The eurocentric arrogance and self-righteousness in new garbs currently, found in Warren, Hyden, etc, dominate this history from the colonial period.

According to the findings of the explorers, adventurers, and missionaries about the "dark continent" — which found its "scientific" expression in Robert Knox (the Scottish anatomist) and Arthur de Gobineau (the French pseudo-scientific racist) — Africans had no culture, history, philosophy, and were incapable of developing on their own. They were a cursed people whose very humanity needed to be questioned because of their barbarism, superstition, treachery, paganism, moral depravity, sexuality, cunningness, laziness, fatalism etc. The "underdeveloped African's intellectual faculties precluded retention of abstraction." Especially before 1920s, Africans appeared in European literature as sub-species of the homo-sapiens who belonged

to the "child races of the world."²⁸

Central in the imperialist process of cultural and material negation of the subject people was religion and education, which also hastened the process of separation of manual and mental labour. Africans had to be civilized (Europeanized) so that they could take after the image of the masters in dress, speech, mannerism, etc. It was believed that the degeneracy of Africans was rooted in their culture and traditional systems of belief:

Implicit in this was the replacement of traditional culture with something 'higher', something new, something European. Clothe the savage, topple the pagan idols, silence the drumming, break up the extended family, encourage individualism, abolish poligamy....²⁹

World War I recasted some of these conceptions. Before 1914, Europeans used to boast of having suppressed "the constant violence of intertribal war in Africa . . . by 1919 that boast seemed empty." In the four years of the War, "more natives had been killed or died . . . as a result of a white war than in forty years — perhaps a century — of the old primitive warfare of the blacks." They admitted, "The native has lost his childlike belief in the white as an inherently superior being. He has become more critical and more restive."³⁰ The "civilizing mission" was in disarray. The war taught Africans, wrote a German missionary in Tanganyika in 1919, to see "the Whiteman from a point which he never knew him before. The native has seen him in his hatred, his hypocrisy, brutality, dishonesty and immorality: He often could justly say 'the blacks are better men.'³¹ Apart from the loss of faith, were the continually native rebellions, which occurred violently or by withdrawal of labour, refusal to produce export crops, pay taxes, etc.

The 1917 Great October Revolution also had its repercussions on a world scale. Besides the crisis facing the capitalist world and the threat of revolutions posed within those countries, the October Revolution altered the "balance of power" on the world scale. The War had messed the economies of the capitalist countries, and they needed to recover if civil wars were to be avoided; and there were at the same time the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles in the East. The October Revolution had by 1919 established a dogma that the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist strug-

gles were now directly linked to the socialist revolution: the capitalist road was closed and it would take no time before it collapsed.³²

The civilizing mission was in a profound crisis. In the West "public opinion . . . no longer felt that Western civilization had incalculable benefits to confer upon inferior races, and was even being stimulated by the discoveries of social scientists to a revival of the romantic cult of the noble savage."³³ This eventuated in a "deepening dissatisfaction . . . , and a growing recognition of the impoverishment that had "come to the Western society". A desire to recreate the bonds which unite men with their fellows was expressed. Accordingly, if science, machinery and industrial organization were to reproduce European conditions in Africa — "conditions from which the best minds in the West" were "seeking a means to escape" — it would be a tragedy.³⁴

B. Malinowski was to state in the 1920s that, the primary motive of colonization was "economic development". Whilst, Western civilization required raw materials and food crops which were essential to the living standards of the "principal nations", most methods used to effect this were objectionable: they were a source of "trouble on a large scale for lasting generations."³⁵ Malinowski was to report to the Rockefeller Foundation that, a new trend of anthropological theory had been developed in America and Europe: "The functional school". Unlike the previous schools, this one did not involve itself with the private affairs of the "missing link", or the reconstruction of histories. Its concern was inquiry in the nature of human institutions and above all their functional value. The practice of condemning "savage" religion and beliefs as something useless had to be abandoned:

It is recognized that they possess a definite value, that they fulfil a specific and unique function, that they are at work like other aspects of culture. Magic has been shown to be a principle of order and co-ordination. It has to its credit a number of economic advantages; it provides a time sequence in those activities which it controls, such as gardening, fishing, industries; it establishes leadership; above all, it gives primitive man the moral stamina indispensable in many enterprises.³⁶

So why destroy that which you can use to meet the same

ends? This was an attempt to find in the colonized subjects, elements which would make the "civilizing mission" effective and also cripple the resistance by the African masses. Malinowski, his contemporaries and others who followed later were looking for those elements which did not contradict Westernity. After all, Africans believed in the "hierachy of forces" — Gods, chiefs, etc., and even the European himself.³⁷ Theirs was an attempt to systematize what they considered to constitute Africanity and "African civilization" — especially those elements which would demobilize African resistance.

Despite the attempt to co-opt some of the elements of African culture in the civilizing mission, resistance by the African masses continued. The enlightened Africans who emerged within the forms of colonial oppression and exploitation, as a result of manual and mental division of labour, had initially, before this revision, surrendered and adopted the colonizers language, customs, culture and religion. These "civilized Africans" had been nurtured into self-hating people, ashamed of everything that identified them with Africans. But that they were civilized did not negate their status as second or third class citizens in their own countries. They were outcasts: excluded from the people's resistance against domination and exploitation and also denied a place in the civilized world. Disillusionment set in, and a journey "back to the roots" began in search of solace. Henceforth, the rediscovery, restoration and reassertion of their own selves was the only means to attain equality with the West. Turning to rebellion, they too took over the systematization of what was considered African: notions that civilization was only European were rejected and the proof for this, as acknowledged even by Europeans, was Egyptian civilization and the "ruins" of Zimbabwe.

Colonial civilization had to be destroyed, and the African was to create his own civilization by picking the best from the West (economics and technology) and from African civilization (social, political and economic structures).³⁸ This was to be the weapon against Eurocentrism; and in this way, European thinking and that of the educated African coincided.

The nationalists emerged as a result of the disenchantment with the dream of developing Africa in co-operation between Europeans and "civilized" Africans. The inability to blend in naturally under the colonial system had pushed them to resistance and

to theoretically refute Eurocentrism. For them, this entailed the rejection of European civilization, and the development of the idea that to be civilized was first and foremost to be African. Indeed the "civilizing mission" had acknowledged that the African was a human being with a civilization with similar objective as Western civilization; and was capable of sharing the universal views of development. He too had the right to participate in universal history, in the development of his own continent. Thus, the nationalists' views, based on partial knowledge of African societies (a knowledge which picked from African societies only those elements which were acceptable to the West) did not contradict Westernity, despite their radical denial of Western values.³⁹ In essence, it was the *victory* of the "civilizing mission." Injection of capital and technology and even the science of economics and law were acceptable; as for the values, Africanism was more humane than European civilization which was seen as cruel and based on the exploitation and domination of people.

The economics of nationalism, were in the demands for the creation of a *modern economy*. Nationalism became widespread during the height of modernization theories, when "modernizing imperialism" of the post-World War II was the main pre-occupation of colonial imperialism. This developed as a response to the 1930s Depression and the strikes and rebellions in the various colonies. The Depression, had revealed to the colonialists, that most impoverished colonies were politically dangerous; and that "self-government" was soon to be on the agenda. One official in London was to ask: "How are we to bind these people to such a way that their moral and material resources of strength will continue to be ranged on the side of Great Britain? . . ." ⁴⁰ This idea was to give birth to the famous Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI).

The rise of modernization thinking had its anchorage in real experience, just as "evolutionism" in the 19th century and early this century. It was not just an illusion of the epoch. Change, in these two centuries, has been globally conceptualized as a shift from state to state, one type of society to another. Precedents for these models were established by Spencer, Durkehim, Maine, Tonnies and Weber. Influential in this century has been Talcot Parsons, who introduced a series of interacting factors — pattern variables—posing each aspect as a description of shift towards

a more complex, differentiated, individualistic and specialized "modern" society. Societies were seen as distributed between two polar types: traditional and modern, community and society agricultural and industrial, rural and urban, particularistic and universalistic, low achievement orientation and high achievement, etc⁴¹

In the period preceeding World War I ("progress" — the "natural" ideological mystification) also characterized the socialist movement. The effect of this was the infiltration by the premises and vocabulary of *economic* and *technical* progress of the natural sciences and Darwinism. World War I checked this tendency to some degree, but at the same time, the Great October Revolution gave rise to a new utopian incarnation: the Party and the superstructure were transformed into history makers — history being dependent on heroism, the state, the party, individual initiative, sacrifice, choice of ideologies⁴². Evolutionism persisted in the colonies, increasingly becoming an ally of the nationalists who at times fused it with "socialistic" tendencies as a result of the resurrection of the cult of the noble savage. It is this aspect which found its expression in the myth of Africanism (at times quasi-socialist, as socialism was acceptable in the West, unlike the hammer and the circle), in which it was a matter of borrowing from the West (technology and economics) and African societies (social and political structures acceptable to the West).

With "modernizing imperialism" in the postworld War II period, the colonial states found the justification of their existence in their alleged centrality to the process of *development*. It was the period when the colonial states began to heed the demands of the nationalists who stood for fast tempo of development of the colonies, although they still marginalized them in the key positions of the state structures. The advanced capitalist countries, at this time, were heading towards the so-called post-industrial stage which favoured the industrialization of the colonies. And thus the "modernization theories."

The nationalists who took power after independence were trained in the "modernization tradition." Their main concern was the development of African countries through active government involvement in the economy, protection and Import Substitution Industrialization in the modernization fashion. This

meant capital accumulation, to be made possible by keeping wages and the prices of raw materials low.

According to modernization views, injection of capital and technology was meant to close the gap between the rich and the poor, industrial and agrarian societies. The sewing of these ideas with socialistic tendencies was possible and even attractive during this period because, they also championed the development of colonies and were sympathetic to the nationalists. Socialists also emphasized the key role of the state. Most fundamental is the fact that socialism by this period was increasingly becoming a *development strategy*, stripped of its political sharpness and was in general being transformed into an elitist ideological guideline to scientific and technological development, and hence standing in defense of the role of the state and enlightened individuals.

With independence, the aim and most important task was to modernize the primitive agricultural sector; build a base for the modern economy by accelerating industrial investments. Such conception of development could not entertain or encourage any self-activity of the common working people, the illiterate, the "uncivilized" which ran counter to "development" goals. It could not entertain any views that transformation of society was possible through social struggles or conflicts; because development in the modernist sense required unity, and the urgent question was that of settling accounts with backwardness and "resistance to change." Fundamentally, societies had to be rescued from conflicts characteristic of Western societies, if development was to be attained. This unity was possible only through the state, an institution which was seen as an embodiment of the principle of consensus.

The inherited states — the bourgeois colonial state — were and remained part and parcel of the social relations of capitalism in dominance. Within this context, the *civil society* had to lose its power and independence. The mass and political organizations were either abolished or brought under direct state control, if they stood in opposition to the general interests which the states sought to defend that is, increased investments which had to be attracted by favourable conditions, low wages and cheap raw materials. Nkrumah initiated this process, by controlling trade unions and other civil organizations, eroding the right to strike, institutionalizing one party state, introducing the notorious de-

tention without trial Act Virtually, all independent African countries were to follow this example, in the name of African socialism and African democracy.

The working people, who were at the core in the struggles for independence, suffered from poverty, ignorance and disease⁴³. It was accelerated investments and capital formation which could solve these problems. Thus, it became the task of the bearers of ideology — cadres, modernizing agents, officials, that is, those who manned the state institutions — to lead in the struggles against the trio enemies. In fact, English and other European languages link poverty and ignorance, in which ignorance is taken to mean lack of knowledge and proper culture. While poverty can be a fact and reality:

However, the myth that poverty somehow results from ignorance is an elitist, ethnocentric interpretation of an international problem, the roots of which lie not in reality but in prevalent middle-class attitudes originating in the North. The attitudes are espoused by professionals educated in European traditions.⁴⁴

The criticism of orthodox and liberal economists and orthodox Marxism by the “Dependency” theoreticians, centred on: questions of exploitation of the “periphery” by the “centre”; problems of poverty and unemployment; the impossibility of autonomous industrialization in the third world countries and Africa in particular under the hegemony of world capitalism; and, the impotence of the bourgeoisie in the third-world countries. This criticism, in essence, ended in providing a further cloak over and protecting bourgeois interests. Effectively, the “socialist strategy” as a solution for the crisis in the process of development only ended up in legitimating the developmentalist conceptions which stood for industrialization and active state intervention in the economy by protectionism and creation of an industrial base.”⁴⁵

The 1960s mark the overthrow of the modernization theories, in the struggles between the various states and the civil society, and the institutional conditions behind the production of ideas in Africa. “Dependency theories” was the *nationalist* solution to the crisis of development as grasped by the states. No wonder

these theories began to lose their ground when the world crisis began.

In the broad examination/analysis of social formations by Dependency school, the controlling paradigm was industrialization and its nature, relations of dependency, forms of capital accumulation, productive forces, etc. Therefore, the debates vegetated around the questions of whether these were capitalism, capitalists, workers or peasants. African social formations and relations. Orthodox Marxism and orthodox modernization theories were challenged on the pretext that although capitalism developed and integrated the third world countries into the world market, it also stopped them from fully entering.⁴⁶ Socialism was taken as a *strategy* or *technique* to deal with the problems of the crisis of development. These aspects paved the way for the revival of orthodox Marxism and orthodox modernization paradigms as alternative models of development. "Dependency School" concentrated on the contradictions of capitalism while the orthodox school did not.

The critics of Dependency school have insisted on the necessity to base analyses on the sphere of production. Thus, theorization on development, whether in its crude modernization guise, or in Dependency theories and the critics of Dependency, has been reduced to an ideological guideline to scientific and technological development. The focus, implicitly or explicitly, has been on the failure or success fairy tales of ideologies, strategies, policies and plans pursued by the various states; and the relations or modes of production which impede or accelerate the development of productive forces.

Even sociological theorization of development has centrally viewed the problems of development and underdevelopment in the same light. It is in this context that ideologies, certain relations and certain values have been held responsible for the stagnation or failure to modernize Africa. Though substely coached in a slightly different language, we have been thrown back to the 1940s and 1950s — the era in which systems, sub-systems, elements, structures etc., were central in analysis of processes. In the mentioned period, it was held that systems were governed by value systems enshrined in institutions and attitudes of the individuals manning those institutions. These value systems were supposed to be directed to goals which are legitimized by the

former. In this case, if structural differentiation in a system results in disequilibrium, and therefore dissatisfaction, this aspect should be regarded as a pathological problem whose solution is in more higher and better non-economic functional changes — better political arrangements, superior values and even the use of the police and the army. If all these do not bring about results, then more refined and better new ideas or institutions should be introduced so as to bring the system back to normal in order to safeguard development and productivity.

In the words of Professor Neil Smelser:

Every social system is governed by a value system which specifies the nature of the system, its goals, and the means of attaining these goals. A social system's first functional requirement is to preserve the integrity of the value system itself and assure that individual actors conform to it. This involves, socialization and educating individuals, as well as providing tension-mechanisms for handling and resolving individual disturbances relating to values.⁴⁷

In sum, capitalism or socialism in development theories in African has all along been reduced to strategies of developing productive forces and technology. The fact that capital or commodities are not things, but that they embody specific social relations has been suppressed. Development as an aspect, has not been free of material class interests: it has been the religion of Mr. Money bag in the post World War II period. Theorization about development has been reduced to erudite refutation of ideologies, policies, plans, and strategies, as if "erudite refutation of false theses of ideologies. . . of domination. . . annul their material efficacy for domination." The fact is, it is "material relations of domination which give power, pertinence or force to those false theses and not the other way around."⁴⁸

Solutions proposed for the socio-economic crisis in Africa, in the form of North-South dialogue, revolutionalization of technology, structural adjustment policies, application of scientific ideologies (as if they were lotions or a box of tools), liberalization of the economies, aid, etc, derived from developmentalist ideologies are basically a product of such theorization. These solutions are based on big-brotherhood assumptions, and they entail the

patronization of the working masses by hierarchy of people, such as those armed with "scientific ideology", modernizing agents (for example, bureaucrats and "modern Africans"), good politicians, good planners, etc. It is an idealist problematic which sees the hegemony of ideas and objects in the life of people — their material world and relations among them. The assumptions are economistic and technocratic which take productive forces as the motive force of history, and embraces an elitist thesis of the dictatorship of the intelligentsia. The end result is legitimization and defense of capitalist social relations, as it has been done typically by Warren, Hyden, Sandbrook, etc.

Concluding Remarks

As shown above, for many African nationalist leaders, the struggles against ignorance, poverty and disease entailed the use of governments and their organs. In which case, if the governments were to be effective in bringing about development, by encouraging industrialization and commodity production and raising the living standards; it had to be made more powerful. According to the nationalists' belief, societies had to be rescued from class wars if development had to be attained. These conflicts could be avoided only if there was concensus, a principle embodied in the state as the mediator of class conflicts. If the state had to become more powerful as a major instrument for development, then the civil society had to lose its independence. Consequently, all mass and political movements which flourished before independence and played a central role in bringing about the downfall of the colonial empires were either abolished or fell under the control of governments. Organized opposition, according to some of these leaders, was un-African and contrary to egalitarian principles⁴⁹ championed by the states. The states became monolithic — the very states created by colonial capitalism, and the people were left defenseless against capital and the states. The only organized bodies which were left intact were the armies and the police forces, which do not form a separate detachment of the states.

Various Africanist and socialist (even Marxist-Leninist) ideologies, which embody modernist thinking, and are part and parcel of material struggles were/have been used to defeat the

working people in their own name. In essence, it seems that independence was the culmination of the victory of bourgeois forces, and their development has been demonstrated by the literature which show the existence of capitalist forms of capital accumulation and industrialization in Africa.⁵⁰

The current socio-economic crisis in most African countries is not due to failure of some ideologies or failure to modernize the countries, but an expression of the rates of capitalist accumulation under the hegemony of imperialism, whereby the working people have been organizationally and politically demobilized by the capitalist forces which hold sway. Poverty, famine, inflation, etc., are the very forms of expression of the rates of unchecked accumulation whereby the people have been stripped off their organizational capacities which would make them defend themselves and influence or fight against some of the arbitrary actions of the various states. The result is, people cannot fight for better living conditions, higher wages, better prices for their produce, better conditions of production, etc. In Ethiopia, for example, people are dying not because of drought; rather, it is that these people are not in a position to struggle against certain actions of the state — for example, importation of whisky, tanks (for colonizing Eritrea and other oppressed nationalities in the name of socialism), while millions of people face the problem of starvation. The opposite finds its expression in the luxuries indulged in by the bourgeoisie and the bureaucrats.⁵¹ All these things happen in the name of the people who are supposedly ignorant of their own interests, and so they must be thought for, fought for, and defended by some individuals.

The play in the debates about development has been to throw overboard and completely banish from the scene the whole question of the conditions of social struggles for *self-defense*, *self-emancipation* and *self-determination* of the people, thus examining even people's weaknesses and strength. It has been a systematic process of discrediting the capacities of ordinary people as makers of their own history in the transformation of their circumstances and themselves — a process in which productive forces, policies, plans, ideologies, etc are grasped as part and parcel. Instead, modes of production (and the other forces and their superstructures) and their supercession has taken the place of people. Modes of production or economic forces do not make

history, they simply define and locate the nature of contradictions in a social formation, the motive force of their history and the movement towards their resolution.⁵² What is surprising is, when things are not working out properly or are out of control, appeal for support of ideologies or policies is directed to the same people who are allegedly victims of ignorance, disease and poverty, and are incapable of making their own history.

This systematic denial of people's capacity as history makers tailors well with developmentalism and modernization. For to concede that people make their own history, is to acknowledge the centrality of social struggles in processes. Such acknowledgement amounts to theorizing and examining processes from the point of view of how people continually struggle and resist all forms of arbitrariness, hierarchization and the whole question of the emancipation of the civil society from the oppression of the states and capital in general. A body of knowledge which does not reflect the social conditions of struggles through which men and women are simultaneously transforming circumstances and themselves; a knowledge which regards the majority of the people as unscientific, incapable of thinking, backward, ignorant of their own interest, superstitious, devoid of initiative or creativity, . . . *ad infinitum*, even if socialist, Marxist or Africanist; is fundamentally oppressive, arrogant and authoritarian and reinforces hierarchization. It is all reminiscent of eurocentrism and *mission civilisatrice* which regarded colonized and oppressed masses in the same manner. African civilization and Africanist ideologies in general regard people thus.

African civilization, Negritude, African socialism, African humanism, African authenticity, etc was partly generated as an answer to European prejudice; it was an attempt to demonstrate the being-in-the-world of the African. It was *not* an attempt, on the part of the educated, to become *organic thinkers* of the masses; but to attain universal recognition. This is what Senghor meant when he declared in 1956 that, "If Europe has now begun to reckon with Africa, it is because African traditional sculpture, music, dancing, literature and philosophy have compelled recognition from an astonished world."⁵³ Plunder Africa, exploit it, fear not the rebellions! Only respect culture!! This is how Aime Cesaire would have retorted to this perhaps. The entrance in universal respectability, then meant, modernization and post-

colonial developmentalism and the looking down upon ordinary people as incapable of their own transformation.

Current theorization on development is *not* a deviation from the norm: it is its logical absurdity. No wonder that even the ethnocentric coins are being circulated more overtly than a few years ago. Fanon declared that Europe is best left to Europeans; any attempt to turn Africa into another Europe should be left to Europeans who can do the best work to that affect.⁵⁴ It is time we came out of the *impasse* after wondering in Sinai for forty years!

NOTES

1. See W.W. Restow, *Stages of Economic Growth: A Non — Communist Manifesto*, CUP, Cambridge, 1960, p. 4 In most colonies, this was the time the governments attempted at transformation/improvement approaches of development. This was an attempt to create a stable bourgeoisie in both rural and urban areas.
2. See D. McClelland, *The Achieving Society*, van Nostrand, New York, 1961, McClelland attempted at applying Weber's ideas on the protestant ethic in third world countries. Experimentation was done in India and Zambia.
3. E.P. Thompson, *Poverty of Theory*, Merlin Press, London, 1978, p. 383. In Africa, the revival mainly took the form of a critique of African socialism and an attempt to demonstrate the validity of Marxism-Leninism in Africa conditions.
5. See Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization, *NLR* No. 81, 1973, and his *Imperialism Pioneer of Capitalism*, Verson, London, 1980.
6. Warren, 1980, *ibid*, p. 28.
7. Goran Hyden, *No Shortcuts to progress: African Development Management Perspective*, University of California Press, Berkely, 1983, p. 5.
8. *Ibid*, p. 28.
9. *Ibid* p. 5. This reduction of processes to *production* and *technology* is also rife even among those who see themselves as belonging to the left. For example, Akin Fadahunsi (in *The Development Process and Technology: A Case for Resources based Development Strategy in Nigeria*, SIAS, Uppsala, No. 77, 1986), opines: "We are thus able to define development within national and international context as the mobilization, adoption and use of human and other resources within the nation-state to meet the needs and possibly wants of people within the state." He goes on, "Encompassed in 'development' is the notion of change — of socio-economic phenomenon over time and space" and therefore GNP as a criteria is still valid. (p. 6). "To talk of pre-capitalist or pre-socialist society in Africa is to talk of essentially a pre-science society. Because the society is yet to advance to the 'age of reason' and 'enlightenment.' Where rationality prevails it has not been able to develop the rationalized economy of either capitalist nor the socialist types hence has remained economically undeveloped." (p. 10 Emphasis added). For him, socio-economic systems are a matter of option.
10. Hyden, *op. cit.*, p. 5. For more or less the same view, see R. Sandbrook, *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*, CUP, Cambridge, 1985, S. Mueller, "Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania", *Socialist Register*, Merlin Press, 1980. Her other articles are: "The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 15 (3), 1981; and "Barriers to further Development of Capitalism in Tanzania: The Case of Tobacco," *Capital and Class*, 1981.
11. See Hyden, *ibid* and Sandbrook, *ibid*, Goran Hyden's *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (Heinemann, London, 1980) is also rife with the same ideas.
12. Hyden, 1983, *Ibid*, p. 5.
13. Sandbrook, *op. cit.*
14. Hyden, 1983, *op. cit.* p. 191
15. *Ibid*, p. 193
16. *Ibid*, p. 194.
17. *Ibid*, p. 194-5
18. *Ibid*, p. 197

19. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
21. *Ibid.*
22. UN Economic and Social Council Report, "Critical Economic Situation in Africa", Second Regular session, April, 1984, p. 5.
23. There is a vast literature on the crisis currently, that mentioning even some of the examples makes no sense.
24. For several years now, these have been the reasons given by the economists, and various governments in Africa, on the crisis. These reasons are best summed up in the arguments for a New International Economic Order, South South Cooperation, and North South dialogue.
25. Claims by most economists who try to explain the crisis are representing "neo-classical" economics. These economics are *vulgar economics*, examining exchange and market relations. Neo-classical would connote a continuation of classical economics, but these seem to have their roots in Menger and Betham.
 One has just to remember Marx's words in *Capital* Vol. I, (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976) p. 85; "Once for all I may here state, that by classical Political Economy, I understand that economy which, since the time of W. Petty, has *investigated the real relations of production in bourgeois society*, in contradiction to vulgar economy, which deals with appearances only, ruminates without ceasing on the materials long since provided by scientific economy, and there seeks plausible explanations of the most obtrusive phenomena, for bourgeois daily use, but for the rest, confines itself in systematizing in a pedantic way, and preclaiming for everlasting truths, the trite ideas held by the self-complacent bourgeoisie with regard to their own world, to them the best of all possible worlds. (emphasis added).
26. For details of the aspects discussed here on the reproduction process, see Marx's *Capital* Vol. II. It's validity is proved by the various calls made internationally about the revival of Third World economies as a means to revive the world economy.
27. Etienne Balibar, *et al.*, "Is the Crisis 'above all National'? A view of the Policy of the French Communist Party" in *Contemporary Marxism*, No. 2, 1980, pp. 42-3.
28. E.H. Berman, *African Reactions to Missionary Education*, Teacher's College Press, New York, 1975, p. 8. Also see L. Milbury — Seen, *European and African Stereotypes in Twentieth — Century Fiction*, MacMillan Press, London, 1980; C. Bolt, *Victorian Attitudes to Race*; and, UNESCO, *Race and Colonialism*, Paris, 1980.
29. Berman *Ibid.*, p. 9.
30. Julian Huxley, *African View*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1931, p. 438.
31. H. Krelle, "On Mission in Usaramo During the War" *Journal of Berlin Missionary Society* No. 6, 1919.
32. This is the standpoint of the comintern especially since 1919.
33. R. Oliver, *The Missionary Factor in East Africa* Longman, London, 1952, p. 231.
34. J.H. Oldham & B.D. Gibson, *The Remaking of Man in Africa*, OUP, London, 1931, p. 49-50.
35. B. Malinowski, "Memorandum for Rockefeller Foundation written for Embree in March 1927", in Mss Brit Emp. S. 1829, Rhodes House, Oxford, p.3 "Memorandum on Colonial Research", December, 1927. in Mss Brit Emp. S. 1829, Rhodes House, Oxford.
36. *Ibid* (1926).

37. See eg. P. Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy*. Presence Africaine, Paris, 1959; and Geoffrey Pavinder, *African Mythology* Hamlyn Publishing Group, Middlesex, 1967.
38. This position was held by people like Leopold Sedar Senghor, David Diop, Leon Damas, Jomo Kenyatta, J.K. Nyerere, Martin Kayamba, etc. and Pan-Africanist ideas of the 1940s and 1950s in general. Essentially, most of the aspects systematized by them sprung from material written by Europeans. For example Senghor mostly refers to Leo Frobenius and Marcel Griaule (Ethnologists), Placide Tempels who wrote the *Bantu Philosophy*. See L.S. Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*, Heinemann, London, 1976, on p. 78.
39. See E. Wamba dia Wamba. "Philosophy in Africa: Challenge of the African Philosopher", UDSM, 1983.
40. At least Aime Cesaire had the audacity to sing in 1937 (*Return to my Native Land*, Penguin, London, 1970). Eia for those who have never invented anything for those who have never explored anything but they abandon themselves, caught up to the essence of things unaware of the surface but caught up by the movement of things not caring to tame, but playing the game of the world. Colonial Office, CO 882/111/46705, Secretary of State for Colonies to All Governors, 23.3.1942.
41. This is the modernization thinking in general, paraded by T. Parsons, N. Smelssr, D. MacClelland, Rostow, etc.
42. See J.V. Stalin, *Marxism and Linguistics*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Peking, 1968. In USSR the Party remained a vanguard even after the Revolution. A vanguard in the state, definitely means statism. In the same period, for Gramsci (*Selections from Prison Notebooks*, Laurence of Wishart, London, 1973), the October Revolution had opened up new possibilities: it was a revolution against Marx's *Capital* which strengthened importance of the necessity to develop class consciousness so as to combat bourgeois culture. Lucas claimed, "The Strength of every society is in the last resort a spiritual strength. And we can be liberated by knowledge "which is practically critical activity". (*History and Class Consciousness*, Merlin Press, London, 1917, p. 229).
43. It can be said that Ignorance, Disease and Poverty is the summary of modernization/developmentalist thinking.
44. See A. Gunglesang, "The Myth of Peoples' Ignorance" in *Development Dialogue*, 1984: 1-2, p. 45.
45. See Dependency theoretians mentioned in footnote 46.
46. I have in mind here Gunder Frank, and other dependency theoreticians such as Laclau, Amin, Immanuel, Cardoso, Rodney, Rweyemamu, Wallestein, etc.
47. N.J. Smelser, *Social Change in Industrial Revolution*, London, p. 180. Also see N.J. Smelser *The Sociology of Economic Life*, Englewood Cliffs, New York, 1963.
48. E. Wamba dia Wamba, "Towards, an Introduction to the Critique of Sheikh Anta Diop's School of African Historiography", UDSM, 1983, pp.1-2.
49. These arguments were presented in the 1960s by leaders such as, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Senghor, etc.
50. See, eg. J. Iliffe, *The Emergence of African Capitalism*, MacMillan, London, 1979. There are various studies on this issue on Kenya, Zaire, Nigeria, Malawi, etc.
51. One of the major objections by "Dependency School" about third-world industrialisation is the fact than heavy industry or that which produces mass consumer goods.

52. E. Wamba dia Wamba, "Is there a way out of the 'Bureaucratic Corruption' Process of the Zairean Underdevelopment? An Extended Review of D.J. Gould's Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in Third World: The Case of Zaire". UDSM, 1983, p. 9.
53. Senghor, op. cit.
54. See F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Penguin Suffolk, 1969.